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Foreword 
I slept twice with my shoes on, a small bag packed at the foot of my bed, ready to 
literally run away as fast as I could if armed men were to enter my home. The 
first time was in Bétou, Republic of Congo (RoC), a small and very isolated town 
on the Ubangui River, hidden within the deep forest that borders the Central 
African Republic (CAR) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). That 
was in March 2003, right after a Coup had ousted the Patassé regime from the 
neighbouring Central African Republic. Mercenaries from the other Congo 
(DRC) had lent a hand in supporting the counter-insurgency, but they had been 
defeated and were therefore on their way home, looting everything they could as 
they passed through. When they showed up on the outskirts of Bétou carrying 
fridges and radios on their heads (Bétou was their first Congolese stop after their 
rout in Central Africa), there was tangible tension in town. Shops had closed 
early and any movement outside was literally suspended. The sous-Préfet wel-
comed the armed men right before they entered the town and promised them 
support (he was later heavily criticized for this). Despite its unconventional char-
acter, his mediation worked quite well. The bulk of the pirogues1 in Bétou were 
requisitioned that same night and the Congolese mercenaries immediately cross-
ed the river to DRC; they were all gone by the next morning. Bétou was com-
pletely spared. 
The second time I slept with my shoes on was a year later, in Abidjan, fol-
lowing the violent events of 25 March 2004, when so many people perceived as 
‘political opponents’ were killed, injured, or went missing. The government had 
played a major role in these disturbing events. I was then staying in a rented 
house with no particular security safeguard besides an old Burkinabé and his 
wife (and myriad kids), who had been ‘guarding’ the house for several years and 
who actually were making their living by selling matches, Maggi cubes and 
batteries through a small hole dug in our cement fence. I was then particularly 
concerned by the anti-French discourse promoted by young mobs close to the 
Presidential party and massively relayed by the main media. It is curious how 
quickly terrible things run through your head. I think my main fear then was of 
being raped. Or being hurt ‘for fun’, ‘to set an example’, or for merely being 
white or French. Being ‘unfortunately’ killed was also a harrowing yet realistic 
threat that at the time seemed to me to lie within the range of possibilities. As I 
                                              
1  Pirogues are local canoes made from a hollowed tree trunk. 
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stayed inside for three days, keeping connected with a range of local contacts in 
the outside world by cell phone, I thought of the ICRC workers slaughtered in 
Eastern Congo in early 2001 (in Ituri), the abduction of a colleague of mine in 
the Ruzizi Plain the same year on 11 September (I was in the car behind), and I 
could not help wondering to myself what on earth I was doing there, far from my 
own home and exposed to events that were far beyond my control and that could 
affect my life in the worst ways.  
Luckily, the person who would later become the father of my daughters was 
there both times; in terms of moral support and shared experience, this is defi-
nitely worth mentioning. And even more luckily, nothing happened. But the mere 
thought that it could have gone wrong is haunting. Maybe this is what triggered 
my interest in violent young African mobs. Or perhaps it was my father’s furtive 
involvement in the OAS2, when he was 18 and prone to being brainwashed, like 
many of his contemporaries. So when the opportunity arose to earn a living doing 
research and when a few doors opened in Côte d’Ivoire that made it possible to 
focus on armed groups, I jumped on the train and put my ‘humanitarian’ hat on 
hold. The journey lasted many years and took more than one turn.  
 
 
                                              
2  OAS stands for Organisation de l'Armée Secrète and was a short-lived French nationalist underground 
organization during the Algerian War (1954-1962). The OAS used armed struggle in an attempt to 
prevent Algeria's independence. 
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1 
Introducing the study 
The recent conflict in Côte d’Ivoire has led to the militarization of many young 
civilians on both belligerent sides. While some participated in combat and fought 
on the front line when violence was at its peak (Fall 2002 – Spring 2003), others 
assumed more backstage functions, from the maintaining of military positions, 
when places were won from the enemy, to basic logistical duties. There are many 
tasks within an armed group, and low-ranking recruits usually navigate between 
those depending on conflict phases and individual skills.1 Where some youths 
were only militarized for a few months (at the onset of conflict), others have 
continued their involvement in armed movements over the years, after the main 
clashes were over, with some being particularly vocal about it. What is of parti-
cular interest is the fact that many of these youths have assumed a function of 
‘commuting’ conscripts, alternating periods of semi-military work, where they 
had to report to some kind of warlike hierarchy, with periods at home where they 
were back to a quasi daily routine. This became particularly characteristic as the 
Ivoirian war evolved into a situation of ‘no peace, no war’ with sporadic violence 
still occurring, but only at certain periods and within specific settings.  
                                              
1  Multitasking is particularly characteristic of civilian recruits. Examples of activities included securing 
of particular places through the set-up of checkpoints, transmission of information between bases, 
registration of men and equipment going in and out military camps, collecting taxes from local 
economic operators, cleaning weapons, cooking, cleaning, sports (to stay in shape), and compulsory 
presence every morning at roll call, during the gathering of troops. 
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As the main theatre of violence, the west of the country has been particularly 
affected by the militarization of the civilian population. It has been chosen as 
terrain for this particular research. If the initial rationale behind arming the 
youths was most probably linked to self-defence in the case of counter-insurgent 
movements, and to the necessity to numerically strengthen the base of the re-
bellion in the case of the insurgents, those who belonged to these violent move-
ments were generally quite negatively perceived by those who stayed outside 
these mobilization processes. In mainstream media and the dominant line of 
thinking in public opinion, there has been a strong inclination to amalgamate 
them with thugs and petty thieves and even if the picture has tended to be more 
nuanced at the local level, negative perceptions have tended to prevail: milita-
rized youths in western Côte d’Ivoire have been socially and negatively marked, 
a paradox in many ways, since conscription has always been a necessary feature 
of civil wars, regardless of context. The way militarized civilians have been pub-
licly framed in the country has fed the ‘loose molecule’ hypothesis popularized 
by Kaplan in the mid-1990s (Kaplan, 1994), where the stand is taken that the 
most likely profile of Ivoirian low-ranking recruits is that of jobless, uneducated, 
and dissocialized youths with few alternative prospects other than to resort to 
violence to make ends meet. Despite having received a great deal of criticism 
(Guichaoua, 2007; Peters, 2004; Richards, 1996), this view continues to remain 
quite anchored in popular sociology and is still popular in certain circles of aca-
demics, donors and practitioners. 
But surely, not every youth drawn into an armed group has turned bandit in 
western Côte d’Ivoire and this book pays particular attention to avoid such over-
simplification. If it is likely that some recruits saw an easy way to earn their 
living by turning criminal and extorting civilians (by making use of their position 
of power and their relatively easy access to weapons), many did not take part in 
such activities and limited themselves to doing what was asked of them by their 
hierarchy (which often only meant – once the period of open war was over – 
filling a shift at a checkpoint every fortnight or so). The scapegoating of these 
youths has probably been convenient for strategic purposes, and by offering a 
plausible explanation to violent events may even have participated in fuelling 
existing tensions by triggering a certain propensity for retaliation. But such a 
perspective had the detrimental effect of masking important differences of 
characteristics across settings and between the different movements. Who joins 
armed groups, and why, eventually remain empirical questions whose answers 
vary considerably across contexts; so do processes of demobilization, and – 
within those – the place of humanitarian action aimed at facilitating a return to 
civilian life for this militarized population. The objective of this study is to shed 
light on these topics in the specific context of western Côte d’Ivoire, taking as 
3 
time span the combat operations of 2002-2003 to the partial demobilization of 
the pro-government militias in 2006-2007. 
Research approach 
This research explores – from the very particular perspectives of young civilians 
who were militarized for some time before receiving short-term reinsertion 
assistance – the different processes which led to their militarization and de-
militarization. There has been no such study to date for western Côte d’Ivoire, 
despite the fact that the region has been home to most persisting non-State armed 
groups involved in the Ivoirian conflict and was the territory most affected by 
warfare. Yet notwithstanding this lack of empirical grounds, western armed 
groups have been a priori viewed in an extremely negative light with an 
overemphasis on their irrationality, violence and lumpen individuals. This book 
is a first-hand attempt to bring some nuance to the fore for this specific geo-
graphical area. 
To examine the different processes that led to the militarization and demilitari-
zation of such youths, I positioned myself at the intersection of what remained of 
a warlike apparatus in two settings located on either side of the former front line 
(two settings that could potentially be seen as sustaining a certain form of latent 
mobilization at the time the fieldwork was conducted), with what grounded the 
structures of interventions themselves (by placing externally-driven ‘post-con-
flict’2 interventions into perspective in those two contexts). The main puzzle I 
wanted to address was to understand the extent to which externally-driven 
interventions targeting militarized civilians should be conceived as special pro-
cesses compared to other social processes at play in the local environment.3 After 
all, and as it is exemplified several times in this study, for this particular type of 
recruit (militarized youth, non-professional and low-ranking), the borders are 
quite blurred between the different social arenas in which they find themselves 
evolving. 
There is no doubt that the fact that I used to be part of the humanitarian scene 
before entering academia has shaped the way I approached the topic, both in 
terms of choice of methodology (by using humanitarian interventions as main 
outlook on how to empirically approach the topic of militarized civilians) and in 
                                              
2  The term ‘post-conflict’ is only used here for descriptive purposes. Refer to footnote 4 for the con-
cepttual view of ‘war’ and ‘peace’ used in this study. 
The terms ‘intervention’ and ‘humanitarianism’ refers in this study to humanitarian interventions tar-
geting militarized civilians, aiming at facilitating their return to civilian life. 
3  Going beyond this main questioning, it could also be worth reflecting on the extent to which an indi-
genous process of peace-building would be possible in western Côte d’Ivoire, given the existing 
knowledge of the local context. 
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terms of how I read and interpreted the existing theory (by drawing on personal 
experience when placing humanitarianism in a larger context of norms, of 
strategies of actors, and when ultimately bringing to the fore the relationship 
between militarized recruits and their social fabric). The Ivoirian context was not 
unknown to me before the start of this research (although the topic of militarized 
youths was), and having worn a ‘practitioner hat’ there for a year in 2003-2004 
partly explains why I was so keen on attempting to formulate improvement 
strategies for existing interventions. But a practitioner background does not ex-
clude reasoning, nor does it exclude a genuine willingness and ability to under-
take in-depth analytical social exploration; several conceptual questions appeared 
relevant to examine as I dug deeper into the subject. What does it mean to be a 
‘reinserted’ or a ‘reintegrated’ rebel or militia, and what does thinking in terms of 
dichotomy bring to the analysis when making the distinction between ‘reinserted’ 
and ‘non-reinserted’ recruits? Is it expected that there will be no regression into 
armed groups for the ‘reinserted’ ones? Under no circumstances?  
If this is the expectation that motivates both the promotion of targeted inter-
ventions and the reasoning in terms of dichotomy (reinserted/non-reinserted), one 
has to seriously explore the specific context under investigation to assess the 
extent of influence of external interventions. With that in mind, I examined two 
particular geographical locations of western Côte d’Ivoire from both a micro-
regional-level perspective and from the particular viewpoints of the recruits I 
interviewed. The fieldwork areas differed in terms of belligerent side (rebel-
controlled vs. government-controlled) and in terms of main characteristics (size, 
rural/urban, ethnicity) and are further described in the immediate context section.  
It could be argued regarding many aspects that, when post-war settings are 
mainly shaped by external interventions, there is a tendency to promote the 
forgetfulness of dreary events and to encourage the framing of the view that war 
was only an unfortunate interlude that disrupted a peaceful routine. Programmes 
that specifically address the reinsertion of militarized youths are generally keen 
on fostering non-military alternatives to soldiering and the option of integrating 
the regular army is rarely first brought to the fore, even when explicitly planned 
in a national security reform plan. In sum, when humanitarianism is at the core of 
a post-conflict setting, what tends to be artificially reproduced is the pre-war 
situation. There are however three major downsides to this situation: first, the 
impact of interventions on their direct environment tends to be overestimated; 
second, such a perspective tends to downplay the importance of war itself by 
reducing it to an anomaly and a brief episode upsetting some kind of (imaginary) 
5 
untroubled order;4 and third, if post-conflict interventions end up recreating the 
pre-war situation, it implicitly implies that humanitarianism can play a significant 
role in reproducing violent conflict, even if it does so unintentionally. After all, 
‘the seeds of war are to be seen shooting up in peace’ (Richards, 2005a). By 
being de facto entangled in a given socio-politico-historical context, planned 
interventions inherit existing social networks and power relations which they 
have little control over. If they temporarily provide some kind of ‘protected’ 
humanitarian space, pre-war power relations are likely to continue to prevail, as 
well as social networks built during the war, which includes friendships and 
patronage relationships built within the military. It is also in this respect that 
humanitarianism targeting ex-combatants can potentially be seen as sustaining 
some form of latent mobilization: by keeping demilitarized people together, the 
setting they provide could possibly serve as platform to reactivate a military 
engagement in a later phase.  
But another way to comprehend a post-conflict situation, much more appro-
priate for the Ivoirian context, is to place humanitarianism to the side of a given 
system (instead of at its core) and to basically consider that planned interventions 
implemented in post-conflict contexts are just additional social opportunities 
among a wide array of other social opportunities. That does not mean that they 
do not have effects, and that these effects do not influence the local systems in 
some ways. Humanitarianism after all remains embedded in local stakes, what-
ever place it has in the local environment. But there are three advantages when 
taking this perspective: first, it suspends preconceived judgment in terms of 
impact; second, it acknowledges the agency of people who operate and who 
participate in such interventions; and third, it rests on the basic assumption that 
humanitarianism emerges from social action and is therefore as much subject to 
social changes as other social processes. External interventions would therefore 
not be necessarily ‘special’ and do not necessarily require to be treated specific-
ally, especially in the Ivoirian case, a country with a strong State apparatus, 
myriad civil society representatives and a civic culture accustomed to mediation 
and consultation.  
What I propose to do in this study is to build on that second perspective (the 
one that posits humanitarianism to the side of a given system) by drawing on my 
own interpretation of the situation in western Côte d’Ivoire. Humanitarianism 
                                              
4  This remark relates to a certain view of ‘war’ and ‘peace’ that chooses not to impose a sharp cate-
gorical distinction between the two concepts, but that prefers instead to speak of a continuum. It 
avoids ‘quarantining war as a “disease” ’, and places war within the range of social possibilities. This 
perspective brings to the fore that ‘pre-war’ peace is often overestimated. It also points out that the 
shifts towards intense armed conflict is a process with many twists, turns and pauses and that return to 
peace ‘is a rocky path with many pitfalls’ (Richards, 2005a). 
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was never at the core of social change there and this point is proven on several 
occasions in this work; hence, it is a reasonably well-grounded hypothesis. 
During the period under study, the number of international humanitarian actors 
remained relatively marginal in comparison with other contexts. There were no 
more than 13 international NGOs in the area bounded by Duékoué, Toulepleu, 
Danané and Man, with a slight variation in numbers depending on the conflict 
phase, political developments, and availability of funding. The main question this 
study therefore attempts to address is determining the extent to which, in such 
situations, externally-driven interventions targeting militarized civilians should 
be conceived as special processes compared to other social processes at play in 
the local environment. The study will place ‘post-conflict’ humanitarianism into 
perspective in the contexts under examination, and will try to determine what 
eventually comes out of a humanitarian apparatus targeting ex-combatants when 
it does not play such a central role in their immediate contexts.5 
There are two levels of reading. The first one – more descriptive – focuses on 
the different processes that led to the militarization and demilitarization of young 
civilians. I examine this point foremost by exploring the mobilization and de-
mobilization contexts of western Côte d’Ivoire from the points of view of the 
‘reinserted’ recruits interviewed. The second reading is more analytical, and 
reflects on the meanings of being a ‘reinserted’ rebel or militia, and on the 
relevance of thinking in terms of dichotomy when the different social arenas in 
which militarized civilians evolve overlap to such a degree. This naturally leads 
me to reflect on the extent to which complex socio-economic reinsertion pro-
cesses can genuinely be driven by post-conflict interventions. I clarify below the 
conceptual framework I use for the scope of this work. 
Defining militarized youths 
The term ‘militarized youths’ encompasses a diversity of profiles in western Côte 
d’Ivoire, which are not exclusive but which have several conceptual implications. 
A first pattern consists of militarized youths locally recruited on both belligerent 
sides and affected in surroundings they know. On the counter-insurgent side, the 
proportion of the autochthonous6 population who were drawn into an armed 
                                              
5  When it does, what tends to be reproduced is the pre-war situation.  
6 In Côte d’Ivoire, people define their ‘autochthony’ foremost in terms of geographical origin. The 
Ivoirian territory has in fact been divided along ethnic lines for a long time and the existing divisions 
are not called into question by the current conflict. In the western region, the Guéré (or Wê) are the 
autochthonous population in Duékoué, Guiglo, Blolequin and Toulepleu, while the Yacoubas (or Dan) 
are the autochthonous population in Man and Danané. At the local level, the term ‘allochthone’ 
designates an Ivorian from a different region (in Guéré territory for instance, allochtones would be 
Baoulé, Yacouba, Sénoufo, Lobi, etc.) and the term ‘allogene’ designates a foreigner from a foreign 
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group was greater than the proportion of the non-autochthonous residents, but 
given that not everyone was living in the area when the war started, it is 
interesting to empirically check the extent of locality of the recruitment. The 
main peculiarity of the ‘local’ recruits is that they always remained involved in 
their pre-war social groups (close and extended family, friends, acquaintances); 
they simply forged additional social networks during the war, with some emer-
ging from their participation in an armed group.  
A second pattern consists of militarized youths who were not based in the 
western region when the war started but who were drawn into the movement 
either out of solidarity (the ones native to the region or those whose ideas had 
found resonance with a particular armed group), or by the prospect of possible 
post-war rewards. An important rationale indeed, when continuing to maintain 
close relationships with the armed group over time, was the prospect of benefit-
ing from some sort of reinsertion or reintegration support promoted by post-
conflict interventions. Another reasonable assumption could also be to hypothe-
size that those non-natives of the West would be more likely to stick with their 
respective armed groups if only to benefit from free accommodation where they 
lacked a pre-war footing, and from expressions of paternalist support on the part 
of their leaders. 
A third pattern consists of people who were temporarily sent outside their 
place of residence at the beginning of the war, to fight on the front line or to 
assume logistical functions for advanced bases during the period of open fight-
ing, before returning home. This was notably the case for many pro-government 
militia elements who lent a hand to the national army from late 2002 to early 
2003 in pushing back the rebels. A variant was to remain in a military setting for 
a year after the period of open war had passed – a setting that sustained a form of 
violent mobilization potentially ready to be reactivated, were hostilities between 
belligerents to be resumed. On the counter-insurgent side, militia leaders set up 
several such paramilitary encampments in the region they controlled near the  
former front line. These were functional until 2005, when the bulk of self-de-
mobilization occurred for the pro-government militias.7 On the insurgent side, 
since at the time the fieldwork was being conducted the rebel État-Major had no 
intention of starting to releasing recruits (talking about demobilization was then 
taboo in the rebel-controlled areas), a typical pattern was that most militarized 
civilians who had been drawn into the rebel forces continued to be based outside 
                                                                                                                                    
country (Burkinabé, Malien, Togolese, etc.). In practice, the terms are often used interchangeably and 
there is less and less distinction made between allochtones and allogenes, who are usually treated and 
considered the same by the autochthonous population. 
7  The base of UPRGO was in Zagné, the base of MILOCI was in Kahadé, the base of FLGO was in 
Guiglo. 
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their pre-war place of residence, with limited visibility on their geographical 
future. A standard trajectory was to have been active on the front line for a few 
months, at more or less advanced positions and in mobile bases as armed groups 
were advancing or retreating, and then to follow the group to a fixed base in one 
of the main localities of the West, where some military obligations persisted. 
In contrast to this third pattern, a fourth one consists of youths who stayed in 
their place of residence for the entire war and who assumed the function of local 
vigilante.8 This only happened on the counter-insurgent side: in many localities, 
young civilians joined a local checkpoint team to ensure the security of their 
village and neighbouring localities, until the dismantlement of the rural check-
points in 2005. 9  If similar ‘vigilante’ phenomena occurred in other Ivoirian 
regions, what was specific to the west was to view the participants in this cir-
cumstantial phenomenon as functioning at the same level as those who parti-
cipated in warfare, notably by sustaining an idea of ‘post-war reward’ and by 
including some of them in the list of recipients of potential intervention benefits.  
This patchwork of engagement types was characteristic of the militarized 
youths encountered during the study and cannot be delinked from the under-
standing of a certain temporality of conflict. What was the norm in 2002-2003, 
during the period of open fighting, was different from what occurred in 2004, 
when pro-government militias were still encamped in a military setting. This also 
differed from the situation in 2007, when the bulk of the pro-government militias 
had self-demobilized and when the rebel forces were continuing to militarily and 
administratively control the northern half of the country. The borders between 
the different spheres (military, civilian, humanitarian) have never been strict, 
varying according to the phases of conflict, individuals’ social networks and the 
extent of locality of the recruitment. 
Structure of the book 
The book is organized in nine chapters and a concluding essay. Chapter 1 intro-
duces the study. It stresses the rationales of undertaking such research and pin-
points the questions the study eventually aims to address. Chapter 2 describes the 
research approach in very practical terms by explaining the methodological 
choices made and by reflecting on certain ethical considerations. Chapter 3 gives 
a brief overview of the theoretical debates relevant to this work by highlighting 
the paradox of external interventions and aspects of social movements theories 
that would be impossible to circumvent, given the scope of this study.  
                                              
8  This trend was also observed in other Ivoirian regions (Chauveau et al., 2010). 
9  They reappeared from time to time in the western region, but very rarely and very briefly. In other 
Ivoirian regions, checkpoints were dismantled in May 2003, after the last official ceasefire. 
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Chapters 4 and 5 contextualize youths’ mobilization and demobilization. 
Chapter 4 places contentious movements into perspective by exploring the extent 
to which particular mobilizing and demobilizing contexts have been shaped by 
their historicity. Chapter 5 continues this contextualization exercise by exploring 
the extent to which, in the fieldwork locations, particular mobilizing and 
demobilizing contexts have been shaped by their immediate environments. It is a 
necessary step to assess the importance of historicity in such processes compared 
to more contingent and circumstantial factors. Based on a solid work of 
document reconstitution, Chapter 5 presents the main aspects of the conflict in 
the western region and the detailed ethnographic contexts of the geographical 
areas under study. In Chapter 6, the different armed factions that operated in the 
west during the period under study are described in detail, which brings to the 
fore the internal dynamics of these groups, their degree of ethnic mixity, which 
factions emerged earliest, which ones were absorbed by other groups, and the 
extent of ‘locality’ of recruitment.   
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 are the empirical core of this book. Chapter 7 explores the 
profiles and motives of several young militarized civilians on both belligerent 
side. Chapter 8 reflects on the complex relationships militarized youths have had, 
throughout the years, with their immediate environment. It notably stresses the 
fluidity of borders between the military, civilian and humanitarian spheres, as 
well as their evolution over time. Chapter 9 examines processes of demobili-
zation and of return to civilian life, and the extent to which such complex 
(re)socialization processes are externally driven. If it is increasingly recognized 
that this transition is foremost driven by endogenous factors, post-conflict inter-
ventions have become unavoidable in the past decade, for better or for worse, and 
there is therefore the need to understand what they can reasonably achieve in 
order to place them better in their operational contexts. Chapter 10 concludes by 
outlining the theoretical contributions this study has made to the field and by 
formulating practical propositions.  
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Photograph 1: Patchwork of pro-governmental militia elements 
 
Photograph 2: Female recruits, Guiglo 
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Methodology 
For a number of reasons – mainly linked to length of stay and instruments used 
for collecting the data – this work is not a classical ethnography. It was none-
theless largely inspired by anthropological work and by actor-oriented ap-
proaches.1 With some exceptions, I did not observe respondents in situ (nor when 
engaged or when carrying out routine tasks); I focused instead on reconstructing 
their perceptions of past events by providing an artificial platform of exchange 
and by taking their life story as point of departure. This methodological choice 
was mainly guided by the object of study: after all, I was studying processes of 
mobilization a posteriori and the bulk of the youths I interviewed had been 
mobilized in 2002-2003, five years before the start of data collection. The 
primary data I gathered foremost stems from 237 semi-structured one-on-one 
interviews2 I conveyed with male and female low-ranking recruits between 14 
                                              
1  Actor-oriented approaches stress the interplay of internal and external factors when exploring social 
change. At the same time, they take the stand that human action and consciousness play a central role 
in that interplay. The concept of agency is central in this perspective and social actors are assumed to 
have a genuine capacity to process social experience, to devise ways of coping with life, even under 
the most extreme circumstances. A core feature pointed out by Giddens (1979) is that at any point in 
time, anyone has the capacity to act otherwise.  
2  The 237 respondents consisted of 200 men, 16 women and 21 adolescents enrolled in a reinsertion 
project. I also interviewed 5 former militia recruits who were not involved in any project and a dozen 
local entrepreneurs who had agreed to take on some of these youths as apprentices in the workshops 
they owned. The detailed interview guidelines are presented in appendix 2. The guidelines were 
usually used as a checklist and interviews took the form of a friendly conversation. 
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and 35 years old.3 At the time of the first meeting, half of them had already left 
their respective armed groups (the pro-government militias) and nearly all of 
them were involved in an NGO-led reinsertion project. Systematic information 
was collected on their pre-war lives (educational and professional trajectories, 
relationships with close family, social networks), their motivations to join armed 
groups, their actions during the war (or perhaps better said, whatever they wanted 
to tell me about that period), and how they saw their future and options outside 
armed groups, including their own reflections on the reinsertion project in which 
they were participating. The relatively large number of cases from both belli-
gerent sides had the merit of providing a great variety of patterns. The bulk of the 
data was collected in Man, Guiglo and Blolequin, the respective strongholds of 
rebel and pro-government armed groups in western Côte d’Ivoire. Perhaps I was 
too cautious, but I chose to conduct most interviews within the premises of three 
reinsertion centres ran by humanitarian agencies and used at the time of the data 
collection for project purposes. A few interviews were done in a village near 
Guiglo (Zouan) and in Abidjan, with former recruits who had not received any 
reinsertion assistance. The fieldwork periods were November-December 2006, 
April-May 2007, June 2007, and follow-up interviews were conducted in 
November-December 2007. I also continued to contact several respondents by 
phone until the summer of 2008, to get a sense of how they were getting on as 
the years passed.  
Prior and during the data collection phase, I had to make a certain number of 
choices, weighing what I wanted to do against what at the time seemed realistic 
to accomplish. How should I empirically define ‘youth’ in this study? Which 
characteristics should I use to choose my sample? Where do I do fieldwork? How 
should I deal with child respondents? In surroundings extremely ‘humanitarian-
ized’, how can I – if not avoid – at least minimize being confused with 
development practitioners? Additional dilemmas emerged while undertaking the 
analysis, not the least related to how to deal with issues surrounding cate-
gorization. And as I was largely drawing on respondents’ narratives, how to 
avoid falling into the trap of taking a too individualistic approach? I reflect on 
those points below.  
Methodological choices  
First dilemma: how best to contextualize individual narratives? 
When drawing on personal narratives, the obvious risk is to fall into an extreme 
form of methodological individualism that partly distorts social phenomena be-
                                              
3  I was helped by a research assistant in that process. We split the interviews among each other. 
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cause it fails to relate individual experiences with the wider structure. The analyst 
in fact has to be particularly careful not to exaggerate the instrumental rationality 
of individuals too strongly, or there is a real danger of remaining confined in a 
deterministic approach that bounds human choices and decisions by motives and 
previously existing causes, regardless of the structural aspects.4 To avoid such 
trap, I engaged in a process of document reconstitution to get a good grasp of the 
local context (by ‘local’ I mean the immediate environment of the people under 
study). I was particularly interested in developing a coherent version of the recent 
history of the western region by generating a detailed timeline of violent events 
since 2002, in order to get a sense of the general atmosphere in which res-
pondents had evolved.5 After all, in many cases, among the driving rationales for 
explaining military engagement were the circumstances. I therefore extensively 
tapped into journalistic sources, particularly Ivoirian newspapers archives 
(Fraternité Matin, 24 Heures, Notre Voie, L’inter, Le Front, Soir Info) and those 
of national and international press agencies (Agence Ivoirienne de Presse, 
Agence France Presse, BBC, PANA Press, Reuters). Luckily, Côte d’Ivoire is 
home to a plethora of media and hosts at least a dozen daily newspapers with 
wide circulation throughout the country and easy internet access. Far from 
denying the partiality of certain sources and the politicized nature of some 
documents (Ivoirian newspapers are well-known for their political engagement 
and aggressive tone), my goal was to extract the most ‘factual’ information; 
hence, I treated the various articles as valuable primary documents that ac-
counted for a particularly violent period. I completed this documentation with 
UN and INGO situation reports on western Côte d’Ivoire, impartial forces up-
dates, and secondary sources (International Crisis Group analysis, IRINNews, 
and UNOCHA Bulletins). This reconstruction work had the merit of clarifying 
the different conflict phases and of introducing a certain temporality to the 
analysis of the conflict in the west of the country. It was a necessary step to 
understand, a posteriori, local processes of mobilization. 
 
                                              
4  Long (2001) in fact warns us that many ‘micro’ studies fall short because of a tendency to adopt a 
voluntaristic view of decision-making, by highlighting too much the transactional nature of actors’ 
strategies while not examining enough how these individual choices were shaped by larger frames of 
meaning and action and by the distribution of power and resources. One acts in a certain way not only 
because of individual characteristics. The ability of people to build up room to manoeuvre only takes 
on full meaning when it is related to structural aspects and specific historical patterns. These actually 
partly explain how such room to manoeuvre is framed (Abbink, 2005; Carney, 1999; Giddens, 1979). 
5  A summary of this chronology is presented in Chapter 5, the detailed version in appendix 1. 
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Second dilemma: doing research in militarized settings 
Man and Guiglo were both extremely ‘militarized’ and ‘humanitarianized’ in 
2006 and 2007 – the period when I was doing fieldwork – which raised several 
dilemmas. How could I best approach such a messy field without unnecessarily 
putting myself and others at risk? How could I avoid being taken for a 
humanitarian practitioner while using the premises they used to conduct my first 
interviews? In Man, at the time of doing fieldwork, the local administration was 
completely managed by rebel officers. No recruits had yet been officially 
demobilized and none had received financial compensation. The mere prospect 
of releasing low-ranking recruits was not even debatable with the highest in 
command five years after the start of the conflict. In Guiglo, 981 militia elements 
had gone through a demobilization process and had received some kind of 
financial compensation. The local administration was also fully military and pro-
government militias had an extremely bad reputation. They were particularly 
prone to hostile demonstrations against the UN and the French impartial forces, a 
characteristic I could fully observe in early 2006, when I was not yet doing 
fieldwork for this study but was nonetheless in the area for consulting activities.6 
It was in such settings that I started my research at the end of 2006. Needless to 
say, timing was quite crucial for the success of my data collection and I could 
probably not have approached the youths the way I did if I had conducted the 
interviews earlier (at least in Guiglo). If I was regularly monitoring the changes 
taking place in terms of local security, my fieldwork occurred during a relative 
period of calm and I was never caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. 
Because of the sensitivity of the topics I wanted to talk about and the risk that my 
actions could be misinterpreted by the military hierarchy if I went into too much 
detail, I adopted a rather low profile and opted, for this particular project, not to 
seek formal approval of the local authorities when carrying out the research. 
When I met the military Préfet in Guiglo and the Com’Zone in Man, I introduced 
myself as a researcher from the University of Amsterdam interested in studying 
the impact of war on local youth. I purposely kept the definition broad to avoid 
                                              
6  On 18 January 2006, following a peaceful demonstration in front of the UNOCI base to protest against 
a controversial communiqué (the International Working Group on Côte d’Ivoire had just announced 
that the mandate of the Ivoirian National Assembly due to expire on 16 December 16 2005 would not 
be extended), the event degenerated into a violent confrontation between the UN Bangladeshi peace-
keepers and an angry mob. It resulted in the deaths of five protesters and the wounding of thirty-nine 
others (Human Rights Watch, 2006). In response to the shootings, a militia leader called everyone on 
the radio ‘to come into town to avenge the death of those struck down by the assassins' bullets.’ 
Shortly after, militia leaders once again used the radio to incite violence against all UN and human-
itarian organizations. Several offices were burned, twenty cars tagged humanitarian were extensively 
damaged, office equipment was looted (computers, electric generators), as well as food and medical 
supplies stocks (the WFP warehouse was completely emptied). 
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giving the impression that I was only focusing on militarized youth. As an extra 
precaution, I temporarily downplayed my French identity, overemphasizing my 
Dutch background instead. This discourse was generally well received and in 
Guiglo, the Préfet was particularly keen on sharing his thoughts on the subject. 
As I did not feel comfortable undertaking such research without the quasi cer-
tainty that an umbrella organization would help me reach a safer place elsewhere 
should the local situation abruptly deteriorate, I approached two international 
development agencies and asked them to include me in their evacuation plan. 
One of them was the German NGO GTZ-IS. I had heard they had just begun a 
pilot project in Man and Guiglo for reinserting young recruits and I used them as 
gatekeeper to get access to 216 respondents.  
 
Third dilemma: doing research tapping into humanitarian practice 
There is an inherent tension in doing research while tapping into practice and in 
combining an approach that critically examines actions of development by using 
external interventions as means of accessing the bulk of respondents. There 
seems to be some kind of irreconcilable contradiction between the two and a real 
danger of bias for the analysis. I would argue that such a tension can yield 
productive results if the researcher pays sufficient attention to a range of things. 
To begin with, planned interventions offer a relatively easily accessible tank of 
potential respondents. While some would argue that it biases the selection of 
cases, not selecting respondents who are engaged in projects would probably also 
lead to bias as humanitarianism has become so much part of the local environ-
ment that it would be a mistake to systematically discard anyone who participates 
in an NGO-driven intervention. Now indeed, critics point more to the question of 
balance. The problem is not so much framed in terms of whether or not project 
participants should be excluded from a selection of cases, but to keep a fair 
proportion of those who are benefiting from some kind of assistance and those 
who are not, to overcome the risk of encountering the same type of profile among 
the respondents.7 I would argue that such precaution is perhaps not necessary in 
certain contexts where external interventions have very limited impact on 
people’s lives. Also, it tends to conceive ‘project participants’ or ‘target popula-
tions’ as a homogeneous group, with ‘post-project’ lives drastically different (and 
better) from the ‘pre-project’ ones. In reality, there is a great variety of patterns 
and different individual responses to similar structural and circumstantial condi-
tions. In western Côte d’Ivoire, the reinsertion projects under study had very 
limited impact on project participants’ lives. I nuance that point more in Chapter 
                                              
7  It could be hypothesized that those who benefit from programme interventions have a better social 
capital than those who do not, so that the socially marginalized are left out. 
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9, but the general impression was that the project fulfilled more a function of 
networking (with project participants adding ‘fellow participants’ and ‘project 
staff’ to their social network and range of opportunities) than a function of sup-
port per se, although this indeed varied depending on individuals.  
The fact that my initial encounters took place in centres run by NGOs for 
reinsertion purposes was nonetheless an issue I needed to mitigate. During my 
first visit to the centres, NGO staff – with approval of their hierarchy – organized 
an informal meeting with the youths present that day, where I was given the 
opportunity to introduce myself and to explain why I was there. For the sake of 
clarity, I explained that I was interested in hearing the life stories of young 
people who had spent some time in the militias/rebellion in order to compile such 
testimonies in a book. I emphasized that I was not interested in names, but in 
understanding from their points of view what drove them in and out armed 
groups and why they acted the way they did. I also emphasized that nobody had 
to meet with me if they did not want to. Interviews were not compulsory. I stated 
several times that I was not part of the project staff, that I could not materially 
help (so as not to raise undue expectations), and that any information shared with 
me would be kept confidential. While it is unlikely that everyone present at the 
meetings understood clearly what I intended to do, several youths volunteered to 
talk to me on my next visits. In terms of order, as I came to realize afterwards, 
the first persons I met in Guiglo were close to the militia leaders, some were even 
related to them. When I interviewed adolescent recruits in Man (they were hosted 
in a separate centre), the first person I met was the ‘President’ of the youths, 
followed by main members of his ‘bureau’. In order to help basic project man-
agement, the creation of a certain hierarchy amongst the children had been 
encouraged by the local NGO running the centre to facilitate collective inter-
actions with project staff. A ‘President’, a ‘Treasurer’, a ‘Secretary’, a ‘Chief of 
Hygiene’ had therefore been named by their peers and were mediating collective 
demands. During my next visits, more and more adolescents registered their 
names to schedule an interview with me, probably reassured by what early 
interviewees had reported to them and by my frequent visits to the centre. If one 
message had been clearly passed on, it was that I was not a threat.  
In Man, Guiglo and Blolequin, most interviews were done inside, in a quiet 
room, and it was usually not a problem to conduct them in French (commu-
nication was difficult with ten respondents in Man and interviews had to be cut 
short as I did not have enough knowledge of their respective local language to be 
able to carry on in-depth interviews without the help of a translator). Some 
interviews were filmed, some were taped and I took notes of the rest. With the 
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youngest respondents, nearly all exchanges were filmed, unless they did not want 
this to be done.8 I was more cautious with older recruits, as I feared – perhaps too 
much – that there was a greater risk my intentions would be misinterpreted. I, for 
instance, intentionally avoided asking from the start if I could tape interviews. It 
was only if I felt a conducive climate in the one-on-one exchange that I would 
ask the respondent if he or she would not mind if our exchanges were recorded. 
Although I had my camcorder with me nearly all the time, I was determined to 
only use it if I was completely sure that my intentions would not be misunder-
stood.  
 
Fourth dilemma: how to empirically define youth for the scope of this study? 
Since this work focuses on militarized youths, there is the need to define what is 
understood to be a ‘youth’ in this particular study. To be young is not a matter of 
biological age, and many scholars would agree with such a statement. Chauveau 
defines youth in terms of relational position. To him (and I share his view), being 
young is socially and culturally constructed, in relation to other generations, and 
in relation to access to relevant assets and resources that confer a certain social 
status (Chauveau, 2005a). If the notion of youth is a heuristic concept, there is 
also no universal definition of childhood, and the concept remains locally de-
fined. Conceptualizing youth and childhood this way, in terms of local categories 
of perception, is in sharp contrast with the ‘target group’ categories built to meet 
the needs of external interventions. Those categories are in fact often constructed 
in ad hoc ways and according to age benchmarks defined by international 
standards, which are quite far from the lived realities of the people they attempt 
to define. In the normative approach promoted by planned interventions, a child 
is considered a child until the age of 18 (the age after which he/she is no longer 
eligible to receive child benefits), and a youth usually ceases to be young at 25 
(the age limit is sometimes extended to 30). Defining childhood and youth along 
these lines inevitably suffers from a lack of solid grounds at the local level. 
Rosen has been among the fervent critics of such ‘politics of age’, a term he 
himself coined. When reflecting on the definition of childhood (Rosen, 2007), he 
argued that one effect of the ‘straight-18’ focus widely promoted in international 
law has been to shape the concept of childhood in a very strict way (bounded by 
numerical age) at the expense of more interesting reflections, discounting the 
more varied and complex local understandings of children and childhood and 
using age categories as instruments to advance specific agendas. Rosen espe-
cially pointed out that the mainstream discourse has tended to stifle the fact that 
                                              
8  It never happened. I forgot my camera twice during the period I did interviews, and each time, child-
ren expressed some disappointment. 
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older teenagers are likely to differ from younger children in many ways and that 
there is a tendency to infantilize 16 and 17-year-old recruits in contexts where 
adolescence and military life are not necessarily seen as antinomic. He has also 
stressed that by focusing too much on the older teenagers (the recruitment age 
debate focused on the ages 15 to 18),9 the youngest ones have been forgotten, 
despite the fact that many child recruits are in their early teens when they are 
recruited (which this case study also illustrates). 
But if youth and childhood are conceived as relational positions locally 
defined, does this thus mean that there are no limits to calling someone ‘young’ 
or a ‘child’? Abbink (2005) strongly argues in favour of such a benchmark, argu-
ing that having no strict definition for youth does not mean that middle-aged 
people should be categorized as young. Even if some of the ‘middle-aged’ share 
common characteristics with younger persons (not yet having secured stable 
work, not yet having been in a position to raise a family, etc.), many of them 
miss the transition to adulthood because of poverty and deprivation (ibid) –  
I would add bad luck. As years pass by, their lives take a tragic turn and they 
eventually lose their youth. Their future no longer lies before them.  
The line between ‘young’ and ‘child’ is a more blurred one and needs to be 
framed along cognitive development terms. Recent research has shown that 
children in different cultures are likely to engage in complex moral reasoning at a 
much younger age than expected (Boyden, 2007; Rosen, 2005; Rosen, 2007). In 
developing countries in particular, where most people are used to fending for 
themselves from an early age, context and experience have proved to play a 
                                              
9  In the late 1990s, there was considerable debate on which minimum age for recruitment to set in inter-
national law and a range of actors actively lobbied for abolishing the then marker of 15 as the mini-
mum tolerated age for recruitment, and for raising this age limit to 18 in official documents (Harvey, 
2000). INGOs were particularly active in pushing this view, along with the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, the Swedish government and the Quaker UN Office in Geneva (Brett, 2005; Rosen, 
2007). Those in favour of the change were mainly arguing that the 1989 UN Convention of the Rights 
of the Child (UNCRC) had failed to completely prohibit child recruitment and were particularly keen 
on underlining a contradiction in the Convention since on the one hand, a child was defined in the text 
as anyone under 18 in need of special protection, and on the other hand, recruitment of 16 and 17-
year-olds was tolerated. Proponents were therefore keen to have such an ‘anomaly’ corrected in 
international law by raising the benchmark to 18. On the opposite side, people feared that too much 
focus on age would distract international attention from more fundamental issues such as forced 
recruitment. Ryle (1999) notably argued that what eventually mattered was the way conscription took 
place, not chronological age. Whether recruits are 16, 18 or 21 is of lesser importance, as long as these 
people willingly enter the force. After several stalls in the negotiation process, an optional protocol to 
the Convention of the Rights of the Child on involvement of children in armed conflict was adopted in 
2000 (United Nations, 2000). It called on states ‘to take all feasible measures to ensure that members 
of their armed forces who have not yet attained the age of 18 years do not take a direct part in 
hostilities’ (Article 3). With respect to state armies, it forbade compulsory recruitment before the age 
of 18 while tolerating voluntary enlistment of 16 and 17-year olds, provided states maintain minimum 
safeguards to protect the minors in their ranks. With respect to non-state armed groups, it uncondi-
tionally forbade recruitment under the age of 18 and criminalized the practice (Article 4). 
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major role in the development of human cognition and in influencing modes of 
action. Age and maturity are no longer conceived as necessarily going hand in 
hand, and adulthood is no longer overestimated by assuming grown-ups’ immu-
nity to being influenced.  
For the scope of this study, I gave up trying not to bracket ‘youth’ into two 
figures, as I kept meeting 14-year-old mothers who were already fending for 
themselves for several years and 42-year-old ‘Présidents des Jeunes’ in the areas 
I toured (which appeared somewhat odd since they generally did not resemble 
adolescents or twenty-year-olds or people in their early thirties). If I tried in the 
beginning to look for some kind of remnants of an intricate age system in the 
societies I visited (a system in which generational issues are mitigated by the 
assigning of a social role to age groups, the maintenance of clear boundaries 
between them, and the existence of strict codes of behaviour), it became clear 
that such a system was long gone in western Côte d’Ivoire, and that the civil war 
had challenged it even more (despite the fact that some underlying ideas con-
tinued to persist in terms of reciprocity and mutual obligations). So when is one 
young in this book and who was included in the sample of militarized civilians?  
I pragmatically opted for men and women between 14 and 35 years old. 
Ethical considerations 
Beyond methodological challenges, studying militarized youths is an ethical 
minefield. The ‘do no harm’ imperative is trickier to reach in conflict zones due 
to exacerbated political polarization, the presence of armed groups, and the 
general unpredictability of events. I tend to agree with scholars who point out 
that research cannot be ethically conducted everywhere and should not even be 
attempted in certain settings. One difficulty is to find satisfactory ways to address 
consent. If tackling the issue is often used as an example of good practice leading 
to an ‘ethically correct’ research, how best to do so is a major point of debate in 
culturally diverse settings. Another difficulty is to mitigate the potential stress 
respondents might experience as they recall disturbing events. But doing research 
on armed groups in war-affected areas is also disturbing because the researcher is 
fully confronted with certain practices and ideas about violence, whatever his/her 
own views are on deontological ethics. To what extent can one suspend judg-
ment? How to minimize emotional shakes? Can one keep a fresh mind after 
hearing about the same atrocities for the umpteenth time? Researchers are not 
immune to feelings, and some discourses can be hard to swallow, even for the 
most open-minded. Wood (2006) mentions these emotional dynamics because 
she is persuaded inadequate attention to them may lead field researchers to make 
errors in judgment.  
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The ‘do no harm’ imperative 
How to define ‘harmful’? Drawing on his experience as a member of a Canadian 
Research Ethics Board, Haggerty (2004) puts it this way: ‘In the eventuality that 
a research project poses a greater risk than what a person might encounter in 
his/her daily life, these risks must be managed by the researcher or the research 
cannot be conducted.’ Since they are related to a broader context than the 
research project alone, ethical concerns are put in some kind of perspective and 
the impact of social science research projects on people’s lives is not over-
estimated. Haggerty in fact specifically warns about the current tendency to 
overrate the potential harm of research, mentioning a certain form of ‘ethics 
creep’ that invades social science research in the name of ethics. 
Did I put research participants at a greater risk than otherwise in their daily 
lives? I doubt it. It would be largely overestimating the impact of this research. 
Notwithstanding a few exceptions, I genuinely believe the bulk of respondents 
were smart enough to decide for themselves whether they wanted to speak with 
me and what information they wanted to share. They also usually had a much 
more developed sense of risk than I did. I was indeed a bit nervous at check-
points when I had on me transcripts that could prove the implication of a youth 
with an armed group ‘from the other side’. But how likely was it that my bag 
would be searched? And if it was, how likely was it that respondents would be 
traced back or blacklisted on the basis of first names and villages of origin? 
Would a pile of paper raise a soldier’s attention? There was surely a greater 
chance of my CFA francs being ripped off. If particular biographical details 
make my respondents recognizable – and I know an obstinate reader would be 
able to trace them back should he or she be patient enough to crosscheck all 
interview fragments in this book – it was highly unlikely in the field that a person 
would take time to do that with the aim of confronting someone.  
But since a method I used was to ask young people to describe the distressing 
events they experienced during the war (thereby obliging them to recall disturb-
ing memories as they were presenting themselves as either victim or perpetrator 
of violence), I had to minimize the psychological harm that might derive from 
such a recollection. It is always tricky to put yourself in the place of someone 
else and to evaluate the psychological damage certain questions can trigger. 
Different individuals have different reactions to the same experiences, and events 
that appear to me (and others) to be terrible do not necessarily affect the people 
who experienced them the same way. While doing fieldwork, I finally opted for 
inquiring about harrowing events without pushing my respondents if they did not 
want to elaborate much. If they wanted to talk and to describe what happened to 
them, I took the stand that they were willingly doing so and that they were 
conscious of the consequences; it was not unethical of me to listen. Some res-
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pondents mentioned having experienced nightmares for a while after having 
fought in the front line, others felt that they had to take some distance before 
returning to their former environment, to make a ‘fresh’ start. With regard to the 
‘do no harm’ imperative, Haggerty (ibid) makes a nice parallel with social 
scientists and journalists, basically arguing that while both conduct interviews, 
videotape people and undertake some forms of participant observation, jour-
nalists are much less bounded by ethical protocols and it is expected that a story 
be told, unless the interviewee clearly mentioned that certain information has to 
be off record. The assumption is also that respondents get quoted, unless special 
reservations are made. In academia, the initial assumption is the opposite: 
research participants remain anonymous unless they provide explicit permission 
to be identified, and the content of information (the nature of what to write) is 
heavily weighed, especially when some information appears sensitive and subject 
to an interpretation that might endanger the respondent or distort an ongoing 
process. When I mentioned that I would not use real names in the book, many 
respondents told me that they would not have any objections if their real name 
was used. For the sake of precaution, I eventually adopted the scholarly attitude 
and opted for standard anonymity.  
 
Consent 
It would be overestimating my explanatory skills to assert that interviewees came 
to me in full understanding of the potential risks and benefits of participating in 
this research. I also cannot ignore the power imbalance between myself and the 
youths I interviewed, or the differences of perception and interpretation of some 
words and concepts across cultures. If, when presenting the topic of my research 
to potential participants, I was careful to say that individual interviews were not 
compulsory, I cannot discount the fact that the mere notion of what is mandatory 
and what is voluntary differs across contexts, and I could be easily challenged if I 
were only to base my argument for informed consent on the basis of this distinc-
tion.  
Power imbalance is an inherent part of society. It is present at the local level 
(based on race, sex, wealth, age, gender and ethnicity) and it is also present in the 
Researcher-Subject relationship in research. In Man and Guiglo, I was by far 
better off than the youths I interviewed. I was staying in accommodations that 
exceeded local standards (in Man, I was hosted in the guest house of an INGO; in 
Guiglo, I was hosted in the guest house of a local timber company), I was 
sometimes eating in fancy maquis,10 and – perhaps the most peculiar aspect – I 
                                              
10 A maquis is a local bar, where you can also eat. It is an Ivoirian term. 
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was only passing through. Everyone I met knew I would be leaving after a while. 
On top of that, I was a young white woman in her early thirties – an outsider, 
clearly – and while this had its advantages in the sense that some people shared 
information with me that they probably would not have shared with someone else 
(a compatriot from their close social network, a younger or an older ‘passer-by’), 
I know it also had drawbacks and it was sometimes difficult to grasp certain 
subtleties. Was I seen as ‘being too outside’ to be a good listener? I don’t think 
so. I may have been the only person to have shown a genuine interest in listening 
to these youths’ life stories, and I was probably the only one to whom they 
narrated their life, from their first memories of elementary school to their support 
network over time, and the range of paid activities they had engaged in since they 
started working. The way I was perceived was not necessarily linked to people’s 
level of education. I had very good discussions with people who had dropped out 
of school at an early age and some exchanges were far less rich with people more 
educated. The quality of the discussions mostly depended on the one-on-one 
interaction between interviewee and interviewer, and on the interviewer’s capa-
city to follow the thread of discussion, allowing interesting digressions and shift-
ing back when needed.  
As research protocol, I opted for oral consent procedures as I did not want to 
formalize the exchanges too much; it also seemed to be the most culturally 
appropriate method. Respondents were briefed on their right to withdraw at any 
time and on their possibility not to answer certain questions. Although no-one cut 
an interview short, some remained evasive on certain points and a few refused to 
answer a particular question. When this was the case – usually while talking 
about war experiences – I stopped probing for more details and usually changed 
the subject. What strikingly comes forward though from this study, in line with 
other ethnographies of civil war (Weinstein, 2007; Wood, 2006), is that someone 
who has experienced war at first hand is usually genuinely willing to discuss his 
or her story with an outside researcher, foremost to ventilate personal feelings 
and to correct what has been told. There are so many negative stereotypes asso-
ciated with combatants. 
 
Am I being lied to? 
If I compare my experience as a humanitarian practitioner with my experience as 
a researcher, the main difference in approach lies in one fundamental assumption. 
As service provider, my main conviction was that people around me were in 
general lying. Or to perhaps put it better: I was genuinely convinced that they 
were overstating their miseries in order to receive more assistance (mixing struc-
tural issues with the effects of war is the common trap of humanitarianism). As 
researcher, I took the opposite stand and the more incredible a story was, the 
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more likely I was inclined to give it credit. When I reflect on this 180-degree 
turn, the best argument I can think of is that – in my new position – people had 
much less reason to lie to me or exaggerate stories. After all, what I was offering 
them was no more than a listening ear and a vague opportunity to anonymously 
appear in a book. The diversity of stories I heard comforted me in this idea. Some 
of my respondents clearly presented themselves as fighters, some stated during 
the interview that they only occupied backstage positions. And while some 
initially introduced themselves as combatants, the rest of their story nuanced 
their position to a great degree. Interestingly, I was sometimes tipped by some 
respondents about their peers: that one had stayed behind, that one had gone to 
combat, that one told lies (recall here that I mainly drew from stories of recruits 
who were enrolled in a reinsertion project so they all knew each other, at least by 
sight). This was indeed an additional layer of information to weigh. But if there 
might be some kind of stake associated with being known for having fought in 
battle (perhaps the feeling of being more entitled than others to receive some 
form of compensation), individual deeds during war were not particularly over-
rated during interviews.  
But there is still a main caveat when tapping into someone’s memories. When 
relying on testimony that describes events that happened several years ago, res-
pondents run the risk of mixing individual experiences with constructed or 
imagined narratives. In most cases this is quite unintentional. Yet it occurs rather 
frequently and the challenge for the analyst is to try to disenmesh the two. An-
other tricky point is to address the complexity of assessing the credibility of a 
story properly. Several studies have looked at the relationship between memory, 
narrative and credibility, especially drawing on refugee testimonies (Cohen, 
2001, Hegel 2002, Kalin, 1986 cited in Lammers (2006) mainly arguing that 
incoherence and inconsistencies in someone’s testimony are not necessarily proof 
of forgery. What I experienced in the field and what at first resembled incon-
sistent storytelling was in fact a genuine difficulty respondents experienced when 
asked to follow some kind of chronological thread. They were constantly navi-
gating between different periods and themes and had tangible difficulties in pro-
jecting themselves in a particular moment during the war. It was a real challenge 
to follow that up in the right manner and probing was constantly needed to get a 
story straight.  
 
Emotional shakes 
I was told many things. Someone regretted he had had to kill prisoners, another 
confessed he had enjoyed torturing them, a very young female respondent ended 
up as sex slave of a local commander, and one will be scarred for life by all the 
beating up he underwent. Some testimonies speak for themselves:  
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‘It is only when I remember the fightings, the death, when I think about what I did that I start 
to feel remorse. Killing someone is not an easy thing. We could not kill the prisoners of war, 
but sometimes, when we had caught 4 or 5 people, we had no other choice. We could not 
guard them and stay behind, we needed to move on and continue to fight. So sometimes, our 
chief commanded us to go with them, he used to say “accompany them”. That meant we had 
to kill them. So if you’re not in a strong state, you cannot do it. When you look a man in the 
eyes, you cannot shoot him. Never. When I think about it (…) But since I was given an 
order, I had to. Afterwards, it takes hours to raise your spirits, to be strong enough. You’ll 
smoke a lot, you’ll drink a lot, until you fall to sleep. It’s not easy.’  
Apart from being a good illustration of a reality that lies miles away from any 
of mine, this story is disturbing because one cannot avoid experiencing empathy, 
even for the cruelest acts. Perhaps placed in the same circumstances, I would 
have done the same things. These reflections led me to read about the ethics of 
war and peace, and specifically on what responsibilities are at stake when obey-
ing orders. Is there some kind of inalienable moral duty that always prevails, 
regardless of context? And if so, what is permissible in times of war and what is 
absolutely not? If there are several approaches to these dilemmas (from Hung-
tington’s moral obligation to obey to Cramer’s moral objection argument),11 I 
tend to be more comfortable with approaches that take the stance that in extreme 
circumstances, the direct perpetrators of violence – the ones who follow orders to 
kill – somehow enter into a process of ‘dehumanizing’ their enemy. The effect is 
to undermine their authority as moral agents and their sense of judgment (Dower, 
2009). 
 
Self-censorship  
I did not approach all respondents the same manner and my data suffers from a 
conscious gender/age bias. I did not use video with female respondents, for 
instance, I did not even ask if they would bother. I was afraid to get dramatic 
confessions of violent sex scenes and I did not want to get that on tape. It seemed 
to be indecent to do so. Looking back on this self-censorship, I realize the pre-
cautions I took may have been unnecessary. With me as interviewer, women had 
no less agency than men in deciding what they wanted to tell and what they 
preferred to keep to themselves. I had no intention to push them. With children, 
                                              
11  Huntington’s position is that as long as an order is lawful, soldiers have a moral obligation to obey. In 
his view, soldiers carry no moral responsibility for war crimes committed in response to a superior’s 
orders and the principles of obedience isolates the culpability for war crimes with those commanders 
who initiate such orders. Huntington’s argument is mainly based on the assumption that without com-
plete and unquestioning obedience, military units will be unable to perform their functions. Cramer 
instead points out the moral objection argument, which designates a situation when an order received 
dictates an action that is morally wrong. In Cramer’s view, the duty to follow orders is not unlimited 
and actions that would be illegal or immoral for individuals to engage in normal times (such as acts of 
torture, mutilation or intentional harming of innocent) are not permissible for a person based on a 
‘blanket of immunity’ (Cramer, 2006).  
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curiously, I had fewer reservations. They were between 14 and 18 when I first 
met them, and as they had already been old enough to carry a Kalashnikov rifle, I 
assumed they would also be old enough to know how to handle me. I therefore 
took the stand that they were able to engage in complex moral reasoning from an 
early age, in line with other critical scholars’ views who argue that in places 
where people are used to fending for themselves from a very young age, context 
and experience play a major role in influencing modes of action (Boyden, 2007; 
Hart, 2009; Rosen, 2005).  
I would have liked to personally interview mid-level and high-ranking officers 
to get their inside view on the mode of functioning of their group. It would have 
brought quite a comprehensive level of detail. But, given the circumstances, I did 
not feel comfortable approaching them with such a topic. If I did not seek a lot of 
contact with local commanders, I nonetheless had the opportunity to meet some 
of them. During my stay in Guiglo, I interviewed a former militia leader who had 
converted himself into a development broker through a local NGO aiming at 
reintegrating ‘deviant young men’ into society. Our conversation was more fo-
cused on his current work than on the armed group he formerly led, yet it yielded 
interesting contextual information and helped put things into perspective. I also 
attended a workshop on social cohesion organized by two consultants commis-
sioned by the European Union. The workshop had the advantage of providing a 
setting where key local actors were gathered in one place at the same time: the 
military Préfets of all the western departments under government control, the 
village chiefs, the chefs de cantons, the representatives of the non-autochthonous 
communities, various local representatives of several committees (the committee 
of the allogenes, the committee of the returnees, the committee of the displaced, 
at both regional and micro-local level). The sous-Préfet of Péhé was particularly 
open to discussion and we exchanged emails. In Man, discussions with high-
ranking officers were couched in much more wooden language. With the 
Com’Zone, exchanges were primarily protocolar and I was particularly concern-
ed to use neutral language, fearing – again, maybe too much – that I could 
jeopardize my research if the highest in command would become suspicious 
about my presence in the area. Talks about reinsertion prospects were out of 
place as releasing recruits on the rebel side was not an option at the time, and I 
found it inappropriate to discuss other affairs. When I had the opportunity to 
informally speak with a rebel sergeant in a local maquis – he was actually partly 
detached to serve as day guard in one of the centres used for reinsertion purposes 
– our conversation remained focused on his life story and on his current extra-
military activities. He was mainly making his living by managing the real estate 
he had in Abidjan (rental stores and houses) and he also told me that he was 
getting a weekly incentive for his participation in the rebellion. We did not talk 
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much about his military involvement as I did not have the impression he wanted 
to elaborate on it.  
 
  
3 
Some theoretical considerations 
This section gives a brief overview of the theoretical debates related to post-
conflict humanitarianism and violent processes of mobilization that are relevant 
to the scope of this study. In this work, the general approach for building theory 
is inductive and inspired by the grounded theory methodology developed by 
Strauss, with special emphasis on the continuous need to compare between 
phenomena and contexts to make the theory strong (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1997). The main intention of having this distinct theoretical 
chapter is to give conceptual keys of interpretation to the reader and eventually, 
by looking at existing theories in the light of the western Ivoirian context, to help 
conceptually refine some of the phenomena already presented in the introduction. 
Since the main research question in this study is to understand the extent to 
which externally driven interventions targeting militarized civilians should be 
conceived as special processes compared to other social processes at play in the 
local environment, it is worth reflecting on several dimensions of the humani-
tarian apparatus: the risk of capture of humanitarian resources by one of the 
belligerents, the extent of entanglement in the local dynamics, and the question 
of power seen from the point of view of the intervention itself but also from the 
points of views of local actors using the intervention for their own ends. If there 
is existing theory on these themes, its main flaw is to be based on static situations 
where humanitarianism plays a central role in the immediate context, with 
tangible effects on the local system. In situations where post-conflict interven-
tions play a more marginal role, varying over time (like the situation in western 
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Côte d’Ivoire), there is a blatant lack of conceptualization. Yet it remains 
interesting to examine the effects of interventions in such settings, notably to 
examine the extent to which they reproduce a patronage and clientelistic mode of 
functioning. 
Post-conflict interventions are paradoxical in nature: they do not initially 
belong to the context in which they operate, and yet, as soon as they start 
operating, they become entangled with local social networks, and not necessarily 
in the way they would like to be. Capturing the extent of such entanglement in 
the contexts under study is a fundamental key for any informed analysis, as well 
as empirically assessing the extent of ‘humanitarian legitimacy’, and the genuine 
effects humanitarianism has in complex environments (especially as Ivoirian 
microcontexts are known to be extremely disparate from one location to another). 
As I was leading these reflections for interventions that specifically targeted ex-
combatants, I could not be unreceptive to debates that regarded the extent of 
‘milicianization’ of a given society. After all, an interesting peculiarity of the 
Ivoirian case is that the militarization of civilians has been relatively contained in 
time, space, and degree of violence (in comparison with neighbouring Liberia 
and Sierra Leone) despite the fact that rebel forces have been occupying half of 
the country for nearly a decade.1 The second conceptual pillar therefore examines 
existing analytical distinctions from a critical perspective (civil war vs. socio-
political outburst, militia member/rebel vs. local vigilante) and eventually pro-
poses a comprehensive categorization of theories related to processes of violent 
mobilization that help to better grasp the concept of militarized youth.  
The paradox of post-conflict interventions 
‘Apolitical’ political actors  
There is a global approach to post-conflict interventions. Peace-building pro-
cesses and conflict prevention are largely based on the idea that positive change 
can be induced by targeted interventions, and it is expected that the propensity 
for recruits to resume fighting can be diminished if sound interventions are 
implemented step by step, according to some kind of checklist. Donors and 
humanitarian practitioners talk in terms of programme objectives, outcome 
indicators, accomplishments, number of beneficiaries, and a twelve-month re-
intergration programme for ex-combatants2 is genuinely considered enough to 
prevent recruits from getting re-enrolled. Perhaps the most obvious reason why a 
                                              
1  This observation continues to hold in the light of the recent events. 
2  Donors and practitioners generally use the term ‘ex-combatant’ in their writings. The term ‘militarized 
civilian’, with the implication we saw in terms of blurred borders between the military and the civilian 
spheres, has not yet entered their discourse. 
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global approach to post-conflict interventions is inappropriate is that it largely 
overestimates the impact of external interventions, namely by ignoring the fact 
that they are always reshaped by contextual dynamics. Interventions take place in 
a social arena, they interact with different stakeholders, and as a consequence, 
they rarely go as planned; they are constantly being reshaped contingent on the 
changing balance of power at the local level (Long, 2001). If initial objectives are 
rarely met, there is nothing wrong about it. I remember humanitarian staff 
working on reinsertion projects for ex-combatants being deeply annoyed by the 
fact that some ‘beneficiaries’ were not performing the way they were supposed to 
and were ‘diverting’ from the project objectives. Lack of assiduousness and 
disposal of project equipment in other ways than planned were in general judged 
severely and often interpreted as deviant behaviour. One can only regret that 
understanding the reasons for such changes of behaviour does not have a place 
on practitioners’ agendas. Pouligny is rather provocative when she writes that 
‘most outsiders falsely believe that the date of their arrival is zero for the country, 
as if nothing had happened before them’ (Pouligny, 2004a). Yet she points to the 
right paradox: there can be no attempt to rebuild a society without pairing the 
peace-building process with an in-depth examination of the existing resources. 
Local means are usually in place long before external interventions, and by being 
deeply rooted in the social and cultural context, they are usually naturally 
accessed by the local population when needed (Pouligny notably mentions the 
positive effects of some of the actions undertaken by traditional healers on 
former Mozambican and Sierra Leonean child soldiers after their return to their 
respective communities). In this particular study, this point is perhaps best ex-
emplified by the extensive recourse to extra-humanitarian activities in the search 
to secure basic income. The fact that some of the reinserted recruits under study 
engaged in private activities in Guiglo and Man in parallel to their participation 
in a humanitarian project, and that some even preferred to skip participation 
because they were committed elsewhere, reveals the relatively low importance of 
interventions from the points of view of the youths themselves, compared to 
other opportunities arising from the contextual dynamic. Humanitarianism has 
only been a extra in western Côte d’Ivoire and there is no need to overestimate its 
effects: on the counter-insurgent side, humanitarian support for militarized civil-
ians only materialized two or three years after the militia elements had left their 
respective armed groups – thus right after their effective demobilization, former 
recruits were mainly tapping into local resources. Such a phenomenon certainly 
opens up the debate whether an indigenous process of peacebuilding is conceiv-
able in western Côte d’Ivoire, given the context we know. I come back to that 
point below, when reflecting on non-interventionism. 
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The humanitarianism-legitimacy nexus 
But there is another reason why a global approach to post-conflict interventions 
is inappropriate. It namely sets too ambitious goals, and notably a goal of state 
(re)building which is highly unlikely to be compelled by outsiders (Jozan & Ray, 
2009). As Duyvesteyn (2009) points out, key to the process of state consolidation 
is the forging of a bargain between rulers and constituents. But when humanitari-
anism enters the scene, by the mere fact that external interventions inject addi-
tional resources and usually fulfil a role in basic service provision, there is the 
risk that an overdose of interventions undermines that very bargain between 
rulers and constituents, making internal agencies competitors of the State, or, in 
contexts outside state control, competitors of the armed group that plays the role 
of local sovereign. This argument of linking the injection of humanitarian re-
sources to local legitimacy (which, pushed to the extreme, may lead international 
agencies to compete with the local rulers) finds most resonance in contexts where 
humanitarianism is at the core of social change. For other situations, and for the 
Ivoirian case in particular, it is worth reflecting on what happened, since the local 
environment was hardly disrupted by the process of intervention. I indirectly and 
empirically address this point in Chapters 8 and 9, when reflecting on the 
blurring of spaces between the humanitarian, military and civilian arenas and 
when examining the process of intervention itself.  
Beyond this question of ‘humanitarian’ legitimacy, there is the need to clarify 
the concept itself in light of the contexts under study. After all, the northern half 
of Côte d’Ivoire was not controlled by the State between 2002 and 2007 (the 
research period), and this calls for a closer look at the links between legitimacy 
and local territorial sovereignty. If we adopt a classical view, state-building 
requires the construction of the monopoly of force in a particular territory and the 
establishment of legitimacy of that monopoly; the core challenge here is to find 
ways to legitimate the rule (Weber, 1997). The recipe that was developed in the 
1990s for rebuilding failed states – a recipe vehemently criticized by Duyvesteyn 
and others – focused on creating strong institutions through democratic elections, 
the basic assumption being that this would be sufficient to generate a legitimate 
rule. However, legitimacy does not always follow from institutions like the 
liberal view suggests, it mostly follows from order, and as Duyvesteyn put it, it 
does not really matter who is responsible for it. Big men, warlords and rebel 
leaders can be particularly successful in creating some sort of social order in 
unstable contexts. They are therefore likely to be entrusted with some sort of 
legitimacy at the local level and even beyond. In this study, this trait was parti-
cularly relevant for the Guiglo site, a location where warlords literally emerged 
from and reconverted into local politicians. Post-conflict interventions found 
therefore themselves there in a quite awkward position: on the one hand, having 
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to find some kind of working grounds with the local guarantors of social order 
(the former warlords); on the other hand, trying to promote a certain type of 
social contract, not necessarily in line with the local norms.  
If one explores a specific post-conflict setting mainly shaped by external inter-
ventions, it could be argued on many aspects that it is an artificial construction 
and that what tends to be reproduced is the pre-war situation (I already alluded to 
that in the introduction). The problem with that perspective is that it tends to 
overestimate the regulating role of the pre-war structures. As Englebert and Tull 
wrote: ‘Today’s state-building practice favours the use of terminology of recreat-
ing the state as it existed before the conflict. But terms such as “rebuilding”, 
“resuscitating”, and “reestablishing” are misleading in so far as they imply the 
prior existence of effective public institutions waiting to reemerge’ (Englebert 
and Tull cited in Duyvesteyn, 2009). Indeed, in many situations, well-functioning 
institutional pre-war structures simply never existed, or at least, they never 
functioned in the sense generally implied. Patrimonialism3 is still the established 
political mode in most developing states (particularly in sub-Saharan Africa), and 
almost everyone is used to be involved in some kind of patron-client relationship 
(civil servants being no exception). ‘Rebuilding’ and ‘reestablishing’ pre-war 
structures therefore make little sense in such conditions. Why should one long for 
that if all it means in the end is recreating a system that favors patronage and 
clientelism under the guise of a democratic façade? Despite this criticism, the 
‘rebuilding’ and ‘reconstruction’ paradigm continues to be widely used in prac-
tice, raising a certain number of concerns about the genuine driving force of 
these post-conflict interventions.  
In situations when humanitarianism does not play a central role and when it is 
conceived at the local level as an ‘extra’ social opportunity coming on top of 
other social opportunities (of a more private or public nature), it remains inter-
esting to examine the extent to which interventions in such settings reproduce a 
patronage and clientelistic mode of functioning. After all, whether interventions 
play a central role in a local context or a more modest one, the overall discourse 
remains the same: ‘rebuilding’ and ‘re-establishing’ pre-war structures is still the 
aim. But because existing studies tend to overrate the place of post-conflict 
interventions in the local dynamics, there is a lack of conceptualization for inter-
ventions that acknowledgeably play a modest role in their immediate contexts. 
This work is a first-hand attempt to shed some light on that aspect. 
 
                                              
3  Tellis-Nayak (1983) gives a particularly accurate definition of the patron-client bond as being ‘an 
asymmetrical, voluntary, and instrumental friendship in which non-comparable goods and services are 
exchanged for mutual benefit’.  
32 
Main debates on humanitarianism  
In politically unstable contexts, there is much ground to question the ‘apolitical’ 
nature of humanitarian deeds. Weinstein warns about ‘the rebel bias’, observing 
that external input in interventions makes rebel victories ‘substantially less 
likely’ because they favour ‘negotiated settlements’ over ‘military victories’ 
(Weinstein, 2005). There is indeed an international disposition to obstruct rebel 
victories, and although this is an obvious sign of partiality, it is rarely presented 
as cause for concern. Duyvesteyn goes one step further and argues that the 
current focus on democratization, negotiation, compromise and increased aid as 
conflict resolution mechanism has the adverse effect of jeopardizing viable state-
building because it bypasses important indigenous state-building mechanisms 
and neglects the fact that states in turmoil have the ability to recover themselves 
(Duyvesteyn, 2009). Others have also acknowledged the benefits of such auto-
nomous recovery, even if it means the continuation of war for some time: ‘War-
making is a process that can provide strong incentives for competing groups to 
secure the consent of the governed, overcome sectarian tendencies in favor of 
more national identities, and develop the administrative capacity required to 
deliver public good to their constituents’ (Weinstein, 2005). The main argument 
here is based on the assumption that indigenous state-building mechanisms are 
the only form of state-building that combine domestic sources of legitimacy with 
realistic views on domestic capacities.4  
If a certain line of thought is strongly in favour of a non-interventionist ap-
proach, there is the need to reflect on the nature of humanitarianism and on the 
debates humanitarianism generates. Not because non-interventionism is margin-
al. A few scholars in fact remind us that the principle of non-intervention actually 
applies in many situations (in Algeria, Colombia, Chechnya for instance) and that 
sometimes, interventionism can play a very marginal role (Bradol, 2003, 2004). 
But where planned interventions take place, there is the need to reflect on the real 
place they take in their local environments, since in war-affected contexts hu-
manitarianism does not always act as a central driving force. 
Interestingly, there is no single perspective on the driving principles of 
humanitarianism. If many restrict its mandate to emergency relief for victims of 
war and survivors of natural disasters, some go beyond that, ‘just because lives 
are no longer at immediate risk does not mean that suffering has ended’ (Barnett 
                                              
4  A disturbing trend nowadays is only to tap into ‘indigenous capacity’ when having to legitimize an 
external intervention, and several authors recognize this (Weissman, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b). 
The role of local actors becomes limited to the role of sub-contractants, with some capacity at best, 
none at worst. If they manage to create the right legal and administrative structures, they might 
succeed in entering a system where international aid agencies delegate operational tasks to them under 
discourses of ‘capacity-building’, ‘sustainability’, ‘recognition of indigenous knowledge’. 
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& Weiss, 2008). The main ideals behind the concept include neutrality (as de-
fined by a rule of behaviour that demands that external interventions refrain from 
taking any side) and humanity (a precept that commands attention to everyone 
and that does not prioritize or sacrifice some to the detriment or benefit of 
others). But even that latter point is not exempt of fierce debate within the 
practitioner community, between those advocating interventions in certain zones, 
regardless of the consequences, and those preferring to stay out when it is too 
difficult to untangle the political, military and humanitarian aspects. Aid can be 
very selective and it is important to reflect on the grounds on which such se-
lection is made. If there is no single perspective on its driving principles, there 
are also several approaches when placing it into context. One is to place humani-
tarianism at the core and to assume that post-war contexts are mainly shaped by 
‘apolitical’ interventions that promote peace and reconciliation in war-torn soci-
eties. Another approach is to place humanitarianism at the side, and to consider 
it, from the points of view of actors, to be a social opportunity among other social 
opportunities. The second approach is the most relevant for our context.  
 
• The risk of capture  
In their analyses of humanitarian action, Barnett and Weiss highlight two contra-
dictory trends that developed in the past two decades: a first one indicating the 
growing willingness and ability of outsiders to help those at risk using discourses 
diffusing ideas on ‘the responsibility to protect’, and a second one reflecting on 
the various issues that contemporary complex emergencies pose for humanitari-
anism (the assumed ‘neutrality’ and ‘apolitical’ nature of aid being increasingly 
called into question). There is indeed plenty of evidence of projects being mani-
pulated, at least partially, to serve non-humanitarian agendas. In contexts where 
humanitarianism has become so intertwined with the local politics, there might 
be no other option than to have to choose sides, challenging thereby the neutral-
ity/impartiality window of planned interventions and blurring the traditional 
analytical boundaries between the ‘humanitarian’, the ‘civilian’ and the ‘military’ 
spheres (Pouligny, 2003, 2004a; Weissman, 2003a, 2004a). There are many 
examples in recent history. In Angola, for instance, at the end of the 1990s, aid 
was clearly manipulated by Luanda. The UN refused to jeopardize their already 
shaky position and deliberately chose not to start any assistance programme in 
the UNITA-controlled areas (Messiant, 2003, 2004). In Sudan, belligerent parties 
developed a real savoir-faire in capturing and controlling humanitarian resources, 
to the point of making them play a significant role in the political economy of 
conflict (Lavergne & Weissman, 2003, 2004). When aid takes sides, it might be 
unintentionally at first but it usually quickly evolves into an informed act. In 
addition, external interventions are rarely seen as neutral by the local popula-
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tions, and in many contexts humanitarianism finds itself subject and object of 
diplomatic games in which humanitarian parameters are far from being the most 
determinants. In Côte d’Ivoire, for instance, there is ground to argue that the way 
post-conflict aid was conditioned eventually served political ends, especially in 
2007-2008 as more and more donors started linking the continuation of their 
financial support to political progress and Ivoirian presidential elections being 
held.5  
 
• The extent of entanglement 
But if Angola and Sudan were clear examples of situations where humanitarian 
resources were captured by a belligerent, other contexts remind us in fact that, 
instead of capture, what happens foremost at the microlevel is the enmeshment of 
postconflict interventions in the local dynamics (and many times, not necessarily 
in the way wanted or anticipated). External interventions inevitably end up 
liaising with local actors in order to be able to operate, and key local actors often 
assume many roles in the community. It is in fact rather common to have a 
situation where warlords are also respected traditional chiefs, with a foot in the 
local politics and a certain influence on their environment through their range of 
‘development’ brokerage actions. Because the mere fact of delivering aid sup-
poses some form of negotiation, recognition and legitimization, planned inter-
ventions have no other option than to become entangled with local social net-
works upon which they have little control, and these networks can include groups 
or individuals known to have a direct or indirect link with the belligerents. If the 
humanitarian context in western Côte d’Ivoire did not manage to escape this 
situation (I’ll develop this more when reflecting on the question of power), one 
cannot really speak of a sophisticated system of capture, and humanitarianism is 
far from having played a central role in the political war economies of Man and 
Guiglo.  
An important aspect that Pouligny brings to the fore with regard to entangle-
ment is the ambiguity of most assistance programmes that claim to help rebuild a 
war-torn society but that ‘drain’ all of its political substance, reducing the process 
to mere technicalities. She writes: 
 ‘The “peace” that we pretend to rebuild might as well be an empty project. We may help 
rebuild economic and socio-political infrastructures and institutions but they are no more 
than “empty boxes”, because we have given little consideration to the conceptual roots of 
social and political life (…). Reconstruction efforts have to see with changing identities and 
group boundaries, the difficulties of communicating across boundaries, justice and “recon-
ciliation” the distribution of property, land and wealth, the writing of history, the rebuilding 
                                              
5  France and Japan for instance suspended their support to education using such argument (personal 
interview with the ERNWACA representative). 
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of trust and the capacity for new political systems. Yet behind these lies a host of cultural 
meanings which are usually unremarked and unanalyzed.’ (Pouligny, 2004a) 
It is indeed a fundamental mistake to downplay the embeddedness of external 
interventions in the local politics and the mere fact that the people with whom 
these interventions are dealing are not apolitical subjects should actually be self-
explanatory. At the local level, it is partly people’s behaviour that sets the stage 
for action or inaction. One should therefore carefully reflect on their perceptions 
of what happened during tense periods (who is to blame, what vengeance is due, 
to which side do they feel the closest, is there any point in rebuilding at all, …) 
and a good understanding of these views should be the basis of any intervention. 
Pouligny yet regrets that this dimension is given too little attention in comparison 
with the exaggerated current focus on technicalities (I tend to share her line of 
thought) and is not the only one to warn about the inappropriateness of pro-
moting a too technical approach. Agier & Bouchet-Saulnier (2003), for instance, 
pinpointed a worrying shift that has occurred in recent years. On the one hand, 
they describe the 1990s as a decade in which unprecedented efforts were made to 
provide material assistance to people in need (mainly focusing on refugee 
contexts), but on the other hand, they also depict the same period as an era of 
‘apparent effervescence’ and as a decade mostly known for having clearly 
marked the deterioration of individual legal rights.6 They write:  
 ‘Behind the apparent effervescence, the question of legal protection has truly regressed. 
From the closing of borders to forced repatriation, endangered populations found themselves 
trapped in conflicts, transformed in human shields, in baits for international aid, in mere ob-
jects deprived of rights and subject to all kinds of violence and arbitrariness. The disappear-
ance of all sort of legal protection for these people has increased their physical vulnerability 
(…).’ (Agier & Bouchet-Saulnier, 2003) 
What is central in this argument for the scope of this study is the recognition 
that under cover of generosity, pragmatism, emergency, and proximity with the 
people in need, an overdose of interventions may run the risk of drying up 
important social mechanisms that already exist at the local level (namely, social 
interactions that regulate responsibilities, rights and reciprocal obligations and 
that generally arrange social life on a much more stable basis than imported 
solutions). Agier and Bouchet-Saulnier strongly advocate resisting the current 
trend that conceives humanitarian spaces as ‘spaces of exception’, where genero-
sity and pragmatism override people’s responsibilities and rights (Agier & Bou-
                                              
6  Agier & Bouchet-Saulnier notably argue that the deterioration of their legal protection is partly linked 
to the confusion between the notion of ‘protection’ (which has legal implications) and the notion of 
‘physical security’ (which is not legislated in international law). This confusion is sustained by the 
ambiguity of UN peace missions, and particularly those under Chapter Seven of the United Nations 
Charter, which foresees military interventions to provide physical security to the local populations, 
provided a range of conditions (Agier & Bouchet-Saulnier, 2003). 
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chet-Saulnier, 2003). The risk, they warn, is that generous aims can be distorted 
to the point of depriving war-affected populations of the little agency they have 
left. What is to be encouraged instead is a constructive confrontation, which does 
not annihilate people in need as thinking subjects. If their warnings make perfect 
sense in situations when humanitarianism plays a central role in its immediate 
environment, it is interesting to examine the same stand from the perspective of 
contexts and societies where interventions play a more marginal role, especially 
in this Ivoirian case, where the militarized youths who have been locally re-
cruited and locally demobilized have actually always stayed in contact with their 
pre-war social groups.  
 
• The question of power 
The question of power has to be seen from the point of view of the intervention 
itself but also from the points of view of the local actors who use the intervention 
for their own ends. If humanitarianism is frequently presented as being devoid of 
power, power is nonetheless an inherent feature of it. Humanitarian organizations 
mainly rests on two types of authority (Barnett & Weiss, 2008): an ‘expert 
authority’, that gives them credibility because of their assumed specialized 
training, knowledge or experience, and a ‘moral authority’, that gives them 
trustworthiness based on the assumption that they speak and act on behalf of the 
most destitute populations. Since humanitarian actors frequently operate from a 
position of dominance vis-à-vis the populations they are interacting with (to the 
point of seeking partial control of individual behaviour), there is ground to 
dispute the base of their authority (which can be understood in this context as the 
ability of one actor to use institutional and discursive resources to induce 
deference from others). Do ‘beneficiaries’ actually confer humanitarian inter-
venetions an authority or is it an authority that is externally bestowed?  
Much of the existing literature emphasizes the external endowment aspect. 
Firstly, because of their social position and symbolic standing, humanitarian 
agencies are among the few that have the social capacity to designate a situation 
as an emergency and to determine therefore which countries, groups and in-
dividuals receive attention and which do not. Secondly, by pointing out the 
current trend that seeks justification for limitless interventions, there is a tend-
ency to suggest that humanitarian agencies cannot be circumvented: ‘No longer 
content with treating symptoms, aid organizations are now tackling the “root 
causes” of disease, conflict, and poverty. Toward that end, they have attempted 
to intervene in a nearly limitless set of social problems that demand to be cata-
logued, controlled, and solved’ (Barnett & Weiss, 2008).  
In comparison, there is little scholarly production that focuses on the authority 
conferred from below and when such a perspective is discussed, it is usually to 
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highlight the ways in which humanitarianism is manipulated by the local elites 
and by current or former warlords (Hammond, 2008; Lavergne & Weissman, 
2003, 2004; Rubenstein, 2008). If it is to some extent true in our case that 
humanitarian interventions targeting ex-combatants have de facto inherited 
existing patron-client relationships over which they had little control (militia and 
rebel leaders had after all much more say in selecting the recruits to include in 
the reinsertion projects than humanitarian staff), it would be worth examining the 
extent of manipulation of the clients themselves, regardless of the patron-client 
relationship. This study will examine this gap, as well as those mentioned above, 
by reflecting on the nature and effects of a humanitarianism which took a rather 
side role in two distinct war-affected environments. By placing much emphasis 
on the viewpoints and actions of ‘reinserted’ recruits, it will ultimately examine 
the extent to which ‘reinserted’ recruits (understood as recruits who have bene-
fited from some kind of reintegration assistance) are different from ‘non-re-
inserted’ ones in contexts where interventionism is marginal. What role have 
external interventions really played in such complex processes and how did they 
become entangled with their respective contexts? To what extent should 
externally driven interventions targeting militarized civilians be conceived as 
special processes compared to other social processes at play in the local en-
vironment, and what are the conditions that make humanitarianism a good (or 
poorer) opportunity in comparison with other types of social action? These are 
the core questions I attempt to answer in this work. Recourse to internationally 
driven projects is far from being the ideal way to alleviate suffering. Yet it is a 
widely promoted solution and it is usually tolerated by parties in conflict. If one 
should not long for it, in many instances there is no way to avoid it. The chal-
lenge therefore is to find satisfactory ways to put external interventions into per-
spective, especially these days, when general enthusiasm for humanitarian values 
is turning into general scepticism.  
Some theoretical reflections on war and mobilization processes 
This particular section examines a neglected point in war theories, which unfor-
tunately is too seldom brought to the fore, despite its empirical adequateness with 
the concept of militarized civilians. It namely reflects on the boundaries of civil 
war and socio-political outbursts, and on the relevance of continuing to make an 
analytical distinction between non-State armed groups and local vigilantes in 
situations where the borders have become blurred between the two. This last 
point is particularly relevant to make in our case for the government-controlled 
area, since during the period under study, most low-ranking militia elements in 
fact navigated between different positions according to the conflict phase and 
their individual skills: from local vigilante in the very beginning, to fighter or 
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logistician in advanced bases in the stage that followed, to more backstage 
positions later on, and eventually back to rural vigilantism. This observation is 
developed further in Chapter 8, where I give several examples of such multi-
tasking. Reflecting on the boundaries of civil war and socio-political outbursts is 
also particularly relevant for the scope of this study given the extent of diffusion 
of violence in western Côte d’Ivoire: in certain areas, violence has come to 
permeate every layer of society and this strikingly comes out of the chronology 
of violent events for the western context (Chapter 5). One could therefore wonder 
if, in these types of ‘no war, no peace’ situations, it is possible to clearly continue 
distinguishing between acts of war and mere socio-political outbursts. Perhaps is 
it only a question of terminology? I reflect in any case on these questions below, 
ending the section by proposing a comprehensive categorization of theories 
related to violent mobilization processes. This framework will be used in the 
following chapters when reflecting on the respondents’ pre-war profiles and 
motives.  
As already noted, there is something peculiar about the Ivoirian case if we 
compare it to other African conflicts. Despite the split of the country in 2002 and 
the persistence of a rebel-controlled area in the northern half of the country, the 
professionalization of violence has been relatively contained in Côte d’Ivoire in 
terms of time, space, and degree of violence. However, a worrying development 
nonetheless took place within the Ivoirian society and at the local level, the war 
has become the occasion to legitimate extensive use of minimal forms of vio-
lence, which have become extremely difficult to put to a halt. In the government-
controlled areas, traditional forms of urban/rural vigilance have evolved into 
more sophisticated structures (better armed and usually linked to one of the main 
belligerent parties), and the visible proliferation of self-defence groups has re-
configured many spaces, to the point of entirely changing local balances of 
power in certain areas. The situation in the Zone de Confiance7 was particularly 
illustrative of such power shifts, and I’ll come back to this point more speci-
fically when presenting the immediate context. But why were the Ivoirian mili-
tarized youths not as keen as elsewhere on pursuing opportunistic careers in para-
state armed groups? Or to probably put it better: why were local warlords not 
interested in continuing to push these youths into an armed movement? If some 
analysts describe Côte d’Ivoire as having engaged in a process of ‘“miliciani-
                                              
7  A Zone de Confiance (Zone of Confidence) was created in May 2003 to separate rebel-held from 
government-held territory and designated a neutral area, free of belligerence, where no weapons were 
allowed and which was monitored by impartial forces (French forces and ECOWA troops at first, then 
ONUCI contingents). It was disbanded in April 2007. In the four years of its existence, the Zone de 
Confiance proved to be a complete misnomer, as it designated an area of widespread banditism and 
unpunished crimes. 
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zation” of society, privatization of violence and militarization of the youth by the 
government in place’ (Banégas, 2008), there is a need to confront these claims 
with empirical evidence and to be particularly careful when drawing conclusions. 
If to some extent, one could argue that such claims held true for a certain fringe 
of the youth (namely, for the Young Patriots,8 a political movement particularly 
active in Abidjan and in the main urban hubs, composed of a diversity of 
individuals ranging from simple demonstrators to violent thugs), there is ground 
to question the relevance of such statements for the suppletive recruits hired 
close to the combat zones.  
 
Civil war or socio-political outburst? 
In countries experiencing a situation of ‘no war, no peace’, there is a time when 
non-State armed groups usually start giving up their purely military tasks 
(attack/defence) to fulfil a function of local guardian with the aim of ensuring 
some kind of social order in the places under their control. Translated into 
practice, this means that once the period of combat has passed, many of these 
groups do not do more in fact than what local vigilantes do, i.e. protect the direct 
environment of a village, a town or a neighbourhood, at least from a military 
perspective.9 The existence and persistence of such phenomena raises a number 
of issues. Firstly, and returning to the previous question, it points to the diversity 
of players in matters of local security, even if it is likely that some groups 
emerged during the war and that others were empowered by the internal conflict. 
In western Côte d’Ivoire, armed mobilization took several forms and borrowed 
elements from both ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ institutions. On the insurgent side, 
it revived the long-standing semi-secret hunters’ association known as ‘dozo’ 
(Hagberg & Ouattara, 2010); on the counter-insurgent side, it was mainly 
grounded on community ways of policing and on the paramilitary structure 
derived from these (eventually becoming enmeshed with the national army).10 
These ‘self-defence’ groups – this term is the most common one used to describe 
such movements – certainly resembled the most paramilitary structures at the 
peak of the counter-insurgency, and when the period of combat operations 
passed, they gradually gave up their purely military tasks. But it remains inte-
resting to explore what remains of this local security apparatus in more peaceful 
times, by examining the extent to which these armed groups are (or not) partially 
                                              
8  It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the phenomenon of the Young Patriots in depth. For 
more information, I refer to the works of Banégas, Arnaut and Koné.  
9  A socio-anthropological focus would have brought more to the fore the embeddedness of local vigi-
lantes with their political environments. See for instance the work of Chauveau et al. (2011) based on 
other Ivoirian contexts.  
10  Detailed contextual information is given in Chapter 5, when describing the immediate context. 
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reactivated to fulfil a function of local guardian more in line with traditional 
forms of urban/rural vigilantism.  
A second issue that such phenomena raise is that it has become very complex 
at the local level to distinguish between component features of civil wars and 
mere manifestations of social and political violence. To paraphrase Cramer 
(2006: 50): ‘When and on what grounds is an event defined as a war? How clear 
is the difference between a civil war and a political or a social outburst? And 
when is war not a war?’ If categorization is a necessary feature of the social 
sciences (without it, the social processes that scholars try to describe would 
simply be too diverse and complex to be understandable), one should not forget 
that analytical frames are socially constructed and can therefore be changed. 
After all the first function of classifying and defining boundaries is to help 
identify patterns in the data, the boundaries can be refined. Any analytical 
attempt to define civil wars (by looking at the number of battle deaths, by recog-
nizing an active armed opposition to the State, if the State is one of the main 
belligerents) 11  could therefore easily be challenged since the chosen criteria 
generally mask important diversities of features. In fact, a main characteristic of 
many modern wars is that they do not have clear-cut beginnings and ends and 
that the modes and causes of contemporary warfare often resemble communal 
violence and socio-political outbursts. Reflecting on that, Cramer argues that the 
important point is not to advocate a rigid distinction between civil wars; firstly, 
because there is a great diversity within the category of civil wars itself, and 
secondly, because there are forms of political outburst that sometimes share more 
characteristics with certain civil wars than other social phenomena classified in 
the ‘civil war’ category (Cramer, 2006:74). In line with other scholars (Debos, 
2010; Duyvesteyn, 2005; Guichaoua, 2010; Richards, 2005a, 2005b), Cramer 
conceptualizes reality as a spectrum of violence with overlapping brutal events. 
He views the concepts of ‘war’ and ‘peace’ as a continuum rather than as two 
distinct phases, and to him, the question is not so much to identify when, how 
and why a civil war turns into a socio-political outburst (the question actually 
                                              
11  Sambanis (2004), for instance, came up with nine criteria: 1) the war must take place within the terri-
tory of an internationally recognized state with a population of more than 500,000; 2) the parties to the 
conflict must be politically and militarily organized with identifiable leadership and publicly stated 
objectives; 3) the government must be a principal combatant; 4) the main rebel groups must be locally 
represented and composed of local recruits (though there may be international involvement in the 
war); 5) the war is deemed to begin in the first year that the conflict causes 500-1,000 deaths and the 
war is only classed as a war if cumulative deaths over the next two years exceed 1,000; 6) the civil 
war must involve sustained violence, with no single year having fewer than twenty-five deaths and no 
three-year period having less than 500 conflict-related deaths; 7) the weaker party must be able at all 
times to inflict at least 100 deaths on the stronger party; 8) the war ends if it is interrupted by a peace 
treaty, cease-fire or decisive military outcome producing two years or more of peace; and 9) if new 
parties enter the war, fighting over new issues, a new war is then begun.  
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loses its relevance when one stops reasoning in phases), but rather when, how 
and why certain forms of violence emerge, increase, decrease, persist and dis-
appear at certain periods of time and in specific settings. I tend to agree with his 
line of thought, which eventually renders the term ‘civil war’ obsolete.  
 
Mobilization processes 
Violent movements take multiple forms and vary widely across contexts in terms 
of size, composition, ways of functioning, strategy and their degree of connection 
to the State. They include insurgent and counter-insurgent groups, but also angry 
mobs, groups of thieves, and ‘self-defence’ movements. In terms of size, they 
range from tiny groups that encompass a dozen militants to mass organizations 
comprising thousands of recruits drawn into the war by compulsory conscription, 
coercion, or on a voluntary base. In Côte d’Ivoire, youth engagement took many 
forms across the country and there was a great disparity by regions, departments, 
and even neighbouring villages or towns. Some recruits wore many hats at the 
same time, and some navigated much more easily than others between their 
different affiliations. The simplest questions were not easy to answer during 
fieldwork: Who is a rebel/militia element? Who is a simple ‘barragiste’ (the 
local term for ‘vigilante’)? The confusion also reached its peak when some of the 
interviewed youths claimed affiliation to one category while they were generally 
classified in another. For instance, someone known to have done (only) vigilante 
work in the surroundings of his village could be referred to as a pro-government 
militia, and two people who fulfilled the same exact function during the war 
could be ‘rewarded’ very differently (I for instance met two siblings in that 
situation in the village of Zouan, near Guiglo. The sister was officially ‘listed’ as 
paramilitary recruit and had received substantial payment, while her brother did 
not get anything.).  
The literature is particularly prolific when it comes to conceptualizing mobili-
zation processes, and much has been written on the propensity of youth to join 
violent movements. Theories can be roughly divided into four stands, none of 
which being mutually exclusive, with some theories being given much more 
credit than others. There are indeed several ways to classify the existing theories 
but the categorization below is based on my own reflection. A first trend is based 
on an assumption of causality that implies that adverse structural conditions 
largely explain engagement with contentious politics.12 A second trend stresses 
the importance of ‘cultural-based’ elements. A (timid) third trend focuses on 
political geography, and a fourth trend tries to bring to the fore the influence of 
                                              
12  Beyond youth studies, this is in line with a broader trend that attempt to assert one – more or less – 
exclusive causal factor that explains contemporary wars.  
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individual emotions in explaining protest behaviour. I develop their main features 
below. Many of these approaches overlap, but they place different emphasis on 
what should be central in the research approach. I come back to this categori-
zation in my conclusions, where I discuss it from a more epistemological per-
spective, but here I present the main features of each theory trend.  
 
• Theories that emphasize a relation of causality 
In a certain stream of literature, youths have been portrayed as a serious threat to 
the existing social order and those living in developing countries have been 
particularly pointed out since they represent the largest segment of the popu-
lation.13 Those living in Sub-Saharan Africa have been stigmatized even further 
since the whole continent has gained a reputation of backwardness and state 
collapse, with scholars pointing out ‘spectacular experiences of social orders 
disintegrating’ (Kaarsholm, 2006: 1). The leading argument in these theories is 
based on the assumption that youths are increasingly being pushed to the margins 
of society. Regardless of the definition one adopts, ‘youths’ are believed to 
display very different characteristics than ‘non-youths’ and some ideas are firmly 
anchored in the popular sociology: youths would be more prone to engage in 
social unrest because they are expected to take up any opportunity thought to be 
likely to relieve them of their perceived condition of outcast (even if only for a 
short while). This conceptualization of youth as outcast is worth a closer look, as 
it points to an important shift in youth studies. From a problematic centred on the 
renewal of generations, Chauveau (Chauveau, 2005a, 2005b) rightly noted that 
the problematic has switched in recent decades to one centred on presenting the 
youth as an apart category. One explanation for this conceptual change is rooted 
in history and in the in-depth structural adjustments that occurred in African 
countries in the 1980s under international pressure. It is well documented that 
young people were particularly vulnerable to these changes by being among the 
first to be affected in terms of access to employment and access to studies. 
Linking joblessness to the propensity to join groups of contestation is therefore a 
step that many analysts took. But not before long, ‘idleness’ replaced ‘jobless-
ness’ in the causal equation, conveying a notion of inherent laziness. Youths 
have been dichotomized in the literature, alternatively presented as ‘vanguards’ 
or ‘vandals’, as ‘makers’ or ‘breakers’, as if there could be no overlap between 
the two concepts and as if the definition of these terms was not arbitrary. One 
                                              
13  One reason why youths have been set as an apart category is numeric. About half of the population is 
under 25 in Sub-Saharan Africa, which has led some analysts to argue that the demographic pressure 
is real and that one of the major stakes is to find a satisfactory way to use the bulk of this active force 
in a positive way. 
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view has emphasized their potential to be agents of positive change; the other has 
conceptualized them as a social problem for society. Several scholars have never-
theless warned against such oversimplification, and have seriously questioned the 
relevance of suggesting a causal link between the fact of being young and the 
fact of being more prone to violence (Abbink, 2005; Abbink & Van Kessel, 
2005; Honwana & De Boeck, 2005a, 2005b). 
Another influential argument in explaining youth’s engagement in violent 
processes is the argument of ‘blocked social mobility’ (Abbink, 2005: 16). It is 
linked to the preceding argument in the sense that it also assumes a causal link 
between the fact of being young and a certain propensity to join violent groups, 
but the reason explaining the link is different. It is not so much because they are 
‘idle’ that youths are likely to end up in groups of contestation. They rather join 
in when they become aware that their room to manoeuvre has been consciously 
limited by the older generation AND when they judge the context opportune for 
certain adjustments to take place. ‘Through looting and violence, the rebellious 
young generation consciously “takes back” what they consider was monopolized 
by the older generation’ (ibid). Teinting the rationale for engaging in social 
action with identity concerns is in line with the current trend in social movement 
theories that emphasize political struggles over material ones. 14  This line of 
reasoning is particularly significant in Africa, as African economies have a very 
low capacity to absorb their educated youth – there is a structural overproduction 
of graduates and inherent frustration over the lack of social and economic op-
portunities. Several scholars have based their argument along the same line, 
postulating that, in the past, youths had quite limited room for manoeuvre, very 
restricted powers of decision and were confined in making their claims heard. In 
contrast, today, youths are believed to have more means at their disposal to 
express their claims – increasing their participation in the local politics or 
resorting to violence being some of their options (Abbink, 2005; Abdullah, 1999, 
2005; Bierschenk & Olivier De Sardan, 1998; Chauveau & Bobo, 2003; Peters & 
Richards, 1998; Richards, 1996). But if there are some examples that show that 
resorting to violence is one response to a situation of stagnation and a lack of 
future prospects (Abbink notably mentions the leftist urban revolt of the Ethi-
opian People’s Revolutionary Party in the 1970s), it should not be taken as the 
norm. After all, the precise dynamics of processes of mobilization remain em-
pirically grounded, vary widely across contexts, and there are many cases where 
structural lacks of opportunities do not necessarily translate into political insur-
gencies.  
                                              
14  Ellis & Van Kessel (2009: 3) rightly point out though that concerns over material issues remain as 
relevant to these struggles as they were to earlier social movements. 
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The ‘blocked social mobility’ argument finds much resonance in theories that 
rest on explaining forms of mobilization through grievance motives (Bazen-
guissa-Ganga, 1996, 1999). While it has been scientifically proven on several 
occasions that rebellions are unlikely to be solely grievance based (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2000), 15  it is important to understand the central concepts behind 
grievance-based theories of conflict to be able to fully capture the complexity of 
violent processes of mobilization. The notions of ‘relative deprivation’ and 
‘horizontal inequalities’ between groups with different characteristics stand at the 
core of such a line of thought, with ‘relative deprivation’ defined as the dis-
crepancy between what people think they deserve and what they actually believe 
they can get (in other words, the gap between people’s aspirations and achieve-
ments) and ‘horizontal inequalities’ defined as ‘inequalities between culturally 
defined groups’16 (Stewart, 2008: 7). The most commonly used example of rela-
tive deprivation is the case of educated young men who cannot find decent 
employment and who eventually join violent mobs in frustration (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2000; Gurr, 1970; Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 2007). Grievance-based 
theories of conflict therefore stress socio-economic inequalities hence poverty as 
a prelude to war. As Cramer pragmatically put it: ‘Where the poor have little 
alternative, there is little to be lost in fighting’ (Cramer, 2006: 75).17 Relative 
deprivation and horizontal inequalities are in fact thought to be important vectors 
of conflict in contemporary wars. 
 
• Theories that emphasize the ‘culture of violence’ aspect 
Another influential argument in explaining youth’s engagement in violent pro-
cesses is the argument of the ‘cultures of violence’, which can potentially explain 
why the militarization of civilians in certain countries is more contained in time, 
space, and degree of violence than in others. For instance, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, 
                                              
15  Collier & Hoeffler (2000) compare them to social movements that emerge in response to socio-
political resentment. They are fuelled by ‘inter-ethnic/inter-religious hatred’, ‘political exclusion’, 
and/or ‘revenge’, but cannot subsist without predation, or they would lack the solid financial base to 
be able to sustain themselves. A lot has been written on greed versus grievance-based theories of 
conflict. Collier’s provocative findings that neither social fractionalization by ethnicity/religion nor 
inequality of income/assets increased the probability of civil war came under much criticism, 
especially in non-economist spheres. However his focus on ‘how to financially sustain a rebellion’ 
had the merit to emphasize money as the very heart of war. In later works, Collier refines his analysis 
and argues against a solely greed-based interpretation of rebellion (Collier et al., 2003; Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004): ‘Loot is not usually the root motivation for conflict but may become critical to its 
perpetuation, giving rise to the conflict trap’ (Collier et al., 2003: 71). Predation remains central in his 
perspective though, and is object of fierce debate between scholars who view it as the outcome of 
warfare, and others who view it as the cause.  
16  In such perspective, group boundaries have to be clearly defined (for instance young vs. old, or 
autochthones vs. foreign). 
17  Yet, Cramer is a fervent critic of theories solely based on grievance rationales. 
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Tanzania, and Botswana have experienced a conflict of much lesser intensity 
than Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone, and even within a country 
itself, if we could argue the example of Côte d’Ivoire, we could argue that the 
southeast region was much less affected by the war than the western districts. As 
Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans (2009: 38-39) put it: 
‘Africa is the continent in which to observe contextualized contestation (…). Countries vary 
in terms of the circumstances they create for contentious politics. The political opportunity 
structures, the openness of the political system for challengers, the access points available for 
people to defend their interests and express their opinions and the temporal political configu-
ration, have all been identified as determinants of the incidence and type of protest.’  
The advantage of adopting this perspective is that it clearly shows that the 
mere combination of lack of opportunities, demographic generational imbalance 
and socio-political tensions is not enough to explain extreme forms of violence in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Abbink (2005: 17) pinpoints important political and sociolo-
gical factors that are likely to play a role in mitigating the escalation of violent 
practices. He stresses the importance of a strong central state tradition and the 
existence of a pattern of values within society that encourages cooperation and 
discursive conflict mediation. He also stresses that a society used to a plurality of 
beliefs and multiple ethnic identities should be less likely to transmit values that 
promote intolerance between groups. This perspective clearly places a strong 
emphasis on the role of leaders and elites in promoting certain values within 
society (or within the social movement they represent). The central question 
becomes then to what extent these leaders and elites are fulfilling a role of 
promoting positive values that promote broad-mindedness, understanding and 
acceptance of other cultures, since they are also known for occasionally pro-
moting negative ones and for regulating part of the local violence when it serves 
their needs. So how to analyze the ways in which values are transmitted? For 
Kaarsholm: ‘This involves an appreciation of the fora and discourses through 
which political understandings and endeavours are constituted; how these fora 
and discourses relate to the state and to each other in different ways, and how 
they change and evolve overtime’ (Kaarsholm, 2006: 13). What is suggested, in 
other words, is a mapping of specific public spheres to get an in-depth under-
standing of their mode of functioning, to investigate how the ‘local’ is consti-
tuted, changed historically and how it is used to interact with other levels of 
society.  
Kaarsholm’s remark links up to an interesting aspect of social movement 
theories, the issue of framing. How are specific facts disseminated to the general 
public? What is the context in which a demand for action is presented? And how 
are such demands interpreted? Several scholars have reflected on these question-
ing (Ellis & Van Kessel, 2009; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009). Be-
cause engaging in collective social processes requires some shared understand-
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ings of who should act, why and how, social movements seek to affect the 
interpretations of the general public and of their members by the information 
they disseminate, a process known as ‘framing’; the maximum is therefore done 
to communicate how a social, political or economic change should be interpreted 
and what should be done about it (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009: 31). 
If a relatively simple and localized fact can potentially be presented by skilled 
leaders as something much larger, one should not forget that there is a multi-
plicity of players capable of framing local discourses in a given arena (political 
parties, armed groups, local elites, the local, national and international press, 
etc,). It should therefore not systematically be taken for granted that a single view 
predominates in a given context and different framing processes might compete 
against each other. This question of framing is particularly relevant for the Ivoiri-
an case since propaganda and hate speech diffused by the local media has been a 
political tool widely used during the period under study, a phenomenon I come 
back to in the Contexts sections.   
As they were tainted by a number of fallacies, theories stressing the impor-
tance of political culture have been somewhat neglected in the past, and when 
they were brought to the fore, cultural traits were at first very broadly conceived 
(for instance as Dutch or French, African or Asian, Catholic or Muslim) and 
there was little room for nuance within such wide categories. Culture itself 
tended to be defined as people’s predominant beliefs and attitudes, without 
recognizing the multiplicity of patterns. Political culture theories also focused on 
elites, as they considered them the only agents capable of paving the way to the 
development of a political culture; they largely ignored the masses. Finally, a 
certain level of growth was believed to be a precondition for the development of 
a political culture to take place (Kaarsholm, 2006: 11). Recent theoretical efforts 
have brought a more critical and dialectical understanding of political culture. 
Firstly, there is now recognition that there might be different political cultures in 
a given context, and that these cultures may potentially struggle for hegemony. 
Secondly, ‘masses’ have been rehabilitated and are now seen as at least as 
important as the local elites in shaping political culture frameworks. Thirdly, it 
has eventually become acknowledged that poor people are not exempt from 
political aspirations (ibid: 11-13). The first point is particularly important since it 
links political cultures with theories of framing, emphasizing the multiplicity of 
patterns.  
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• Theories emphasizing the importance of immediate contexts and political  
   geography 
Arjona and Kalyvas are among the few to recognize the importance of political 
geography18 in explaining mobilization processes. Drawing on a study of coun-
ter-insurgent groups in Colombia, they found that the ability of armed organiza-
tions to rule specific areas has an important effect on the willingness of indivi-
duals to join in. In other words, local territorial sovereignty would be an im-
portant dimension of recruitment in civil wars and would continue to matter as 
the conflict evolves overtime: 
 ‘A country in the midst of civil war is best conceptualized as a fragmented territory and the 
ensuing “micro-orders” are characterized by varying standards of governance established by 
the ruling armed groups. (…) A person is most likely to make the decision to join an armed 
group if she lives in a micro-order where that group has consolidated its power and the 
majority of the community has embraced its rules. This is most likely to occur in localities 
where the group has engaged in a comprehensive type of rule – i.e. if combatants are able to 
establish a monopoly of the use of violence and rule over other aspects of human inter-
action.’ (Arjona & Kalyvas, 2009) 
It might sound self-evident, yet it is striking to note how theories stressing the 
importance of local territorial sovereignty are downplayed in the literature, in 
comparison with theories that rest on assumptions of causality. If one could argue 
that armed groups might conquer areas that are already receptive to them for a 
host of structural reasons, others could oppose that it is only a matter of geo-
graphic and military factors, and that it is an empirical question after all. But in 
both cases, whoever controls a given place is likely to have some influence on 
people’s behaviour. Such way of theorizing rehabilitates the importance of local 
processes of mobilization in explaining the rise and fall of social movements 
(these have lagged far behind explanations that emphasized the grievance and 
structural aspects). It is linked to political cultures theories in the sense that they 
also emphasize processes of framing and people’s perceptions, but it seems to be 
less rooted historically and more subject to drastic reversals (in a contested 
territory, the ruling armed group can be rather quickly replaced by another). 
These theories find particular resonance in our case and will mostly be exem-
plified in Chapter 7, when reflecting on motives to join armed groups. 
 
                                              
18  Political geography is the field of human geography that is concerned with the study of both the 
spatially uneven outcomes of political processes and the ways in which political processes are 
themselves affected by spatial structures (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_geography). 
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• Theories bringing to the fore the influence of emotions for explaining protest  
   behaviour 
Collective action is a group phenomenon rather than an individual one and 
conflict can probably not solely be explained from individualist perspectives 
(Cramer, 2006: 108). But because in the end individuals themselves decide 
whether or not to join an armed group (when they are not being coerced) or 
whether or not they would like to enter a project, it is necessary to examine what 
connects the individual to the collective and the influence of individual emotions 
on protest behaviour. Identification seems to be one answer: 
 ‘People participate not so much because of the outcome associated with participation but 
because they identify with the other participant. Group identification changes the focus from 
what “I” want to what “we” want. Collective action participation is seen as a way to show 
who “we” are and what “we” stand for, and people experience commitment and solidarity 
with other members of the group. In addition, group members have the idea that “we” have 
much in common (by way of shared grievances, aims, values or goals). Group identification 
seems to be a powerful reason for participating in protest.’ (Van Stekelenburg & Klander-
mans, 2009: 32-33) 
People have many social identities. What therefore makes some repertoires 
central to mobilization and others not? Probably the most powerful factor that 
comes to mind when bringing individuals together in some kind of membership 
is conflict or rivalry between groups, the so-called ethnic, religious or political 
wars. Western Côte d’Ivoire is particularly propitious to such development as 
there are many stakes associated to the control of land and a historical back-
ground of contested autochthonous and non-autochthonous rights. But this can-
not explain why violence occurs only at particular times and places, and why, 
even at such times and in such places, only some people participate in it and 
others do not. There is therefore the need to look beyond the influence of social 
identities and to try to provide clues on differential responses to the same 
structural conditions.  
Why do people act so differently despite sharing similar characteristics and 
originating from the same contexts? Why are some aggrieved and not others? 
Why do some feel afraid and ashamed where some feel empowered and proud? 
Social constructivists attempt to draw on explanations founded in emotions to 
seek to uncover interpretation and meaning. The main argument here is that 
structural explanations are limited, because individuals who are in the same 
structural position do not necessarily display identical behaviour (Van Stekelen-
burg & Klandermans, 2009: 30). When they do, their motivational background 
and accompanying emotions can be very different. Little is known about the 
influence of emotions on protest behaviour, and there has been little research on 
the complex emotional processes that channel fear and anger into moral indig-
nation, political activity and violence (probably because these are very complex 
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phenomena which are very complicated to research). Yet it is acknowledged that 
emotions permeate all phases in participation in social movements: they inform 
behaviour at the recruitment stage, during the stay within the group, and when a 
participant drops out (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009: 32-33). Because 
emotions propel behaviour, if one wants to understand engagement in collective 
action, one must understand how emotions work. Obviously, emotions can be 
manipulated. Goodwin, Jasper & Polleta (cited in Van Stekelenburg & Klander-
mans, 2009) argue that emotions are socially constructed, but that ‘some emo-
tions are more constructed than others’. Other persuasive scholars have also 
stressed that participation in social action is rooted in a notion of belonging 
(identification with a group), in experienced grievances (influenced by processes 
of framing), and in emotions that initiate action. In western Côte d’Ivoire, the 
fact that being exposed to the same trouble did not automatically translate into 
participation in violent action is worth careful consideration.  
Concluding remarks 
The contexts under study and the data collected during fieldwork have brought to 
the fore a series of phenomena that are so far under-theorized for situations 
where post-conflict intervention plays a side role in the local system. This 
chapter has called into question several analytical categories (the distinction 
between militia and local vigilante and the dichotomy between civil war and 
political outburst). It has also uncovered some conceptual gaps that this study 
will attempt to fill (the genuine effects humanitarianism has in environments 
where post-conflict interventions do not play such a central role in the immediate 
environment, the extent of manipulation of the intervention by the clients 
themselves going beyond the simple patron-client relation, the extent of a 
possible indigenous recovery with regards to the demilitarization of civilians), 
and it intuitively hopes to strengthen timid theory trends that conceptualize the 
propensity of the youth to join violent movements (namely those theories em-
phasizing the importance of immediate contexts in explaining engagement, and 
those focusing on the influence of emotions). 
But if we want to understand local processes of mobilization/demobilization 
well, it is important to place contentious movements into perspective by ex-
ploring the extent to which particular mobilizing contexts have been shaped by 
their historicity and local context. Several scholars have in fact argued that ans-
wers to questions such as who protests, why people protest and the forms that 
contention takes, lie in the interaction of supranational processes, national poli-
tical processes and local immediate contexts (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 
2009: 37). Different spatial and temporal locations would therefore give birth to 
different forms of action. In the following section, I particularly explore the 
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second factor – the interaction of national political processes with the dynamics 
of non-State armed groups – since national political processes have, in the 
opinion of many, played a major role in leading Côte d’Ivoire into war, and in 
fostering a situation of ‘no war, no peace’ for several years. I also put humani-
tarianism in Côte d’Ivoire into perspective by emphasizing its relative recentness 
and by reflecting on the place it took as post-conflict interventions gradually 
started becoming enmeshed in the national politics.  
 
  
4 
A conducive historical  
and political terrain to the 
militarization of civilians 
The current conflict is deeply rooted in history. It partly results from the 
exhaustion of the old Ivoirian regime, which is no longer able to provide enough 
resources to everyone in a context of economic recession; it partly results from 
political struggles for power, which are exacerbated to some extent by a spirit of 
revenge, as certain groups were privileged over others at certain periods of time; 
and it partly results from the instrumentalization of the population to political 
ends, which has aggravated the fragmentation of society by heightening long-
standing, contentious issues, and which has led several analysts to describe the 
current conflict as a ‘citizenship crisis’. The mere fact that national level politics 
did not have the same effects in all Ivoirian regions is a good illustration of the 
importance of the immediate context in influencing local modes of action and the 
particular receptivity of certain locations to certain repertoires. The ‘citizenship 
crisis’, for instance, could develop in a very propitious climate in the west of the 
country, where tensions between autochthones and non-autochthones were al-
ready a structural issue before the war. 
But if the war that broke out in September 2002 expresses the exacerbation of 
deep lines of fracture (along ethnic, social and economic divides), it is also very 
circumstantial, and as Banégas & Marshall-Fratani (2007) point out, the way 
violence imposed itself in a relatively short period as the central element struc-
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turing the political field raises the question of what place historicity really has in 
this process, as opposed to some kind of reactive contingency activated by ex-
tremely explosive circumstances. I reflect on that below. 
From cosmopolitan politics to a politics of ethnic polarization 
About a third of the population residing in Côte d’Ivoire today is of foreign 
origin, with a total population estimated at 20 million. During the colonial period, 
immigrants from neighbouring countries and Ivoirians from the northern and 
central part of Côte d’Ivoire migrated to the south in large numbers and played a 
major role in the development of the plantation economy, outnumbering the 
autochthones in certain areas who thus became minority groups in their own 
homeland. At the end of French colonial rule, in the 1960s and 1970s, President 
Houphouët-Boigny continued to promote the same trend by applying an open-
minded politics that granted political rights to foreigners, and access to land and 
civil service jobs. He wished to make Côte d’Ivoire the pole of attraction of the 
West African region and viewed the Ivoirian population as a melting pot. In his 
view, there was no need to distinguish between Ivoirians and non-Ivoirians and 
he went as far as proposing dual nationality for all West African migrants (in 
1966). But such a cosmopolitan vision did not find resonance everywhere, espe-
cially among the southern autochthones who were increasingly viewing them-
selves as spoiled of resources. I give below a few keys of interpretation to under-
stand why such open politics were contested at the time, and continue to be.  
 
Colonial times: Valorization of migrants, downplay of certain ‘autochthones’ 
When the first colonists settled in Côte d’Ivoire, they established themselves 
along the east coast, mainly in Agni homeland. It was relatively easy to do so as 
the local populations were relatively receptive, and trade was facilitated by the 
open access to the sea. Although settlement mainly took place on the coast, there 
was also a strong willingness to develop trade with the interior, especially with 
the forested areas, which appeared rather rich in gold, ivory, palm oil, rubber, 
and which offered quite a propitious terrain for the extensive cultivation of 
cocoa, coffee and timber. Dozon pointed out very well the colonists’ dilemma of 
those times: on the one hand, the woodlands were favourable to exploitation; on 
the other hand, in the eyes of the colonial administration, the people who in-
habited these zones (notably the Bétés and Guérés) were seen as primitive and 
backwards. The western woodlands were especially pointed to, since ‘savage’ 
practices such as cannibalism, sacrifices and fetishism prevailed and did not 
seem to be compensated by the type of ‘ordered anarchy’ that existed in the east. 
The western inhabitants were also known for being aggressive and for being 
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fierce opponents of colonization (Dozon, 1997). When, after bitter fighting 
(1908-1913), the colonists finally conquered the west, they partially solved their 
dilemma by promoting massive immigration in these zones, notably by tapping 
into the Ivoirian populations of northern origin. The colonial administration came 
up with a sort of professional categorization along ethnic lines, and promoted it 
over the years. According to this logic, the Malinkés/Dioulas1 were seen as ‘poli-
tically superior’ and as ‘apt’ to become agents of trade. The Sénoufos were 
perceived as good agricultural labour, and it was genuinely believed that the 
Malinkés, Dioulas and Sénoufos would all benefit from a change of region, since 
it had been assessed that the savannahs they inhabited were not really favourable 
to a quick development. As Dozon and Chauveau (1987) put it, the plantation 
economy provided the context in which the colonial state was to ‘produce’ an 
ethnic identity that gave rise to a territorialized and ethnicized definition of 
citizenship and national identity. It was precisely through this process that posi-
tive or negative opportunities were determined. In other words, ‘right’ ethnicities 
were more likely to lead to social mobility and assimilation while coercion and 
exclusion were more likely to be the lot of the ‘wrong’ ones. Now ‘right’ and 
‘wrong’ did indeed vary over time, depending on the political rhetoric, and were 
subject to multiple interpretations.   
Extensive exploitation of the Ivoirian land first occurred where the colonists 
dwelled early on, in south-east and along the eastern coast, in the Agni region. 
This was initially driven by European entrepreneurs who started timber, coffee 
and cocoa plantations, but the new cultures were quickly adopted by the local 
populations, especially the cocoa culture. An indigenous plantation economy 
developed in the 1920s, attracting both autochthonous and non-autochthonous 
producers. The Malinkés/Dioulas, in particular, became involved in peasant 
labour, moving beyond the trader function assigned to them by the colonists, 
towards a function of agricultural producers, having to negotiate their access to 
land with the autochthonous population (Agnis). The Baoulés, originally native 
to the central region, were also keen to migrate south-east to work as paid 
labourers on the existing plantations. By doing so, they were fleeing the forced 
labour duties they had to perform in their region of origin. They became involved 
in negotiations with the autochthones to get access to land and they eventually 
started to exploit their own allotted land, provided they complied with certain 
local arrangements. These migratory movements of peoples and this ‘overstep-
ping’ of labour boundaries (particularly in the Malinké/Dioula case) largely hap-
pened in the margins of the colonial administration.  
                                              
1  Dioula is a generic term to refer to Muslims from northern Côte d’Ivoire or the Sahel.  
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It is within such a context that a first movement of contestation rooted in an 
autochthony discourse emerged in the 1930s. The ADIACI (Association de Dé-
fense des Intérêts des Autochtones de Côte d’Ivoire), an association of natives led 
by educated Agnis, started protesting against various matters. They started cri-
ticizing the Malinkés, Dioulas and Baoulés, who, according to their view, had 
engaged in a process of usurpation of land and were spoiling the autochthones. 
Of course, the ADIACI never mentioned the existence of informal arrangements 
that regulated land use at the local level. But framing the discourse in such terms 
found a certain social resonance and paved the way to follow-up contentious 
politics based on autochthone and migrant antagonism. The ADIACI was also 
particularly vocal against the attribution of civil servants jobs to migrants of 
Dahomese and Senegalese origin. The French had promoted their immigration in 
order to have support in the administration of native affairs, but the ADIACI 
judged the phenomenon excessive, foremost because educated Ivoirians could 
fulfil those positions in the colonial administration (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 
2005; Dozon, 1997).  
By 1950, indigenous cocoa and coffee plantations had spread in western Côte 
d’Ivoire, and the colonial administration had openly encouraged the migration of 
Malinkés, Sénoufos and Baoulés to the area, building on the 1920s experience. 
Given that the French administration had promoted such migration, the dis-
placement of populations from the northern and central regions to the western 
woodlands were much more massive than in the previous period, and native 
populations were outnumbered in many areas. In the region of Gagnoa, the 
autochthonous people (Bétés), who had the disadvantage of having a priori been 
severely judged by the colonists, were excluded from all types of negotiation. 
When indigenous political movements were allowed by the colonial admini-
stration in 1944, the first union to be created was the Syndicat Agricole Africain 
(SAA), led by Félix Houphouët, which was embraced by many northerners and 
Baoulé peasants. Its primary function was to lobby for the abolition of forced 
labour. This was eventually achieved in 1946, when Houphouët, then elected 
deputy and appointed member of the Commission des Territoires d’Outre-Mer, 
presented an abolition act that passed at the French National Assembly. In 1946, 
the political party Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) replaced the SAA 
but kept its electorate base of northerners and Baoulés. Educated Agnis created 
an opposition union at about the same time, and a political party that clearly 
defended Agni rights. The Agni élite was then using the term ‘autochthone’ very 
restrictively, only to designate the Agni population. By opposing the PDCI, the 
Agni opposition movement was clearly trying to safeguard some kind of political 
position. In addition to the PDCI and this Agni opposition party, another political 
movement emerged in the west of the country, the Mouvement Socialiste Africain 
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(MSA), which clashed on a number of occasions with the Parti Démocratique de 
Côte d’Ivoire.  
 
The Houphouët era 
Multipartism did not last long in Côte d’Ivoire and after the country became 
independent in 1960, Houphouët set up a single-party system with PDCI as the 
leading party based on the argument that a single-party system was needed to 
build the country’s social cohesion. While keeping a democratic façade (multi-
partism was never formally abolished from the Constitution), the new head of 
State was keen on silencing any form of opposition.  
Under Houphouët’s 33-year presidency, the agricultural sector grew rapidly. 
Partnerships with foreign companies, particularly with French ones, brought an 
influx of capital to the agricultural sector as well as privileged access to Euro-
pean markets and advantageous agreements on coffee and cocoa which guaran-
teed planters high prices for their exports (International Crisis Group, 2003; 
Losch, 2000). Noteworthily, the former colons were not asked to leave, contrary 
to what was happening in the neighbouring ex-colonies, and instead, new French 
citizens were encouraged to come and bring their expertise. Houphouët’s policy 
of promoting mass immigration from neighbouring countries provided planters 
with a steady labour supply. His famous statement, ‘the land belongs to those 
who cultivate it’, explicitly conceived that the non-autochthonous population 
(Ivoirians and non-Ivoirians alike) had the same rights with regards to land than 
the autochthonous population, if they put the land to use. This was a clear 
political stand, which did not go uncontested at the local level, especially since it 
was so much in rupture with the customary practice that promoted inalienability 
of land for the autochthones. It surely fuelled existing tensions between autoch-
thonous, allochthonous and allogene populations, in situations when previous 
arrangements related to land tenure were already being contested.  
During the 1970s, the Ivoirian economy exploded. It was then mainly based on 
cocoa and coffee exports and cocoa prices multiplied sevenfold during the de-
cade and fourfold for coffee. Houphouët, who was then the largest plantation 
owner of the country, drastically increased his personal fortune. PDCI political 
figures, who had been given land and forests over the years, likewise became 
considerably richer (Wodié, 2003). That was the period of the ‘Ivoirian miracle’. 
By 1979, Côte d’Ivoire had become the world’s leading cocoa producer and 
continues to be the world’s top producer at the time of writing, despite the nine-
year war and the very stringent socio-economic conditions it had to face for the 
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past three decades.2 Côte d’Ivoire also has a long-standing position as coffee 
producer and has been ranked third for several years among coffee producing 
nations (after Brazil and Colombia). Since the start of the war though, coffee has 
suffered a major setback in production. The country is also a major exporter of 
bananas, palm oil and pineapples. The 1970s were the years of opulence, making 
Côte d’Ivoire the economic engine of West Africa. A lot was done to modernize 
the country, and a great deal of public infrastructure (roads, highways, schools, 
hospitals) was constructed during that period. There was a real effort to develop 
all Ivoirian regions: public schools were entirely free, so were hospitals, and the 
government provided enough jobs so that unemployment was not an issue at the 
time (Wodié, 2003).  
Yet such a ‘miracle’ did not go without encumbers. For many, Houphouët 
ruled with an iron hand. The press was not free and violent repression occurred in 
the 1960s and 1970s, targeting anyone who was seen as a potential threat for the 
established order. Between 1961 and 1965, Houphouët organized targeted purges 
that were based on false allegations of plots. From the young elite, Houphouët 
picked the ones who would be susceptible to opposing him one day and incar-
cerated them in military camps. The people he arrested were presumably guilty 
of either wanting to remove him from power or guilty of participation in 
subversive activities. Hundreds were put in jail, including Houphouët’s own 
nephew, Jean Konan Banny, and Seydou Diarra who would later become Prime 
Minister of Côte d’Ivoire between 2003 and 2005 (Wodié, 2003). In addition to 
these purges aimed at individuals, Houphouët violently repressed two secession-
ist movements: the Sanwi crisis at the end of the 1960s, and the Kragbé Gnagbé 
movement in the early 1970s. The Sanwi crisis was an attempt by the Agni king-
dom of Sanwi to retain a separate identity by breaking away from the Republic of 
Côte d’Ivoire, right after independence. Government troops swiftly suppressed 
this movement. In the same vein, but in another region and a few years later, 
another opposition movement was repressed in the Bété region. A local political 
leader of Bété origin, Kragbé Gnagbé, was expressing a lot of grievances against 
the Baoulés who, from his point of view, were taking over Bétés’s land. He 
created an opposition political party, the PANA (on paper, multipartism was still 
a constitutional right according to Article 7 of the Ivoirian Constitution). But the 
party was never legalized by the Ministry of Interior. Gnagbé therefore vehe-
mently denounced the lack of freedom of expression and decided to start a 
secessionist movement. He created the Republic of Eburnie within the Ivoirian 
                                              
2  The list of world’s top cocoa bean countries is based on the latest production estimates for the 
2006/2007 season from the International Cocoa Organization. In 2006/2007, the Ivoirian cocoa pro-
duction still accounted for about 40 per cent of the world output. 
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territory, in the Bété homeland, and he and his partisans led an attack on the city 
of Gagnoa. His attempt at secession ended in a bloodbath. The national army 
crushed the rebels and killed many civilians who were suspected of having 
provided assistance (Wodié, 2003). 
The Houphouët regime was rotted by corruption and it unfortunately became a 
way of life for many people, with those working in the public office being no 
exception. Nepotism became quite common among the Ivoirian elite and every 
time new ministers were appointed they would be keen to promote their kin and 
their kin only. Since, to some extent, the head of State was doing the same, it was 
not really seen as an issue. Houphouët principally hired people of the same ethnic 
origin (Baoulé). Under his thirty-three years of reign, the defence ministry was 
always occupied by a Baoulé, the Presidential Guard was entirely composed of 
Baoulés, and Houphouët’s own nephew was Minister of Defence for several 
years before being replaced (Wodié, 2003). This indeed fuelled some sort of 
tribalism, in sharp contrast with a regime line that promoted cosmopolitan values. 
At the same time, Houphouët gained the favour of the non-Baoulés by dis-
tributing favours and gifts to ‘worthy militants’ regardless of their ethnic affili-
ation and on basis of patronage relationships. Akindès (2009) points out well the 
‘ethnic balancing’ of such a redistribution process, which namely profited a 
young elite recruited on the grounds of the diversity of their regional and ethnic 
backgrounds, who ended up in very lucrative positions. In such ways, ‘ethnic 
balancing’ was used as a political tool to foster some sort of social cohesion. 
Potential disputes were anticipated and mitigated by supplying jobs to known or 
suspected opponents in the public and private administration, in the army, in the 
agricultural domain, and by providing educational advantages for their children. 
In other words, Houphouët promoted a regime that allowed people who fulfilled 
high public functions to live well above the normal standard of living. In ex-
change, they were expected to show continuous support to the head of State. 
Their positions were at stake. This compromise depended above all on an insti-
tutionalized form of clientelism that some scholars described as being ‘oiled’ by 
export revenues (Banégas & Marshall-Fratani, 2007). 
The economic recession in the early 1980s and the liberalization of global 
markets led to a dramatic drop in primary product prices and by the calling into 
question of many of the Houphouëtan pillars. By the end of the 1980s, cocoa 
prices were at the same level in real terms as in 1945 (International Crisis Group, 
2003). Côte d’Ivoire was plunged into a financial crisis that was further worsened 
by government corruption and mismanagement. The State was facing many 
complex issues simultaneously: while it was no longer able to absorb the in-
creasing numbers of educated youth, demands for social services were on the rise 
from the middle class, and civil servants were calling for substantial salary rises 
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(so was the army, and so was the educational sector). The government was 
eventually forced to break its longstanding fixed-price contracts with cocoa and 
coffee planters, and in 1989-1990 prices were cut in half, which immediately 
resulted in mass protest (International Crisis Group, 2003). Since the entire eco-
nomy of Côte d’Ivoire was based on cocoa/coffee exports, it was an economic 
disaster. The country became more and more dependent on foreign funding to 
function, and part of the unemployed educated urban youths started returning to 
the rural areas where they had come from. There, many found that the land that 
they had hoped to claim was held by non-autochthones. With no work and no 
parcel of land to cultivate, xenophobia grew even further. It was at this time that 
the political rhetoric started playing with nationalist feelings, finding a great deal 
of resonance in certain fringes of the Ivoirian population. The notion that im-
migrants were taking ‘the bread out of Ivoirians’ mouths’ (International Crisis 
Group, 2004) has in fact grown over the years, in proportion to the depth of the 
national economic crisis, and has contributed to reinforcing the view that the 
current conflict is foremost a crisis of and about citizenship (such overemphasis 
on rights and citizenship had not been free from criticism and I’ll briefly come 
back to the controversy when discussing the politicization of the ethnicity 
rhetoric). 
The economic crisis has definitely marked the end of Côte d’Ivoire’s idealized 
image of an ‘open’ country, by unveiling the extent of social fragmentation. 
Rather than a melting pot, ‘what we find is a form of cohabitation and division of 
labour amongst communities where each group occupies a specific economic 
niche’ (Banégas & Marshall-Fratani, 2007; Dembélé, 2002). 
Feeling that things were gradually slipping from his grasp, and faced with in-
ternal political dissension, Houphouët eventually (re)introduced multiparty poli-
tics in 1990, starting by the presidential elections – some would interpret this 
political act as a carrot. The first multiparty elections of 28 October 1990 were in 
fact far from being ‘democratic’: candidates had to be vetted by the Ministry of 
Interior, and only PDCI militants and people handpicked by Houphouët himself 
were allowed to run for presidency (Wodié, 2003).3 One year later, following a 
politics of austerity imposed by the World Bank, which forced the State to reduce 
its public expenditures, most notably by cutting off civil servants’ salaries and by 
shifting most of the social costs to the population (schools and hospitals were no 
longer free), violent protests erupted in Abidjan. One of the worst moments was 
the government’s violent repression of a peaceful opposition march in February 
                                              
3  In 1990, there were three political parties in the opposition: the Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs (PIT) 
led by Francis Wodié, the Parti Socialiste Ivoirien (PSI) led by Bamba Moriféré, and the Front 
Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) led by Laurent Gbagbo (Akindes, 2009).  
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1992, which eventually degenerated into an uncontrolled riot (Akindes, 2009). 
Opposition leaders Laurent Gbagbo (FPI), who would later become President of 
Côte d’Ivoire between 2000 and 2010, and Francis Wodié (PIT) spent some time 
in prison following this event. At the death of Houphouët in 1993, the country 
had not yet recovered from the economic crisis and the entire Côte d’Ivoire 
model was still being called into question. 
 
Politicization of the ethnicity rhetoric 
The decade of the 1990s was characterized by intense political struggles and by a 
political crystallization of the autochthony discourse. Henri Konan Bédié, then 
President of the National Assembly, succeeded Houphouët as the head of State, 
first as the interim President (in accordance with Article 10 of the Ivoirian Con-
stitution), and then as elected politician representing the PDCI party, after the 
presidential elections were held in 1995. His main political opponent, Alassane 
Ouattara, who was the last Prime Minister under Houphouët, was barred from 
running in these elections because of a last-minute opportunistic revision of the 
electoral code which raised doubts about his true nationality.4 Ouattara’s party, 
the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR), had emerged out of dissatisfaction 
with PDCI politics and was mainly composed (in the beginning) of discontented 
PDCI militants. It positioned based itself from the start on a northern electorate 
by capitalizing on pre-existing demands from the northern elites who had set on 
paper a ‘Charte du Grand Nord’ in 1992, which called for more participation in 
Ivoirian politics of those of northern origin (Akindes, 2004). When Ouattara was 
excluded from running for presidency in 1995, the two other main parties op-
posing the PDCI (the RDR and the FPI) decided to boycott the elections.  
Autochthonous ideologies – which were already popular within a certain 
fringe of the population – became even stronger in the 1990s when they were 
institutionalized in mainstream politics. They were largely adopted by the FPI 
and became part of its main political discourse. Even Bédié (PDCI), who was 
then the Ivoirian President and the direct political successor of Houphouët, 
openly questioned the past cosmopolitan politics by casting doubt on the sound-
ness of keeping an open immigration policy in a context of unemployment and 
economic recession (Dozon, 2001). Was he trying to draw a clear line between 
himself and his predecessor’s policies? Perhaps it was only an opportunistic 
political move, to put an end to the FPI’s monopoly of the theme. Regardless, 
Bédié placed the issue of immigration control very high on the PDCI agenda. 
The defence of autochthony grew to be couched in ideological terms and Bédié 
                                              
4  He was unable to run for Presidency on the grounds that both his parents were from Burkinabé origin. 
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launched the notion of ‘Ivoirité’ in the national politics (Ivoirian-ness), inspired 
and supported by a large number of Ivoirian intellectuals:  
‘Ivoirité is the set of socio-historical, geographical and linguistic data which enables us to 
say that an individual is a citizen of Côte d’Ivoire or an Ivoirian. The person who asserts his 
Ivoirité is supposed to have Côte d’Ivoire as his country, be born of Ivoirian parents be-
longing to one of the ethnic groups native to Côte d’Ivoire.’ (Niangoran Bouah, ethno-socio-
logist) 
‘Foreigners occupy a dominant, sometimes hegemonic, situation in the Ivoirian economy. 
This massive foreign presence is therefore a threat to the socio-economic balance of the 
country.’ (Jean-Noël Loucou, historian) 
‘Houphouët gives preference to the individual rather than to the citizen. An openness to the 
other of this magnitude transformed the country into a sort of African microcosm, a melting 
pot, in which even today, it is difficult to distinguish precisely the original components.’ 
(Professor Leonard Kodjo cited in Akindès 2003) 
‘The discourse over Ivoirité is part of the general discussion about all the questions which 
underlie the very existence and progress of our developing nation. The fact that it was 
launched during the 1995 elections should in no way reduce it to a dispute dictated by 
political and electoral considerations. It is a fundamental question, which deals with what 
makes a people, its identity and collective soul.’ (ibid) 
‘To build “Us”, we should be able to distinguish from “Them” (…) It is necessary to estab-
lish such “Us/Them” distinction, in a compatible way with the pluralism of nationalities.’ 
(Niamkey Koffi, philosopher, cited in Curdiphe, 2000) 
The concept of Ivoirité basically distinguished between the Ivoiriens de 
souche, which designated the ‘pure’ Ivoirians from the other ones of a more 
doubtful origin (the latecomers, people whose parents were not necessarily 
Ivoirians, etc.). Needless to say that it opened the door to many abuses. The 
concept of Ivoirité formed the base of a new social contract based on ethnic 
polarization. The idea had been developed very sophisticatedly and was tapping 
into a populist repertoire that implicitly conveyed the belief that the country 
would return to prosperity if it focused its strength on core traditions and values 
(implying the need to return to autochthonous traditions, which were presented as 
particularly rich and alive in southern Cote d’Ivoire). The CURDIPHE (Cellule 
universitaire de recherche et de diffusion des idées et actions du Président Bédié) 
was particularly active in promoting these ideas and came up with an elaborate 
categorization. Professor Niangoran-Bouah (anthropologist and high-ranking 
employee at the Ministry of Culture) defined several criteria: people who wanted 
to claim their Ivoirité had to belong to Côte d’Ivoire and be born from Ivoirian 
parents who themselves belonged to one of the autochthonous groups of Côte 
d’Ivoire; ‘genuine’ autochthones had to be related to one of the founding fathers 
of the different provinces; they had to share the language of one of the five main 
groups (Twi for the Akan, Madé-Tan for the Malinkés/Bambaras, Mandéfou for 
the Dan, Siénéfo for the Gour and Magwé for the Krou), and had to have similar 
cultural practices. Autochthony was also dated: those who were already in coun-
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try on 10 March 1893 – ‘when Côte d’Ivoire was born’ – could be designated as 
autochthones, while the others could not (Curdiphe, 2000). If someone fulfilled 
all these criteria, he/she could be recognized as an Ivoirien de souche.  
The date benchmark obviously excluded the populations who arrived later, 
and in particular all those who were attracted by the development of the planta-
tion economy and all those who had been ‘imported’ by the colonial admini-
stration to develop basic infrastructure. Many scholars expert on Côte d’Ivoire 
therefore agreed that the concept of Ivoirité framed in the mid-1990s was a sort 
of claim that fostered the idea of a southern autochthony (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 
2005; Jean-Pierre Dozon, 2000; J.-P. Dozon, 2000). Dozon also warned about the 
double exclusion the ideology implied: on the one hand, excluding the northern 
immigrants (the Burkinabé, the Senoufo, the Lobi), and on the other hand, ex-
cluding certain southerners too (and especially the Bété), on the grounds that 
certain ‘ethnic groups’ would supposedly be less capable of leading the nation 
than others who have a more propitious cultural heritage.5 As the concept of 
Ivoirité was becoming more and more politically instrumentalized by the PDCI, 
it diffused the view that the Baoulés were some sort of super-autochthones with 
full legitimacy to rule the country (after all, Baoulé presidents had run the 
country for 35 years).  
Other scholars have reflected on the negative characterization of some ethnic 
groups (particularly the Dioulas and the Bétés), contrasting those with the pre-
supposed positive qualities of others (the Agnis and Baoulés). As Memel Foté 
(1999) puts it: 
‘The Dioula and Bété are discriminated against using dubious psychological arguments. 
They are not “genuine” in the words of the ideologists, their reactions are unpredictable and 
they are not really to be trusted (…). Significant immorality traits are associated with this 
psychology. According to one person, the Dioula are “lawless unbelievers” and the Bété are 
“violent women-chasers”; another says the Dioula are as malevolent as slaves; a third person 
states the “class education” which is characteristic of “the civilized Akan” is not apparent 
among the other two ethnic groups and their like. (…) These negative anthropological 
factors define in reverse the positive qualities considered desirable in the ideal political class 
of the Ivoirian nation, the assumption being that these are to be found in the Akan alone, 
particularly among the most militant Baoulé and Agni who were the spokespersons.’  
This construction of a positive representation of the self in opposition to others 
has contributed to the accumulation of a whole set of imaginary stories and 
psycho-sociological markers for social groups. These are conveyed in the popular 
culture and ultimately structure the way in which the members of a given terri-
torial space perceive one another (Akindes, 2004; Konaté, 2004). Yet we need to 
be careful when suggesting causal associations. If some analysts have attributed 
                                              
5  I discuss the western Ivoirian ethnic groups in the following chapter. 
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the situation that led to the partition of the country in 2002 to the outcome of a 
longstanding crisis of citizenship (understood as a struggle for redefining the 
content of citizenship, rights and the conditions of sovereignty from two com-
pletely opposite conceptions of citizenship)6 (Banégas & Marshall-Fratani, 2007; 
Marshall-Fratani, 2006), there is the need to go beyond this single explanation, 
especially since the war did more than expressing deep lines of social fracture. 
The Ivoirian conflict that started in 2002 was also very much led by circum-
stances and we need to reflect on what place historicity really had in this process, 
including the historicity of the ethnicity rhetoric in the national politics. 
From the Coup to the war 
The military Coup of 24 December 1999 ended the rule of Bédié and forced him 
into exile one year before the planned presidential elections of 2000. A group of 
young noncommissioned officers took power in a bloodless insurgency, pro-
testing against Bédié’s refusal to pay them overdue wages, the severely degraded 
material conditions in the army, and the corruption and authoritarianism of the 
Bédié government. The months that preceded the Coup were characterized by a 
particularly tense atmosphere dominated by a political discourse framed by 
Ivoirité: an international arrest warrant had been issued for Ouattara who had 
been accused for the umpteenth time of having forged his Ivoirian identity (how 
opportune in those pre-electoral days); several RDR militants had been arrested 
and imprisoned; and while the electoral lists were being updated, several people 
of northern origin had fallen victim to physical and verbal aggression on the part 
of the police and gendarme officers. In such an agitated context, the Coup was in 
fact very much welcomed by the people and was eventually perceived as a 
necessary step towards lowering tensions (Akindès, 2009; N'guessan, 2002). The 
Coup also clearly marked the fact that the identity dimension could no longer be 
treated unidirectionally in politics, i.e. solely limited to the PDCI agenda: it had 
moved beyond a one-party rule. 
The Coup marked the entry of a fresh political figure, General Gueï, not so 
new to the Ivoirian political scene, but not so used to being in the spotlight. Gueï 
was the Army Chief of Staff between 1990 and 1995, until Bédié put an end to 
his appointment after he refused to send the army to curb RDR and FPI oppo-
sition demonstrations. Of Yacouba origin, Gueï was born in the west, in a village 
north of Man. He always denied being at the root of the Coup, yet he was chosen 
to lead the junta and he assumed a leadership role from the start by becoming the 
                                              
6  One conception of citizenship is rather open, while the other is based on the political ideology of 
autochthony. 
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head of the Comité National de Salut Public (CNSP). In early 2000, he formed a 
government with the main opposition parties, from which the PDCI was 
excluded. This strongly marked the end of a forty-year hegemony. The post-
Coup government was presented as transitional and presidential elections were 
announced for October 2000. At first, General Gueï fostered an ‘anti-‘Ivoirité’ 
politics and made clear that framing national politics along ethnic lines was a 
threat to national unity. He was particularly keen on reassuring foreigners and 
nationals of non-Akan origin about their respective ‘historical’ places in relation 
to the construction of the Ivoirian nation (Akindès, 2004: 21). In his first months 
in power, Gueï presented an image of ‘pacifier’ and used several means to such 
ends: he restored Ouattara’s rights on his return from exile, he quashed the legal 
proceedings against him, and he extensively drew on Houphouët’s cosmopolitan 
discourses to promote a peaceful climate (notably by broadcasting past inter-
views of the former President that promoted social cohesion on national tele-
vision). Until March 2000, the Gueï military regime gave the impression that the 
transmission of power to elected politicians would occur smoothly in October. 
But once engaged in politics, Gueï’s tone gradually changed and his position 
hardened. Quite unexpectedly, he announced that he would also run for President 
and as the months passed, he showed less and less willingness to leave his 
position as head of State. The rhetoric of Ivoirité re-emerged, somewhat dis-
guised, 7  and several people were arrested on the grounds of their political 
affiliation. Another military Coup was attempted on May 2000 by militant 
soldiers who were disillusioned by such changes in discourse and attitude; Gueï 
after all was gradually adopting the very ideology against which they had risen a 
year before. The mutiny ended in bloodshed. Some soldiers were tortured and 
killed, and others vanished (Akindès, 2009).  
Between the Coup and the 2000 presidential elections, the army gradually 
disintegrated into multiple factions and semi-autonomous paramilitary groups 
(PC-Crise, Camora, Kamajor, Cosa Nostra, Red Brigade). These factions even-
tually started obeying informal networks and personal clans more than their 
official hierarchy.8 By July 2000, Cote d’Ivoire was described by many observers 
as having descended into a state of near anarchy. The population was racketeered 
by several armed groups, and some military leaders9 in the divided army had 
become unavoidable political actors (Banégas & Marshall-Fratani, 2007; Le Pape 
& Vidal, 2002). Gueï attempted to mitigate the excesses of his troops and suc-
                                              
7  The term was no longer used but the discourses were the same. 
8  This process was already underway under Bédié, who – mainly led by fear of a coup – sowed the 
seeds of division in the army by discriminating against the officers he thought to be close to his 
political rivals (Banégas & Marshall-Fratani, 2007). 
9  The leader of the 2002 insurgency, Staff Sergeant Ibrahim Coulibaly, was among them.  
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ceeded in disbanding one of the paramilitary groups in the summer of 2000 (the 
PC-Crise). However, he was incapable of controlling all of them.  
 
The 2000 and 2001 elections 
It is within such a climate that presidential elections were held in October 2000. 
Ouattara’s nationality had been once again called into question and he had once 
again been excluded from the presidential contest. Gueï and Gbagbo were there-
fore the main contestants. The electoral contest took place in a highly tense 
climate. Gueï attempted to rig the elections by declaring himself winner at the 
end of the first round, which led both FPI and RDR partisans to take to the streets 
to demand the departure of Gueï. But while the RDR was demanding new elec-
tions, the FPI was claiming its legitimate victory. Gbagbo proclaimed himself 
head of State on the grounds that partial electoral results showed that he had 
beaten Gueï, and the protests degenerated into violent clashes between FPI and 
RDR supporters, and with the army (Akindès, 2009). Many people were killed 
and injured during these events and a mass grave was even discovered in the 
northern Abidjan suburb of Yopougon. Gueï fled the country on 26 October and 
Laurent Gbagbo remained, as President of the second Ivoirian Republic.  
A failed coup attempt in January 2001 was blamed on foreigners and resulted 
in large numbers of immigrant workers from Burkina Faso leaving Côte d’Ivoire. 
Municipal elections were nonetheless held in March 2001 and marked an 
important turning point in the country’s electoral history: for the first time, all 
political parties were given permission to compete, including Ouattara’s RDR, 
which won an important number of communes (Mission Des Nations Unies En 
Cote D'ivoire, 2004). President Gbagbo consequently engaged into national re-
conciliation politics and organized a national forum in October 2001 to debate 
the issues that had polarized Ivoirians for many years: the conditions of service 
of the security forces, the fiercely debated questions of nationality and land 
ownership, the criteria of eligibility to run for presidency and the extent of 
legitimacy of the Gbagbo government. The forum proved to be a sort of 
catharsis. Gbagbo, Bédié, Gueï and Ouattara eventually issued a communiqué in 
early 2002 in which they agreed to oppose undemocratic avenues to power, to 
improve the conditions of service of the Ivoirian security forces, to create a 
broad-based national electoral commission, to create a national body that would 
address the question of land ownership, and to form a new government of 
national unity that would better reflect the diversity of the electorate. The new 
Gbagbo government was eventually formed on 5 August 2002 and included 
representatives of the main opposition political parties: 20 portfolios were allo-
cated to the FPI, 7 to the PDCI, 4 to the RDR, 2 to the PIT (Parti Ivoirien du 
Travail, led by Francis Wodié) and 1 to the UDPCI (Union pour la Démocratie 
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et la Paix en Côte d’Ivoire, led by General Gueï). The long-standing controversy 
concerning Mr Ouattara’s nationality, which had been a major source of political 
tension and instability, was finally resolved when an Ivoirian court delivered him 
a nationality certificate on 26 July 2002.  
 
The 2002 uprising 
This short period of appeasement came to an end with the military uprising of 19 
September 2002. At the origin of the putsch were discontented soldiers who had 
initially been close to General Gueï before being thrown out of the army (either 
by Gueï himself or by his successor). Some were facing demobilization in 2003 
under an army reform programme decided upon by the Gbagbo government, and 
many of these soldiers had actually found refuge in Burkina Faso in successive 
waves between September 2000 and September 2002. Those who were facing 
forced demobilization had written several times to the head of State, pleading to 
be retained in military service, or at least to be given a decent demobilization 
package. But their actions bore no fruit, and in addition, they were accused by the 
Gbagbo government of offences under the previous regimes. Some of those who 
were already in exile were tracked down and threatened by Ivoirian agents. It is 
believed that, from 2001 onwards, Burkina Faso played a substantial role in 
training these uncommissioned officers in exile in logistics, communication, and 
clandestine operations (International Crisis Group, 2003). These soldiers in fact 
had little to lose and on 19 September 2002, a number of them led simultaneous 
attacks on strategic military positions in three major Ivoirian towns – Abidjan, 
Bouaké and Korhogo. Under their command were an estimated 800 men.  
When they failed to take Abidjan (the combat operations there only lasted a 
couple of days), they retreated to Bouaké and the attempted coup degenerated 
into a civil war between soldiers that had remained loyal to the State and break-
away army troops quickly supplemented by militarized civilians. While loyalist 
security forces quickly regained control of the situation in Abidjan, the rebels 
retained control of Bouaké and Korhogo and started seizing other towns in the 
northern and western regions as other disgruntled soldiers and civilians swelled 
their ranks.10 General Gueï, together with several members of his family, and 
Minister of the Interior, Emile Boga Doudou, were killed in Abidjan the first day 
                                              
10  If the majority of rebel recruits were of northern origin, rebel forces have always denied having a 
specific regional or ethnic affiliation (Langer, 2003). One of their announced objectives was ‘to put an 
end to the domination by the Southerners’ but it would be a mistake to equate rebel recruits with 
northerners, especially in the west of the country; we will elaborate on that in Chapters 6 and 7, when 
reflecting on the geographic origin of recruits and on the rationales to enlist. If many northerners were 
attracted to the movement, it might simply have been because the recruitment discourse had found 
resonance with them.  
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of the insurgency. The Ivoirian national army (FANCI) launched several military 
operations to dislodge the rebel soldiers from the seized towns, but did so with-
out success. By the end of September, the insurgents were firmly in control of the 
northern and central parts of the country. Bouaké was the main rebellion strong-
hold, and rebels were referring to themselves as the Mouvement Patriotique pour 
la Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI). The country was split in two, leading to – as Arnaut 
(2004: 240) nicely puts it: ‘the kind of geographical framework within which the 
discourse of autochthony flourishes so well’ – and a significant portion of the 
civilian population had been drawn into armed movements, on both belligerent 
sides.  
Many MPCI commanders who led the initial revolt were originally members 
of the paramilitary factions that had emerged in 2000, under the Gueï junta (the 
Cosa Nostra, the Camorra). Some were also former members of the Presidential 
Guard. The majority of the rebel leadership was in exile in Ouagadougou in 
2001-2002 and had left the country after Gbagbo had evicted Gueï from power. 
Staff Sergeant Ibrahim ‘IB’ Coulibaly, former member of the Presidential Guard, 
is credited with having led the 19 September coup from Ouagadougou.11 A large 
part of the armament used for the uprising came from the State arsenal in 
Bouaké, as the government had had it recently replenished in anticipation of a 
counter-coup in Abidjan (International Crisis Group, 2003; Langer, 2003). Staff 
Adjutant Tuo Fozié commanded the military operations in Bouaké and was one 
of the first spokespersons of the rebel forces. He notably signed the first ceasefire 
agreement in Bouaké on 17 October on behalf of the ‘Coordination des mutins’ 
(African Union, 2002) and he was the one representing the MPCI during the 
peace discussions of Lomé.12 Chérif Ousmane was Fozié’s right hand, and be-
came head of the Guépard company during the war, then assistant commander of 
operations for the Bouaké area, and ultimately Com’Zone of the rebel stronghold. 
Other like soldiers, who had also been in exile in Burkina Faso, included Issiaka 
Ouattara (alias Wattao), field commander of the Anaconda Company in Bouaké, 
and Massamba Koné, the Com’Zone of Korhogo, who would later be appointed 
Minister of Development and Planning under the government of national recon-
ciliation.  
                                              
11  ‘IB’ was arrested in Paris in August 2003 and was put on trial in France in the spring of 2008. 
12  Under the government of national reconciliation, he became Minister of Youth and Civic Service. He 
left this function in 2005 when a new Prime Minister was appointed, but has since remained director 
of the Forces Nouvelles police and Maréchaussée.  
67 
When the first peace talks were held in Lomé at the end of October 2002,13 the 
MPCI made a series of military and political demands. On the military side, it 
demanded an amnesty for the soldiers in exile in Burkina Faso and the sus-
pension of the demobilization process planned under the government’s army 
reform programme. These demands were rapidly addressed and on 1 November 
2002, the government submitted a draft amnesty law to parliament that included 
the liberation of jailed soldiers, an end to the open proceedings against the ones 
accused of jeopardizing state security, the return of the soldiers in exile and their 
reintegration into the army. On the political side, MPCI demands were taken less 
seriously. The MPCI had demanded a review of the constitution, the resignation 
of President Laurent Gbagbo, new elections, and ‘an end to the domination by 
the southerners’,14 but these demands were largely dismissed as the host to the 
talks, Togolese President Eyadéma, ostensibly took the position that an armed 
rebellion could make military claims but not political ones. The MPCI eventually 
withdrew its demand for Gbagbo’s resignation and requested instead that a 
transitional government be installed to prepare for anticipated presidential elec-
tions.  
Overall, MPCI forces were estimated to number 10,000 recruits. Two addi-
tional rebel movements emerged at the end of November 2002 before merging 
into the umbrella group, the Forces Nouvelles. I describe these evolutions in the 
next section, when having a closer look at insurgent and counter-insurgent 
groups. 
2000-2010: a decade of FPI rule 
Contrary to contexts where the mobilization of the repertoires of autochthony and 
territorialized belonging can be analyzed as a supranational phenomenon that by-
passes a ‘weak’ state in a context of globalization, the Ivoirian case shows in-
stead the continued vitality of a nation-state, which – with renewed ardour since 
the Bédié Presidency – has been the principal space to construct and make sense 
of the autochthony discourses, as well as the principal space that has used 
techniques to put them into play (Marshall-Fratani, 2006). The mobilization of 
the discourses of autochthony and nationalism has therefore been a conscious 
                                              
13 The two sides ‘acknowledged the need to preserve territorial integrity, respect of institutions, and 
constitutional legality’. They also agreed to respect the ceasefire and to refrain from ‘the recruitment 
and use of mercenaries, enrolment of children, and violations of the accord on cessation of hostilities’ 
and pledged to urge ‘their authorities to refrain from any bellicose acts such as abuses, violence and 
extra-judicial killings’. (International Crisis Group, 2003) 
14  United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI), Conflict Background (cited in Langer, 2003). 
These demands were mediated by Guillaume Soro and Louis Dacoury-Tabley, who were both leading 
the rebellion political branch. 
68 
political strategy for defining, redefining, and controlling certain spaces and 
categories, and this has found a particular resonance in Côte d’Ivoire, since the 
relationship between foreigner and national is essentially considered – as Dem-
bélé (2002) reminds us – in terms of territorialized ethnic spaces. 
The FPI has particularly excelled in using an ultranationalist discourse that 
framed the idea that there can be ‘no identity without territoriality’.15 Such a 
motto has echoed and fuelled, concomitantly, local conceptions of autochthony, 
which implicitly call for excluding ‘strangers’ from certain belonging, while 
constantly redefining who is a stranger and who is not (Bayart & Geschiere, 
2001; Bayart et al., 2001; Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005; Dembélé, 2003). In Côte 
d’Ivoire, a person would define his or her ‘autochthony’ foremost in terms of 
geographical origin and would eventually end up reducing to himself and his 
group the attributes of Ivoirian citizenship. This conception automatically ex-
cludes all others from citizenship – and by others, I mean people from a foreign 
country (allogenes), but also Ivoirians who reside and work in a different region 
than their region of origin (allochthones). It is therefore no surprise that less and 
less distinction is made at the local level between allogenes and allochthones; 
they are usually labeled the same by a population that claims that it ‘was here 
before’, and new conceptions of rights and citizenship are derived from it. At the 
local level, there has been a resurgence of the idea of autochthony in recent years 
with the increasing competition for resources. In certain areas, foreign commu-
nities are being ever more excluded from certain forms of citizenship by cus-
tomary institutions, and this process takes several forms depending on contexts, 
from restricted access to resources or rights, to excessive taxation or over-
regulation of certain social, legal and religious matters. The concept of autoch-
thony has taken a more radical turn in recent years by stressing the importance of 
belonging to one of the ‘right’ ethnicities, which excludes northerners. The FPI 
has only recycled existing ideas, adapting the concept of Ivoirité to its own ends 
by rehabilitating the Bétés over other groups, and by continually toying with the 
idea of who is a ‘real’ Ivoirian and who is not.  
The question of immigration control has been central in FPI politics since the 
party’s emergence. Accusing Houphouët of using northern immigrants as ‘elec-
toral cattle’, Gbagbo fiercely campaigned against foreigners’ voting rights during 
the 1990 presidential elections; he also warned about the too preponderant place 
they had in the national economy. In the early 1990s, it was the FPI press that 
began publishing rumours about Ouattara, suggesting that he was Burkinabé and 
not Ivoirian (Marshall-Fratani, 2006). 16  While it was Bédié who eventually 
                                              
15  The idea was first advanced by Mbembe cited in Marshall-Fratani, 2006). 
16  The press has been an instrument extensively used by politicians to disseminate such libelous ideas. 
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coined the term Ivoirité, Gbagbo had earlier displayed a genuine interest in 
finding scientific ways to legitimize the autochthony of the Bété ethnic group. As 
a historian, he attempted to show in his writings that the Bétés were among the 
very first peoples present on Ivoirian territory (Gbagbo, 2002: 39-42). In 1998, 
he claimed that the violent land conflicts between autochthones and non-
autochthones in the west had nothing to do with ethnic problems but were mere 
‘technical issues’, and that one way to solve this, in his perspective, was to 
relegate the northern autochthones to their zones, eventually with the aid of a 
state development policy (Marshall-Fratani, 2006). His vision of territorialized 
ethnic spaces was clearly stated there, when what he proposed to do was to close 
internal borders and to confine ethnic groups within their assumed territorial 
‘boundaries’.  
During the first two years of the Gbagbo regime, the cleft between FPI and 
RDR sympathizers grew to a worrying extent. The latent nationalism of the FPI 
became state policy and was echoed with increasingly xenophobic and radical 
accents by pro-FPI press and pro-FPI youths just about everywhere. The con-
fusion between Ivoirian northerners and foreign immigrants intensified and led to 
very extreme declarations on the part of autochthones in certain areas.17 Those in 
the army who were thought to be sympathetic to the RDR were demoted, and 
some were even forced into exile.  
The programme of national identification FPI launched in the summer of 2002 
marked a turning point in internal politics. Not surprisingly, this was one of the 
first things rebel forces wanted to put an end to, and national identity records and 
state registries were often destroyed in rebel-held territories, after a town or 
village had been captured18 (several accounts report that rebels were outraged 
when people presented these ‘new’ identity documents at checkpoints). National 
identity cards and the question of ‘usurpation’ of citizenship have been a national 
obsession since the early 1990s, when the structurally deteriorating conditions 
led Ouattara to introduce the carte de séjour for foreign residents. In its pro-
gramme of national identification, the FPI yet differed from the previous at-
tempts to create a reliable system of national identity records in both its 
methodology and conception. The FPI was basically seeking to institutionalize a 
system in which, alongside the place of birth, the ‘village of origin’ would appear 
on the new identity cards and would be consider a key marker to determine 
whether someone was Ivoirian or not. What the FPI was seeking to consecrate in 
                                              
17  See the extracts of the Youth Assembly hold in Bonoua, Ivory Coast, on 22 January 2001. 24 heures 
on 8 January 2004 – article entitled ‘The Bonoua xenophobic laws’.  
18  The Minister of the Interior who had engineered the programme was also murdered in Abidjan in 
September 2002. 
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sum was the principle of territorial autochthony as the main ground for claiming 
national identity and full citizenship (Marshall-Fratani, 2006). What is of parti-
cular interest is that while claiming to be fighting against this very ideology, 
rebel forces paradoxically came to capitalize on it, as their ranks gradually ab-
sorbed people of northern origin and others who were feeling excluded from 
FPI’s extremely restricted conception of citizenship. 
In the ten years of FPI rule, political opposition was quite fragile. A G7 
coalition 19  was formed in 2003, which attempted to project an image of a 
common ‘republican’ front to counter the FPI, but the Gbagbo regime regularly 
refused any form of political compromise, increasingly isolating itself in the 
political scene, a trait that probably reinforced its radical character.   
 
The longstanding controversies on nationality and land 
The question of Ivoirian citizenship has been fiercely debated for decades. It 
peaked with the FPI national identification programme and was recently reset 
high on the agenda during the 2010 elections. The first Ivoirian Code de la 
Nationalité (1961) stipulated that any child born on Ivoirian soil was eligible to 
Ivoirian citizenship on the grounds of ius soli.20 Article 105 provided that those 
whose ‘habitual residence’ was in Côte d’Ivoire prior to independence were 
entitled to Ivoirian nationality if they applied for citizenship within a period of 
one year after the law had been passed.21 Many people missed the deadline, 
mostly out of ignorance of the procedures, or due to being unaware of the time 
limit, or having little interest in ‘formalizing’ their legal status. Few people 
actually saw the need at the time to claim formal citizenship; it was not an 
economic necessity then, everyone had access to land.  
In 1972, the Code was modified and included a combination of ius soli and ius 
sanguini; that meant that any child born on Ivoirian soil was eligible for Ivoirian 
citizenship if he or she had at least one Ivoirian parent.22 This change in law 
unfortunately formalized statelessness for generations of individuals born since 
independence to parents who had not claimed citizenship at a time when they 
could. If the Code provided for the automatic acquisition of Ivoirian nationality 
for an abandoned infant found in Côte d’Ivoire (until and unless the infant is 
                                              
19  The G7 is composed of seven of the ten signatories of the Linas Marcoussis peace agreement of 
January 2003. Apart from the three rebel movements – MPCI, MPIGO, MJP, now grouped together 
under the term ‘Forces Nouvelles’ – the G7 comprises the PDCI, RDR, UNDPCI, and a small party, 
the Mouvement des Forces de l’Avenir (MFA).  
20  Law 61-415, 14 December 1961. 
21  Because Côte d’Ivoire came into existence in 1960, the meaning of ‘Ivoirian’ in Article 6 of the 1961 
Code is itself problematic: no one was legally ‘Ivoirian’ prior to this date; all Ivoirian residents were 
then French subjects. 
22  Law 72-852, 21 December 1972. 
71 
proven to have another nationality), it made no provision for children born on its 
territory from stateless parents. These ambiguities have been explicitly recog-
nized by the 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords (23 January, 2003), which 
explicitly called for amending Articles 6 and 7 of the Nationality Code. The 
Code was eventually amended in 2004, but only superficially, and amendments 
mainly addressed questions of naturalization and procedures of inter-marriages 
between Ivoirian and foreign residents.23 
 
• From the FPI national programme of identification to the ‘audiences foraines’ 
The programme of national identification FPI launched in the summer of 2002 
was quickly put to an end by the war, yet it continued to weigh on political 
imaginaries and administrative practices. To some extent, some of the FPI 
operational procedures were reactivated during the pre-electoral exercise of the 
audiences foraines in 2007. In 2002, the process was as followed: under the 
assumption that every Ivoirian had a village of origin, the procedure for acquiring 
an ID card was for everyone to return to his or her village of origin to request it. 
Protests about this extremely onerous procedure led to the adoption of another 
procedure that enabled the individual to request the card in the place he or she 
resided, with the obligation to cite local witnesses from his or her village of 
origin. The idea was also to have local commissions in place, composed of 
village chiefs, land chiefs, members of leading families and political parties, to 
verify the claim of autochthony. In 2007, following the Ouagadougou agreement, 
the authorities launched a country-wide initiative to provide birth certificates to 
the Ivoirian residents who lacked such documentation, a first step in establishing 
a reliable identification system in order to prepare updated electoral rolls for the 
upcoming elections. Under the agreement, mobile courts presided over by a 
judge (the courts were known as the audiences foraines) started touring the 
country to issue substitute birth certificates (jugements supplétifs) to everyone 
older than thirteen born in Côte d’Ivoire who had never been registered before. 
The nationality of the applicant’s parents was apparent on the jugement supplétif. 
Individuals were asked to claim their jugement supplétif at the mobile court 
closest to their place of birth. They had to be accompanied by witnesses to testify 
as to the truth of the place of birth they claimed. While the registration process 
was free of charge from the applicant request to the transcription in the national 
registers, the applicant was requested to pay a ‘stamp fee’ if he wanted a copy of 
the birth certificate transcript. By March 2008, the mobile courts had issued 
372,810 jugements supplétifs (Bah, 2010). The hearings, which have been inter-
                                              
23  Law 2004-663, 17 December 2004. 
72 
mittent since their launch in 2007, restarted in August 2008 and by the end of 
2008, 2.8 million people had registered at approximately 3,000 registration sites 
(ibid). Such massive enthusiasm for the audience foraines shows a clear depar-
ture from past practices and may be an indication that more and more people 
want to secure some kind of documentation, as local and national regulations 
become increasingly exclusionary. While the certificates issued through this pro-
cess do not conferred Ivoirian citizenship, they nonetheless mark a first step.  
 
• The issue of land 
Another burning issue – very salient in a country which still derives one fourth of 
its income from agricultural exports – relates to the security of land tenure and 
the changes it underwent over time. One of Houphouët’s central state policies in 
relation to land fundamentally linked ethnicity and autochthony to national 
politics: if his 1962 land decree was never implemented, Houphouët’s 1963 
motto – ‘the land belongs to those who made it productive’ – had value of law. 
Until the passing of the 1998 rural land law, non-immatriculated rural land 
officially belonged to the private dominion of the State. Customary law con-
tinued to hold though, but at the local level, in practice, non-immatriculated rural 
land continued to be perceived by autochthones – and even by some non-autoch-
thones – as the unalienable property of autochthonous communities. Chauveau 
(2007) shows well the evolution over time of the state strategies related to this 
question: from a land regime that sought to foster ‘positive discrimination’ in 
favor of the non-autochthones (1900-1950), we observe a shift to a land regime 
that tried to rehabilitate autochthonous rights (1955-1956), and then another shift 
back to a land regime favouring foreigners, that institutionalized several inter-
dictions for levying excessive land taxes on strangers (ministerial decrees of 
1957 and 1961). Then there was a legal vacuum of about 30 years, a period 
during which the State formally disengaged from any form of land regulation 
while informally shaping the customary system of land tenure known as the 
institution of tutorat. The tutorat system was putting the accent on the cultural 
obligations to give access to land to strangers, a sign of African fraternity, but at 
the same time it also favoured autochthones in the sense that complex moral 
obligations were deriving from the obtention of such right. I expand this parti-
cular point in the following chapter but it suffices here to say that the autocht-
honous claims on land were at least as much driven by the desire to continue 
benefiting from the non-autochthonous financial and in-kind rents as by the 
willingness to physically retake a portion of land. The 1998 law marked another 
shift, this time to a land regime that favoured the autochthones by basically put-
ting on paper that foreigners had lost their right to own land. They could lease it, 
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but if they did, they were expected to respect certain local arrangements (Chau-
veau, 2000, 2002a, 2002b; Chauveau & Richards, 2008a, 2008b).  
Chauveau (2007) interprets these policy shifts not so much as a response to a 
demand for more security in land tenure or for the recognition of certain 
customary land rights, but rather as a response, from national political elites, to 
changing socioeconomic contexts that affect the production, taxation and redis-
tribution of export crops. Such stakes he writes, are at the heart of land policies, 
and this is what leads political elites to favour certain groups in the population 
over others, at certain periods of time. Clearly, the 1998 law makes autochthony 
the main source of legitimate entitlement to land ownership, but this is mostly 
due to the socioeconomic context, it is not driven by ideology. Yet depending on 
how autochthony is conceptualized – and at the local level, it may be subject to 
worrying interpretations – the 1998 law opened up the possibility to exclude non-
autochthonous Ivoirians from land ownership. But the passing of the law was 
largely perceived as necessary, in a context where local arrangements were in-
creasingly contested, and where the existing system of land conflict mitigation 
was showing its limits. It is in fact during a conciliatory visit in the west of the 
country in 1997, following particularly violent skirmishes between autochthon-
ous Guéré and allochthonous Baoulé, that President Bédié announced the project 
of reforming the rural land law. The law was unanimously adopted in 1998. All 
political parties had reached a consensus despite its anticipated short-term nega-
tive effects on a certain fringe of the population. The law set out drastic rules, 
one of them being that in the case of a previous land transaction between an 
autochthone and a foreigner, land titles had to be given back to the Ivoirian seller 
at the death of the foreign buyer; there was no possibility of transmission. But the 
law was never implemented in practice. Its implementation was stalled in the 
very beginning by the Gueï military Coup, and in rural areas, informal arrange-
ments continue to prevail between native sellers and foreign buyers, these petits 
papiers being constantly re-negotiated over time, with tacit acceptance of the 
local authorities (Koné et al., 1999).  
The place of humanitarianism in Côte d’Ivoire 
Côte d’Ivoire is not the first nation that pops into mind when thinking of coun-
tries that receive international humanitarian assistance. Its image of ‘Ivoirian 
miracle’ has remained quite anchored in the general public opinion, and despite 
having undergone general impoverishment for nearly three decades, the country 
still appears in rather good shape in comparison with its western and northern 
neighbours. Even at the peak of the crisis, Côte d’Ivoire has been the object of 
limited humanitarian attention. If international agencies started appearing in the 
country in the 1990s to provide assistance in dealing with the massive arrival of 
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Liberian refugees, by the end of 2003 there were only 13 international NGOs 
intervening as a result of the Ivoirian conflict: Médecins Sans Frontières (the 
French, Dutch and Belgian sections), Médecins du Monde, OXFAM, the 
International Rescue Committee, Save the Children (the English and Swedish 
sections), Solidarités, Handicap International, CARE US and AFRICARE. If 
some other INGOs arrived later (notably the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) 
and the German NGO GTZ-International Service (GTZ-IS)24), the number re-
mained close to fifteen. In comparison with the 108 international NGOs ope-
rating in Afghanistan, that was indeed not many.25 The other usual international 
agencies active in the field were the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) as well as the main UN humanitarian agencies: World Food Programme 
(WFP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), International Organization for Migration (IOM), 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humani-
tarian Assistance (UNOCHA).  
If the UN humanitarian system differed in its mode of functioning from 
international NGOs (UN humanitarian agencies are led by a UN Humanitarian 
Coordinator, INGOs are independent), there were nonetheless mechanisms of 
coordination in place: INGOs’ heads of mission were meeting every two weeks, 
the UN coordinated various sectoral groups on health, education, social cohesion, 
in which INGOs took part to share information and coordinate action, and there 
was a weekly UN Inter-Agency Humanitarian Coordination Meeting (IAHCC), 
in which INGOs could take part once a month. In early 2004, on the initiative of 
the UNOCHA, humanitarian agencies institutionalized a regular meeting with 
donors’ representatives present in the country. Humanitarian agencies were left 
relatively free from control and could usually circulate everywhere in Ivoirian 
territory without having to report their movements to any official institution. In 
late 2003, early 2004, most INGOs had to sign an official agreement with the 
Ivoirian State (un accord d’établissement) which provided them with several 
advantages, such as exemption from VAT on purchases, exemption from custom 
taxes when importing goods, exemption from tax on funds sent from abroad, and 
favoured treatment by the immigration services when entering and/or exiting the 
country.  
On top of that humanitarian apparatus, international peacekeeping missions 
came along. Beyond their military aim of monitoring the ceasefire and move-  
 
                                              
24  GTZ-IS is distinct from the bilaterally funded GTZ, which stands for German Cooperation.  
25  http://afghanistan-analyst.org/ngo.aspx 
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Map 4.1 Areas of intervention of humanitarian agencies 
 
Source: UNOCHA, July 2004. 
 
 
ments of armed groups, they also had a role to play in supporting humanitarian 
assistance by establishing the necessary security conditions in the areas of inter-
vention. The first to step in were the French, from the very beginning of the 
Ivoirian crisis. In September 2002, France already had a military battalion 
stationed in Abidjan to honour the defence agreements signed in between France 
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and Côte d’Ivoire on 24 August 1961. Following the start of the crisis, it gradu-
ally reinforced its presence on the ground to 4,000 men in early 2003. The 
French peacekeeping operation in Côte d’Ivoire was baptized Opération Licorne 
and clashed on a number of occasions with rebel forces when they breached 
ceasefires (1 December 2002 in Man, 21 December 2002 and 6 January 2003 in 
Duékoué, 4 April 2003 in Dibobli), and with government troops (6 November 
2004 in Abidjan). Following the first ceasefire of the Ivoirian war (on 17 October 
2002), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreed at 
the end of October to send a military force of 2,000 men to monitor it, taking 
over this task from the French. The ECOWAS peacekeeping mission was com-
posed of troops from Senegal (the leader country of the operation), Ghana, 
Benin, Togo, and Niger.  
The first United Nation Security Council Resolution on Côte d’Ivoire wel-
comed the deployment of ECOWAS forces and French troops (a posteriori) and 
authorized them to take the necessary steps to guarantee the security of their 
personnel and the protection of civilians immediately threatened with physical 
violence within their zones of operation (Resolution 1464, 4 February 2003). The 
second UN Resolution on Côte d’Ivoire (Resolution 1479, 13 May 2003) estab-
lished the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) for an initial pe-
riod of six months. The MINUCI mandate was to facilitate the implementation 
by the Ivoirian parties of the Linas-Marcoussis agreement and also included a 
military component, as complement to the French and ECOWAS operations. 
After several extensions of the MINUCI, ECOWAS and French mandates, the 
UN Security Council eventually decided to establish a UN peacekeeping ope-
ration in Côte d’Ivoire (the ONUCI), which took over the missions previously 
carried out by the MINUCI and ECOWAS (Resolution 1528, 27 February 2004). 
The ONUCI consisted of military and civilian staff and its military strength was 
set to a maximum of 6,240 United Nations personnel.26 Its initial mandate was 
for 12 months starting on 4 April 2004, and was extended several times as the 
peace process regularly stalled. ONUCI staff was gradually deployed, building 
on existing MINUCI and ECOWAS resources, with Bangladesh, Pakistan and 
Morocco being major contributors of military personnel. French forces remained 
deployed, under an independent chain of command, and continued to be manda-
ted by the UN Security Council to provide support to the UN Operations in Côte 
d’Ivoire. 
                                              
26  Since then, the authorized (man)strength of the ONUCI has been reviewed and changed by the Secu-
rity Council on a number of occasions, depending on the situation in the country and the needs of the 
mission. 
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It is beyond the scope of this study to explore in depth all humanitarian inter-
ventions that have been implemented since the start of the Ivoirian crisis. But 
since one aim of this research is to explore local processes of demobilization, I 
must take a closer look at the general driver behind interventions aimed at re-
inserting ex-combatants.  
 
DDR in Côte d’Ivoire 
Reinsertion programmes for ex-combatants have become standard interventions 
in the aftermath of war and are usually part of a planned process that includes a 
Disarmament phase, a Demobilization phase and a Reinsertion component to 
facilitate the transition from soldiering to civilian life. The entire process is 
referred to as DDR and is widely fostered in international diplomacy. The Linas-
Marcoussis agreement (23 January 2003) was the first document that addressed 
the question of DDR in Côte d’Ivoire. UN Resolution 1528 (27 February 2004), 
which set the ONUCI mandate, later included a disposition that empowered the 
ONUCI to assist the Government of National Reconciliation in this process. With 
regard to DDR, the ONUCI mandate was to help undertake the regrouping of all 
the Ivoirian forces in cantonment sites, then to guard weapons, ammunition and 
other military materiel handed over by the former combatants, and finally to pro-
vide support to implement the national DDR programme. According to ONUCI 
estimates (September 2006), the Ivoirian DDR process was expected to target 
37,914 rebels (FAFN), 4,000 soldiers of the regular army who were recruited 
after 19 September 2002 (FANCI/FDS), 2,000 militia members from the western 
region (FLGO, AP-Wê, MILOCI, UPERGO, FS-Lima), 4,000 children associ-
ated with the above armed forces and groups, and 3,000 people considered ‘at 
risk’. At the time of writing, DDR had not yet started for the main belligerents 
(the FANCI and the Forces Nouvelles), and militias had only been partially dis-
mantled in the summer of 2006 (981 individuals). 
While Chapter 9 empirically explores the humanitarian aspect of DDR by 
examining two instruments of reinsertion widely used in post-conflict politics to 
help resocialize young people temporarily drawn into armed groups (the supply 
of transitory financial safety nets and the provision of short-term vocational 
training), I focus here on the link such a type of ‘humanitarian programming’ has 
with the national political processes (and progress).  
If we look at the chronology of DDR-related events, the general impression is 
that of a political yoyo. Negotiations between parties to the conflict progress, 
inter-belligerent communication resumes, a new peace agreement emerges (to 
usually confirm the road map of the previous ones), and eventually implement-
ation fails because of some stalling somewhere (which leads to a hardening of 
positions, increased tensions and rupture of dialogue until the next mediator 
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fosters another round of negotiations). In sum, the start and implementation of 
DDR seems to depend much more on political and military matters than on 
humanitarian principles.  
 
• A political yoyo 
Both Linas-Marcoussis and Accra III international agreements (respectively 
signed on 23 January 2003 and 29-30 July 2004) specifically addressed the issue 
of DDR and included a first plan of action. Prime Minister Diarra announced an 
initial starting date of 8 March 2004 which in the end appeared quite an un-
realistic deadline since rebel forces were unlikely to agree to disarm before the 
deployment of the UN peacekeeping force on Ivoirian territory (this was ex-
pected to start in April). The Accra III Agreement set a second starting date on 
15 October 2004:  
‘The [DDR] process will be conducted on the basis of a specific timetable, in accordance 
with the relevant provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement and the decisions adopted in 
this regard in Grand Bassam and Yamoussoukro. The DDR process shall include all para-
military and militia groups. It is also agreed that the restructuring of the defence and security 
forces should be undertaken in accordance with the road map delineated at Grand Bassam.’ 
(Accra III Agreement, 30 July 2004).  
The initial idea was to split the disarmament phase in three stages (with phase 
1 starting in central Côte d’Ivoire, followed by phase 2 targeting the west and the 
east, and then phase 3 ending with the disarmament of armed forces in the north 
and south). The National DDR Commission (CNDDR) suggested later that the 
process should start in the east and west of the country simultaneously. The 
initial road map was therefore updated and encompassed six areas: preliminary 
operations, awareness raising, regrouping of forces, disarmament, demobilization 
and a reinsertion/reintegration component. The DDR process did not start in 
October as planned, because the rebel forces announced that they were not 
prepared to disarm in the absence of political progress (namely, the other dis-
positions of the Accra III Agreement: the delegation of powers to the Prime 
Minister, the resumption of the work of the Government of National Reconcili-
ation, and the criteria for eligibility to run for the presidency). The rebellion 
therefore stopped its collaboration with the CNDDR for a while. November 2004 
was the period of violent clashes between the FANCI and the French forces and 
in early 2005, the CNDDR was restructured to ensure a more balanced repre-
sentation. Rebel forces and the Ivoirian Army eventually resumed their coopera-
tion with the Commission after more than one year of stalling. Unfortunately, the 
seminar to finalize the National DDR Plan was cancelled at the last minute 
because the FANCI and the French forces again entered into violent clashes in 
Bouaké (Boshoff, 2005, 2007). 
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The peace talks of Pretoria marked another benchmark in the Ivoirian peace-
building process as they formally ‘ended’ the country's state of war (Pretoria 
Agreement, 6 April 2005). It was decided that FANCI and FAFN Chiefs of Staff 
would resume contact (they had had no official communication for a few 
months) and their first meeting was scheduled on 14 April to specifically discuss 
the implementation of the National DDR Plan. It was also recommended that 
specific suggestions be formulated with respect to the restructuring of the de-
fence and security forces into a new army; the commitment to disarm and dis-
mantle pro-government militias was also reiterated. At a follow-up meeting, the 
CNDDR proposed a third date for the start of the DDR process, 14 May 2005. 
The start of the process was conditioned to financial and technical aspects but 
also to the extent of progress made in the non-DDR aspects of the Pretoria agree-
ment (Boshoff, 2005). The date was eventually postponed one month, following 
talks in Yamoussoukro that clarified certain practical DDR modalities. The start 
of disarmament of the regular troops (which designated all FAFN rebel recruits 
and all FANCI soldiers recruited after 19 September 2002 in the government 
army) was eventually scheduled to start on 27 June 2005 and to end on 10 
August. It targeted 42,564 rebels and 5,500 FANCI forces, and included indivi-
duals who might eventually be susceptible to being integrated into the restruc-
tured Ivoirian army (AFP, 2005; Reuters, 2005). 
Following violent clashes in Duékoué in early June 2005,27 the start of the 
DDR process was once again delayed. The international community condemned 
the Duékoué massacre and pledged action to prevent a repetition of similar 
events (Declaration of Pretoria, 29 June 2005). The Declaration of Pretoria laid 
out another framework for DDR and for the first time set on paper that it would 
not be possible to hold the presidential elections in October 2005 without first 
demobilizing and disarming the armed parties involved in the conflict. DDR and 
political reform had to go hand in hand and the adoption of key laws28 constituted 
a prerequisite for the start of the process. The disarming of the regular troops was 
rescheduled for the end of July 2005 under the assumption that the laws would be 
amended by then. On 9 July 2005, political talks were held in Yamoussoukro 
pledging all FAFN recruits and all FANCI soldiers recruited after September 
2002 to start assembling at the agreed pre-cantonment sites (these talks became 
known as the Yamoussoukro Declaration). A timetable was also set for reforms 
                                              
27  Forty-one people were killed in the villages of Guitrozon and Petit Duékoué, and 61 wounded by men 
armed with machetes and guns. Chapter 5 gives more contextual information on this particular event.  
28  The Pretoria Declaration had set a deadline, 15 July 2005, to amend seven key laws: related to the 
reform of the Independent Electoral Commission, the financing of political parties, the Ivorian nation-
ality, the issue of national identity documents, the establishment of a human rights commission and 
the regulation of newspapers, radio and television.  
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to be passed. An additional aim of the Yamoussoukro talks was to foster the 
disarming and dismantling of the western pro-government militias and to have it 
completed by 20 August 2005. But if the adoption of reforms respected the 
chronogram set in Yamoussoukro, various laws were passed by presidential 
decree and remained contentious, which led to another political deadlock and to 
another refusal by the rebel forces to start the process of pre-cantonment. 
Arguing that some reforms were inadequate, the political wing of the rebellion 
withdrew from the peace process on 25 August 2005 (Unowa, 2005). With DDR 
failing to happen, the October 2005 presidential and legislative elections also did 
not happen as planned and the African Union had to extend by twelve months the 
mandate of the Ivoirian President and his Prime Minister. In October 2006, their 
mandate was extended by a year for a second time due to a continuing political 
deadlock, and a new election date was set for October 2007.  
Between August 2005 and April 2006, the FAFN and the FANCI Chiefs of 
Staff had cut all lines of communication. In early April 2006, disarmament talks 
resumed among them under the mediation of the African Union Chairman, 
Congolese President Sassou Nguesso. It was then decided that both the processes 
of disarmament and identification would be conducted concomitantly instead of 
one before the other (ICG, 2006; UN, 200829). The FAFN agreed to start dis-
arming after the dismantling of the pro-government militias and the dismantling 
of the western militias eventually started at the end of July 2006, but was cut 
short due to the low weapons yield (Chapter 9 provides more information on the 
dismantlement of pro-government militia elements, while this section focuses on 
the disbanding of the regular troops, the post-19-September FANCI and the 
FAFN). Followed another political stalemate, another extension of the presi-
dential mandate (the third one) and the controversial passing of UN Resolution 
1721 which transferred important presidential prerogatives to the Prime Minister. 
Specifically, it enabled the Prime Minister to legislate independently of the 
President and the Parliament, and to exert ‘necessary authority’ over armed 
forces (UN Resolution 1721, 2006). In reaction to this diplomatic confiscation of 
power, President Gbagbo proposed to engage in a direct dialogue with the Forces 
Nouvelles, as much as possible stripped of international influences. This new 
position led to the Ouagadougou talks on 5 February 2007, and to a new political 
agreement, the Accord Politique de Ouagadougou (APO, 4 March 2007). With 
respect to DDR, the APO reiterated its attachment to the Yamoussoukro Decla-
ration, to the last version of the DDR timetable, and to the Plan Conjoint des 
Opérations. Two new national institutions were created to implement the DDR 
                                              
29 Available at: 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/pp.aspx?c=glKWLeMTIsG&b=2876173&printmode=1 
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process (the CNDDR was dissolved), with the military components falling under 
the responsibility of the Centre de Commandement Intégré (CCI), and the re-
insertion elements becoming part of the PNRRC (Programme National de 
Réinsertion et de Réhabilitation Communautaire). On 30 July 2007, President 
Gbagbo visited the rebellion stronghold of Bouaké (the first time he stepped into 
rebel territory since the start of the war) and attended a weapon-burning cere-
mony that symbolically announced the start of the disarmament process. A few 
weeks later, a first programme for the voluntary demobilization of FAFN recruits 
started in Bouaké, and on 22 December 2007, joint parades of rebel and 
government troops in Tiébissou and Djébonoua marked the official start of the 
DDR process for the regular troops. Government troops and the FAFN were 
expected to move away from their front-line positions and to start handing over 
weapons. On 24 January 2008, the FANCI Chief of Staff General Mangou 
announced the withdrawal of 12,000 FANCI soldiers from the front line and the 
completion of their cantonment in barracks. Shortly after, the rebel army Chief of 
Staff General Bakayoko announced the start of the FAFN cantonment process. 
By mid-March, 118 rebels had officially surrendered their weapons. The imple-
mentation delay in rebel-controlled territory was attributed to a lack of structures 
to house the combatants. In the south, barracks were already functional, so it was 
relatively easy to gather the elements. 
These positive moves of late 2007, early 2008, could not hide the fact that 
DDR was again faltering. In June 2008, FAFN elements rioted in Bouaké over 
delayed disarmament payouts, mixed FAFN/army brigades blocked the road 
between Yamoussoukro and Bouaké in protest of the non-payment, and in 
August the same year, 300 rebels demonstrated for the same reason. At the end 
of 2008, the DDR process had again come to a halt and the election date of 30 
November 2008 was once again postponed. The main contribution of this DDR-
related chronology has perhaps been to strikingly bring to the fore the inter-
twinement of political progress and humanitarian objectives. 
 
• The process on paper 
Two main documents define DDR practice in Côte d’Ivoire: the Plan Conjoint 
des Operations (PCO) signed in Yamoussoukro on 9 January 2004 by both 
FANCI and FAFN Chiefs of Staff, by the impartial forces (the then ECOWAS 
and Licornes), and by the Head of the CNDDR (the PCO was last revised in May 
2005); and the National DDR Programme, which includes a timetable adopted on 
9 July 2005 by both FANCI and FAFN army Chiefs of Staff (the Yamoussoukro 
chronogram). The PCO clearly states that all combatants have to surrender their 
weapon(s), including FANCI and FAFN recruits, but also any individual in 
possession of arms. Disarmament and demobilization operations are supposed to 
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be carried out based on a list of recruits and a list of equipment has to be 
provided by both belligerents. The National Commission for DDR has the overall 
responsibility to carry on the process (PCO, 2004). The process includes four 
steps: 1) Cantonment; 2) Disarmament; 3) Demobilization; 4) Reinsertion. ‘Can-
tonment’ is the process by which armed forces regroup in a secure compound to 
demobilize and disarm, ‘Disarmament’ consists of the collection, control and 
disposal of weapons, ‘Demobilization’ is the process by which armed forces 
downsize or completely disband, and ‘Reinsertion’ refers to the process by which 
militarized individuals make the transition from military to civilian life. The 
terms are defined more extensively in Chapter 9.  
Seventeen possible cantonment posts were identified by FAFN and FDS 
Chiefs of Staff (they were called the ‘DDR zones’). Should the official DDR start 
for the regular troops (if ever), disarmament and demobilization operations were 
expected to take place in eleven of these zones.30 Each zone would in theory 
consist of four sites: one site for registering, disarming combatants and relieving 
them of equipment; another site for demobilization; quarter areas for the ones re-
entering the army (also called casernement site); and a specific site for under-age 
combatants. In the first site, combatants would be welcome, disarmed, registered, 
photographed, and examined by a doctor. They would then be either oriented to a 
demobilization site or to casernement barracks. There, demobilized combatants 
would fill in a questionnaire where they would express their wishes and clarify 
their main skills, based on which the CNDDR would determine what measure(s) 
of reinsertion would fit them best. From the day of registration to their final 
orientation, it was expected that each recruit would stay no longer than five days 
in a DDR zone (PCO, 2004). 
The National DDR Plan entitled demobilized combatants to a safety net 
package of 499,500 CFA francs (EUR 760) for six months, disbursed in three 
installments: 25% paid upon demobilization, 25% paid 45 days later, and 50% 
paid 90 days after demobilization. The package was planned to be distributed at a 
regional office, upon presentation of a demobilization ID card. Ex-combatants 
were then expected to be oriented depending on their choice of activity and 
depending on whether they would want to be transferred back to their home-
towns or villages of origin, or whether they would prefer to settle elsewhere. The  
 
                                              
30  In the northern part of the country (controlled by the Force Nouvelles) there were 5 DDR zones: 
Bouaké, Bouna, Korhogo, Man and Séguéla. In the southern part of the country (controlled by the 
FANCI/FDS) there were six: Abidjan, Guiglo, Daloa, Yamoussoukro, Bondoukou and San Pedro 
(UN, 2008). Most of these zones had undergone extensive rehabilitation works at the time I was doing 
fieldwork, and ONUCI had already allocated some containers at these DDR sites to store and secure 
the ammunitions and arms that would be collected during the disarmament process. 
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Figure 4.1      The planned Ivoirian DDR process 
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plan also foresaw individual advice on available reinsertion/reintegration oppor-
tunities. It was expected that demobilized recruits would receive enough informa-
tion on possible educational grants, short vocational training, job placement, 
income generating activities and possibilities for micro-credit. More substantial 
financial assistance was also proposed for the ones wishing to resume their  
studies (up to 200,000 CFA francs), those who would prefer to engage in tech-
nical training (supplying of tools kits), and those who would opt to set up their 
own business (an individual loan up to 180,000 plus 150,000 CFA francs for the 
purchase of equipment).31 It is a real pity these generous measures were never 
applied in practice. 
 
• The linking of funding to political progress 
Curiously, the issue of DDR funding has hardly been front-page news and it is 
only recently that (partial) funding has been secured. What dominated the Ivoiri-
an media and the political discourse since early 2003 has been the political yoyo: 
Should DDR precede the identification process? Should it run concomitantly 
with it? Is DDR completion a condition for holding elections? But while simple 
calculations would show that to be able to provide 40,000 combatants with the 
agreed safety net, this would imply the quick disbursement of USD 37.6 million 
                                              
31  http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=51#approach: accessed Jan. 23 2009. 
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in cash, finance-related issues were rather downplayed.32 The cost of DDR was 
estimated at USD 150 million for the period 2005-2008, and funding was far 
from being secured before the second half of 2007, boosted by the apparent 
success of the APO and the World Bank announcement in April that Côte 
d’Ivoire had become eligible for a loan. The agreed scheme was that the Ivoirian 
government would contribute 30%, international donors 20%, and the World 
Bank the remaining 50% by providing an USD 80-100 million grant.33 At the end 
of 2006, approved multilateral and bilateral contributions amounted to USD 16 
million34 (plus another USD 6 million funding DDR related projects). The World 
Bank had not yet disbursed its contribution due to unpaid arrears in debt pay-
ment. This is in fact a disturbing example of political manipulation of aid: it is 
indeed quite strange to make the payment of debt arrears conditional to financial 
support for a peace-building process. It is then only in July 2007 that the World 
Bank reiterated its commitment to partially fund the DDR process. It publicly 
announced the approval of a USD 120 million IDA grant in support of the 
government’s crisis recovery programme.35 A third of the grant was directed to 
DDR programming and specifically to the financing of the economic reinte-
gration component of ex-combatants, youths associated with armed groups, and 
youths at risk (USD 40 million). Most of the operating costs of the PNRRC were 
supposed to be covered by it. Another important source of funding for DDR was 
secured in July 2008 when Arab donors agreed to loan USD 463 million for 
infrastructure development and reinsertion of ex-combatants (ICG, 2008; World 
Bank, 2007).  
Concluding remarks 
Beyond the fact that this section presented an historical overview of Ivoirian 
national political processes and that it linked these to broad processes of mo-
bilization and demobilization, the genuine attempt of the chapter was to place 
                                              
32  The amount of the safety net package in Côte d’Ivoire (USD 940 or EUR 760) has been subject to 
controversy when compared to the amount used in Liberia and Sierra Leone (USD 300).   
33  On April 2007, the World Bank agreed to lend USD 100 million to Côte d’Ivoire for disarming 
recruits in exchange for the repayment of past debt interest. But it was not until 17 July 2007 that the 
World Bank announced the approval of this USD 20 million IDA grant. The grant was meant as 
general support for the government’s crisis recovery programme (ICG, 2007). 
34  The multilateral and bilateral donors who committed to contribute to DDR financing are UNDP, 
UNICEF, France, the EU, Japan, Denmark and Sweden. 
35  The World Bank’s programme had been suspended in Côte d’Ivoire due to the start of the crisis in 
2002 and the government failing to pay arrears in 2004. The grant approved in 2007 is known under 
the name ‘Post-Conflict Assistance Project’ (PCAP).The PCAP represents part of the World Bank’s 
increasing re-engagement in the country since the signing of the APO. The World Bank is working 
closely with its partners, including the United Nations system, the European Commission and the 
International Monetary Fund in aiding the Ivoirian authorities make the transition from war to peace. 
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contentious movements into perspective by exploring the extent to which 
particular mobilizing and demobilizing contexts had been shaped by their his-
toricity, in order to avoid overestimating its effects. I was therefore particularly 
careful when suggesting causal relations, especially when reflecting on the ethnic 
roots of conflict and/or on the ‘citizenship crisis’ argument. Meso and micro 
political processes being inherently complementary, the next chapter continues 
this contextualization exercise but this time by exploring the extent to which par-
ticular mobilizing and demobilizing contexts had been shaped by their immediate 
environments. This necessary complement eventually strengthens the analytical 
grounds to reflect on the real place historicity took in these processes, compared 
to other factors perhaps more contingent and circumstantial. As already mention-
ed, the mere fact that national level politics did not have the same effects in all 
Ivoirian regions illustrates well the importance of local contexts in influencing 
local modes of action. Some areas were far more explosive than others, and if 
self-defence groups did not only emerge in the western region and also devel-
oped elsewhere,36 the violent and enduring forms they took in certain locations 
show that some areas were more receptive than others to some forms of populist 
rhetoric. The western context, with its history of immigration, contested land 
rights and structural intercommunity violence, was particularly receptive to the 
instrumentalization of the autochthonous discourse towards hostile ends. Chapter 
5 presents the main aspects the conflict took in the western region and the micro-
ethnographic contexts of the geographical areas under study. 
                                              
36  See the works of Banégas (2008) and Chauveau & Bobo (2003).   
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Photograph 3: Market scene, Man 
 
Photograph 4: Rebel taxation on small businesses, Man 
  
5 
The immediate context 
The way western Côte d’Ivoire has been presented since 2002 in the local press 
and in international reports has been somewhat misleading. The region tends to 
be depicted as a homogeneous area, differences are downplayed, and what is 
suggested is a certain form of uniqueness: in comparison with what the other 
regions of Côte d’Ivoire have experienced in the past decade, the situation in the 
west is supposedly more extreme, more violent, more militarized, and these ob-
servations led many analysts to assume that the west was likely to undergo a 
process of unique societal changes. The ‘Ivoirian Wild West’, which stretches 
between Danané, Man, Duékoué, and Toulepleu (see Maps 5.1 to 5.4), has be-
come a name commonly used to label the area (BBC News, 2005), and countless 
reports perpetuate the myth of a region doomed to violence, cultural divide and 
inter-ethnic tensions (Agence France Presse, 2005; BBC News, 2004a, 2004b). It 
has in fact become quite a challenge to reverse these perceptions. 
But there are many wests within the same boundaries. Not only in terms of 
territorial sovereignty – between 2002 and 2010, the towns of Danané, Maha-
pleu, Man, Logoualé were controlled by rebel forces; Duékoué, Guiglo, Blole-
quin, Toulepleu, Zouan-Hounien were in government-controlled area; and Ban-
golo, Zou and Diéouzon used to be part of the buffer zone in between1 – but also 
because the sub-areas display quite different characteristics in terms of ethnic 
                                              
1  The buffer zone here refers to the Zone de Confiance, already described in a previous footnote.   
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composition, migration dynamics, economic activities and political affinities. 
The Yacoubas are the autochthonous population in Man and Danané, the Guéré 
area comprises Guiglo, Blolequin and Toulepleu, and the Wobés live on the 
outskirts of a rebel stronghold, when they have more traditional affinities with 
the counter-insurgent movement. It is worth noting that if these autochthonous 
groups had been mapped in 2007, they would not have shared the same borders 
as their local administrator. Many people of Wé origin found themselves split by 
the ex-front line in fact, and I heard many anecdotal examples of individual 
allegiances that defied conventional keys of interpretation (Yacoubas fighting on 
the same side as Guérés for instance). This chapter presents the main aspects the 
conflict took in the western region and the main features of the ethnographic 
context. The Man and Guiglo areas are particularly detailed at the end of the 
chapter, since they were chosen as terrain for doing fieldwork.  
The general atmosphere:  
Chronology of violent events in the west (September 2002-2007) 
Starting with a chronology of violent events is key to helping the reader grasp the 
general ambiance that prevailed in the west through the different phases of 
conflict. Western residents have been particularly affected by acts of extreme 
cruelty during the six months of warfare that lasted from November 2002 to May 
2003, when belligerent parties were scrambling for territory with the help of 
particularly brutal allies. Unluckily for them, they have not been spared in the 
years that followed, when the stage of open warfare was replaced by widespread 
banditism and by a vicious circle of intercommunity violence, which connected 
many times to enduring war factions. If bloodshed caused by acts of war only 
lasted a few months, killings, petty crime, fear and general mistrust have conti-
nued over the years, fueled by the regular occurrence of violent events in the 
western region, which often took the form of inter-ethnic clashes.  
Far from being exhaustive, the chronology presented below (Table 5.1) puts to 
paper a certain number of benchmarks and is used as a way to reflect on the 
turmoil that reigned in the region since the start of the war in September 2002 (a 
longer version is presented in Appendix 1 with the detailed sources documenting 
the events). The chronology is particularly illustrative of the shift from a classical 
form of warfare composed of attack/defence operations to large-scale inter-ethnic 
violence; it was already a structural issue before the war, which the 2002-2003 
events exacerbated. In Guéré government-controlled territory, violence especially 
targeted the non-autochthonous populations, Ivoirians and foreign nationals alike 
(Burkinakés, Baoulés, Dioulas, etc.). In the Zone de Confiance, where no clear 
authority prevailed during the period under study, the local prerogatives of the 
non-autochthones were instead strengthened, and they started playing a leading 
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role in local security matters (see for instance in the chronology the particularly 
violent clashes between Guérés and Burkinabés in Toa Zéo in 2006 and the 
involvement of the dozo brotherhood2 in the process). The chronology shows 
well that in the rural societies under study, any type of petty crime began to be 
interpreted as an act of war and was systematically framed along ethnic lines, 
calling for a ‘group’ response and entering thereby a vicious cycle of retaliation. 
I come back to these remarks later in the chapter, when reflecting on the dif-
fusion of violence in those rural societies. To clarify the outline below, I use the 
terms autochthone, allochthone and allogene when needed, using the definitions 
clarified in an earlier footnote (Chapter 1, footnote 6). 
 
 
Table 5.1  Chronology indicative of the atmosphere of violence peculiar to western 
Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2007) 
7 October 2002 As the military front moves West, autochthonous Guéré 
youths are mobilized by local authorities to protect their 
villages. Escalating violence against allogene Burkinabés 
living in the area (especially on the Duékoué-Kouibli axis, 
villages of Blodi, Iruzon, Diahouin, Toa Zeo, and Kouibli). 
Burkinabés flee en masse.  
3-4 November  Rebel forces attack the local firm Sucrivoire in Borotou-
Koro, 150 km north of Man, taking 42 tons of sugar, cash 
and various equipment. 
28 Nov.-1 Dec.  Rebel forces take the towns of Man, Danané and Zouan-
Hounien on 28 November. Man is recaptured 2 days later 
by loyalist forces and cleansing operations follow 
(arbitrary arrests, summary executions, etc.). 
2 December Moving south along the Liberian border, rebel forces take 
Toulepleu. 
6-7 December Rebel forces then move east and take the town of 
Blolequin. Five days later (12 December), loyalist forces 
retake the town aided by autochthonous militias. 
19 December Man is recaptured by rebel forces. Cleansing operations.  
Map 5.1 
20 December Rebel forces take Bangolo and the villages nearby (Blodi, 
Iruzon, Toazeo, Sibabli and Kouibli). It is now the turn of 
                                              
2  The dozo designates a group of traditional hunters from north of Côte d’Ivoire, armed with hunting 
rifles and believed to have mystical powers. Since the early 1990s, they were commonly employed as 
local security providers thoughout the country, in both rural and urban areas. Armed with shotguns, 
mystic amulets, and wearing traditional clothing, they were widely praised for significantly reducing 
crime rates and were notably used by political parties to secure their respective rallies. Fearing that the 
dozo would get out of control, Bédié physically confined their activity in 1998 by prohibiting them by 
law to exercise their activity in another region than their region of origin (Bassett, 2004). Within the 
framework of the current war, the dozo phenomenon has been revived and dozos have been increas-
ingly contracted by local authorities to provide local security – especially in the Zone de Confiance 
and in the rebel-controlled areas. The agreement is generally formalized through a contract signed 
between the dozo and the local authorities (Human Rights Watch, 2010). 
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the Guéré autochthones to flee the area en masse. 
10-12 Jan. 2003 Loyalist forces retake Toulepleu. Surroundings are looted 
and set ablaze. 
14 January  Ethnic tensions explode in Guéré territory (Bagohouo, 
Nidrou, Yrouzon, Blodi, Bahé Sébon). Circumstantial 
alliances occur between allogene Burkinabés and rebel 
forces to fight autochthonous youths. 
25 February Attacks on Baoulé farmers (allochthonous) in the area of 
Guiglo. 
7 March At least 60 civilians are killed in Bangolo by Liberian 
mercenaries. The Dioula quarter (allochthonous) is 
targeted in particular. 
22-23 March 
 
The village of Dah, 9 km southwest of Bangolo, is attacked 
at night. It is locally interpreted as an act of retaliation for 
the Bangolo event.  
6-14 April Loyalist forces launch a major offensive along the Liberian 
border between Toulepleu and Danané and recapture 
Zouan-Hounien (6 April). One week later, rebel forces 
retake Zouan-Hounien. 
6 May Despite the ceasefire (3 May), loyalist forces attack rebel 
positions and retake the town of Zouan-Hounien for the 
second time. 
Map 5.2 
23 May Impartial forces are deployed in the west to monitor the 
ceasefire. A buffer zone is instituted, the Zone de 
Confiance (ZdC), which separates government and rebel 
territory by a neutral area. 
20 November Heavy fighting between autochthonous Guérés and 
allogene Burkinabés in the village of Zou, in the ZdC. 
8 January 2004 Guéré youths raid Kahin (in the ZdC), a village populated 
in majority by Baoulés (allochthonous) and Burkinabés 
(allogene). Eight people are killed in the attack. 
18 February Three Burkinabé farmers (allogene) are killed in Duékoué. 
20-27 April Fighting between autochthonous Guérés and allogene 
dozos in the villages of Diéouzon and Kouibli.  
18-19 May A Togolese (allogene) is found dead in Guiglo. 
2 June A Dioula taxi driver (allochthonous) is found dead in 
Guiglo.  
1 June 2005 The villages of Petit-Duékoué and Guitrozon are attacked 
by armed men, leaving 41 dead and 60 wounded, all of 
autochthonous Guéré origin. 
Map 5.3 
 
6 June 
 
Reprisals immediately follow. Three Dioulas and 1 
Burkinabé are killed by autochthonous militias in 
Duékoué. Later, 4 Guérés are attacked. 
5-6 Febr. 2006 
 
Unidentified armed men attack the encampment of 
Peehapa (part of the village of Mona), 17km from Guiglo. 
Twelve autochthones are killed. 
13 February In retaliation for the Peehapa killings, Guéré youths from 
the villages of Mona and Zouan plot to launch an attack 
targeting the Burkinabé camp in Guiglo. Local authorities 
intervene and contain the youths. 
Map 5.4 
10 April First day of disappearance of a Baoulé farmer 
(allochthonous), last seen near Petit Guiglo. 
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1 May 
 
Guérés accuse Baoulés (allochthonous) and Burkinabés 
(allogene) of having set fire to several autochthonous 
plantations in the village of Gohouo Zagna, east of 
Bangolo.  
3 May A Burkinabé is reported missing in Gohouo Zagna.  
4 May Three autochthonous Guérés are found dumped in a hole, 
hands tied behind their backs, stabbed to death. Four other 
Guérés fall into an ambush in the same area but succeed to 
escape and alert the impartial forces. 
20 May Armed individuals attack a passenger truck in Saada, 20 
km of Guiglo.  
29 May Armed men attack two buses between Bangolo and 
Guehiebly. 
24 June 2 Burkinabé children aged 3 and 6 (allogene) found dead 
in Douekpé.  
27-28 June French forces discover the corpse of 7 autochthones in two 
villages near Douekpé. Fifteen are wounded. It is 
interpreted as an act of retaliation for the murder of the two 
allogene children. 
Early November 
 
Toa Zéo allogene Burkinabé leader calls on the dozo 
brotherhood to protect his community. The decision is 
contested and leads to internal clashes (1 dead).  
19-20 Nov. Tensions escalated when the dozos move from Toa Zéo to 
Blodi. Autochthonous militias become involved, leading to 
6 deaths, the burning down of an allogene encampment, 
and the emptying of nearby villages.  
4 December In Téapleu, an accident between a bus and a motorbike 
degenerates into ethnic conflict between Yacoubas and 
Dioulas. Some houses are set alight.  
 8 January Several coffee/cocoa plantations located between Duékoué 
and Blodi are burnt down, allegedly by autochthones. 
14 January Six young autochthonous Guéré of the village of Baoubly 
are declared missing after having gone fishing near a 
Baoulé encampment. 
23-24 January  Two persons of Baoulé origin (allochthone) are lynched in 
the village of Baoubli, between Bangolo and Logoualé. A 
Burkinabé (allogene) is stabbed to death near Baoubli. 
not 
mapped 
25 January 
  
A 90-year-old Guéré autochthone is found dead on his 
plantation, feet bound and beheaded. 
 23 May 2007 Allochthonous and allogene dozos kill four thieves in the 
Zou area. 
Source: See Appendix 1 for the detailed sources. 
 
  
   Map 5.1   Types of violent events in western Côte d’Ivoire from 19 September to 31 December 2002 
 
   Source: Compiled by the author based on a chronology of violent events using GIS, 2010 
   Map 5.2 Types of violent events in western Côte d’Ivoire – 1 January 2003 until the Zone de Confiance being set up (23 May 2003 
 
  Source: Compiled by the author based on a chronology of violent events using GIS, 2010 
   Map 5.3   Types of violent events in western CI – from the Zone de Confiance being set up (23 May 2003) until December 2005 
 
  Source: Compiled by the author based on a chronology of violent events using GIS, 2010 
   Map 5.4 Types of violent events in western Côte d’Ivoire during the year 2006 
 
  Source: Compiled by the author based on a chronology of violent events using GIS, 2010 
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Temporality of conflict, changing mobilizing contexts 
If we surpass the first impression of ‘spiral of violence’ that comes from the 
reading of such lines, what comes out of the chronology is a useful contextual 
information that enables to draw different conflict phases and that enables to 
introduce a certain temporality to the analysis of conflict in the west of the 
country. The Ivoirian war has neither been linear nor continuous, even in the 
west, even in the worst months of conflict. There have been ups and downs, 
periods of extremely brutal confrontation, periods of relative pauses, and im-
mediate contexts have been largely shaped by the occurrence of these specific 
events. Armed factions’ mobilizing discourse and recruitment strategies have 
changed overtime, especially when the belligerents needed to reinforce their 
troops with fresh recruits prior to a major attack or counteroffensive, and the 
witnessing and hearing of certain events have certainly influenced individual 
interpretations of immediate contexts.  
The detailed chronology has been mapped using a geographical information 
system (GIS) and is visualized by Maps 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. The maps clearly 
show the shift from a period of warfare mainly characterized by combat opera-
tions and that lasted roughly until May 2003 (capture and recapture of towns, 
moving front line, displacement of populations) to a period of more diffuse 
violence characterized by violent settling of accounts, systematic retaliation 
based on ethnic grounds, and acts of pure banditry (that period more or less 
lasted until the recent events of 2010-2011).  
Between September 2002 and May 2003 (Maps 5.1 and 5.2), several phases 
shaped the period of warfare in the west: when rebel forces recaptured the town 
of Man in late December 2002, when loyalist forces recaptured the Toulepleu-
Blolequin axis in early 2003,1 the period of sharp fighting for control of the road 
between Danané and Toulepleu in April 2003, the hunting down of Liberians 
when the Ivoirian rebels decided to split from their inconvenient friend (January-
May 2003), and the setting-up of the Zone de Confiance in May 2003, which 
completely changed the local balance of power in certain places and provided the 
geographical space to allow widespread unpunishable banditism.  
If there was a temporality of conflict, there was also a temporality in the pro-
cesses of mobilization, and reports of military attacks, counter-attacks, purges in 
ranks, killings of individuals, acts of retaliation, robberies, allegations, rumours, 
                                              
1  With the help of Liberian recruits (mostly recruited from anti-Taylor movements), the government 
launched a major offensive and regained control of Toulepleu in January 2003. By the end of Febru-
ary, the northern loop of the road between Blolequin and Toulepleu was under the control of Liberian 
fighters allied to the government and to Guéré militias. The presence of the Ivoirian national army was 
minimal in this area and ended at Blolequin.  
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have all played their part in radicalizing positions and in shaping immediate con-
texts on either side of the front line.  
 
• On the counter-insurgent side 
Close to the front line, in the government-controlled areas, militarized civilians 
largely consisted of young autochthones of Wê origin (Guérés, Wobés). Prior to 
the rebel attacks, mobilization first resembled an advanced form of urban/rural 
vigilantism, more structured and better armed than usual, which aimed at pre-
venting rebel incursions in villages and towns not yet taken by the rebel forces. 
The capture of Vavoua by the rebellion was an important trigger to set up these 
self-defence groups on a massive scale, since Vavoua was considered the north-
eastern gateway to the western region. People realized that the threat was real 
and that, in no time, the military front would move westwards and would directly 
threaten them. At various levels, civilians were therefore encouraged to mobilize 
into self-defence groups and to set up checkpoints (‘corridor’ in Ivoirian French 
or ‘barrage’) in order to protect key entry and exit points at specific locations. 
The Ivoirian army spokesperson, Jules Yao Yao, made a public statement on 
television in that regard, on 18 October 2002, encouraging youths to take appro-
priate measures in self-defence. At a more local level, the city, district or pro-
vincial authorities gave the Guéré youths permission to organize, and in many 
cases, were actually the ones promoting this armed mobilization. This period was 
pretext to many abuses of power. I come back later to this point when reflecting 
on the ethnicization of conflict in the west, but there is here the need to mention 
that the function of added security these barrages were supposed to fill quickly 
derived into a means of extortion and a way to violently assert some sort of 
autochthonous legitimacy, and control checkpoints started to be used as racke-
teering locations for systematically nicking money and goods from the non-
autochthonous population (allochthones and allogenes alike), even from those 
well known to the barragistes.2 This particular phenomenon marked the begin-
ning of a worrying trivialization of violence at the village level: verbal harass-
ment and physical assault had started to become a norm in these societies.  
After this checkpoint period came the time to fight. Particularly widespread 
mobilization occurred in Guiglo in early December, after the rebel forces cap-
tured the towns of Toulepleu and Blolequin in Guéré territory. Many autoch-
thonous Guéré youths reported having been extremely shocked by the distress of 
the displaced people they saw – their ‘parents’ – who were passing through town 
as they were fleeing combat. With the rebels only a few kilometres away, a 
                                              
2  See Chauveau & Bobo (2003) and Chauveau et al. (2010). 
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recurrent concern was that Guiglo would soon be attacked, and if the insurgents 
encountered no resistance, Guiglo residents – and especially the autochthonous 
Guéré – could experience the same distress. At the local level, municipal 
authorities and community leaders toured the immediate surroundings and called 
for volunteers to participate in the war effort. Each village was asked to send 
between 30 and 50 youths and there was no retaliation if fewer volunteered. 
Counter-insurgent movements were quick to emerge in the west, fostered by 
local ‘comités de crise’, who had been set up at the start of the war by municipal 
and district authorities. If one of the genuine mandates of these committees was 
to alleviate suffering of the local population (a declaration by the comité de crise 
of Bangolo went as far as to publicly contradict pro-government propaganda in 
order to obtain basic assistance),3 they also played a major role in motivating the 
autochthonous youth to lend a hand to an Ivoirian army that was often described 
as being struck by high desertion rates (Pana Press, 2003o). Counter-insurgent 
groups rapidly evolved into organized armed militias and eventually played a 
major role in pushing the rebels back from Taï, Toulepleu, Blolequin and 
Bangolo in late 2002. I describe these armed factions in detail in the next chapter. 
At the national level, large-scale mobilization was boosted by Minister of 
Defence Bertin Kadet’s call on national television on 8 December 2002. This 
came amidst reports that rebel factions were advancing eastwards from the 
Liberian border. ‘We are calling for mobilization because, with the increase in 
the number of fronts, we need to increase the size of our defence forces’ (BBC 
News, 2002).4 Thousands of young Ivoirians thronged the headquarters of the 
national armed forces in Abidjan in response to the appeal of the minister. If 
some were driven by pure patriotism and included Guérés who had moved 
outside their region of origin, many were also driven by the prospect of getting a 
permanent job in the army. Three thousand civilians between 20 and 26 years old 
were incorporated into the national army – they were later labeled the ‘post 19 
September’ recruits. Some of them were already in the armed branch of the 
Young Patriots movement and would later be nicknamed ‘les soldats Blé Goudé’. 
Not surprisingly, the youth wing of the opposition urged its partisans to use all 
                                              
3  ‘Contrary to a certain press and to what FANCI’s press releases suggest, the department of Bangolo 
has been continuously controlled by the rebels since 20 December 2002.’ Such a declaration was all 
the more surprising since its author – the President of the comité de crise of Bangolo – was known for 
being a member of the FPI, the President’s political party (Notre Voie, 2003a). 
4  ‘Ivoirians are showing the desire to go to the front and they should be satisfied’, he said. ‘The people 
of Ivory Coast will apply all the resources at their disposal to struggle on the side of President Laurent 
Gbagbo and his government to put an end to these aggressors and liberate our country.’ The declara-
tion came after the discovery of a mass grave in the western village of Monoko-Zohi, following 
intense fighting between government and rebel troops. The government denied any responsibility, 
stating that government forces ‘are not in the habit of burying their dead in common graves’ (BBC 
News, 2002). 
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republican means to oppose the mobilization call made by the Minister of 
Defence (Pana Press, 2002d, 2002f).  
Of the many youths who had volunteered but had not been selected, some 
were eventually sent to the front line to strengthen the base of the western 
militias. During this period of open warfare – which lasted roughly until May 
2003 – checks intensified on both sides to discover suspected ‘enemies’. Sus-
picion could fall on anyone and fake denunciations were commonplace. The 
mere fact of displaying an amulet could be interpreted as a need for special 
protection, hence as a feature of a combatant. Amulet holders could be ‘dozos’, 
one of these traditional hunters present and active in the security arena for de-
cades in Côte d’Ivoire, and recruited by the insurgents at the very start of the war.  
After the period of open fighting, a time of urban/rural vigilantism recurred, 
followed by a time of more ‘hidden’ military operations (opérations de ratissage 
in the bush, infiltration, spying). This period lasted roughly until 2005 in the west 
and a bit longer in the Zone de Confiance, a period after which several indicators 
point to a relative return of normalcy, at least in matters related to warfare. 
Checkpoints were still in place during this time, with the misconduct we know 
and following a logic of ‘protection/extortion’ (Banégas, 2010); on both belli-
gerent sides, autochthones and non-autochthones were using war as pretext to 
expand their respective assets. This is perhaps the most worrying development 
that took place in Ivoirian rural societies: violence had become so diffuse in some 
places that it has been quite difficult to disentangle structural forms of ethnic 
violence from war crimes – and it was probably an impossible task between 2002 
and 2006. Agier warns about the emergence of such a culture of violence and 
against the tendency to transform every social problem into a new front of 
violence, regardless of the cause. Reflecting on the period known as ‘La Vio-
lencia’ in Colombia and its sixteen years of cycles of killing and retaliation, he 
argues that when a society is marked by an extremely violent history, the col-
lective memory of violence eventually overshadows the causes of major and 
minor conflicts, especially when all actions are committed in total impunity 
(Agier, 2004: 236). A possible effect is that violence can come to be regarded as 
ineluctable in certain contexts, ‘as a plague that can strike at anytime’, ‘as a 
historical phenomenon beyond individual control’ (ibid). Western Côte d’Ivoire 
is particularly at risk of internalizing such a culture of violence. Somehow 
legitimized by the climate of extreme violence that prevailed during the period of 
open fighting, long-standing inter-community tensions and pre-war clashes have 
found a new breeding ground and more extreme forms of expression to manifest 
themselves, especially since checkpoints and their corollary of abuses have 
become extremely difficult to put to a halt in certain locations (Maps 5.3 and 
5.4). To paraphrase Vlassenroot (2006: 65), a bitter effect of those self-defence 
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groups and counter-insurgent militias is that it reinforces the view that violence is 
a legitimate strategy of defence while at the same time suggesting that it is a 
legitimate strategy for creating change. In western Côte d’Ivoire, from certain 
autochthones’ perspective, resorting to violence can be seen as a legitimate way 
to rehabilitate too long spoiled autochthonous rights, when dispossessing allo-
genes and allochthonous farmers is perceived as a way to take back what belongs 
to Guérés. But such a focus on local conceptions of rights should not negate the 
fact that, in certain instances, these acts of dispossession have little to do with 
ethnic identities. Sometimes, they are only disguised ways for an individual to 
grab someone else’s resources in an attempt to achieve some kind of upward 
social mobility. Rather conveniently, western Côte d’Ivoire has provided the 
contextual background needed to legitimize this. Confiscation of successful 
agricultural plantations has actually been a real issue in the western region during 
the period under study (especially in Guéré territory); I come back to this point 
below when describing how militia leaders eventually had to become involved in 
these types of land conflict mitigations. The issue of confiscation of the Baoulé’s 
plantations has in fact been particularly salient in the Guiglo area, exacerbated by 
the war and the displacements of populations. 
 
• On the insurgent side 
Mobilizing contexts also evolved over time in the rebel-controlled areas. During 
the first weeks of insurgency, the rebellion leadership paid particular attention to 
minimizing abuse of civilians. In the towns they captured, in the villages they 
took, rebels made a point of behaving quite cordially towards the population. In 
Man, right after having taken the town, the rebels hold information meetings with 
civilians and even distributed food. ‘They broke into a storehouse where loyalist 
forces had stored their food – they had just been supplied – and they took the tins 
of sardines and gave them to the people’ (Human Rights Watch, 2003b). Such 
‘altruistic’ features in the early stage of a rebellion are not unique to the Ivoirian 
case, and may even mirror, to some extent, the beginning of the insurgency in 
neighbouring Sierra Leone. 5  Although rebel forces never claimed to have a 
specific regional or ethnic affiliation, many early joiners were of northern origin 
and had experienced some form of discrimination based on their ethnic back-
ground. In that sense, they were sharing some common grievances with the 
population in the north which was particularly receptive to their seizing of power. 
                                              
5  Early rebellion in Sierra Leone could be considered ‘altruistic’ in the sense that young people 
mobilized to fight for their dreams of responsible government and a strong state. In the later stages, 
Richards suggests that it turned into a ‘fatalistic’ civil war, where desperation turned into extreme 
destructiveness (Kaarsholm, 2006).  
  
101
In many areas, therefore, at the start of insurgency, the rebellion was perceived as 
some kind of liberation movement. Rebels were praised by the local crowd, and 
the rebellion leadership was quite keen on fostering such an image.  
But the early days of insurgency should not be romanticized. If rebel forces 
reportedly drafted consenting civilians (including prisoners detained in police 
stations), forced conscription was also rather common in the areas they 
controlled, a trivial reason being that the base of the movement had to be manned 
well enough to be able to pose a serious threat to the loyalist forces. Sometimes, 
the village chief was asked to give the rebels young men for recruitment. Re-
cruitment strategies resembled then what was happening on the other side, yet 
with the major difference that it was impossible to refuse – some form of 
retaliation usually occurring if too few men joined the rebel ranks.6 But as the 
war intensified in the west and with the increasing involvement of the Liberian 
suppletive forces, recruitment methods hardened and rebel forces eventually 
started to systematically take people by force, without even bothering taking 
contact with the local chief. An account of a Yacouba villager is particularly 
telling: ‘The rebels arrived in a jeep and a four-by-four. Some of them were 
soldiers and others were youths who did not seem to be there by choice. They 
asked where the customs office and the gendarmerie were. They were after the 
corps habillés. After ransacking the town hall, they organized a meeting with the 
population. They told us not to panic, they were there to help, they were not after 
the people, only after the administration and the corps habillés.’ (Human Rights 
Watch, 2003b). In Zouan-Hounien, several testimonies collected by Human 
Rights Watch reported that rebel forces left people in peace in the beginning, but 
that things worsened when the Liberians entered the town: ‘The rebels came at 
the end of November. At the beginning they left people alone, then, the Liberians 
came, and things really worsened for the population. First, they looted the houses 
of those who had fled, the houses of the government officials; then they started 
attacking Guérés, then the foreigners. Now, they even attack the Yacoubas. For 
them, it does not matter if you are a Christian, a Muslim or a cow, they kill you 
anyway.’ The following description of a Dioula family, attacked in Toulepleu by 
Liberian elements of the MPIGO fighters, is particularly telling: ‘The rebels said 
they would not hurt civilians, so we were surprised when they broke our door 
down and asked for money. My grandmother was coming out of the shower. She 
was shot dead. My older sister went to get the money, but she was trembling so 
                                              
6  Although this point has to be nuanced, Liberian backed forces were known to exploit civilians: ‘From 
Blolequin to Péhé, it is all mercenary checkpoints and bodies, all along the way, new bodies and old 
bodies, maybe three to four weeks old. They force you to work, to bury the bodies.’ (Human Rights 
Watch, 2003b) 
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much that she was slow. They said the money was not enough and they shot her 
in the chest.’ Those stages are the most worrying, when all popular enthusiasm 
fades away, when perceived ‘liberators’ turn against the very ones that they are 
supposed to set free, when control is lost, and when the initial fervour is replaced 
by the abrupt realization that the paths of war are foremost destructive.  
On either side, Liberian suppletive forces committed massive looting and 
exactions. I do not want to develop much the reasons for the use of such troops in 
this book – it would be beyond the scope of this study – but in order to give the 
reader some keys to interpret the western context, I briefly describe what 
happened then. Liberian mercenaries were known to use extreme forms of 
physical violence and to show no mercy; much of their loot was sent to Liberia. 
The promise of Ivoirian richness was perhaps the main driving force for many of 
those Liberian fighters, after all they were all coming from a devastated country. 
If they first started stealing from the property of those who had fled the area, they 
quickly targeted the remaining people, threatening everyone suspected of having 
assets remaining. The loot included money, food, vehicles and other personal 
property (Liberians sent hundreds of tons of such items across the border), but 
also primary resources. The cocoa and coffee harvest for instance (which takes 
place between October and January) was also ripe for taking. Diamonds and gold 
were also taken, especially around the Zouan Hounien area, where there were 
reports of forced labour working in the Ity mines (Human Rights Watch, 2003b). 
Close to the Liberian border, the towns of Danané and Zouan-Hounien were used 
as logistic platforms to organize this particular trade. 
 
The slip into large-scale inter-ethnic violence 
In the first months that followed the start of the war, several journalists and 
political figures made allegations that Burkina Faso was backing the insurgents. 
The displaying of rebel captives of northern origin in the local media (Burkina-
bés are easily recognizable by the scarification they have on their faces) height-
ened popular hostility against these groups and had immediate repercussions in 
the agrarian societies of the interior where most Burkinabés live.7 Burkinabés 
became the ideal scapegoats and were systematically attacked after each rebel 
                                              
7  About a third of the population residing in Côte d’Ivoire today is of foreign origin, out of a total 
population estimated to be 20 million. Burkinabés are the most important foreign community in Côte 
d’Ivoire and represent more than 55% of the foreign nationals who live in the country (about 2.5 
million people). The majority lives in rural areas and usually started to work first as paid labour in 
plantations owned by Ivoirians. After some time, they settle down and start running their own planta-
tions. Burkinabés have been living in Côte d’Ivoire since the colonial period and many families have 
been here for more than one generation (Zongo, 2003). 
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advance.8 In the rural areas north of Duékoué, in the fall of 2002, groups of 
young Guérés stormed Burkinabé quarters and encampments, armed with mache-
tes, hunting rifles and miscellaneous other weapons. Attacks were particularly 
brutal in the villages of Blodi, Iruzon, Toa Zéo, Sibabli and Kouibli, in the 
Bangolo area: 
‘When the rebels took Vavoua, people started saying that the Burkinabés were with the 
rebels. The young Guérés started to attack them. At first, the mayor came and asked the 
youths to set up checkpoints to defend the village. But not before long, youths started to 
harass the Burkinabés and to steal from them. This continued until they were organized with 
weapons. On October 8, they attacked an encampment and killed three young Burkinabés. 
They burnt everything. We had to leave.’ (Human Rights Watch, 2003b)  
The reaction from the Guéré communities to the activism of these youths 
varied widely per village. In some places, Guéré chiefs did little to quell their 
militancy, in others, local authorities intervened, including village chiefs and 
sometimes even the gendarmes, to try preventing an escalation of violence; it 
was, however, usually to little effect (Human Rights Watch, 2003b). In late 
October 2002, when the cocoa and coffee crops were ready for harvesting, most 
of the Burkinabés had been chased out of the area and were sheltering in 
Duékoué or had returned to their homeland.9. When the area fell into rebel hands 
at the end of December, the balance of power switched and the Guérés became 
the ones on the move (this trait is particularly apparent in the chronology pre-
sented earlier).  
But arbitrary violence did not remain confined to Burkinabés in government-
controlled areas. Any individual who belonged to an ethnic group that potentially 
could be perceived as allied to the rebels was a potential target. In April 2003, 
Human Rights Watch report the lynching of a Yacouba who had gone to the 
mayor’s office in Duékoué to obtain a laissez-passer to be able to travel in the 
area. When someone accused him in the street of being an assailant, a crowd 
threw themselves on him and beat him with bricks and stones. He was taken to 
the local hospital, but some individuals dragged him outside and killed him. His 
body was set alight and left into the hospital courtyard. In such a tense and 
                                              
8  International Crisis Group went so far as to report that violence against Burkinabés and Malians in the 
Duékoué-Guiglo area had become so systematic, widespread and excessive throughout April 2003 
that it resembled deliberate policy. Local militias and village self-defence committees were involved, 
as well as the gendarmes and the police. Even village elders were used to draw Burkinabés back to 
their plantations, where they were killed by local youths. The flight of Burkinabés by bus to Burkina 
Faso reached a dramatically high level in March and April 2003 (International Crisis Group, 2003). 
9  Returning to Burkina Faso was already an existing trend and can be traced back to the mid-1990s 
(Zongo, 2003). The main cause of this reverse migratory flow relates to a growing uncertainty with 
regard to land transfers due to the increasing contestation of existing arrangements. It is however 
noteworthy that only a minority of Burkinabés left Côte d’Ivoire, even at the peak of conflict; many 
stayed in fact relatively nearby, in the western region, probably waiting for a decrease in tension. 
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suspicious climate, being accused of being an assailant could be a death sentence, 
and anyone, even Guérés, could be beaten to death.10  
In the Zone de Confiance, in Wé territory, the war eventually weakened the 
position of the Guéré and Wobé, while strengthening the local prerogatives of the 
non-autochthones. Wê youths were particularly affected by this changing balance 
of power, and in the villages of Zou and Zeregbo for instance, at the time I was 
doing fieldwork, they had stopped regulating the local taxation on transport, 
market stalls and local trade. They were also only playing a marginal role in 
matters related to local security. Non-autochthones, particularly of Lobi origin 
and those involved in the dozo brotherhood, had gradually taken over most of 
these privileges and were playing an increasing role in settling local affairs, 
adding a new layer to the local mechanisms of conflict resolution. Situations 
varied a lot, depending on villages and village chiefs. At the time of doing field-
work, the climate between autochthones and non-autochthones was much more 
tense in Zeregbo than in Zou for instance: in Zou, the local chief was a contested 
but respected elder, who was genuinely seeking some kind of social cohesion 
among the communities he administered by trying to mitigate the interethnic 
tensions that had been revived by the war; in Zeregbo, communities were openly 
afraid of each other at the end of 2006, and the chief, who was known to be 
involved in petty trafficking, was doing little to change these perceptions.  
Box 5.1 is particularly telling because it illustrates quite well the confusion 
between acts of war and petty crime, and how, at the village level, any type of 
anecdotal incident has come to be systematically framed along ethnic lines, 
calling for a ‘group’ response and beginning a spiral of retaliation. To an outside 
observer, there is little in common between the third war of Zou and the first two. 
To an insider – since immediate consequences are similar (houses are burnt, 
people are slaughtered, specific quarters are targeted, many people flee) – dis-
tinguishing between acts of war and other forms of violence has become mean-
ingless. This is the worrying development we were talking about earlier: violence 
has become so diffuse in certain locations in the western region that the the 
rationale of violence does not matter anymore and everything becomes pretext 
for group confrontation.  
The Zone de Confiance, where no clear authority prevailed between May 2003 
and April 2007, has been the theatre of so many incidents that degenerated into 
intercommunity conflict that it raises serious doubt whether such a dynamics of 
revenge can ever be broken in certain areas. The events of Diézouon/Kouibly in  
 
                                              
10  Human Rights Watch reports that in early March 2003, a Guéré was beaten to death in Duékoué, 25 
metres from a gendarmerie post, after another Guéré had accused him of being an assailant. 
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Source: IRC, MARP Zou, 2007 
 
Box 5.1: The three Zou wars 
 
The first war 
Liberian MPIGO forces entered the village on 1 January 2003. The first week 
was relatively peaceful, but the situation drastically changed in the second week. 
There were shootings, broken down doors, looting. The Liberians were stealing 
anything, bikes, motorbikes, coffee/cocoa mills, food, poultry, etc. When they 
were passing through the village from Bangolo or Logoulalé with their loot, they 
were obliging youths to carry it to Mahapleu or Danané. The youths were beaten 
up, they were threatened at gunpoint, so they had to go with them. They were 
shooting in the feet of those who were resisting too much. Much of the 
population fled during that period, to escape these sufferings. They left the 
village and went to the bush, in the encampments. Some fled to the nearby 
towns. MPIGO was chased out by the MPCI a few weeks later. The MPCI 
stayed about two weeks in the village, without making any trouble, which 
restored the confidence of the population. That is when the population came 
back. The cohabitation with the rebels was so peaceful then that certain cadres 
from the village, who were living in town, accused the Guéré village chief of 
having entered into an alliance with the rebels. The chief was publicly accused in 
a local newspaper. 
 
The second war 
MJP troops relayed the MPCI in Zou and started disarming the population. Four 
Guérés from the nearby village of Phing-Béoua, including the President of 
Youth, visited the rebels to reclaim their weapons. During the discussions, the 
Guérés wounded two rebels. Retaliation was immediate and the four Guérés 
were shot dead. The death of the President of Youth was quite badly received 
by the Guérés of Phing-Béoua who decided to retaliate the same day. Forty 
Guérés therefore attacked the 12 rebels who were staying in Zou. The rebels 
retreated, due to their small number, and called for reinforcements. Reinforce-
ments arrived the evening of the same day from Man and Danané and sur-
rounded the village. The fighting lasted for four hours. More than 23 Guérés 
were killed, a lot of houses were burnt down in the Guéré quarter, and many 
people who were trying to escape fell into ambushes. During and after this 
violent episode, a lot of Guérés left the village. Some returned after the Zone de 
Confiance was set up in May 2003, reassured by the presence of impartial 
forces who had established a base in the village to monitor the local security. 
 
The third war 
On 20 november 2003, a Young Burkinabé accidentally hit a Guéré girl with his 
bike. He was stabbed in the neck by a young Guéré of Phing-Béoua and died. 
Apparently, the two people already knew each other and were involved in some 
kind of affair with the same girl. Tensions escalated quickly between the Bur-
kinabé and Guéré communities, despite attempts at mediation by the village 
chief. The Guérés refused to hand over the offender to the Burkinabés and even 
helped him to escape. Calling for revenge, the Burkinabés started the war. Con-
sequences were quite heavy for the village. There were several dead, dozens of 
diasppearances, people were slaughtered, their throats cut, houses were burnt 
down. The village emptied of most autochthones after that. Even some alloch-
thones left for more secure places. 
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April 2004, the killings of Duékoué in June 2005, and the incidents of Toa Zéo in 
2006 are all visible benchmarks for each of these events led to massive 
displacement of people (all events are recorded in the chronology above). Less 
obvious, yet taking the same worrying ethnic turn, is the series of attacks on 
individuals that took place in the Zone de Confiance between 2004 and 2007, 
sparing no one, from 3 year olds to 90 year olds, fishermen, businessmen, 
farmers (ibid). One even gets the impression that the mere fact of being young 
has become suspicious in such contexts and worthy of punishment. In Guéré 
territory, in 2005-2007, any type of petty crime came to be interpreted as an act 
of war and was systematically framed along ethnic lines, calling for a ‘group’ 
response and beginning a vicious cycle of retaliation. Any source of tension had 
become a potential trigger to ethnic violence, regardless of what the initial cause 
of friction was (a dispute over land or a mere conflict between neighbours). 
An example of inter-ethnic rivalry that has been instrumentalized by the war is 
the long-standing Yacouba/Guéré resentment. In February 2003, the MJP leader-
ship publicly claimed that if the State was going to use Guéré militias to kill 
Yacoubas and Dioulas, it would organize attacks on Guéré and Bété villages in 
reprisal (International Crisis Group, 2003). Mid-July 2003, after the end of war 
had been declared, Guéré militias were still involved in raids against Yacouba 
villages in the areas of Zouan-Hounien and Bin-Houyé, and it was suggested that 
the Guéré/Yacouba conflict was mirroring the Khran/Gio feud that had been 
revived on Ivoirian soil by the use of Liberian mercenaries on both sides (ibid). I 
tend to think that the Khran/Gio strife had little to do with the recrudescence of 
tensions between Guérés and Yacoubas. From an emic perspective, the mere fact 
of associating Yacoubas with rebels and Guérés with pro-government militias 
was probably enough to legitimize a cycle of violence difficult to break. Again, 
the rationales of violence hardly matter when everything becomes pretext for 
group confrontation. 
An interesting feature of this period of systematic intercommunity violence is 
that it is relatively loose from the Ivoirian conflict. If we exclude the recent 
events of early 2011, rebels and loyalist forces had stopped fighting each other 
for many years, the last direct attack probably being the assault on Logoualé, in 
February 2005, when progovernment militias shot at rebel positions. The bulk of 
intercommunity violence was largely happening within agrarian societies where 
people knew each other very well. It usually involved individuals and groups of 
individuals from the same village, or from a neighbouring one. If enduring war 
factions lent a hand to certain groups on a number of occasions, war – as back-
ground context – has acted more as a catalyst, providing the space with no clear 
territorial sovereignty which was needed (the Zone de Confiance) to make it 
possible for such a spiral of violence to ensue.  
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Another interesting feature of that period of intercommunity violence is that 
violence has been used as a means to reorganize the local socio-economic spaces 
and to control mobility within and between those spaces. After all, ethnic groups 
do not compete for territory in Côte d’Ivoire and spaces are already divided along 
ethnic lines; the existing divisions are not called into question. But ethnicity has 
provided an easy grip for weakening the positions of autochthones in certain 
places, and strengthening them in others. As Vlassenroot wrote: ‘Ethnicity con-
tinues to be the main instrument to organize disorder: no other theme or issue has 
remotely similar mobilizing power and reducing the explanation of a current 
crisis to an ethnic issue is generally sufficient to convince youngsters to join or 
form an [ethnic] militia’ (Vlassenroot, 2006: 59). 
Multi-ethnic agrarian societies 
Mono-ethnic villages do not exist in Côte d’Ivoire, and the west is no exception. 
Villages are mixed, composed of autochthones who are considered autoch-
thonous on basis of some kind of historical primacy (‘the ones who were here 
before’), and also composed of foreigners, which eventually designate nationals 
of a foreign country (allogenes) and Ivoirians from a different region (alloch-
thones). There is a whole history and ideology behind the concept of autochthony 
in Côte d’Ivoire, which I described in detail in the previous chapter. Suffice here 
to say that the concept of autochthony implicitly calls for excluding strangers 
from belonging, while at the same time constantly redefining who is a stranger 
and who is not. At the local level, less and less distinction is made between 
allogenes and allochthones in the rural areas, and they are usually labeled and 
treated the same from an emic perspective.  
Côte d’Ivoire counts a large diversity of ethnic groups that are commonly 
classified into four, based on linguistic criteria: the Akan, which includes the 
Baoulé and Agni and finds its geographic origin in eastern, southeastern and 
central Côte d’Ivoire; the Krou, which originates from the southwest of the 
country and which counts among others the Krumen, the Bété, the Guéré and the 
Wobé; the Mandé, also called the Mandingué, from the northwest, which consists 
of the Malinké, the Bambara, the Dioula, and the Yacouba; and the Gour, also 
called the Voltaïc, which originates from the northeast and includes the Sénoufo 
and Lobi communities. Some kind of territorial ethnic mapping can be drawn out 
of such divisions, which highlights the geographical origin of Côte d’Ivoire’s 
main ethnic groups and shows, for each area, who is considered autochthonous 
and who is not (Map 5.5).  
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Map 5.5 Geographical origin of the main ethnic groups in Côte d’Ivoire 
 
Source: UNOCHA, 2003. 
 
 
The terrain chosen for this particular research and roughly bounded by the 
towns of Danané, Man, Duékoué, and Toulepleu is home to various autoch-
thonous groups. The Guéré homeland extends from Toulepleu east to the Sas-
sandra river, north towards Bangolo, and south to Taï. The area occupied by the 
Wobé people extends further north, east of the Guéré area, on the Duékoué-
Kouibli axis, in the sous-préfectures adjoining the Niédéboua territory. The 
Guéré, Wobé and Niédéboua are part of the larger ethnic group Wê, and share 
historical and cultural ties with the ethnic group of the current President (of Bété 
origin). They are consequently more inclined to adhere to pro-government propa-
ganda.  
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Administratively, the Wê are located in the Moyen-Cavally region and in the 
southeastern part of the 18 Montagnes region.11 The sous-préfectures of Zou, 
Diéouzon, Zéo, and the departments of Toulepleu, Blolequin, Guiglo, Duékoué, 
Bangolo (all located in Guéré territory), were particularly affected by the war and 
have been home to the bulk of the pro-government militias. It is estimated that 
the Guéré and Wobé respectively represent 3.4% and 1.7% of the Ivoirian 
population (2001 national census). The Yacouba territory extends from Man to 
Danané, then south along the Liberian border, until north of Toulepleu. It was for 
the most part occupied by the rebel forces, with the exception of some villages 
and encampments in the Zone de Confiance. The towns of Zouan-Hounien (pro-
nounced Zonn-Houyé in the local language) and Bin-Houyé are in Yacouba 
territory. The Yacouba people are estimated to represent 5.9% of the Ivoirian 
population (approx. 250,000 people). They are also called Dan and share cultural 
affinities with the Liberian Gio. The Toura live in the north of Man, in the region 
of Biankouma and represent about 1% of the Ivoirian population.  
Western Côte d’Ivoire has been particularly affected by internal and cross-
border migration.12 If the Ivoirian land was at first massively exploited by Euro-
pean entrepreneurs in the south-east and eastern part of the country (colonists 
started wood, coffee and cocoa plantations), the indigenous plantation economy 
developed quite quickly in the 1920s and spread to other regions. It involved 
both autochthonous and non-autochthonous producers. By the early 1950s, in-
digenous cocoa and coffee plantations had spread so much in western Côte 
d’Ivoire that the triangle west of Zouan Hounien across the Cavally river and 
south of Zou had become one of the most productive areas of the country. The 
colonial administration openly encouraged the migration of Malinké, Sénoufo 
and Baoulé to the western woodlands. The autochthonous Bété, in particular, 
                                              
11  The 18 Montagnes region counts 6 departments and 41 sous-préfectures, also called communes, which 
designate rural hubs: the department of Bangolo, with the sous-préfectures of Bléniméouin, Diéouzon, 
Gohouo-Zagna, Guinglo-Tahouaké, Zéo, and Zou; the department of Biankouma, with the sous-
préfectures of Blapleu, Brima, Gbablasso, Gbangbégouiné, Gouané, Gouiné, Gourané, Mangouin, 
Santa, and Yorodougou; the department of Danane, with the sous-préfectures of Daleu, Gbon-Houyé, 
Gouotro, Kouan-Houlé, Mahapleu, and Séileu; the department of Kouibly, with the sous-préfectures 
of Nidrou, Poumbly, Sémien, Tién-Siably, and Totrodrou; the department of Man, with the sous-
préfectures of Douélé, Gbatongouin, Gbofesso-Sama, Gotongouiné 1, Kiélé, Podiagouiné, Yapleu, 
and Zagoué; the department of Zouan-Hounien, with the sous-préfectures of Banneu, Glangleu, 
Goulaleu, Guiamapleu, Téapleu, and Yelleu. 
The Moyen-Cavally region counts 4 departments and 25 communes: the department of Blolequin, with 
the sous-préfectures of Diboké, Doké, Tinhou, and Zéaglo; the department of Duekoue, with the sous-
préfectures of Bagohouo, Diahouin, Dibobly, Diourouzon, Gbapleu, Guéhiébly, and Guézon; the de-
partment of Guiglo, with the sous-préfectures of Bédi-Goazon, Kaadé, Kéibly, Nizahon, Petit-Guiglo, 
Sakré, Zagné, and Zro; the department of Toulepleu, with the sous-préfectures of Bakoubly, Bohobli, 
Méo, Nézobly, Péhé, and Tiobly. 
12  I developed this migration dynamics in the previous section and I only repeat a few points here to 
explain the immediate context. 
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were severely judged by the colonists and excluded from any form of nego-
tiation. Many people from northern and central Côte d’Ivoire therefore moved 
west, soon outnumbering the Bété and Guéré autochthones in many locations. At 
Independence, the first Ivoirian President continued to promote the same trend by 
applying a very open immigration policy to the citizens of the neighbouring 
countries, particularly the Burkinabé. After all, part of Burkina Faso had been 
administratively linked to Côte d’Ivoire during colonial rule, between 1932 and 
1947 (Zongo, 2003). Houphouët-Boigny’s well-known statement ‘la terre appar-
tient à ceux qui la cultivent’ (the land belongs to those who put it to use) had 
value of law and explicitly implied that foreigners and autochthones had similar 
land rights, provided they were growing crops on Ivoirian soil. This was a clear 
political stand which did not go uncontested at the local level. It was so much at 
odds with customary practice that promoted inalienability of land rights for the 
autochthones that it fueled a great deal of tension in agrarian societies, while 
providing the ideal background for a possible slip into inter-ethnic violence.  
If western Côte d’Ivoire consists of a mosaic of ethnic groups, the belief that 
autochthonous rights prevail over the rights of the non-autochthones is firmly 
anchored at the local level. Not so much because autochthones cleared the land 
first, thereby earning specific rights – the majority of the land was actually put in 
use by imported labour, so such a justification would not really hold in such a 
context – but because being autochthonous in Côte d’Ivoire is foremost con-
ceived in terms of belonging to the ethnic group of the first settlers in a well-
defined territory (sous-préfectures tend to mirror such ‘autochthonous’ ethnic 
divisions). It does not matter if ‘native autochthones’ do not exist in Côte 
d’Ivoire. After all, ‘the whole country has been populated by successive waves of 
migrants, with no exception for the western parts’ (Schwartz, 1968). But the firm 
belief still exists that being first entitles someone to more rights than being 
second or third, and this conception is enough to legitimize clear and explicit 
autochthonous rights that are eventually used as a basis to regulate social 
relationships in multi-ethnic agrarian societies. Non-autochthonous rights and 
obligations are derived from this. It is not rare for non-autochthones to be res-
tricted in their actions or to be forbidden to carry out certain tasks and economic 
activities without authorization. In Zéregbo, for instance − a Guéré village in the 
sous-préfecture of Zou where I did exploratory fieldwork − there were many 
rules framed along ethnic lines in order to regulate access to some of the local 
resources. Fishing, for instance, was strongly regulated. The nearby Cavally river 
was divided among all Guéré family heads. They could use intensive fishing 
techniques to catch fish (traps, floating baits, small dams), but non-autochthones 
could only go fishing with a line and a hook, and only in certain waters located 
far from the village. If they wanted to fish nearer by, they had to ask an 
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autochthone permission, which was generally granted against some kind of pay-
ment.  
Related to land use, the institution of ‘tutorat’ is particularly present in the 
western region, both in Wê and Yacouba territory, and is deeply embedded in 
social relations. Chauveau & Colin (2005) define it as an agrarian institutional 
device, which regulates first-comers/late-comers relationships and which fits into 
a moral economy in which one cannot refuse land access to an outsider who 
needs land as a mean of subsistence for himself and his family. The institution of 
tutorat regulates therefore, on the one hand, the transfer of land rights between 
autochthones and non-autochthones,13 and on the other hand, the incorporation of 
the non-autochthones in the local community. Merely because of the notion of 
tutorat, it is in fact not rare for a foreigner to live in an autochthonous neigh-
bourhood, close to his ‘tuteur’;14 however, the reverse is not common, and in the 
Wé homeland, a Guéré would not normally live in a Mossi15 quarter. A main 
feature of the institution of tutorat is that migrants are expected to owe their 
tuteurs perennial gratitude. A bundle of explicit and implicit obligations is fully 
part of the land transfer agreement, and it is usually expected that migrants share 
part of the harvest, that they give some kind of financial contribution to mark 
personal events in their tuteur’s life (funerals, sickness, etc.), or that they simply 
respond when the tuteur asks for help. The tendency to increase and monetize 
social obligations in return for access to land has encouraged the idea among 
migrant settlers that they had engaged in a purchase-sale transaction. But from 
the autochthonous perspective (and generally also from the viewpoint of many 
settlers), an economic transaction in no way cancels the moral obligation of 
gratitude owed to the tuteur. Sometimes, tuteur demands grow out of proportion, 
at other times migrants do not honour the agreed commitment. What eventually 
matters, however, is that a multiplicity of arrangements exists at the local level, 
and that the terms are constantly being negotiated and renegotiated over time by 
all parties involved. Noteworthily, purchasing an agricultural plot and paying a 
substantial amount of money for it does not mean that the migrant can waive his 
obligations. From the autochthonous perspective, the buyer still owes the tuteur, 
and this belief is shared by many foreigners. In fact, as Kabeer (2005) put it for 
another context, allogenes and allochthones often have their own views on when 
it is fair for them to be treated the same as autochthones, and when is it fair for 
them to be treated differently. 
                                              
13  See the works of Koné et al. (1999) and Koné & Chauveau (1998).  
14  Tuteur is an emic term referring to autochthones who have entered a client-patron relationship with a 
migrant.  
15  Mossi is a widely used local term to designate Burkinabé.  
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If land issues in western Côte d’Ivoire are not directly related to war per se, 
the current conflict has exacerbated pre-war frictions and has added new sources 
of tension. Pre-war frictions over land, related to the sale and resale of agricul-
tural plots, incomplete payments, contested boundaries of forests, arrangements 
not honoured within the framework of tutorat, etc. They could take extremely 
violent forms, including murder that often went unpunished. The war – and the 
displacement of population that followed from it – added new sources of tension. 
In some places, the conflict was used as pretext to settle old disputes and expand 
individual territories: several non-autochthones, previously involved in a tutorat 
relationship, took advantage of the confusion and of the flight of the autoch-
thonous population to expand their share of cultivated land. Non-autochthonous 
newcomers also added to that messy field by settling in places where they were 
not authorized to do so. In the Zone de Confiance, with the balance of power 
shifting from autochthones to non-autochthones and the abrupt end to formal 
judicial authority, the general feeling at the time I was doing fieldwork was that 
many pre-war issues had been put on hold, in the wait for a reversal of power at 
the village level, or the restoration of civil courts for the cases that demanded a 
more formal settlement. I interviewed a Guéré from Zéregbo who had experien-
ced a very brutal altercation with three Yacoubas from the neighbouring village 
in 2001. During the dispute, his wife was wounded and his newborn killed, 
accidentally stabbed while on his mother’s back. He went so far as to hire a 
lawyer to represent him in court, at the tribunal of Man. His case has been on 
hold since the start of the war, as all judicial administrators have fled the area. In 
the same Zone de Confiance, in Guéré territory, there has been a revival of 
‘illegal’ plantations, ‘illegal’ designating the unauthorized exploitation by ‘stran-
gers’ of plantations owned by autochthones who fled the village during the war 
and who have not yet returned. Although some form of moral economy still 
prevails – according to the village chief of Zou, if the tuteur has not yet returned, 
‘son étranger’ can use part of his land to plant subsistence crops (rice, maize, 
cassava) – there are limits to how far such complaisance extends, and non 
autochthones are strictly prohibited to grow perennial crops, such as coffee or 
cocoa. ‘S’il le fait, c’est à ses risques et périls’ (interview with the village chief). 
To give a sense of scale to this phenomenon, it is useful to note that when this 
interview took place in December 2006, the village of Zou was nearly emptied 
from its autochthonous population. In addition to the village chief, a respected 
elder, only eight young men of Guéré origin had returned since the violent events 
of spring 2003. Everybody else had fled, either in neighboring towns in govern-
ment-controlled territory, or in Abidjan.  
The year 2005 was marked by two important events. The first one related to 
the creation of a military administration in the west. In an attempt to ‘secure’ the 
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region following the tragic events of Petit-Duékoué and Guitrozon where 41 
autochthones were killed in one night (including children, women and the 
elderly), the President decided to set up a ‘gouvernorat militaire’ in the Moyen-
Cavally region, a disposition that persisted until recently. The second event 
concerned the upgrade of certain villages, communes and sous-préfectures, which 
respectively became communes, sous-préfectures and departments. These new 
administrative territories were established by presidential decree on 2 July 2005 
(two years after the end of combat operations) and notably concerned several 
localities in the west (several sous-préfectures were created in the departments of 
Kouibly, Zouan Hounien and Blolequin: Zéaglo, Zagné, Nizahon, etc.). If one 
reading could be to associate the creation of these departments, sous-préfectures 
and communes to a hidden agenda linked to electoral purposes (assuming for 
instance that more sous-préfectures and communes were created in government-
controlled territory), it does not seem to be a driving rationale. A better inter-
pretation is perhaps to only note the resumption of the ordinary administrative 
and political life in the areas close to the former front line from 2005 onwards. In 
2005, it was possible to make such administrative changes, a few years before it 
was unthinkable. This does not exclude that some villages may have been 
promoted to communes for the strategic role they played during the war (like the 
villages of Kahadé and Zagné, for instance, the respective bases of the MILOCI 
and UPRGO, or the village of Doké, home to the mother of a high-ranking 
FANCI commander). But because other administrative districts were also created 
in the rebel-controlled zones at the same time, this tempers the argument that it 
was a ‘reward’ or an electoral deed. After all, in October 2005, 520 communes 
were created in Côte d’Ivoire (on top of the 198 existing ones), and only 25 were 
located in the Moyen-Cavally region.  
The fieldwork locations and the western humanitarian context 
The two settings I focused on are not only different in terms of local territorial 
sovereignty (Guiglo is located in the government-controlled area, Man is con-
trolled by the rebel forces), but also in terms of size, ethnic composition, eco-
nomic activities and political affinities. The two locations have been differently 
marked by the war and by some of the situations that derived from it: mobilizing 
contexts have been very specific to each setting and the forms that humanitarian 
interventions took, within specific geographical contexts and when targeting 
militarized civilians, also differed depending on the location. 
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Guiglo 
Guiglo was never attacked. It is a rural town of about 66,000 people,16 capital of 
the Moyen-Cavally region, located on the Nzo river, at approximately 600 
kilometres from Abidjan. The department of Guiglo borders four others, the 
department of Blolequin in the west, the department of Bangolo in the north, the 
department of Duékoué in the east, and the department of Tabou in the south; it 
counts 8 sous-préfectures (Bédi-Goazon, Kahadé, Kéibly, Nizahon, Petit-Guiglo, 
Sakré, Zagné, and Zro). The autochthonous population is of Guéré origin. The 
refugee camp of Nicla borders the town and hosts about 6,000 Liberian refugees 
who have been living in Côte d’Ivoire since the mid 1990s. At the last municipal 
and legislative elections in 2001, both the elected mayor, Gaha Barnabé, and the 
elected department député, Hubert Oulaye (later to become minister in the 
government of reconciliation) were FPI sympathizers.17  
Economically, Guiglo is a dynamic market centre where autochthonous and 
non-autochthonous communities trade rice, livestock and cassava. The town is 
also a collection depot for cocoa, coffee and timber, before it is taken to the 
coastal ports for export. It hosts an industrial sawmill, the French owned Thanry 
company, which employs many people in town. The local informal economy is 
an important source of income for many people and includes the artisanal 
production of charcoal, made from the timber industry scrapwood. There is more 
export industry nearby, the Compagnie Hévéicole du Cavally (CHC), a rubber 
company located near Zagné, a few kilometres south of Guiglo. The CHC is also 
a major player in the local economy and employs more than a thousand perma-
nent staff as well as sustaining privileged links with thousands of individual 
rubber producers.18  
 
• Mobilization contexts 
During the war, Guiglo was the centre from where the form of counter-
insurgency movements that emerged in reaction to the rebel attacks resembled 
the most organized forms of paramilitary militias. Although the town was never 
attacked, Guiglo was on maximum alert in early December, when local residents 
heard that the towns of Toulepleu and Blolequin had fallen into rebel hands. 
Mobilization initially resembled the self-defence movement phenomenon des-
cribed earlier, derived from an existing type of urban vigilantism, but with the 
                                              
16  http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Villes_de_Cote_d%27Ivoire 
17  FPI was the Presidential party when Gbagbo was in power. 
18  CHC provides local farmers with planting material, training and finance to establish their own rubber 
plantations. Then, ‘cuplump’ (raw rubber) is bought at market prices for processing at the company’s 
factory. Chapter 9 gives more details on that. 
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front line only a few kilometres away, these self-defence movements rapidly 
became more structured and developed closer links with the Ivoirian army 
(FANCI). The following testimony is particularly telling:19 
‘I joined a self-defence group. In the very beginning, we were not yet with the FANCI. We 
were posted at the various entries of the town, to secure the place and to prevent the rebels 
getting in. If we noticed someone suspicious, we would call the FANCI to investigate 
further. The soldiers were not particularly keen on us. They were saying we were different 
and that we had a different way of seeing things. At the checkpoints, we were on our own. 
We had wooden clubs and 12 calibres for those who had a gun. We were given ammo.  
At first, the self-defence group had no name. It is when it was decided that we had to lend a 
hand to the FANCI that we were given a name. We were called AP-Wê, that meant Patriotic 
Alliance of Wê. We could not really tell people that we were reinforcement militia members. 
We were wearing green tee-shirts, with the AP-Wê name on it. Because there were many of 
us and because many of us were from neighbouring villages, we got transferred to Blolequin. 
Other people came to Guiglo, including some from Abidjan. They created their own alliance, 
the Front for the Liberation of the Great West. They had grey tee-shirts with the FLGO name 
on them. They stayed in Guiglo; we left for Blolequin.  
Later, Général Maho united the two movements. Because he had not fled [Guiglo], he was 
trusted and all information was passing through him, even encouragement messages. It was 
him who motivated the youth to protect the town. So he became our chief and our group 
merged and became the FLGO. There was also another group in Zagné, and another group in 
Duékoué. They had come to Guiglo to receive military training and later they went back to 
their positions. In Blolequin, we had our own military camp. We started fighting with our 
own guns [hunting guns at first], and then we got access to Kalashs that we were taking from 
[dead] rebels. Sometimes, we found more sophisticated weapons. Some of the FANCI sol-
diers also trusted us and gave us arms. They knew we were there to help. It is in Blolequin 
that we learned how to manipulate weapons: how to assemble and disassemble machine 
guns, how to unjam guns in the heat of combat (…).’ 
 Militias’ links with the Ivoirian army were reported several times in the local 
press despite repeated government denials. In early December 2002, an article 
from the Agence Ivoirienne de Presse reported that the Blolequin municipal 
authorities had officially announced their support for the Ivoirian army and the 
mobilization of Wê youths ‘for pushing the rebels out of the Wê homeland’. 
According to the article, the youth directly received military equipment from one 
of the mayor’s assistants and local chefs de terre had been mobilized (Agence 
Ivoirienne De Presse, 2002). The article also stated that in order to prevent 
further rebel advances and to keep the populations safe, the villages of Doké, 
Goya, Yoya and Ifa were already guarded by these Wê warriors (Agence Ivoi-
rienne De Presse, 2002).20  
As already mentioned, local ‘comités de crise’ emerged relatively quickly in 
the western region and played an important part in motivating the local youths to 
                                              
19  The text has been slightly adapted for better reader comprehension. 
20  The article also reported that traditional female shamans (féticheuses) had also joined the Wê youths 
to prepare them mystically before they attacked rebels’ positions(Agence Ivoirienne De Presse, 2002). 
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lend a hand to an Ivoirian army struck by high desertion rates (Pana Press, 
2003o). Several accounts have in fact pointed out that in the very first days of 
violence, many gendarmes21 – who at the time were the local representatives of 
the Ivoirian army before reinforcements were sent in – fled the area (individual 
interviews, December 2006).  
A particularly large mobilization occurred in Guiglo. Many youths enlisted in 
the emerging militias, responding to several calls for volunteers from the mu-
nicipal authorities and from the Ivoirian army. From the testimonies heard, the 
registration process simply consisted in giving one’s name at the local city hall, 
or at the FANCI military camp, or at one of the militias’ bases, which was 
usually the leader’s compound – on several occasions this happened to be a local 
appointed official. Even if some of these youths had previous experience in rural 
or urban vigilantism before the war (with some having already been involved in 
village or neighbourhood watches), they were usually new to warfare and several 
testimonies show that they underwent some kind of accelerated military training 
led by experienced soldiers. All travel between Guiglo and Toulepleu was 
temporarily prohibited by the Ivoirian army and by municipal authorities to avoid 
information on FANCI positions leaking out (Agence Ivoirienne De Presse, 
2002). 
 
• Demobilization contexts 
If municipal and district authorities22 were very much involved in the mobili-
zation of the youths in the early stages of the counter-insurgency, they were no 
less involved in ‘demobilization’ matters. Indeed, militia leaders had a vested 
interest in having these militias persist as long as possible and they particularly 
exceled in framing a discourse that overemphasized the military power of the 
pro-government militias by conveying the idea that uncontrolled ‘elements’ of 
the base were regularly ‘threatening’ to resume violence if they were not proper-
ly compensated for their war effort (Nord-Sud, 2009). To a certain extent, pro-
government militias have evolved in recent years from an armed group involved 
in warfare to what is simply an instrument for consolidating the power of local 
elites. On the part of militia leaders, it is ‘a skillful manipulation of disorder’ 
(Vlassenroot, 2006: 56). In 2007, these groups seemed more to have stopped 
                                              
21  The gendarmerie is part of the national armed forces of Cote d’Ivoire and is roughly equivalent in size 
to the army. It fulfils the function of a national police force and is particularly responsible for terri-
torial security in rural areas. In times of national crisis, the gendarmerie can be used to reinforce the 
army.  
22  Municipal and district authorities consist of the Mairie and the Conseil Général. Conseil Généraux 
were created only a few months before the start of the war so they were relatively new actors in the 
local arena. 
  
117
seeking socio-political change and to be aiming at defending their autonomy as a 
group (the same idea was advanced by Amadiume cited in Ellis & Van Kessel, 
2009). But if we except recent pre-electoral and post-electoral events, one could 
argue that militia leaders were exercising little control over their elements in 
2006 and 2007.23 The likelihood that angry militiamen formed a serious threat to 
national security was low then: firstly, because the bulk of the heavy weapons 
had been in storage in arsenals for a few years, and secondly, because – even if 
tensions were increasingly visible between leaders and the most vocal elements 
on the base – the bulk of militiamen had returned to civilian activities and had 
resigned themselves to getting little, if not nothing, out of their participation into 
warfare. They only had vague hopes of compensation.  
When it became clear that a political settlement would prevail over a military 
one, militia leaders were avid to (re-)take on24  a role in local politics. This 
included a function of broker – especially since they were keen on reinserting the 
militarized civilians under their command – and they notably started extensively 
liaising with the burgeoning hevea export industry nearby (this point will be 
further developed in Chapter 8 when reflecting on the humanitarian-military 
nexus). The same militia leaders have also become increasingly involved in 
reconciliation matters recently, showing many signs of their willingness to 
cooperate for restoring a peaceful climate in the west. They have, for instance, 
become involved in land conflicts mitigations, particularly regarding the issue of 
confiscated plantations (Maho promised to find a solution for restituting the 
plantations confiscated by autochthones to Baoulé farmers) (Fraternite Matin, 
2009); they have promoted the return of civilians to certain locations (Notre 
Voie, 2008); they have tried to appease discontented militia recruits (Notre Voie, 
2009); and in local security matters, they have tried to address the security 
concerns of the western residents under their jurisdiction, particularly those of 
the local traders and transporters, by notably escorting vehicles for a while on 
sections of roads known to be prone to banditry. 
 
Man 
Man is an urban hub and a heterogeneous town about three times the size of 
Guiglo. Its population was estimated to be 160,000 in 2010. It is the capital of the 
18 Montagnes region and lies between mountains that include Mount Toura and 
                                              
23  This led to several amusing anecdotes. Diomandé Vassé for instance, a Minister’s advisor known to 
have supplied the militias in the beginning of the conflict, was taken hostage by FLGO militiamen 
when they were denied their financial demands (L'inter, 2008b, 2008c). 
24  Before the war, FLGO leader Maho Glofehi was the third assistant of the Mayor of Guiglo, member 
of the FPI, and a traditional Wê chief. UPRGO leader Octave Yahi was Vice President of the Conseil 
General in Guiglo.  
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Mount Tonkoui, the two highest peaks in Côte d’Ivoire. The department of Man 
borders the department of Danané in the west, the department of Bangolo in the 
south, the department of Vavoua in the east, and the department of Biankouma in 
the north. The autochthonous population is of Yacouba origin. At the last muni-
cipal and legislative elections in 2001, both the elected mayor, Albert Flindé, and 
the elected department député, Siki Blon Blaise, were UDPCI sympathizers, the 
political party of former head of State General Gueï. 
Economically, the region of Man is the largest producer of coffee in Côte 
d’Ivoire and the town hosts the national factory Coffee Manufacturer of Côte 
d'Ivoire (UNICAFÉ). Man is also home to other export industries and there are 
several industrial timber companies nearby. There is a dynamic market centre in 
town, which attracts many people of different origins. Everything is traded, from 
agricultural products such as rice, cassava, plantain, to a wide range of fabrics, 
spare parts, and miscellaneous other items. The town is also a collection depot 
for cocoa and coffee and a logistic centre for their trade.  
 
• The effects of war 
The town fell into rebel hands for the first time at the end of November 2002. 
Two days later, loyalist forces recaptured the town for a few weeks, and on 19 
December, Man was once again retaken by the rebellion. For the past eight years, 
it has remained in rebel-controlled territory. State institutions immediately ceased 
functioning: the armed forces, the police, the gendarmerie, customs, water and 
forest services, the judicial system, the administrative prefects, as well as the 
Conseil Général and the Mairie. The municipality (Mairie) was not closed for 
long though and resumed work in three domains: the registration of births, is-
suing certificates, and liaising between the population and rebel forces (they were 
then referred to as the Forces Nouvelles).  
Man was located in Zone 6 in rebel territory.25 During the period under study, 
it was headed by zone commander Losseni Fofana (Com’Zone), in place since 
July 2003 and known locally as ‘Loss’ or ‘Papa Cobra’.26 He used to be a 
corporal in the Ivoirian army, where most high-ranking elements of the Forces 
Nouvelles came from (Heitz, 2009a). Since the rebellion had to find ways to 
reach financial and economic autonomy in the territory they occupied, an eco-
nomic forum was held in Bouaké on 9 November 2003, where tax collectioning 
systems were discussed in depth (Pana Press, 2003c, 2003k). A few days earlier, 
                                              
25  The rebel-held part of Côte d’Ivoire is divided into ten zones. 
26  There was much internal rivalry in the beginning when competing for positions and resources. It 
claimed many deaths among the rebels. Loss gradually eliminated his opponents or forced them into 
exile. 
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rebel forces had made a public statement against the redeployment of the State 
administration in the territories they controlled and had started recruiting staff to 
fulfil administrative positions (Pana Press, 2003h, 2003l). Shortly after the 
Bouaké forum, they started to systematically levy trade taxes on local businesses, 
from petty traders to the large export industries of cocoa, coffee and timber. In 
Man, the new tax system for the big companies began being implemented at the 
end of April 2004; a colonel from Korhogo had been specially mandated to that 
end (personal communication with Colonel Moussa, May 2004). In addition to 
the routine bribes demanded at checkpoints from individuals and transporters, 
extortion from businesses occurred openly and followed a clear chain of com-
mand.  
I come back to some of the points mentioned here in Chapter 8, when em-
pirically reflecting on the functioning of these armed groups. But suffice here to 
say that the Forces Nouvelles’ most lucrative sources of money were the cocoa 
and timber industries, ransacked at every single level of the chain. On a different 
scale, elements of the Forces Nouvelles could be observed collecting fees at the 
local market and at various shops in town, carrying receipt books.27 Small busi-
ness owners usually handed over the money on a weekly basis: 
‘The rebels come every Tuesday. One group comes to collect the 500 CFA francs (USD 1) a 
week and then there is a second group that comes to check your documents on another day. 
If you don’t pay, or if your documents are not in order, they can confiscate your equipment 
and take it to their military camp. There, you have to pay 5,000 CFA francs to get it back.’ 
(Human Rights Watch, 2010) 
Despite partial redeployment of the State administration (the Prefecture of 
Man was handed over to the civilian authorities in June 2007), the Com’Zone 
continued to exercise almost complete control over economic, security, and 
judicial affairs within his zone until the recent events.  
In 2005, the Ivoirian State and the Forces Nouvelles reach an agreement 
authorizing the Forces Nouvelles to fulfil the function of police and gendarmerie 
in the territory they controlled. On 21 April 2006, the Préfet de Police of Man 
announced a large-scale recruitment campaign for police officers, and anyone 
under 30 years old was invited to apply, provided he or she had a minimum 
educational level (CM2/6th grade). Low-ranking rebels were particularly respon-
sive to this call, and it is a topic that came up on several occasions during 
individual interviews. On 15 December 2006, 600 Forces Nouvelles police and 
gendarme officers were officially released from training to be deployed in rebel-
held territory (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, 2006e). This auxiliary police force was trained in collaboration with 
                                              
27  Noteworthily, the municipality successfully negotiated a share of the market taxation (Heitz, 2009b). 
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UNPOL, the UN Police, and received the blessing of the highest authorities 
(from Prime Minister Banny to the Ministry of Justice). In rebel-controlled terri-
tory, prisons, gendarmeries and police stations re-opened for the handling of 
civilian disputes.  
 
The western humanitarian context 
With the exception of Médecins sans Frontières (the Belgian, Dutch and French 
sections started their operations in the west in early 2003 while there were still 
combat operations in the area),28 most humanitarian agencies started operating in 
the west in the latter half of 2003, when the period of open combat had ceased.29 
The first initiatives fostered focused on health care, water, basic sanitation and 
food security. Protection and programmes of reinsertion for ex-combatants came 
much later on the humanitarian agenda, with the latter appearing to be more 
boosted by political progress than by a genuine desire to understand the complex 
issue of temporarily militarized civilians. Reinsertion programming has mainly 
been framed in terms of technicalities, with indicators focusing on the number of 
project beneficiaries per activity and per site, the price details of the equipment 
provided, attendance lists, etc. Such an operating framework was intrinsically 
flawed by the lack of recognition of the project dynamics, an aspect I particularly 
explore in Chapter 9, when analyzing two standard instruments of post-conflict 
interventions targeting ex-combatants.  
Simply because post-conflict interventions operate geographically near to the 
heart of conflict, they are quite likely to become entangled in social networks that 
play some part in structuring the conflict itself. Western Côte d’Ivoire has not 
been an exception. It is therefore worth to explore the extent to which humani-
tarianism has interacted with the war apparatus and whether it has been mani-
pulated (or not) by the local warlords. I examine these two questions by reflect-
ing on certain remarks made during the interviews I conducted and by recalling 
my own practitioner experience in Côte d’Ivoire in 2003-2004.  
 
                                              
28  MSF-Belgique was running the hospital in Man, MSF-Netherlands the hospital in Danané, and MSF-
France the hospital in Guiglo. All sections started running mobile clinics when the security situation 
allowed movement outside the towns. 
29  They included Médecins Sans Frontières (the French, Dutch and Belgian sections), Médecins du 
Monde, OXFAM, the International Rescue Committee, Save the Children (the English and Swedish 
sections), Solidarités, Handicap International, CARE US and AFRICARE. A few INGOs came later, 
notably the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the German NGO GTZ-International Service 
(GTZ-IS), the latter provided support to militarized civilians.    
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• The humanitarian/military nexus from the insurgent perspective … 
As I dug into my professional files, I came across several anecdotes that depicted 
the relative lenience of the rebel forces towards humanitarian workers. This 
report of an INGO field coordinator in Man is particularly telling: 
‘Last week, we could see movements of troops with heavy weapons in town going north, on 
the Guinean border. The French forces Licornes advised us not to travel there at the moment. 
The area is not secured. (…) Two Forces Nouvelles officers visited our office: the Chargé de 
Communication and the Responsable des Affaires Sociales. It was the first time they came 
along. The objective of their visit was to tell me that everything was under control but that 
the Forces Nouvelles had decided to tighten the current checkpoints. They were thus apolo-
gizing in advance for the potential car and truck hassles. Indeed, our cars are now checked 
and searched almost all times and ID cards are asked from all the passengers.’ (extracts from 
an INGO situational report, Man, 9-27 May 2004) 
On the insurgent side (at least in the Man area), international humanitarian 
agencies have remained relatively free from control and despite punctual inter-
diction from times to times, could circulate nearly everywhere in rebel territory if 
they were in possession of a valid laissez-passer and ‘ordre de mission’. The 
laissez-passer was a document issued by the Forces Nouvelles covering a parti-
cular zone (Man was for instance in Zone 6); it was usually necessary to obtain a 
laissez-passer from the rebel État-Major of Bouaké first to show that the agency 
had received approval from the highest in command. The ordre de mission was 
an internal document of the agency that was usually signed by the project 
manager. Humanitarian staff were also usually provided with an agency ID card, 
so they could present it at checkpoints, in case of identity checks. 
Not everything ran smoothly of course, and in the absence of local com-
manders checkpoint staff could become quite heavy-handed. Sometimes, they 
would not be willing to let vehicles pass for fear of fighting in the area, on other 
occasions they would insist on getting a lift or receiving some petty cash, but 
these problems were usually solved quite easily after lengthy talks with them, 
without having to resort to giving in to their demands. Then, after a while, when 
the humanitarian agency was better known in the area, these kinds of problems 
tended to diminish. 
Can we thus speak of a capture of humanitarian resources by the insurgent 
side? If routine bribes were probably sometimes paid by transporters on humani-
tarian freight at particularly heavy checkpoints, this was far from being the norm 
and the tax-free character of aid was usually recognized in rebel territory. In Côte 
d’Ivoire, we were far from the sophisticated system of capture described by 
Lavergne & Weissman (2003) in Sudan. There, the insurgents had developed a 
real savoir-faire in this respect, a humanitarian wing had been created within the 
SPLA to control the distribution of aid (the SRRA) and a significant part of 
resources were diverted to the rebel army and to the local elites through several 
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means (from the looting of WFP warehouses to an indirect system of taxation of 
humanitarian agencies). If humanitarianism in southern Sudan played a key role 
in the political economy of conflict, its role was much more modest in western 
Côte d’Ivoire. The Forces Nouvelles created a sort of humanitarian wing within 
the movement (it took several names: from the Bureau des Affaires Sociales in 
the beginning, to division Chargée des Affaires humanitaires in more recent 
years), but such structures had little say in what international agencies did on the 
ground. When agencies were asked for their daily route (under the pretext of 
‘needing to know for providing protection’), there was no sanction when the 
information was not supplied and in the same vein, when the Forces Nouvelles 
suggested a potential local development partner to INGOs (known to be pro-
rebel), there were no coercive measures when the suggestion was not followed. If 
any, financial and in-kind flows were minimal in Man between humanitarian 
agencies and the Forces Nouvelles, at least nothing comparable with what the 
companies exporting timber, coffee and cocoa were subject to (personal commu-
nication, April 2004). 
 
• … from the counter-insurgent perspective 
Hassling humanitarian workers was much more common on the counter-insur-
gent side and examples of humiliation and excessive harassment were frequently 
reported by INGOs working around Ben Houyé and Zouan Hounien: 
‘J. was obliged to do push-ups at a particularly heavy checkpoint last week, the one set at the 
exit of Zouan Hounien on the road to Ity. The same problem happened with WFP drivers. It 
was at the same place.’ (extracts from an INGO situational report, Man, 14 February 2004) 
‘Our car with our local staff was stopped for more than one hour at a FANCI checkpoint at 
the entry of Bin Houyé (coming from Zouan Hounien). Two reasons were given: one was 
that the local staff didn’t present the proper authorization (but I know they presented the 
same documentation we have been presenting for the past three months) and the second 
reason was that one of our staff is called Dely Desiré and one well-known rebel commander 
in Man is called Dely Gaspard. So FANCI accused our staff of being part of a rebel family.’ 
(extracts from an INGO situational report, Man, 8-19 November 2003) 
‘Last Friday, our staff was again stopped by the FANCI at the exit of Bin Houyé. One soldier 
aggressively asked why IRC staff were all Yacouba. And then he started to check their 
identity cards. One didn’t have his ID card so the car had to go back to his place to pick it up. 
Fortunately, his house was not too far away. The soldier let them go afterwards.’ (extracts 
from an INGO situational report, Man, 5 March 2004) 
But despite heavy harassment at checkpoints (under the pretext of checking 
travel documents, car insurance or ID), international humanitarian agencies were 
also rather free on the government side and could circulate everywhere without 
having to report to any official body. In late 2003, early 2004, most INGOs 
signed an official agreement with the Ivoirian State (un accord d’établissement) 
which included several advantageous agreements for the INGOs such as the 
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exemption from VAT on purchases, the exemption from custom taxes on im-
ports, the exemption from taxes on funds sent from abroad, and favourable 
treatment by the immigration services when entering and/or exiting the country. 
These dispositions were in general implemented and were not issues. Some 
INGOs also signed agreements with specific ministries, in relation to their activi-
ties.    
Has some sort of capture of humanitarian resources thus occurred on the 
government side? The tax-free character of international aid was usually also 
recognized in the government-controlled territory and trucks labeled ‘humanitari-
an’ and transporting humanitarian freight could usually avoid paying the routine 
fines. Although the World Food Programme warehouse was looted in Guiglo in 
January 2006, along with other INGOs stocks and equipment, this was more due 
to a crowd effect and the unexpected local mass reaction after the Bangladeshi 
UN peacekeepers opened fire on particularly strident demonstrators (shooting 
and killing several of them). Even though this tragic event was politically ex-
ploited by the local authorities, the loot probably went to the angry crowd, and 
what actually came out strikingly of the contexts under study, is that if some sort 
of capture was happening on either belligerent side, it was not at the level of 
physical humanitarian resources.  
In contrast, local aid mechanisms were probably more prone to physical 
capture. As already mentioned, in the early stages of the counter-insurgency, 
Guéré cadres were raising financial contributions in their respective towns in 
support of the war effort and of the displaced populations. But it is quite possible 
that part of the help targeting the displaced was diverted to sustain the counter-
insurgent groups, especially during the encampment period, where pro-govern-
ment militias were confined in a military setting and were given free food.  
‘On 4 May 2004, a FANCI truck arrived in Bangolo with rice and other food for the IDPs of 
the area. This food apparently was a gift from the Guéré community of Abidjan. Some Guéré 
politicians accompanied the truck. These politicians first met representatives of the IDPs, 
and this was followed by a very disorganized and messy food distribution.’ (extracts from an 
INGO situational report, Man, 9 May 2004) 
• The ‘Zone de Confiance’: military, political or humanitarian product? 
On top of that humanitarian apparatus, international diplomacy was keen on mo-
nitoring the ceasefire and movements of armed groups in the west of the country, 
and impartial forces were also mandated to play a role in supporting humani-
tarian operations there by establishing the necessary security conditions in the 
areas of intervention. 
Perhaps the most tangible example of a military, political and humanitarian 
embroilment in western Côte d’Ivoire was the set-up of the Zone de Confiance, 
an artificial area created completely from scratch by the impartial forces, which 
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was used for both military and humanitarian ends. The Zone de Confiance 
designated a geographical area that separated rebel-held from government-held 
territory between May 2003 and April 2007. It was supposed to be neutral and 
belligerent and weapon free (the ceasefire was monitored in it by the impartial 
forces; French forces and ECOWAs at first, and then the ONUCI contingents), in 
sum, it was supposed to be one of these ‘spaces of exception’, an expression 
coined by Agier and Bouchet-Saulnier which I already alluded to in the theo-
retical considerations. In the four years of its existence, the Zone de Confiance in 
fact was a huge misnomer to designate a space of widespread banditism and 
where crimes went unpunished. No clear authority prevailed there and the visible 
proliferation of armed groups had the effect of reconfiguring many spaces, to the 
point of entirely changing the local balance of power in certain areas.  
There is some ground to argue that the set up of such a Zone was necessary to 
reestablish basic living conditions in certain areas and to create favourable 
conditions for humanitarian interventions. After all, in many locations check-
points were ended after the impartial forces asked the local youths to stop. And 
when the French forces and the ECOWAS started setting temporary bases in 
remote rural settings in the summer of 2003, people slowly started to leave the 
bush where they had been hiding, and started to repopulate the villages. But it is 
noteworthy that because of this new setting, with such unclear local laws, im-
partial forces were drawn more and more into local processes of conflict resolu-
tion, which therefore became quite controversial. Several examples in the chro-
nology recounted below point to that trend. 
If counting the dead is part of standard ceasefire monitoring, becoming in-
volved in structural tensions is more questionable, even if the genuine aim is to 
mitigate violent conflicts. By playing an increasing role in settling local affairs, 
especially with regards to local security matters, impartial forces have involun-
tarily added a new layer to the local mechanisms of conflict resolution and one 
might wonder whether it is for better or worse. Such questions fully echo what 
we stressed earlier, when reflecting on interventionism: the fact that an overdose 
of interventions runs the risk of drying up important social mechanisms that 
already exist at the local level (i.e. the social interactions that regulate responsi-
bilities, rights and reciprocal obligations and that generally arrange social life on 
a much more stable basis than imported solutions). In the western context, if both 
Licornes and ONUCI have endorsed the hat of the best legal facilitators in the 
Zone de Confiance, there is the need to reflect on who will replace them when 
they leave, once their mandate expires.  
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Table 5.2 Series of events showing the increased implication of the impartial forces in 
local mechanisms of conflict resolution 
17 and 19 April 2006 ONUCI facilitates reconciliation meetings between Guéré and Baoulé 
communities. 
4 May 2006 Four Guérés fall into an ambush in Gohoua-Zagna but succeed in escaping 
and alert the impartial forces. 
27-28 June 2006 French forces discover 7 dead and 15 wounded in the villages of Blédi and 
Goho2, next to Douekpé. The attack is locally perceived as a reaction to the 
murder of the two Burkinabé children. 
September 2006 French forces publicly state that, since February 2006, inter-ethnic conflicts 
have cost the lives of 25 people and wounded 46 in the area east of Bangolo 
(axis Baibly/Gohouo). Acts of banditism have cost the lives of 16 and 
wounded 11 on the Bangolo/Duékoué axis and the Daloa/Vavoua road.  
28 December 2006 Impartial forces arrest the dozos of Toa Zéo. 
14 January 2007 Six young Guérés of the village of Baoubly (between Duékoué and Bangolo) 
are declared missing after having gone fishing near the Baoulé encampment 
of Koffikro. Impartial forces conduct the investigations. 
25-26 September 2007 A farmer of Pinhou (sous-préfecture of Zou) is accused by his peers of being 
a thief and having stolen poultry. He is severely beaten and dies.  
Impartial forces arrest four suspected criminals. 
Source: see Appendix 1 for detailed sources. 
 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has placed contentious movements into perspective by exploring the 
extent to which the mobilizing and demobilizing contexts of Guiglo and Man 
were shaped by their immediate environments. It presented the main aspects of 
the conflict in the western region, the micro-ethnographic contexts of the two 
localities under study, and it has reflected on the question of dosage when 
examining the western humanitarian context. As a necessary complement to the 
preceding chapter, this section eventually strengthens the grounds to avoid over-
estimating the importance of historicity in processes of mobilization compared to 
more contingent and circumstantial factors. It has particularly stressed the im-
portance of the local territorial sovereignty dimension on matters related to re-
cruitment, a thread I pick up in Chapter 7, when reflecting on the motives that 
drew young civilians into armed factions.   
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Photograph 5: Pork farm sponsored by the GTZ-IS project, Guiglo 
 
Photograph 6: Apprentices fixing a motorbike, Man (one of them is a former child recruit) 
  
6 
Armed factions operating in the west 
On both belligerent sides and at various levels, a significant portion of the 
civilian population became involved in armed movements and started engaging 
in a wide range of (para)military tasks, from combat operations to basic logistical 
duties (multitasking was the norm within armed groups). While some analysts 
went as far as describing Côte d’Ivoire as having engaged in a process of 
‘milicianization’ of society, it is worth exploring the extent of this phenomenon 
since the links between joining armed groups and political loyalty are more 
complex than it seems. Processes of mobilization took different forms across the 
country, depending on individuals’ affiliations, beliefs and social networks, and I 
explore these individual characteristics in the next chapter. But processes of 
mobilization were also contingent to more contextual factors such as proximity to 
the front line, the temporality of the conflict, the dynamics of local politics, the 
characteristics of the mobilizing context, and the recruitment strategy of the 
armed faction in question. I focus here on the dynamics of the armed factions that 
were active in western Côte d’Ivoire between 2002 and 2007. By stressing their 
temporality, their evolution in time, their degree of ethnic mixity (which factions 
emerged earliest, which ones were absorbed by other groups, the extent of 
‘locality’ of recruitment), I try to go beyond the prevailing views of these 
movements. The general discourse has in fact rarely been satisfactory and there is 
a blatant lack of empirical studies of the western region. Existing literature has 
tended to put all militias in one basket, masking the differences, and by doing so 
it has failed in capturing the dynamics of these groups and in clarifying inter-
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groups relations. The diversity of rebel and militia members these armed factions 
encompassed has also rarely been acknowledged and discussions tend to quickly 
fall short because of the lack of detailed knowledge of these armed groups’ base. 
This section and the following chapter partially attempt to fill that gap and are 
based on information derived from the local press and from certain individual 
interviews.   
Counter-insurgent movements 
As has been already mentioned, it is mainly in western Côte d’Ivoire, in the 
Moyen-Cavally region, that counter-insurgency movements took the form of 
armed groups that resembled the most structured forms of paramilitary militias. 
With the proximity of the front line, and in reaction to unprecedented levels of 
violence in the area, the existing form of rural/urban vigilantism (which also 
existed elsewhere, in other regions) quickly evolved into more sophisticated 
structures with the support of local leaders, in order to secure areas and places 
not yet taken by the rebel forces. While it is suggested in some writings that the 
Ivoirian government initiated these groups (or at least helped in fostering them 
by calling for civilian help in the media), an alternative perspective is to postulate 
that the State has in fact built on these existing small-scale counter-insurgent 
initiatives, and that it has helped them to develop by improving their structure 
and equipment in order to serve the incumbent regime’s military and political 
aims.  
These groups – which I call ‘pro-government militias’ in this book or 
‘counter-insurgent movements’ – rapidly connected with each other, merged, and 
developed links with other military and paramilitary movements; it included the 
Ivoirian army (FANCI) and the Liberian mercenaries hired by the State to 
counter the rebel attacks. Noteworthily, a number of high-ranking FANCI com-
manders were of Wê origin, which might partly explain the craze for defending 
Wê territory (General Mathias Doué, the FANCI Chief of Staff in 2002-2003, 
was of Wobé origin; Lieutenant Jean Oulaï Delafosse1 was of Guéré origin. His 
name was often cited during the individual interviews I conveyed as having been 
closely associated with the Liberian-backed LIMA forces.).  
There were several pro-government militias: the Alliance Patriotique Wê (AP-
Wê), the Forces de Libération du Grand Ouest (FLGO), the Mouvement Ivoirien 
pour la Libération de l’Ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire (MILOCI), the Union des 
                                              
1  At the start of the war, his mother was still living in Doké, a small village located on the Blolequin-
Toulepleu road. In 2005, when after the Petit-Duékoué incidents it was decided that the western sous-
préfectures would be administrated by military personnel, Delafosse was appointed sous-préfet of 
Toulepleu. 
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Patriotes pour la Résistance du Grand Ouest (UPRGO), and the Liberian-backed 
LIMA forces. They eventually played a major role in pushing back the rebels 
from Taï, Toulepleu, Blolequin and Bangolo in late 2002 and early 2003. If in 
times of war, all pro-government armed factions collaborated with each other, it 
would be a mistake to ignore their differences and the diversity of militia recruits 
they encompassed. In the west, militia members ranged from poorly armed and 
ill-trained villagers to individuals who clearly received extensive military train-
ing in order to provide substantial support to the national army. Some groups 
were more ‘local’ than others, some were more important in scale (Table 6.1), 
some emerged before others, and some were completely absorbed by other armed 
factions.  
 
 
Table 6.1 Claimed affiliation of pro-government militias listed by the PNDDR2 
Armed factions N % 
APEWE 950 16.8 
FLGO 3,260 57.8 
UPRGO 580 10.3 
MILOCI 14 0.2 
FAT/FATCI/FSAT 145 2.6 
FDS 1 0 
LIMA 1 0 
MPIGO/FAFN 2 0 
Not claimed 688 12.2 
Source: Data taken from PNDDR. Table compiled by the author (2007). 
 
 
Several testimonies of the ‘early joiners’ I interviewed suggest that the 
Alliance Patriotique Wê (AP-Wê) was the first pro-government militia to be 
formed in Guiglo in December 2002 before spreading to nearby towns. This is 
corroborated by Fofana (2009) who describes the AP-Wê as the first ‘self-
defence’ movement in western Côte d’Ivoire and as being the result of an 
initiative driven by the local comité de crise.3 The official discourse had a strong 
ethnic connotation: the objective was to mobilize Wê youths to defend the Wê 
territory. One form of the mobilizing discourse was also very contentious and 
                                              
2  There was indeed a certain opaqueness of numbers and several estimates have been put forward by 
different spokespersons at different periods. In contrast to these figures, a declaration by FANCI 
officer Colonel Jules Yao Yao in a local newspaper mentions 1,200 AP-Wê, 7,000 FLGO and 1,800 
UPRGO recruits, quite a different estimate than the numbers advanced by the PNDDR (‘Désarmement 
des milices à Guiglo’, Soir Info, 1 June 2005). 
3  Crisis committees were set up at the outset of the crisis by representatives of the Mairie and Conseil 
Général and emerged in reaction to the levels of violence in the area. 
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openly hostile to the Yacouba ethnic group who, for a variety of reasons, had 
been associated with the assailants: it was presented as necessary to ‘defend the 
Wê against the Dan, those who make war against the Wê to avenge the death of 
General Gueï’. (Fofana, 2009) There seem to be several branches of the move-
ment. In Guiglo, the bulk of AP-Wê recruits was absorbed by the FLGO move-
ment and received FLGO militia cards (personal communication with militia-
men). In Duékoué, Julien Gnan Monpého, alias ‘Colombo’, claimed leadership 
and made several public statements in the press presenting himself as the AP-Wê 
leader.4 In Toulepleu, there is some evidence that a branch of the AP-Wê move-
ment was active during a certain period of conflict – this is documented by local 
press releases – however, the precise leadership and connections with the other 
branches remain unclear.  
The Forces de Libération du Grand Ouest (FLGO) was also founded in the 
very early stages of the counter-insurgency and absorbed most of the AP-Wê 
recruits in Guiglo. Many recruits I interviewed who first enrolled in the AP-Wê 
movement in fact say that they received a FLGO card later, after the first fighting 
was over and some kind of ‘formal’ process of registration was taking place. 
Both the AP-Wê and the FLGO movements were initiated by Maho Glofiéi 
Dennis, who proclaimed himself General of these movements. Maho was then 
third assistant to the mayor of Guiglo, a political activist (as an active member of 
the FPI Central Committee, he had solid ties with the Presidential party), and a 
respected community leader in his function of President of the Association of Wê 
Chiefs. Like the AP-Wê movement, FLGO was by majority composed of young 
people of Wê origin. In the first years of the movement, the official discourse 
was more keen on presenting FLGO as an ‘army of resistance’ instead of as a 
‘militia’ (BBC News, 2005), and FLGO and AP-Wê played a major role in 2002-
2003 in pushing back the rebels from several key locations in the Moyen-Cavally 
region. Then the initial discourse gradually evolved and the militia term lost its 
pejorative connotation as it became more visibly associated with eligibility to 
DDR benefits. At certain periods though, the FLGO discourse revived a certain 
war discourse, but this time directed at the international peacekeeping forces and 
often openly hostile towards the French forces. After the attack on Logoualé 
(February 2005), a declaration by the FLGO leader urged the United Nations and 
the international community to proceed with the immediate and unconditional 
retreat of the rebels and of the French army from the western territory (Agence 
France Presse, 2005). In January 2006, following the unfortunate killing of two 
demonstrators by the Bangladeshi UN peacekeepers based in Guiglo, local autho-
                                              
4  Colombo was alledgely involved in banditry and he was known in the Duékoué-Bangolo area as 
fostering tensions between autochthonous and non autochthonous populations. 
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rities instrumentalized the crowd and all UN and INGOs offices and equipment 
were looted or burnt.  
Explanations concerning the military supplies have always remained vague, 
with both FLGO leaders and recruits consistently and frequently claiming – at 
least in the beginning – that FLGO had no guns others than those stolen from the 
dead rebels. Several sources have however reported that FLGO received financial 
and in-kind military support from different channels, which included people 
close to the Presidency (BBC News, 2005; International Crisis Group, 2004). In 
fact, the movement had developed links with several key political figures in 
Abidjan and had also built on existing connections. It has been documented that 
at the peak of conflict Maho had daily phone contact with the then Minister of 
Defense Kadet Bertin5 and Minister of Civil Service and Employment Hubert 
Oulaï (Oulaï was also of Guéré origin, from a village near Guiglo). By the end of 
2002, Maho had therefore become an unofficial politico-military relay in a 
parallel chain of command that ran from the Presidency to the various pro-
government western militias (International Crisis Group, 2004). If Maho was the 
political face of the movement, the FLGO military branch was led by Ivoirian 
soldiers (the name of Sergeant Jean-Marie Toualy notably appeared in some lite-
rature (Dioh, 2003)).  
Like the AP-Wê movement, there were several branches of the FLGO and the 
ways of settling demands or disputes did not go unchallenged. If Maho was its 
uncontested leader, other FLGO chiefs played an important role at grassroot 
level, particularly in holding the militias together. In Toulepleu in 2007, FLGO 
leader Paul Houeya intervened when Kadet Bertin (former Minister of Defence 
in 2002-2003 who was then acting as personal advisor to the President on 
security matters) met militia elements in town to ask them to hand over their 
weapons to the Prefect of Toulepleu. Unsatisfied with the incentives proposed, 
Houeya held a separate meeting with his forces to discuss what other options 
they had (Onuci, 2007). This example is a rather good illustration of how loose 
the chain of command had become in 2007. In those days – and probably up to 
until recently – it was unlikely that Maho could claim full control of his troops, 
and non-State armed groups were probably much better coordinated in 2002-
2003 − at the peak of the conflict − than in 2007. The militias’ chain of command 
appeared rather loose then, especially as the financial stakes linked to former 
combatants’ reinsertion were becoming more and more important. In several 
towns, a number of young civilians who, at a certain time, had been involved in 
                                              
5  Kadet Bertin was Minister of Defence in 2002-2003. After that, he became personal security adviser 
to Laurent Gbagbo. He is the nephew of the incumbent president and is also viewed by many as the 
unofficial head of the Ivoirian army. 
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FLGO, started manifesting their discontent, openly contesting their leaders’ act-
ions (L'inter, 2008a, 2008b). FLGO local commanders could therefore play an 
important role in holding the militias together (or not), and in fueling or miti-
gating tensions.  
The third main militia faction, the Union des Patriotes pour la Résistance du 
Grand Ouest (UPRGO), was created at the end of spring 2003, when acts of war 
had calmed down. An article in the Ivoirian newspaper Soir Info, dated 3 June 
2003, reported that a public meeting was held end of May in Guiglo, at which 
local elected officials announced the creation of a new counter-insurgent move-
ment: the Union des Patriotes pour la Résistance du Grand Ouest (cited in Inter-
national Crisis Group, 2003). Why such a movement emerged at such a period 
and in the same town as the FLGO is not clear from the information we have, but 
it is well documented that UPRGO and FLGO maintained close links and that the 
two leaders were well-known local political figures (Octave Yahi, UPRGO 
leader, was Vice President of the Conseil Général of Guiglo). UPRGO is thought 
to have been military led by General Banao on the ground (Banégas, 2008; 
L'inter, 2007a). Blolequin was one of their bases in the beginning; then when the 
degree of violence decreased the following year, the base of the movement was 
eventually relocated to Zagné, a few kilometres south of Guiglo. In size, UPRGO 
was much smaller than the FLGO movement (Table 6.1) estimates it to be ap-
proximately seven times smaller). 
The Mouvement Ivoirien pour la Libération de l’Ouest de la Côte d’Ivoire 
(MILOCI) appeared on the militia scene much later, in early 2005, when its 
leader, Pastor Gammi, claimed responsibility for the attack of Logoualé on rebel 
positions in February 2005 (Irin, 2005; Yao Ferdinand Pour Le Rassemblement 
Des Republicains, 2005). Even if the attack was unsuccessful and Logoualé 
remained in rebel hands, Gammi’s discourse was that this event marked the start 
of a series of aggressive acts meant to ‘liberate’ the zones under rebel control, 
since the impartial forces ‘were doing nothing’ or worse, ‘were blocking militias’ 
advances’. Verbal criticism of French forces was very harsh and French soldiers 
were even threatened that they could be the next targets (Irin, 2005). It is esti-
mated that between 200 and 300 armed men were involved in the attack on 
Logoualé, of whom 87 were taken prisoner by the rebels and then by the im-
partial forces. Prisoners included people of Wê origin but also young Yacoubas, 
who had joined the pro-government militias, rendering the composition of the 
group rather counter-intuitive.6 Contrary to the bulk of AP-Wê and FLGO re-
                                              
6  Pastor Gammi himself was said to be of Yacouba origin, and was father of Diomandé Vassé, who was 
advisor of Minister Douaty in 2002-2003. Both politicians were known to have played an important 
role in supplying the starting counter-insurgency with military materiel. 
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cruits, the MILOCI was not an ‘ethnic’ movement and the recruitment was not as 
local as theirs was. It was largely composed of Abidjanese activists, members of 
the Jeunes Patriotes social movement, who had fought in FLGO ranks at the 
height of the war (notably to recapture the towns of Toulepleu and Blolequin) 
and to whom it had been promised integration into the army (Le Patriote, 2005). 
When it became clear that most of them would never be incorporated in the 
army, some of these youths gathered in Duékoué and decided to form the basis of 
a new movement. The movement was based in Kahadé, a Guéré village 25 km 
from Guiglo, and had close links to the FLGO and the Ivoirian army. In an 
extensive interview in Le Patriote, a young militia member describes the con-
nections with Abidjan and the regular army (Box 6.1). 
 
 
Source: Le Patriote (2005)7 
                                              
7  For better reader comprehension, the translation was slightly adapted by the author. 
Box 6.1: Testimony of a MILOCI recruit 
 
‘The MILOCI is composed of “young patriots” who were active in the communes of Yopou-
gon, Adjamé, Abobo and Koumassi in Abidjan. Some of them gathered in Duékoué and 
formed the basis of the movement. […] At the beginning of the war, patriotic movements 
started. In Yopougon, we were with someone called Julien. Every commune in Abidjan had 
its group of young patriots who were part of street agoras and parliaments. It was co-
ordinated by M.Batoa and Pastor Gammi. […] Pastor Gammi is of Yacouba origin, from the 
region of Danané. His real name is Diomandé and he is related to Vassé Diomandé, advisor 
of minister Douaty and member of the Social and Economic Council. He is not a pastor. He 
was the right hand of Blé Goudé at the head of the COJEP and […] to make himself more 
popular, he joined the armed branch of the patriotic movement. […] I never met him. He 
was not on the ground.  
 
The MILOCI used to be part of the FLGO movement. When we fought in Toulepleu and 
Blolequin, the MILOCI did not yet exist. Later, we were all brought back to Abidjan, to the 
1st Battalion of parachutist commandos, where we told that we would be integrated in the 
Ivorian army. But we were left on our own. […] They only integrated one section in the 
army, the “Unité Tonnerre”, currently based in Ity, in the 1st Battalion of parachutist com-
mandos […]. The MILOCI is not an “ethnic” movement. It is composed of “young patriots” 
from Abidjan who wanted to become soldiers, and to whom it was promised integration into 
the army after the battles in the west. We were 350 people in the beginning. Between then 
and today, many were discouraged.  
 
In the west, we were based in Kahadé, a Guéré village, 25 km from Guiglo. We used to 
sleep at the youth centre. Minister Douaty used to provide us with food supplies, via his 
advisor Diomandé Vassé. We also had a stock of weapons in Guiglo. The minister visited 
our arsenal twice while I was on the watch. Commandant Batoa was the MILOCI Chief of 
Staff on the ground. He was a civilian. Our war leader was an officer, from the FANCI. It 
was Lieutenant Teha from the First Battalion of the infantry detachment in Blolequin. Our 
armament, military training and uniforms were provided by the FANCI. We were not staying 
in the same camps, but we had access to their base. […] In the village where we were 
based, the chief also helped us to get weapons; he was buying them in Liberia. […] Colonel 
Yedess, head of the Ivoirian army’s operations in the west, was our spiritual chief.’ 
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If the links with Abidjan and with the regular army were obvious, connections 
with the FLGO were no less evident. Shortly after the attack of Logoualé, Gene-
ral Maho issued a communiqué: ‘We offer our complete support to the actions by 
MILOCI, and our youth, and all his strength, are at its disposal for any need at 
any point’(Agence France Presse, 2005). The connection with the Ivoirian army 
was also later confirmed by Colonel Eric Burgaud, Chief of Staff of the French 
forces in the West: ‘We have proof that the [MILOCI] militiamen were super-
vised by the Ivorian army and that they had been armed by the Ivorian army’ 
(Reuters cited in Human Rights Watch, 2005). This was also confirmed by the 
testimony of Liberian fighters who had participated in the Logoualé attack who 
told Human Rights Watch staff that they had received arms, ammunition and 
uniforms from military personnel in preparation for the attack.  
In July 2005, the FLGO, MILOCI, UPRGO and AP-Wê started to appear in 
the press, regrouped under the umbrella organization Forces de résistance du 
Grand Ouest (FRGO) and led by Maho (Human Rights Watch, 2005). This in-
centive to merge probably arose from the likelihood of receiving financial 
compensation for having participated in the war effort and perhaps it was then 
thought that presenting one group instead of four would facilitate the disburse-
ment of the DDR cash instalments. 
On 13 December 2005, the FRGO held a press briefing in which it announced 
its full support for the new Prime Minister in his mission to restore peace. Maho 
took advantage of this communiqué to put the disarming of the 10,700 FRGO 
combatants on the agenda, expressing his disappointment at not having been 
involved in the discussions on DDR held by the UN, the African Union and the 
South-African mediation, while the rebel factions had had a say (Nord-Sud, 
2005). This was quite an opportune statement to make, at a time when the modus 
operandi for disarming the pro-government militias was still being designed. In 
practice though, and in comparison with the individual armed factions, the FRGO 
did not weight much in the political scene. Financial compensation for partici-
pating in the war effort was largely negotiated directly with the leaders of the 
four militias, and sometimes on a case-by-case basis with a number of local war 
lords. Several ‘presidential envelopes’ were also opaquely distributed in the west, 
notably in 2005, when Minister of Defense Kadet Bertin visited Toulepleu, and 
in 2007 when President Gbagbo came to Guiglo.8  
Another counter-insurgent armed group that emerged in the west were the 
Liberian-backed LIMA forces, who were particularly active in the very begin-
ning, at the height of conflict. If their precise chain of command largely remains 
                                              
8  I come back to this question of payment in Chapter 9, when reflecting on the function of such incen-
tives. 
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unclear, we know that they were led on the ground by several Liberian com-
manders and Ivoirian FANCI Lieutenant Jean Oulaï Delafosse is reported to have 
been closely involved with them (United Nations, 2006). It has, however, been 
reported that on a number of occasions, the Ivoirian army lacked direct command 
over their Liberian elements. Human Rights Watch even wrote that Guéré offi-
cials from the Toulepleu area complained to government officials in Abidjan 
about the way their Liberian allies were treating civilians. They were told in 
answer ‘to be very careful’ and ‘not to say that it was the mercenaries who did 
these things’. ‘Say instead that it was the rebels’ (Human Rights Watch, 2003a). 
Nearly half of the pro-government militias I interviewed mentioned having 
started their militia days with the LIMA forces (Table 6.2). The name ‘LIMA’ 
was actually given by the French peacekeepers early on and represented the 
international radio code word for the letter L, as in Liberia (International Crisis 
Group, 2003). Various statements and press releases from the UN, the French 
government and international news agencies (and notably the 2003 Report of the 
Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council reso-
lution 1458, S/2003/498) have designated these factions as ‘supplétifs Libériens’ 
or as ‘LIMA’ forces. Not surprisingly, neither the State nor the FPI press has 
ever acknowledged the use of Liberian elements as reinforcements. LIMA forces 
have yet always been linked to the Ivoirian State and a LIMA section has even 
persisted in Toulepleu up to quite a recent date. Some accounts even reported 
tensions between FLGO and the remnants of these LIMA factions. During the 
disarmament process in Guiglo in late July 2006, when the Toulepleu-based 
LIMA forces wanted to join the process, they were called ‘Liberian’ by the other 
groups and were therefore excluded. UNOCI staff observed militia leader Maho 
telling LIMA recruits who had arrived from Toulepleu that they could not disarm 
as they were ‘Liberians and not Ivoirians’. Maho was also observed criticizing 
 
 
Table 6.2 First faction integrated by respondents 
MAN GUIGLO 
MPCI 34 AP-WE 22 
MPIGO 32 LIMA 45 
MJP 33 FLGO 16 
Other 1 UPRGO 10 
  Jeunes Patriotes 1 
  FANCI 2 
  Rural vigilantism 3 
  Other 1 
Source: Fieldwork, 2007. 
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the fact that the Toulepleu counter-insurgency group was retaining Liberian 
fighters in violation of international agreements (United Nations, 2006). 
Finally, there is ground to think that the MODEL – the Liberian armed move-
ment that eventually ousted Taylor from power – was in fact an offshoot of the 
LIMA. Entering into details here would be beyond the scope of this study but it 
is worth noting that after LIMA forces fought alongside FLGO and MILOCI 
elements in Côte d’Ivoire, some sections composed of Liberians and of Ivoirian 
militarized civilians crossed the border to eventually fight in Liberia9 (notably in 
Zwedru and Toe Town, two battles mentioned in the chronology of violent 
events in Appendix 1 and visualized by Map 5.2 in the previous chapter).  
In the two fieldwork locations on the government side, Guiglo and Blolequin, 
the recruitment of low-ranking pro-government militia members appeared 
strikingly local. The large majority of the recruits I interviewed were of Guéré 
origin (the local autochthones), and this suspected ‘locality’ of recruitment was 
later confirmed when examining a larger dataset from the National Programme of 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion (PNDDR). The dataset I had ac-
cess to provided the nominal listing of 5,641 pro-government militia members 
with specifications on the faction they had joined, their sex, age, civil status, 
place of birth, origin, place of current residency, pre-war activity, education 
level, and the ‘wishes’ they expressed to the PNDDR staff in terms of place of 
residence and activity should the official DDR programming ever start on a large 
scale. Regardless of obvious questions concerning the way such data were 
compiled, 90% of the 5,074 recruits who were then listed by the PNDDR were 
from Guéré localities (Table 6.3).10 
Insurgent movements 
If the majority of rebel recruits were of northern origin, rebel forces have always 
denied having a specific regional or ethnic affiliation (Langer, 2003). True, their 
political demands had some kind of ethnic connotation in the beginning; one of 
their announced objectives was ‘to put an end to the domination by the south-
erners’,11 in addition to demanding the resignation of the current President, the 
holding of inclusive national elections and an in-depth revision of the Ivoirian 
Constitution. Many observers hence concluded that the current conflict had only 
crystallized a long-standing North-South divide, and the term ‘northerner’ often 
 
                                              
9  It was reported that Gbagbo had then gained tacit U.S. approval to pressure Taylor (International 
Crisis Group, 2003). 
10  The table includes people who had left their area of origin before the war and who returned to fight. 
11  United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI), Conflict Background (cited in Langer, 2003). 
  
137
Table 6.3 Cities of origin of pro-government militias listed by the PNDDR 
 N % 
WEST 5,074 90 
Bangolo 317 6 
Blolequin 1552 28 
Duékoué 588 10 
Guiglo 988 18 
Péhé 394 7 
Tai 260 5 
Toulepleu 707 13 
Other locations in the West (<100 recruits) 26812 5 
CENTRE 62 1 
Bouaké 31 0.5 
Other locations in the Centre (<30 recruits) 31 0.5 
NORTH EAST 47 1 
Tehini 46 1 
Other locations in North East (<30 recruits) 1 0 
CENTRE WEST 44 1 
SOUTH WEST 23 0 
EAST 15 0 
SOUTH EAST 15 0 
NORTH / NORTH EAST 15 0 
ABIDJAN & suburbs 133 2 
Abidjan 111 2 
Other locations in Abidjan (<100 recruits) 22 0 
NON-SPECIFIED 213 4 
Total Militia Recruits 5,641 100 
Source: Data taken from PNDDR. Table compiled by the author, 2007. 
 
 
became synonymous with ‘rebel’ in the general public opinion. Also true, many 
northerners, living in both government and rebel-controlled areas, were drawn 
into the movement because the recruitment rhetoric had somehow struck a note – 
as one recruit put it: ‘When people come and say: “We’re fighting for you, 
because we know that day and night, you get hassled. You are called foreigner 
(…).” Such a discourse generates energies’ (Fofana, 2009). But rebel recruits 
were not confined to people of northern origin: the ones who stirred up the coup 
were foremost discontented soldiers protesting against their increased marginali-
zation and the ethnic composition of the group of people I interviewed in Man 
nuances such claims. The quasi-immediate politicization of ‘northern people’s 
generally felt ethnic grievances’ by the opposition, however, was opportune in 
quickly giving the insurgents some sense of legitimacy.  
                                              
12  ‘268’ means that 268 recruits have come from localities that supplied less than 100 recruits to the 
armed group. 
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If we look at the ethnic composition of the group of people I interviewed, the 
picture is rather diverse. In Man, western and northern ethnic groups were 
roughly even in proportion. Many youths drawn in the armed factions were in 
fact of Yacouba origin, the local autochthones (also the ethnic affiliation of the 
controversial former head of State General Gueï), and many respondents were 
also of other ‘western’ ethnic affiliations (Toura, Mahou, and even rather coun-
terintuitively, Wobé). About half of respondents were of northern origin and con-
sisted of Dioulas, Sénoufos, Mossis, Malinkés, Lobis, and Odiennekas (Table 
6.4). Although, to complement my sample, I could not collect detailed informa-
tion on the overall composition of the rebel forces in my fieldwork locations, the 
multiplicity of ethnic backgrounds among my respondents was striking in Man 
compared to the quasi mono-ethnic situation encountered in Guiglo and Blole-
quin, where by large, the majority of respondents were of Guéré origin. 
 
 
Table 6.4 Respondents’ ethnic group 
MAN 
Rebel forces 
GUIGLO 
Pro-government militias 
Yacouba/Dan 46 Agni 2 
Dioula 11 Wobé 2 
Sénoufo 15 Guéré 93 
Toura 4 Bété 2 
Mossi 6 Krumen 1 
Mahou 3 Yacouba 1 
Djimini 1   
Koyaka 2   
Malinké 7   
Agni 1   
Lobi 1   
Wobé 1   
Samogo 1   
Odienneka 1   
Source: Fieldwork, 2007. 
 
 
The group that led the initial revolt in September 2002 was the Mouvement 
Patriotique pour la Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI). Although the MPCI signed a first 
ceasefire on 17 October, the conflict was further complicated by the emergence 
of two additional rebel movements in the west of the country: the Mouvement 
Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO) and the Mouvement pour la Justice 
et la Paix (MJP). Both came into existence at the end of November, as they 
claimed the capture of strategic towns in the west. Since MPIGO and MJP were 
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not signatories of the 17 October ceasefire agreement, they could violate the 
truce with total impunity.  
The MPIGO was mainly composed of Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters,13 
and was assisted by Yacoubas (the local autochthones of the Man/Danané area). 
It gained a reputation of perpetrating extremely violent acts on civilians. From an 
emic perspective, MPIGO became synonymous with Liberian mercenaries, un-
controlled troops, fear, and extreme cruelty. The movement came into existence 
with the capture of the town of Danané on 28 November 2002 and primarily 
claimed to have emerged in response to the assassination of General Gueï, killed 
in Abidjan in the first hours of the revolt. One of the recurring discourses was to 
avenge this deed. The armed group was estimated to number 6,000 recruits.  
MJP was the western extension of the MPCI and was the smallest of the rebel 
movements. Initially, it only counted 250 men and was composed of dozos (the 
traditional hunters mentioned before), Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters, and 
local and non-local Ivoirian recruits. The attack on Man was led by Liberian 
commanders. Little is known about the Ivoirian MJP leader, Déli Gaspard, other 
than the fact that he was one of the signatories of the Linas-Marcoussis agree-
ment. In Man, the connection between MJP and MPCI was evident from the very 
beginning, as vehicles and equipment stamped with the MPCI logo were seen in 
town shortly after MJP commanders claimed responsibility for the attack on the 
city. MPCI leaders were also frequently seen in town and MPCI laissez-passer 
was recognized in MJP-controlled areas (and vice versa). This was not neces-
sarily the case between MPIGO and MPCI. 
Following violent clashes in Duékoué on 21 December 2002 between the 
French peacekeeping force and a rebel armed faction (it was the first time the 
French had opened fire to halt a rebel advance), MPCI, MPIGO and MJP issued 
their first joint statement in Bouaké. France was warned that any other attack on 
a rebel position would be considered to be an ‘act of war’, and the French forces 
were threatened with being attacked on all fronts if they would do so again. In 
February 2003, the leaders of the three factions met again in Man to discuss a 
possible merger, and shortly after, MPCI, MPIGO and MJP officially joined to-
gether and the name Forces Nouvelles (FN) started to appear in the press to 
designate the coalition (Pana Press, 2003f, 2003g, 2003q). Since then, all military 
and political negotiations on behalf of the rebel forces have been conducted by 
the Forces Nouvelles, with Colonel Soumaïla Bakayoko as Chief of Staff on the 
military side and Guillaume Soro as the political leader.  
                                              
13  Liberian fighters were composed of a mix of pro-Taylor militia members and local recruits of Gio 
origin. 
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Yet, despite this union, the Forces Nouvelles have not been exempt from 
internal dissension (International Crisis Group, 2003; Langer, 2003; Reuters, 
2003). Shortly after the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis agreement in January 
2003 which stipulated a series of actions to take (setting up a government of 
reconciliation, creating an independent electoral commission, preparing presiden-
tial and legislative elections in October 2005, the demobilization, disarmament, 
and reintegration of combatants, and a series of reforms of both nationality and 
land laws), violent conflicts broke out between rebel commanders because some 
were refusing to make too many concessions. Pro-IB14 military elements were 
particularly prone to view any progress in the political resolution of conflicts as 
capitulation, and there were therefore many clashes in the course of 2003 be-
tween pro-IB elements and more progressive troops, who continued to show 
loyalty to the military commanders who had been involved in political negotia-
tions (Tuo Fozié and Chérif Ousmane). Much internal cleansing therefore took 
place during that period in the rebellion strongholds of Bouaké, Man, Korhogo, 
Séguéla and Vavoua. 
The coexistence of Ivoirian and Liberian elements in the rebel forces did not 
go without encumbers. The schism between Ivoirian rebel forces and their Libe-
rian allies dates almost from the beginning, when Ivoirian rebel leaders realized 
how badly their temporary associates were treating the civilian population. In 
December 2002, a tacit deal restricted the Liberian-backed MPIGO zone of 
influence to Danané and to the immediate border with Liberia, and, until April 
2003, MPIGO zones were distinct from MPCI-MJP zones. In late January 2003, 
MPCI Chief of Staff Tuo Fozié ordered the expulsion from Man of the worst of 
the Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters, at least those known for their extreme 
violence against civilians, who had been regularly witnessed roaming between 
Danané, Bangolo and the Liberian border, pillaging, raping, burning villages and 
killing civilians. Following a meeting in Korhogo on 6 February, Ivoirian rebel 
leader Ousmane Coulibaly was placed in charge of a ‘clean-up’ and reinforce-
ments were sent from Bouaké. The plan was to contain the Liberians to the 
border area. But as MPIGO and MPCI Ivoirian leaders openly clashed on a num-
ber of occasions and as it became increasingly difficult to control the Liberian 
elements of MPIGO in Danané, the strategic alliance did not survive the loyalist 
offensive of April 2003 and an extensive clean-up took place in the rebel ranks. 
The MPIGO Ivoirian leader, Felix Doh, was murdered at the end of April, in 
                                              
14  ‘IB’ stands for Staff Sergeant Ibrahim ‘IB’ Coulibaly, former member of the Presidential Guard, who 
was credited with having led the 19 September insurgency. 
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obscure circumstances.15 As peace discussions were progressing (notably with 
the Linas-Marcoussis agreement, which led the rebel political branch to agree to 
joining a power-sharing government), the Ivoirian rebel military leadership was 
more and more keen on putting an end to the increasingly inconvenient alliance 
of convenience with the Liberians (January-May 2003). The hunting down of 
Liberians then followed in the period February-May 2003. After having chased 
the Liberians from Danané, MPCI military leader Chérif Ousmane assumed 
leadership of the region (Human Rights Watch, 2003b). 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter was necessary to clarify the dynamics of the armed factions that 
operated in the west between 2002 and 2007 in order to avoid putting them all in 
one basket. It brought to the fore the internal dynamics of these groups, their 
degree of ethnic mixity, which factions emerged earliest, which ones were 
absorbed by other groups, and the extent of ‘locality’ of recruitment. On that last 
aspect – which is key for making an informed analysis on violent mobilization 
processes – it showed that recruitment appeared strikingly local in both towns, 
despite the fact that the two mobilizing contexts varied tremendously from one 
place to another. Next chapter looks at the individual motives for enlistment, and 
at the pre-war profiles of the militarized civilians in the west. 
                                              
15  Ivorian rebels blamed Doh’s death on Sam Bockarie, a well-known RUF commander with close links 
to Taylor. It is however not out of the question that Doh was killed by his own brothers in arms, given 
the suspicions surrounding his true loyalty to the cause. Bockarie was also eventually killed in unex-
plained circumstances a few days later, another sign of the deterioration of the Taylor/rebel military 
partnership (International Crisis Group, 2003; Langer, 2003; Reuters, 2003). 
142 
 
Photograph 7: On the way to Dompleu, 5 km of Man 
 
Photograph 8: Market scene, Guiglo 
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Militarized civilians:  
Diversity of trajectories,  
diversity of motives for enlistment 
Who joins armed groups and why, are empirical questions whose answers vary 
considerably across contexts. Why do civilians follow certain leaders into war? 
Are there certain profiles more likely to enrol? When are people more likely to 
engage in violent action? And certainly equally important to reflect upon when 
trying to understand local mobilization processes: why do some people ‘not join’ 
when faced with similar circumstances? Answers to these questions largely 
depend on individual and collective interpretations of given contexts. Surely, im-
mediate circumstances play an important role in triggering people’s engagement, 
but because the mere fact of being exposed to the same trouble does not auto-
matically translate into participation in violent action, it is also necessary to 
reflect on the diversity of exit strategies people devise when subject to harass-
ment by non-State armed groups. In western Côte d’Ivoire after all, not every-
body felt obliged to take up arms in self-defence. Not everyone was coerced. 
This section therefore attempts to find keys of interpretation to understand why 
some men and women ended up taking up arms at some point in the western 
region. To do so, it explores the pre-war profiles of 237 militarized civilians who 
were drawn into armed factions on both belligerent sides, and their motivations 
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for engagement from their particular points of views.1 Interviews took place in 
Man, Guiglo and Blolequin, three locations extensively described in Chapter 5. 
Gurr’s famous question, ‘Why Men Rebel’ (Gurr, 1970), has fascinated 
scholars for a long time. If much has been written on social protest movements 
(Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009: 22-26), the literature on violent social 
protest movements is much scarcer; this chapter partially attempts to fill this gap. 
Classical approaches tend to describe contentious politics as an irrational 
phenomenon: ‘the politics of the impatient’. From this perspective, it is assumed 
that people protest because they are frustrated, marginalized, affected by 
economic crises and/or deprived of certain social rights, and explanations are 
framed foremost in terms of grievances. It is also often assumed that when 
protest occurs, it is most likely to occur in a chaotic way. Dissatisfaction with 
these theories grew in the late 1960s with the growth of social movements 
activities on both sides of the Atlantic, as social protest lost its irrational 
character and started to be perceived as a positive and possible way to improve 
politics. The new paradigms that emerged, simultaneously, were structural 
approaches on the one hand, which began to emphasize the political element of 
protest, and socio-constructivist ones on the other hand, which focused on the 
collective and individual interpretations of socio-political contexts. In both these 
theory trends, grievance has been assigned a subordinate position and the 
analytical repertoires tapped into have mostly been organized around the three 
concepts of framing, identity and emotions (and particularly the influence of 
emotions on action). In conflict studies, a direct consequence has been to switch 
the focus away from the felt need to make an inventory of grievances to search 
for the cause(s) of conflict, to a growing interest in understanding the diversity 
and complexity of local mobilization processes. Perhaps the root causes of civil 
war no longer matter, as Woodward (2007) writes. After all, people’s motiva-
tions usually overlap one another and it makes little sense to search for a mono-
cause or for a rationale that would be more significant than others. I empirically 
reflect on such questions below. 
                                              
1  As already mentioned earlier, the bulk of respondents were identified using supporting NGOs as point 
of entry and were involved in a ‘reinsertion programme’ at the time of the interviews. Given the 
limited timeline of humanitarian interventions targeting ex-combatants, the terms ‘reinsertion’ and 
‘reintegration’ are here used interchangeably. All respondents occupied low-ranking positions in the 
armed movements and had either joined pro-government militias and rebel groups at the start of the 
Ivoirian conflict. A few recruits who had demobilized themselves were selected through other net-
works, mainly through young people I interviewed who referred me to other youths who were not part 
of any programme. The bulk of respondents were young men and women, between 15 and 35 years 
old; a large majority were men.  
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Who ‘took up arms’ in the west? 
The question of who joins armed groups depends a lot on individual and col-
lective interpretations of a given context. When he studied ethnic militias in 
Nigeria, Guichaoua (Guichaoua, 2007) used three indicators to characterize the 
profile of recruits: ‘levels of education’, ‘occupation’ and ‘social connectedness’. 
His results show that militia members were educated above average, that a large 
majority had a side job outside the militia, and that most were not dissocialized at 
all. Many recruits were married, had children, were well-settled in a place they 
rented, and known as militia members in their neighbourhood. In contrast, Hum-
phreys & Weinstein (2004) pointed out a different trend and found that across 
factions, the majority of the Sierra Leonean ex-combatants they interviewed were 
uneducated and poor, with a pre-war background as student or farmer. Perhaps 
there is some kind of profile for those more likely to join a violent movement. 
Perhaps there is none and it is more a matter of circumstances. In western Côte 
d’Ivoire, as I dug into the pre-war educational, professional and social trajecto-
ries of the recruits I interviewed, I came across a diversity of patterns. 
 
Education trajectories: no need for war to disrupt them 
Education is not to be taken for granted in Côte d’Ivoire, and for the ones who go 
to school, each additional year of education is the product of a fierce struggle 
against poverty and familial priorities. Militia members interviewed in Guiglo/-
Blolequin were much better educated than the rebels interviewed in Man. In 
Man, about half of the respondents had never been enrolled in an education 
system recognized by the state, while in contrast nearly all had gone through 
some kind of formal education in Guiglo/Blolequin, with half succeeding in 
starting secondary school and three entering a post-secondary phase (Table 7.1). 
These results are not surprising per se and only reflect the structural regional 
disparity that existed before the war in terms of enrolment rates, use of infra-
structure, and completion of schooling (Chelpi-Den Hamer, 2007; Hugon & 
Bommier, 2002; Le Pape & Vidal, 1987; Proteau, 2002). In Côte d’Ivoire, formal 
education is the least popular in rural areas, in the north, and among the popu-
lations of northern origin, partly because they compete with Quranic schools.2  
Lack of means, including lack of means after a parent’s sudden death, was the 
main reason put forward in both locations to explain why respondents had 
 
                                              
2  In 2001, five years was the average duration of schooling in rural areas compared to fifteen years for 
the country as a whole. Literacy rates were 60% in Abidjan, 10% in the north, 30% in rural areas and 
70% in urban zones. Primary enrolment rates were 40% in Korhogo and 80% in Man (Hugon & 
Bommier, 2002).  
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Table 7.1 Last year of schooling before dropping out 
      MAN GUIGLO TOTAL 
Primary education CP 9 5 14 
 CE 6 8 14 
 CM1 3 7 10 
 CM2 12 24 36 
 Total 30 44 74 
Secondary education 6ème 6 7 13 
 5ème 5 8 13 
 4ème 8 14 22 
 3ème 6 16 22 
 2nde 1 1 2 
 1ère 0 3 3 
 Total 26 49 75 
Technical education (formal)   1 1 
Post-secondary education   3 3 
 TOTAL 56 97 153 
Source: Fieldwork, 2007. 
 
 
dropped out of school – this strikingly came up when examining respondents’ 
individual trajectories (Box 7.1). Another reason to drop out of school was the 
loss of interest in general education, the willingness to work and/or the necessity 
to help parents by either entering the family business or by working for a third 
party to generate an extra source of income. At adolescent age, many adult 
respondents reported that they had not yet completed their primary education. 
Some reported feeling too old to continue going to school and a minority stopped 
because of educational failure. They usually repeated a class first, but then failed 
a second time, which was eventually the trigger that convinced them to drop out: 
continuing was no longer worth their time and financial sacrifices. Many res-
pondents had already stopped attending school one or more years before the start 
of the war. The few who reported dropping out because of the conflict mentioned 
their school’s closing as the main reason. 
 
Professional trajectories: 
The tribulations of ‘hyper-mobile’ youths in the informal sector  
Most recruits I interviewed earned money before the war. Some were doing 
contractual work and their income varied according to contract opportunities; 
some were working as day labourers, and some had a regular income. The ma-
jority was employed in the informal economy, a few had very decent jobs. 
Variable income was the norm, and only a minority were earning the same 
amount every month (about 10% of respondents). In Man, roughly a quarter were 
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Source: Fieldwork, 2007 
 
 
self-employed before the war, another quarter were employed by some kind of 
boss, and another quarter were enrolled into some kind of informal apprentice-
ship. The rest did contract and day work; only a minority were studying. In 
Guiglo, two-thirds of the respondents were self-employed or involved in the 
family business, 15% were apprentices, 10% were employees, and only a few 
were still at school.  
At the one extreme, I met quite entrepreneurial young men. One respondent, 
for instance, whom I met in Man, was combining two jobs before the war. He 
Box 7.1: A selection of educational accounts 
 
1. B. was a brilliant young man who had received all his education in Abidjan. His father had 
died when he was very young and his mother was financially taking care of him. When she 
fell sick in 1996 and decided to go back to her village to get treatment, B. had just started 
secondary school. He was put into the care of an uncle. Unfortunately, the uncle was 
transferred not long after to the north of the country, leaving him alone in Abidjan. B. tried to 
cope as best as he could, but he could not last more than a few months on his own. 
Schooling was free, but he could not afford transport to go to school and his uncle did not 
support him regularly. He could no longer rely on his mother as she had passed away. 
Three months after the start of the 1998-1999 school year, he finally received some financial 
help from his uncle (the equivalent of EUR 10). He realized it would never be enough to 
enable him to continue his education and therefore decided to drop out of school. He used 
the money to pay for transport, and went to the village his mother was from, in western Côte 
d’Ivoire. He had never been there before but he thought life would be easier than in Abidjan. 
He moved to the west four years before the start of the war. 
 
2. G. dropped out of school in 11th grade (1ère), one year before completing his secondary 
education. He was 22 years old. He said he stopped because he lacked the financial means 
to continue. His scholarship was not enough to cover his expenses. He was entitled to 
12,000 CFA francs per trimester, but given that he was an intern in Yamoussoukro, the 
money was directly channeled to the boarding school and he did not get any cash. He had a 
side job and used to work as a hairdresser during weekends and vacations, but he was not 
earning enough. He therefore decided to stop and to return to his hometown, Guiglo, where 
he started working full time as a hairdresser. 
 
3. M.’s father was a primary school teacher and used to get transferred from one village to 
another for his work. His wife and kids always followed him. When M. was enrolled in 3rd 
grade in a village near Duékoué, his parents got into an argument and split up. He ended up 
living with his mother, who could not afford to have him stay in school. He dropped out of 
school at 9 and started working as an apprentice in an auto workshop.  
 
4. A. had to enrol in a private school after finishing primary education, spending 90,000 CFA 
francs a year for tuition fees. He had successfully passed the secondary school entrance 
exam but his grades did not allow him to continue in the public system. Like many sub-
Saharan African countries, Côte d’Ivoire has such a structural lack of infrastructure at the 
secondary level that only the pupils who score above a certain grade get access to free 
secondary education. A. was also taking courses in parallel in a vocational school to learn 
auto mechanics. His father was running a garage. He was 23 when he stopped studying and 
started helping his father full-time with the family business.  
148 
 
was an employee of the sugar firm Sucrivoire in Borotou, where he was paid 
75,000 CFA francs a month to stack sugar bags (the equivalent of EUR 115). 
After his day shift, he ran his own electronic workshop and a local radio station. 
He had several apprentices to help him, and his daily sales varied between 5,000 
and 40,000 CFA francs. Another respondent (met in Guiglo) was running his 
own business as a building painter and was registered with the local Chamber of 
Commerce. He had won several bids before the war and once economic activities 
resumed after the main clashes were over, he became involved in contracts for 
renovating public infrastructure. At the other end of the spectrum, I met young 
men who led quite dependent lives. They would not work and blamed their 
family for that, ‘for failing to place me somewhere’. There were not many of 
them but their discourses were in sharp contrast with the rest. Out of the 10% of 
respondents who had never worked for a wage before the war, a minority fell into 
that category. The rest were simply very young in 2002, under 19, and usually 
still under parental care. They were either at school, in their first years of ap-
prenticeship, doing rural/urban petty jobs or simply doing nothing. 
The flexibility and geographical mobility of the youths I interviewed was 
rather striking. In western Côte d’Ivoire, and in the country in general, it is a real 
struggle to work, and earning a living requires more than goodwill and individual 
skills. In respondents’ own terms, ‘on part pour se chercher’. That literally 
means that they leave home behind in search of better prospects elsewhere. They 
may be helped by relatives in the process, or rely on acquaintances to find their 
way, but this stage recurs repeatedly in their professional trajectories and helps 
them make the transition to adulthood and financial independence (Box 7.2).  
Apart from giving the reader a good insight into (unsafe) local work practices, 
this case is illustrative in many respects. First, it shows that at a certain point in 
their lives, it is implicitly expected that young people, and especially young men, 
stop being a burden on their relatives. Second, from the day they start working, 
youth are successively pushed and pulled into activities, moving from one region 
to another, following opportunities or fulfilling certain commitments. They usu-
ally work in several locations before reaching financial independence, and many 
eventually build their professional trajectories by alternating work in urban and 
rural settings. Finally, this case shows that it is not uncommon to return to the 
village or town of origin after a few years of independence, and not necessarily 
for lack of options. An implicit set of obligations exists among family members, 
and sometimes one simply goes back to respond to familial obligations, even if it 
takes precedence over personal preferences. One respondent was an accom-
plished tailor in town, running his own business for several years, when his 
brother asked him to return to their village to take care of their mother. Their 
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Source: Fieldwork, 2007 
 
 
three sisters had married and had left home, leaving the old woman on her own 
with several grandchildren in her custody. The person I interviewed was 26 years 
old when he moved back to his village. There, he started a small tailoring work-
shop with three sewing machines (two were paid for by his brother) and four 
apprentices. He was taking care of twelve people: his mother, his own family, 
and all the nephews and nieces his mother had in her custody.  
Box 7.2: A typical ‘hyper-mobile’ youth 
 
C. was 22 years old before the war and had already worked in six different locations. 
He never went to school and started working when he was 11. He would go and fetch 
water, he would scare the birds in the fields, he would sell bags of rice in the market. 
His mother gave him petty cash when needed. He was 16 when he left home and 
began doing contract work. He started clearing the field of a Baoulé in a village near 
Issia. The man told him that he would pay him 150,000 CFA francs after the harvest 
(the equivalent of EUR 230), but C. only received the third of it. Cocoa and coffee 
yields had not been good that year, and the man could not pay what he had 
promised. C. left him and started working on the cocoa and coffee plantation of a 
Sénoufo near Guiglo. He said he would have liked to stay longer there, but a few 
months after he started the job, a group of men – former employees – broke into his 
boss’s house, where he was staying, with a 12-calibre gun. C. was frightened. He 
thought that if the men came back when the boss was absent, he would be beaten 
up. He therefore left for a more secure place.  
 
At first, he stayed at his aunt’s in town, in Biankouma, helping her in her cassava/-
yam/maize fields for a few months. Then he worked for a Baoulé, to whom he had 
been introduced before (the person was the friend of an acquaintance). His new boss 
was working for the Ivoirian electricity company. Despite his lack of specific skills, C. 
was hired to work on high-voltage power lines in the rural areas near Touba. He was 
based in town but usually spent a couple of weeks in nearby villages to do the work. 
He used to work in a group of 7 or 8 men, and each of them would earn 50,000 CFA 
francs per job (the equivalent of EUR 75). The work was hard but C. said his boss 
took good care of them. He paid for their food, and he also provided accommodation, 
power and water. A few months later, C. moved on elsewhere. He went to a mining 
place with a friend and started digging holes to find diamonds. But as he did not earn 
anything there and as he did not trust his co-workers, he stopped and went back 
home, to his mother’s place. He was then 19 years old. There, he started commuting 
every day between his village and the nearby town (Man), earning his living by carry-
ing luggage and pushing wheelbarrows. On good days, he could make up to 5,000 
CFA francs (the equivalent of EUR 8), on bad days nothing. He would take 200 FCFA 
francs per day to pay for the rental of his wheelbarrow, and he would save some 
cash to pay the city fee, which allowed him to carry out such activities (13,000 CFA 
francs per year). Sometimes, he did contract work for the Ivoirian electricity company. 
C. gave most of what he earned to his mother and was the primary provider for his 
family.  
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Social connectedness: alternating practices of ‘tapping’ and ‘giving’ 
About a third of respondents in Guiglo were head of their household before the 
war and another third were still under their parents’ direct care. In Man, familial 
ties were looser: if a third of the respondents were still living at their father/-
mother’s place, another third lived with extended family and about one fourth 
were fending for themselves with no family to rely on, living with acquaintances, 
in the home of their boss, or living on their own. This is not to say that they were 
disconnected socially (I only remember one or two cases that I would qualify as 
being socially ‘lost’ before the war), but many respondents in Man were using 
weak ties and extra-familial networks to get along on a daily basis. This is in fact 
hardly a surprising situation: Man is an important magnet for the western region 
(it is much bigger than Guiglo in terms of size) and it has become the host city to 
many youths who had left home in search of better prospects.  
One way to assess how much the recruits I interviewed were socially con-
nected before the war is to look at their degree of financial dependence. Were the 
youths I interviewed supported by someone before the war? Or were they 
supporting someone themselves? If a majority of respondents claim to have re-
ceived some kind of financial assistance, many also claim to have provided for 
close relatives before getting involved in an armed group. It was not rare for a 
‘supporter’ to become someone ‘supported’ later on, and vice versa. The scope 
and frequency of support generally varied depending on timing, available re-
sources and upcoming expenses, but a common pattern was that even in a diffi-
cult position, they were doing their best to send something to close parents and 
spouses. This did not impede them from tapping into their social network when 
they were in difficulties (father/mother, relatives in better economic conditions, 
creditors); several youths mentioned having been helped by relatives to set up 
their own business, some were regularly receiving Western Union transfers from 
siblings overseas, and it was also not uncommon to see a younger sibling sup-
ported by an older brother in a better socio-economic position, even if it was not 
really necessary (the younger sibling being completely independent financially 
and primary caregiver for his own family). Help could be given with no ex-
pectation of payback or could be linked to some sort of investment, in which case 
the ‘supporter’ retained some rights to expected returns. But in general, respond-
ents’ testimonies show that family members were simply helping one another in 
a context marked by a severe socio-economic crisis and by structural poverty 
features unfortunately unlikely to disappear any time soon.  
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The specificities of the youngest recruits 
The participation of children and adolescents in violent conflicts is the gloomy 
reality of many wars, and Côte d’Ivoire is no exception. Both rebel and pro-
government militias made public that they had some under-eighteens among their 
troops in the beginning of conflict. At the same time, they always denied having 
consciously recruited them.  
There is little hope of getting a good approximation of the number of child 
recruits in the Ivoirian conflict, let alone of the number of those who did not 
enter formal demobilization and reinsertion. Numbers used in institutional re-
ports are based on FAFN and militia lists and are only reported cases of demo-
bilization. They are therefore rule-of-thumb figures, which say little about the 
scope of the phenomenon, even if intuitively one could argue that child recruit-
ment in Côte d’Ivoire was not as massive in scale as it was during the Liberian 
and Sierra Leone wars. The conflict did not last long, and the main period of 
violence only lasted a few months in the west, from the end of 2002 to mid-
spring 2003, with a short peak in November 2004. This is of course not to 
suggest that extreme violence was absent in the Ivoirian war, but only to make 
the point that cannon fodder was only needed for a short period, given the time-
line of combat operations. 
Much of the literature on children’s involvement in military action emphasizes 
their limited agency when they enlist in violent groups and often implies that 
youngest recruits follow different patterns of mobilization than their older peers. 
There has in fact been a proliferation of articles and reports in recent years that 
have been widely relayed in the international media, documenting stories of 
youths coerced into violent movements. The main effect of such writings has 
been to shape the dominant discourse on child soldiering, with the main pitfall 
being to oversimplify children’s motives for engagement by reducing the issue to 
forced conscription and manipulable minds. Conversely, ethnographic studies 
have highlighted the complexity of children and adolescents’ mobilization pro-
cesses, the multiplicity of patterns, and the similarities and differences with the 
older recruits. After all, who joins armed groups, how and why remain empirical 
questions, regardless of the age marker. As noted earlier, the main pitfall of 
adopting a ‘politic of age’ is to distract public attention from the real problems. 
By drawing on solid empirical data, the reflections that follow hope to join this 
stream of writing. 
The youngest recruits I interviewed were between 14 and 18 years old at the 
time of the first interview and they were then hosted in a reinsertion centre in 
Man. The first interview happened approximately three or four years after their 
enlistment into an armed group, which means that they were between 10 and 14 
years old when they were recruited. This is well below the acceptable age in Côte 
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d’Ivoire, even if we take the pragmatic view of tolerating recruitment into armed 
groups for the oldest teenagers. A striking outcome of the interviews was the 
degree of resilience and maturity these children displayed when confronted with 
difficult situations. They shared several characteristics with the older recruits: 
they were far from having few or no ties to society (even if most were using 
loose networks to get along on a daily basis), they usually had a certain level of 
education (dropout was mainly due to a lack of financial means), some had job 
skills (mainly learnt through informal training), and they were not necessarily 
more prone to violence than their contemporaries.3  
Perhaps the main difference with adults is that child respondents experienced a 
substantial loss in terms of human capital, a point Blatmann (2006) made for 
another context. In our case, the ones at school when the conflict started and the 
ones involved in informal apprenticeships clearly wasted precious years. As they 
say in their own words, they ‘put themselves late’. If the same motto generally 
also applies for the older recruits, the genuine effects are usually felt to a much 
lesser extent. The main difference is that when this loss of human capital happens 
at an early age (which is the case for children and adolescents), there is usually 
much less time to acquire a skill before joining an armed group and there is also 
less time to develop an extensive social network, which might result in fewer 
options after the war for employment or self-employment. In sum, the involve-
ment in warfare of the very young hampers their individual social advancement 
on a much more pronounced scale than it does for adults.  
There are two other differences with adult respondents that young age also 
exacerbates: one relates to the extent of financial independence, the second con-
cerns the extent of geographical mobility. If adult recruits often reported having 
left home in their late teens or early twenties in search of better prospects else-
where, this trend was much less pronounced with child respondents. In addition, 
even if many were contributing to the family income by earning petty cash, most 
were still dependent on caregivers, whether direct family (mother and/or father) 
or extended relatives. This second point, however, also applied in our case to 
many young adults. 
What drove young civilians to military life?  
Protection from real and perceived threats 
‘I joined the militia because transport was too expensive.’ I would never have 
thought of such an argument if I had not come to Guiglo to hear it, and hear it 
repeatedly. If the causal relationship does not strike the reader at first sight, it 
                                              
3  For additional interview fragments and detailed empirical information, see (Chelpi-Den Hamer, 2010). 
  
153
quickly makes sense when you put the line into context. At the start of the war, 
the west was at the heart of the violence and there was fierce fighting between 
government troops, the rebelling forces, and their respective allies. Civilians 
were not spared and people had to act quickly in towns and villages close to the 
front line to save their families and their main assets. Those wealthy enough to 
own cars, minivans, buses or trucks had an important advantage compared to the 
others and could flee faster than those on foot to safer places. But since vehicles 
were valuable assets for belligerents and quite prone to be quickly requisitioned 
for warfare, there was no time to lose. Several people I interviewed pointed out 
that transport prices to southern locations skyrocketed during that period, making 
it very difficult to transport everyone in the family.4 In addition, not much room 
on board was available and the families of the vehicle owners had priority over 
clients and acquaintances.  
Many respondents considered their involvement in armed groups as the most 
logical move in response to a potential threat (Chelpi-Den Hamer, 2011). By 
taking up arms, they were protecting themselves from an extremely violent con-
text (or at least they were trying to). Many felt that they would be better off in 
than out. As Utas (2006: 165) noted for another context, they were ‘escaping the 
disadvantage of being a civilian’. One individual, for instance, joined to be 
allowed to continue farming. As he put it: ‘It was very common then to arrest 
someone for no reason. But if I am within the movement, I am one of them. They 
can no longer accuse me of being against. I can therefore go and work without 
being arrested.’ Other respondents felt they had to become soldiers to protect 
their family from abuse while trying to save the little they owned: ‘Soldiers were 
annoying the population, so we joined to protect our parents. No-one bothers 
them anymore since we are in.’5 Many said ‘took up arms’ because everybody in 
town was in uniform and could break into their homes and steal from them with 
total impunity. When Man was attacked, most of the population fled to neigh-
bouring villages, and after a few days young men began to return to their homes 
to keep an eye on family assets. The town had however become so militarized in 
the meantime that many respondents genuinely believed that they would be better 
in the rebel forces than out. It was also not uncommon for families to split up in 
the panic surrounding the flight, especially if all household members were not 
physically present at the same location when they had to leave in a hurry. The 
youngest were particularly vulnerable if they were left on their own, and in such 
                                              
4  The trip from Guiglo to Abidjan could cost up to 20,000 CFA francs per person. One respondent men-
tioned that since he could not afford to pay for the 10 relatives he supported, he decided to stay and 
fight.   
5  Original text in French: ‘Les corps habillés fatiguaient la population. Nous, on s’est mis dedans pour 
protéger les parents. Personne ne vient plus menacer nos parents puisqu’on est dedans.’ 
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cases joining an armed group – or being taken into the custody of a rebel chief – 
was therefore perceived as a real relief (Chelpi-den Hamer, 2010).  
 
The question of ethnic polarization: the feeling of being ‘on the wrong side’    
If it would be over-simplistic to describe the Ivoirian war as ‘ethnic’ in nature, 
ethnic polarization did occur and the Ivoirian war crystallized long-standing 
tensions in the west between autochthonous and non-autochthonous populations. 
As already outlined in the contextual sections, the concept of ethnicity provided 
an easy political and military hold over the years, in a historical and structural 
context propitious to this.  
On the counter-insurgent side, mobilization clearly took place along ethnic 
lines, with an unprecedented massive mobilization of the Guéré youths. There, 
the populations of northern origin were perceived as ‘the others’ and associated 
with the enemy, foreign nationals and some Ivoirians alike (Burkinabés, Dioulas, 
Lobis); they were then naturally drawn into the rebel forces, either by circum-
stances or out of genuine interest, in which case mobilization was often spurred 
by pre-existing social networks. Noteworthily, even if the Baoulés were also 
targeted by some of the most extreme autochthonous youths (the chronology 
presented earlier revealed several cases of expropriation of plantations), they did 
not seem to be particularly prone to join the rebel forces in the west (in our 
sample for instance, we did not interview any Baoulés in Man). If one could 
argue that the individual feeling of being on the wrong side was particularly 
present at the start of the war (especially with the Burkinabés and Dioulas), it 
also survived over the years in government-controlled territory, especially in the 
Guiglo/Duékoué area. At some point, one could even wonder why the targeted 
non-autochthones continued to live in the area despite so many recurrent attacks 
and such a latent threat. Perhaps the main reason was to maximize potential 
benefits (at great risk), since volatile environments are also known for the 
opportunities the circumstances provide. A more practical reason could also be 
that having already invested quite a lot in their plots, in time, daily labour and 
money, non-autochthonous peasants were genuinely hoping to avoid losing eve-
rything and to be obliged to start from scratch elsewhere. 
Ethnic polarization was also an important dimension of recruitment in the 
rebel forces. One respondent described how government soldiers would come 
into town to conduct identity checks on foreigners and on Ivoirians of northern 
origin. Being the latter, he thought he would be better off if he enlisted in the 
rebel forces: ‘Gbagbo people6 were killing the Malinké. Because of the rebellion, 
                                              
6  ‘Gbagbo people’ refers to government soldiers. 
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we were killed. Because we did not have papers, we were killed. Because we 
were dressed with dirty clothes, we were killed. They were even killing insane 
men. We were scared.’ (interview fragment, April 2007). In November-Decem-
ber 2002, Man changed hands three times in a couple of weeks, shifting first 
from the national army to the rebel forces, then from the rebel forces to the 
national army, and finally from the army to the rebel forces. Each time, violent 
retaliation followed, targeting suspected opponents. But the feeling of being on 
the wrong side was not only framed along ethnic lines in rebel-controlled 
territory, it was also conceived in terms of political and social markers. In 
December 2002, being a gendarme and a FPI sympathizer was a double offence, 
and there was usually no mercy. These markers were much more pronounced in 
the beginning than in the later stages of conflict. Conversely, on the counter-
insurgent side, ethnic polarization seemed to reinforce itself over the years with 
the diffusion of violence in the rural societies. 
Another example of inter-ethnic rivalry instrumentalized by the war in the 
western region is the long-standing resentment between Yacoubas and Guérés, 
triggered by the assassination of former head of State General Gueï (he was of 
Yacouba origin). This event had a significant impact on the young Yacoubas and 
was cited many times as a reason to enlist. But simple facts clearly stress the 
need to go beyond an interpretation of the Ivoirian conflict based solely on ethnic 
grounds, notably because there has been anecdotal evidence that, in some cases, 
Yacoubas fought on the same side as Guérés (this was the case for one female 
respondent, for instance, who only joined a pro-government militia to save her 
family assets). Pastor Gammi, the leader of the MILOCI pro-government militia 
has also been said to be of Yacouba origin.  
 
Unwilling and coerced 
If most respondents could exercise some kind of agency in their decision to enlist 
(with the little room to manoeuvre they had), many were also taken by force, 
especially those who joined armed factions led by Liberian mercenaries: ‘They 
would have killed me if I had refused to carry their ammunition in the bush.’ 
Others were taken because their skills were useful to the group, blacksmiths for 
instance, or technicians. The first knew how to repair guns, the second could 
maintain communication equipment. 
‘We heard on the radio that Côte d’Ivoire was under attack, but our boss decided to continue 
working. Some workers fled, others stayed, and I continued at the factory. One night, I heard 
gunshots at the plant. We were then busy loading sugar bags in trucks. It sounded like 
shooting in the air. Rebels came in and requisitioned a truck. They asked us to load sugar 
bags in it. We were at gunpoint, so we had to obey. They came back shortly after. They were 
looking for a technician to change the frequency of their walkie-talkie. The staff was scared 
and pointed at me. They asked me to do it because they wanted to communicate with their 
chiefs. I did not want to but they had guns, so I could not refuse. When they were finished 
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speaking to their commanders by radio, they told me I was an important asset for them, as a 
technician; they could therefore not let me go. I did not want to go with them. I told them I 
was no military, I had no war experience, I did not know how weapons worked. But they 
told me they would protect me. The more we were discussing, the more angry they became. 
“Why was I annoying them?”, they said. One rebel took his Kalash and hit me with the butt. 
He told me that if I wanted to die now, he would kill me. I was therefore obliged to follow 
them. We left for Séguéla to receive military training. I did not want to be part of it, but the 
ones who refused were killed in front of me. I had to stay calm.’ 
Interestingly, some people reported having first been coerced into an armed 
group and then having stayed for lack of better alternatives elsewhere. Some 
were initially taken by force into a rebel Liberian-led armed group, and then fled, 
only to re-enter another armed group, willingly (this was mentioned several times 
by recruits who had first been drawn into MPIGO and who had been left 
‘unattended’ when the Ivoirian rebel forces rid themselves of the Liberians in the 
spring of 2003). Noteworthily, being coerced was not necessarily presented as a 
traumatic event. It was sometimes very pragmatically presented as an inevitable 
event, as some kind of necessary plague:  
‘In the beginning, there were not enough men in the rebellion, so they were taking people by 
force. At the military camp, we were told that it is now war and that we have to fight. We 
were given two days to visit our parents to receive their blessing and anti-bullet medicine. 
After that, we all boarded a military truck and we were sent as reinforcements to fight the 
battle of Man.’7 
 
Opportunistic young men? 
Contrary to the widespread idea that the core of armed groups consists of 
opportunistic young men, relatively few respondents reported having joined for 
work. If some people mentioned having been attracted in a group by the prospect 
of receiving subsequent incentives, they also said they were quickly disabused: 
‘They told me that if I go and fight, they will give me 100,000 or 200,000 CFA 
francs. I got money once, after the first fighting. Afterwards, I got nothing.’ 
Some were told that there might be an opportunity to enter the regular army 
afterwards (a rather interesting prospect as it implied stable work, and decent and 
regular pay with retirement benefits); others were promised implicit rewards if 
their group was victorious. But many simply reported to have enlisted because 
there was nothing else to do. At the peak of the conflict, in areas close to the 
front line, economic activities had either stopped or had slowed down consider-
                                              
7  ‘On nous a raflé. En ce moment, y avait pas beaucoup d’hommes. Donc eux prenaient les gens par 
force. Tu sais, ça a commencé chez nous. Le même jour, y a eu la prise de Bouaké et de Korhogo.  
Quand on est arrivé au camp, on nous a dit que, actuellement, c’est la guerre et que chacun va faire ça. 
On nous a donné deux jours pour aller voir nos parents pour qu’ils nous donnent un peu de “babwadi” 
(médicaments anti-balles). Après les parents ils ont dit, on n’a qu’à aller. On est monté dans camion. 
On nous a envoyé en renfort à Man.’ 
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ably and many people were unable to resume their pre-war activity; some there-
fore pragmatically decided to join an armed group; at least then they would be 
certain to eat during the period of their engagement. Being given the opportunity 
to start a career in the military was surely an attractive prospect for many youths, 
but to equate all civilian recruits with young men driven foremost by opportu-
nistic motives would simply be oversimplistic in its disregard for the complexity 
of the process.  
Switching between groups existed, especially in the beginning, as FLGO 
absorbed most LIMA and AP-Wê recruits on the militia side, and when Liberian 
fighters were expelled from the rebel factions (several MPIGO recruits I inter-
viewed reported having re-entered other rebel factions afterwards), yet these 
movements between factions appear to have been relatively marginal. If there 
was some kind of flow between the different armed groups, it was not so much in 
terms of shifting allegiance (free movement between the rebel and the pro-
government zones was particularly difficult at the peak of conflict and even in 
the later stages) and individuals more often ended up in another group as a 
consequence of the recomposition of armed forces. This situation is very differ-
ent from the one Vlassenroot describes in Eastern DRC in early 2000. There, the 
speed with which militarized civilians changed ideologies and allies was a clear 
sign that what they were ultimately looking for by joining an armed group was 
some alternative to a situation of acute deprivation and social marginalization 
(Vlassenroot, 2006: 59). In western Côte d’Ivoire, such opportunist behaviour did 
sporadically occur, but was far from being a norm. 
 
The question of informed choice for the youngest combatants   
There are a number of well-anchored ideas about children that are not easy to 
challenge. Across contexts, they are usually presented as innocent, vulnerable 
and financially dependent, regardless of actual circumstances, to the point that it 
has become unimaginable that they would rationally choose a path that could 
possibly lead them to perform evil. For the youngest combatants, the question of 
informed choice is fiercely debated (Peters et al., 2003). Boyden (2007) has 
rightly pointed out that any child engaged in violence disturbs adults, foremost 
because by going against the odds, he or she challenges the very foundation of 
the existing social order. In the same vein, Honwana (2005) recognizes that 
children who behave violently clearly fall outside mainstream formulations of 
childhood and upset social norms and codes. The view that children are innocent 
is largely based on a certain conception of children’s cognitive development that 
assumes that their moral understanding, their political thoughts and their actions 
differ widely from those of adults because they mature in stages, following an 
ordered sequence of cognitive steps (Kohlbert, 1976; Piaget, 1972). In this per-
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spective, the following holds: children’s abilities to think and act reasonably are 
largely conceptualized as being immune from environmental influence; a lower 
age limit is even suggested for linking moral reasoning with action; it is strongly 
implied that adolescents and pre-pubescent youth are more malleable than adults; 
and the phenomenon of child soldiering is mainly explained by coercion, abuse 
of authority, unscrupulous commanders or drug addiction.  
Far from denying the fact that, in many cases, children’s recruitment was the 
result of coercion in western Côte d’Ivoire, reducing their agency to nil during 
the enlistment process and during their involvement in warfare would also be 
misleading. If the children I interviewed clearly expressed having felt more fear 
in the recruitment stage (even if they could exercise some kind of agency in the 
process), the processes of mobilization had also been very complex: there was no 
single pattern and the types of rationales that emerged generally challenged 
popular theories on social movement that assume causal relationships between 
pre-war backgrounds and motives for enlistment. Various reasons were mention-
ed for joining the rebellion ranging from self-defence to the protection of parents. 
They also included genuine desire for revenge, joining for lack of alternatives, 
and merely seizing an opportunity to secure food for a limited period of time. 
Some enlisted late and only joined the military after a brother or sister had done 
so, several months prior. Some were recruited because they were alone, with no 
resources, in a place full of soldiers. For them, joining the army was a logical 
move, and becoming a soldier was perceived as a necessary and positive choice. 
Motives were rarely clear-cut, and respondents usually brought forward more 
than one reason in their narrative, pointing to different degrees of agency. As an 
analyst, I started wondering if some motives weighed more heavily than others in 
their decision-making and if I should rank them in my interpretation. I quickly 
discarded that option. What led children to join a group, and what kept them 
there, was the result of a complex process, rather than something that could be 
attributed to isolated factors. What mattered in the end was how respondents 
made sense of their war experience, and how they interpreted their entry into the 
groups and their stay there. With some children, it was clear from their accounts 
that they never wanted to be where they were. Certain youths, especially among 
the ones that had been coerced by Liberian mercenaries, were forced to do things 
that they would have despised in normal times (torturing prisoners, extortion, 
stealing). Some reported feeling under constant threat. With other children, it was 
more complex. Even if some had initially been abducted into the movement, they 
did not experience their belonging to the group as something entirely negative.  
The accounts that follow describe the complex reasons and processes that led 
very young people to engage in violence. They clearly show that the phenom-
enon of child soldiering cannot be reduced to coerced recruits, and that even the 
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youngest can exercise some degree of reflection and agency when enlisting in the 
military. Two primary aims of respondents were staying alive and protecting 
their closest caregiver, which in practice meant finding the right strategies when 
their path and the military’s crossed. The testimonies are expressive enough to 
give a fair idea of the diversity of enlistment patterns while bringing to the fore 
the extraordinary individual stories. Some of the accounts have been slightly 
adapted for better reader comprehension. 
‘Everybody had fled the village. I had stayed with my grandfather. When the rebels came, 
they said my grandfather was hiding a soldier at his place. They started to beat him up. I 
pitied him. I even cried. They shot a bullet at his feet. But they were telling lies. My 
grandfather was hiding no-one. The rebels searched everywhere in the house. They told my 
grandfather that they would kill him if he would not tell them the truth. That is why I joined 
the rebellion. It hurt me too much to watch my grandfather being molested. Two or three 
days after this incident, I and my brother gave our names, and we joined the rebels.’ 
‘The war came in the weekend. I was in town, working in my uncle’s workshop. Everybody 
fled. I fled with my cousin. We went to the bush, then to the village. My uncle was there. He 
told us that he feared his place in town would get robbed. He did not have the time to lock 
his home. The attack had arrived so quickly that even the food was still the stove. So with 
my cousin, we went back to town to guard the houses. We stayed in one home, and we were 
watching the others. One day, a rebel came. He told us not to worry and he started staying 
with us. We were eating together. After a while another rebel came, and then another. Even-
tually, there were a lot of them in the house. My cousin said we’d better join them. We were 
stuck anyway. We could not go back to the village because they had installed checkpoints 
and we could not leave the town.’ 
‘I was recruited by someone I knew from my neighbourhood. He knew my difficulties. My 
grandmother had died, and she was the one who used to take care of me. My boss had also 
died, and I had to stop my work at the workshop. When the rebels took the town, my 
neighbour joined them, right from the beginning. When he saw that he was earning a bit of 
money, he came back to our neighbourhood to recruit people. He knew my situation. He told 
me to go with him; he told me I would earn something out of it. He promised me money.’ 
‘When the rebels came, they took people by force and loaded them into trucks. They caught 
me and my brother. We did not want to go, but we had to. They were threatening people at 
gunpoint.’ 
 
Reflection on violent mobilization processes 
Finding clear boundaries between motives is a difficult task as respondents’ 
narratives are rarely clear-cut in distinct categories. Motivations usually overlap 
one another and people enlist for a range of reasons; it therefore makes little 
sense to search for a single cause. If we look at what people spontaneously 
mentioned (Table 7.2), there seems to be relatively little support for grievance-
based motives for enrolment and only a minority enlisted to express their 
frustration with a past event or to seek revenge. It is rather striking that land-
related grievances were absent from the reasons brought forward, and have not 
been mentioned once by the people I interviewed, especially since the Ivoirian 
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history of land tenure is closely intertwined with that of inter-ethnic violence. 
Surely the picture would have been different if I had focused on more rural forms 
of counter-insurgency (the rural vigilantism we mentioned earlier, that was re-
activated during the crisis in a more sophisticated way). From the chronology of 
violent events presented earlier, it is clear that land stakes have fueled violence in 
several rural locations in the west, and at several periods, before and since the 
start of the war. To mention a few: the Guéré-Baoulé clash at Fengolo in 1997, 
which was used as pretext to introduce a new land regulation; the events of 
October 2002 on the Duékoué-Kouibli axis (the villages of Blodi, Iruzon, Dia-
houin, Toazéo, and Kouibli), when Guéré youths were abusing the Burkinabés 
residing in the area; January 2003, when ethnic tensions exploded again in the 
same area but targeting the autochthones instead since a circumstantial alliance 
between Burkinabés and rebel forces had actually occurred to fight the Guéré 
youths; April 2004, in the Diéouzon area; April/May 2006, east of Bangolo, 
when Guérés accused Baoulés and Burkinabés of having set fire to several 
autochthonous plantations near the village of Gohouon Zagna, etc. As already 
mentioned, such diffuse forms of violence have surely been the most worrying 
development that has taken place in the Ivoirian rural societies. 
 
 
Table 7.2 First reason given by respondent for joining an armed movement 
 MAN GUIGLO TOTAL 
To protect themselves 14 4 18 
To protect parents and community 22 42 64 
To defend ‘their’ region - 19 19 
Taken by force 24 - 24 
Encouraged by friends 5 5 10 
Harassed too often for being of northern origin 10 - 10 
To avenge the death of General Gueï 1 - 1 
To work 10 5 15 
In response to a call for volunteers 4 5 9 
Encouraged by soldiers 2 3 5 
In response to the death of someone close 7 15 22 
Other 1 2 3 
Source: Fieldwork, 2007. 
 
 
As the mere fact of enlisting in a movement that seeks to overthrow the state 
probably draw on other rationales than enlisting in a movement that seeks to 
defend it, there is the need to make an analytical distinction between insurgent 
and counter-insurgent movements and each must be explored in depth. This 
might sound trivial, yet it is striking how uninvestigated counter-insurgent mo-
bilization processes are in comparison to the extensive research on rebel recruit-
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ment. This observation is shared by other scholars (Arjona & Kalyvas, 2009; 
Meagher, 2008), who urge that more attention be given to how the State accom-
modates (or not) the counter-insurgents. In western Côte d’Ivoire, belligerent 
side and local territorial sovereignty clearly mattered in fostering local mobiliza-
tion. In Guiglo for instance, it was striking that the large majority of respondents 
reported having enlisted to protect their region and community. If the role of 
immediate contexts has to be acknowledged (and foremost the role of local 
leaders in promoting mass mobilization), individual perceptions should not be 
underestimated, especially the feeling of ‘being attacked’. A lot of the youths I 
interviewed reported having been extremely ‘shocked’ when they witnessed the 
distress of the displaced people who were passing through Guiglo as they were 
fleeing combat in Toulepleu or Blolequin, and a recurrent concern I heard was 
the fear of what would happen to their family if some of them would be unable to 
flee on foot, if no-one posed any resistance. Armed mobilization took several 
forms on the counter-insurgent side, but was eventually grounded foremost on 
community ways of policing and on the paramilitary structure that derived from 
these. These ‘self-defence’ groups resembled paramilitary structures at the peak 
of the counter-insurgency, before gradually giving up their purely military tasks 
after the period of combat operations had passed. But while one would have 
expected that they would have gradually changed function to become local 
guardians by securing their immediate surroundings (resuming thereby a more 
traditional form of urban/rural vigilantism), western militias have in fact done 
little to counter the criminality in their zone in the later stages of conflict. Con-
versely, on the insurgent side, low-ranking elements in the rebel forces increas-
ingly fulfilled the role of public security officials.  
Processes of mobilization took on different forms in the western region, de-
pending on individuals’ affiliations, beliefs and social networks, but also depend-
ing on more contingent and geographical factors such as which side of the front 
line it was, the dynamics of local politics, the characteristics of the mobilizing 
context, and the recruitment strategy of the armed factions. Although this di-
versity of factors is usually recognized in explaining processes of mobilization, 
there is somehow a tendency to bring to the fore grievance-based motives, ad-
verse structural conditions, and individuals’ characteristics, especially when the 
base of an armed group shows a certain ethnic homogeneity. The contribution of 
this section has been to rehabilitate the importance of immediate contexts and 
political geography.  
Concluding remarks 
The Ivoirian case is a good illustration of the plurality of profiles and of the 
diversity of forms of engagement. It also clearly stresses the importance of im-
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mediate contexts in explaining processes of violent mobilization. This chapter 
has pointed out that in 2002-2003, enlistment in armed groups in western Côte 
d’Ivoire stemmed from highly circumstantial factors, showing that, in some 
cases, who mobilized and who did not was simply a matter of geographic and 
military factors. As Arjona & Kalyvas (2009) put it, ‘by assuming the role usu-
ally ascribed to the state, armed groups become recognized as the authority, 
which ultimately leads to recruitment’. In other words, whatever armed group is 
in control of a given place at a given moment is potentially the most decisive 
factor in influencing people’s behaviour. This perspective clearly places a strong 
emphasis on the role of leaders and the elite in promoting certain values within 
society and emphasizes the importance of ‘framing’ and the role and charisma of 
individual leaders in explaining recruits’ engagement (Leach & Scoones, 2007): 
in which circumstances did civilians take up arms? What information was dis-
seminated at the time to the population? Who framed such local discourses, and 
how was it interpreted locally? If these dimensions are usually less put forward in 
conflict analysis in comparison with explanations based on adverse structural 
conditions, they are certainly worth looking at, and what happened in western 
Côte d’Ivoire highlights very well the importance of each of the points above. On 
the pro-government side, the role of a local political leader in Guiglo was key in 
triggering massive local mobilization; on the rebel side, the assassination of the 
former head of State General Gueï and the way this information was exploited by 
the media and local politics had a significant impact among the young Yacoubas, 
and was cited many times as a rationale to enlist. Recruitment appeared strikingly 
local in Guiglo and Man, and if mobilizing contexts have varied tremendously 
from one place to another, local territorial sovereignty was clearly one important 
dimension of recruitment there, combined with individual interpretations of spe-
cific situations.  
In terms of profile, the Ivoirian case shows that there was no single pattern. 
Recruits displayed very different pre-war trajectories, and in line with other 
studies on social movements (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2009: 22), this 
case tends to depict a picture that shows that it is people who are rather em-
bedded into society who are politically active, and not the alienated ones. 
Empirically, this study firmly dismisses the loose molecule hypothesis, which 
basically argues that the most likely profile of low-ranking recruits consists of 
jobless, uneducated, and dissocialized youths with few alternative prospects other 
than to resort to violence to make ends meet. If the young militia members I 
interviewed appeared better educated, with more stable social networks, this does 
not mean that the young people who joined the rebellion were disconnected 
socially. They were just using other ties and extra-familial networks to get by on 
a daily basis. Perhaps one noteworthy characteristic of recruits was the fact that 
  
163
prior to their engagement in armed groups, they were all extremely mobile, both 
in terms of geographic location and sector of activity. Although this observation 
can be made for most African youths, whether or not they have been drawn in an 
armed movement, it exemplifies once more the already well-documented ‘hyper-
mobility’ phenomenon, and at the same time recalls the fact that the charac-
teristics of militarized recruits only resemble the ones of the population at large.  
In terms of mobilization processes, one has in fact to be careful not to 
downplay individual perceptions at the expense of geopolitical factors, even if 
the characteristics of immediate contexts are recognized to have played a major 
role in the processes of enlistment. This work has also empirically underlined 
that individual perceptions matter quite a lot in understanding local processes of 
engagement and that several considerations are at play for individuals: how they 
experience direct danger; how they perceive their degree of vulnerability; to what 
extent the choices they have is constrained by a limited room to manoeuvre; and 
the social proximity to militia and/or rebel insiders. Such results are in line with 
certain scholars who argue that these factors are more decisive in explaining 
processes of mobilization in certain contexts than poverty per se or perceived 
socio-economic exclusion (Guichaoua, 2007). 
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Photograph 9: Ex-combatant taking part in an informal production of charcoal, Guiglo 
 
Photograph 10: Soccer team, Man, including one ex-combatant 
 
  
8 
Blurred spaces:  
Militarized youths and  
their relationships with  
their immediate environment 
It is often assumed that youngsters who have been involved in armed groups 
must be resocialized after their military experience, as if their bond with society 
was cut during their engagement (Geenen, 2007). The vast majority of reinsertion 
programmes are based on this postulate. There is, however, growing evidence 
that militarized civilians often retain contact with civilian life during their period 
of engagement in an armed group, especially the ones locally recruited who 
remain in their immediate surroundings (their main peculiarity in fact is to never 
stop being involved with family, friends and pre-war acquaintances). In western 
Côte d’Ivoire, many recruits I interviewed involved themselves in extra-military 
activities when heavy fighting diminished and there were always the basic 
logistics to ensure that implied continuous interaction with non-military people. 
If not yet mainstream, this conception of armed violence as a prosaic and 
intermittent occupation has been noted by other scholars (Debos, 2010; Guicha-
oua, 2010), and calls for a nuanced approach when analyzing processes of violent 
mobilization, an approach that rests foremost on the assumption that borders 
between the military, the civilian and the humanitarian spheres are fluid and 
blurred, especially once open fighting is over. In the same writing style of 
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Christiansen et al. (2006: 12),1 we could assert for the regions under study that 
‘within the same day, a person can be positioned (or position him/herself) as 
combatant, ex-combatant, civilian, “beneficiary” of humanitarian assistance, em-
ployed youth or unemployed, depending on the situation and the stakes involved 
in the relationship with the other party.’ Respondents have certainly made use of 
these different framings, presenting themselves differently to various outside 
entities depending on the image they wanted to convey at a particular time, 
consciously positioning themselves in certain groups but not in others, navigating 
between categories in pursuit of their best interest; this intentional identity 
bricolage is after all normal in situations where the people benefiting from an 
intervention are also the usual residents of the environment hosting that in-
tervention. The aim of this chapter is therefore to rehabilitate these multiple 
identities by reflecting on the complex relationships militarized youths have 
entertained over time with the different arenas in which they were routinely em-
bedded.  
Part-time recruits 
What does it mean to be considered – or to consider oneself – ‘militarized’ when 
most of the week is devoted to agricultural activities or non-military petty tasks? 
The Ivoirian case illustrates this paradox quite well, as most non-professional 
recruits have actually been part-timers in the Ivoirian conflict once the period of 
combat had passed. The extracts below exemplify well this peculiarity on both 
belligerent sides: 
B. is still active in the rebellion. He is responsible for selling the compulsory ‘verification’ 
tickets to transporters at the Zélé checkpoint. The ticket proves that the transporter has paid 
his daily tax to the rebel forces. When he is not commissioned (4 or 5 days per week), he is 
engaged in another activity: ‘I do not have a lot of [financial] means. So I am currently 
working on a project with a friend – the person who just called me. He works the iron. We 
try to come up with a project for producing coffee/cocoa mills, to see if it can become 
something. If this project does not work, we’ll see.’ Eight months later, I meet B. again. He 
is still selling tickets to the transporters for the rebel forces, but he now invests his free time 
in a gardening project. We visited his field of cucumbers. He said that it was quite a lucrative 
business. The plan was to sell at the market.  
                                              
1  Reflecting on how complex it is to properly define youth, Christiansen, Utas and Vigh have argued 
that youth is better conceptualized as a social position (rather than a social or cultural entity in itself or 
a rigid developmental life-stage), internally and externally shaped and part of a larger societal and 
generational process. How youth position themselves, how they are positioned within generational 
and societal categories, how young people construct ‘counter-positions’ are central questions for them. 
The dynamics of this social position, its ‘navigating’ component, is perhaps best captured in this 
quote, taken from their introduction, and which I paraphrase here for the Ivoirian context: ‘Within the 
same day a person can be positioned as a child, youth and adult, depending on the situation and the 
stakes involved in the relationship’ (2006: 12).  
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A. is also part of the rebellion, working for the eaux et forêts division. During his spare time, 
he manages a cabine (a cellphone stall): ‘I am settled in Man but sometimes I have to move 
around. You know, the ones who live out of town actually pay transport to be able to place a 
call. In the bush, there are many areas where there is no cellular network.’ 
On the other side of the ex-front line, J. tells me that he used to work as private vigilante in 
parallel with his activities in the militia: ‘When I was based in Guiglo [he was based there 
three months in the beginning of the war], I guarded private shops when I did not have to 
work at the checkpoint. We were three from my group to do this. We were paid 15,000 
francs each, every month. Our chiefs had no problems with that, they let us do it. When we 
left for Zagné, we continued to stand guard in rotation at the checkpoints. When I was off 
duty, I was selling plastic shoes. I used to do that before the war.’  
In the same area, H. explains: ‘After the attack of Logoualé, we retreated to Zéo. I stayed 
there 4 or 5 months. Then we moved to Guiglo. The war had calmed down and it was no 
longer necessary for us to stay in Zéo. In Guiglo, I started working with someone, I was 
managing his cabine. He was paying me 5,000 by pre-paid card of 100,000. In a month, I 
could empty four such cards. I was placing the calls for the people and they were paying 
me.’  
Extra-military activities indeed did not start when belligerents were still com-
peting for territory; regardless of individual duties, there was no time at that 
juncture for doing something else and combat operations were the priority. 
People instead started to diversify their activities when the situation grew calmer, 
after the period of fighting. For those who did so, the main goal was often quite 
modest: just to earn enough to pay the rent and routine expenses. The start of 
intermittent work is perhaps easier to trace on the counter-insurgency side, where 
those who started working usually began their activity in the second half of 2003, 
or in 2004. The situation at the time allowed a clear division of labour between 
‘checkpoint shifts’ every fortnight or so, and ‘private work’, and in addition, 
militia leaders were showing a certain leniency in this respect by not hampering 
their elements to work when they were not on duty. About two thirds of the 
interviewed militia members were involved in extra-military paid occupations in 
parallel to their activities in the militia. Activities ranged from hairdressing to 
painting, from masonry, farming, cellphone services, to running local bars. On 
the government side, I even came across a few cases where the respondents, who 
were living in Abidjan before the war, were still managing their Abidjan activi-
ties from a distance, receiving money on a regular basis from the relative or 
skilled apprentice they had put in charge.  
With the progressive closing of checkpoints in 2004 and 2005 (notably 
boosted by the deployment of the impartial forces in the western region), those 
years also marked the end of active involvement for most militia members, even 
if a few continued to maintain relationships with militia leaders and occasionally 
executed sporadic missions. Perhaps the label ‘intermittent’ is then misplaced for 
the bulk of the pro-government militias after 2005 and we’d better speak of the 
‘end of armed mobilization’. Interviewed militia members in this respect were 
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much freer than their rebel counterparts, who literally could not demobilize 
themselves from the rebel forces in the same period without facing trouble. There 
was a much greater stake to keep the elements together on the rebel side since the 
rebel forces had to maintain the impression of potential military threat. On the 
insurgent side at the time, the military hierarchy sustained an ambiguous attitude 
towards its low-ranked elements. Until 2006-2007, being involved in extra-
military economic activities was usually interpreted as a sign of lack of interest in 
military duties, and carried the risk of leading to serious intimidation. From 2007 
onwards, being a part-time recruit was usually tolerated in the rebel ranks, as 
long as the recruit continued to give visible signs from time to time of his or her 
belonging to the movement (I illustrate this point later in the chapter).  
Social relationships within the armed groups 
Hierarchical relationships within the different armed groups vary widely from 
one individual to another, ranging from the display of paternalist behaviour (e.g. 
commanders giving petty cash to individuals from time to time), to certain forms 
of authoritarianism (to fight against defection), and tolerated practices of laissez-
faire. I examine below some examples of interactions between low-ranking re-
cruits and their direct hierarchy. In addition to providing a series of individual 
accounts, rich in detail, the interview fragments presented here also shed light on 
the basic functioning of insurgent and counter-insurgent armed groups. 
 
The question of payment 
‘There is nothing of nothing in the rebellion. Now we see it clearly. It only delays a man. 
You earn nothing, you do not eat well, you are dressed in dirty clothes, it is zero. When it is 
over, I am going to run a small business, or buy a truck, build a house. I want to run a small 
shop, one of those selling soap, biscuits, Omo, milk, huile du nord.’ (S., Man) 
‘I was given 15,000 CFA francs a day [during combat operations]. But you do not know if 
there is a tomorrow, so you spend it all. You waste it buying drinks, or you go and buy 
cigarettes, even if you did not smoke before the war.’ (C., Guiglo. She fought with the Lima 
forces in the beginning of the counter-insurgency). 
‘In the beginning, we were given 10,000 CFA francs per month every two months and then it 
stopped. Afterwards, we were coping as well as we could. At the checkpoint, you could get 
5,000 a day. It was our parents who were actually taking care of us. We were getting food 
from the village, my wife was actually sending me manioc. And when we set a town free, we 
received a bonus, a prime d’État.’ (T., Guiglo). 
‘In Toulepleu, we were given 25,000 CFA francs per month, for three months. We were paid 
by a Liberian chief. In Liberia, we were given 20,000 Liberian dollars every two weeks.’ (S., 
Blolequin). 
‘When we were based in Blolequin [during combat operations], we were not paid but we 
were given encouragement incentives to pay for our cigarettes, our soap. Some days, for 
instance, our section chief could give us 10,000 each, it depended. We were called the 
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Forces Spéciales, the ‘ready-to-die’ (les prêts-à-mourir). We could be called at anytime to 
fight. Other sections did not earn anything, for instance, those who would come to replace 
us, or those who were doing the security in the villages. Not everyone was earning some-
thing. But us, if we were told, “the rebels are positioned there”, once you get the information, 
even if you’re asleep, they wake you up, you have to go fight. This was the task of the first 
five sections. Each of us had a weapon and we were sent to cleanse a place [of rebels]. When 
the place was secure, the other sections could come to guard the location and to make sure 
that the rebels would not come back. With these sections, there were perhaps ten people for 
two weapons. With our section, everybody was armed.’ (G., Guiglo) 
Far from suggesting that rebels were not paid and that pro-government militias 
were financially much better off, I use these introductory accounts to illustrate 
the extreme diversity of stories. Some respondents were never paid, some were 
paid generously in the beginning but only for a short period, some consistently 
received a regular incentive, some were fully dependent on their spouse’s 
income, and some only could lay hands on an annual ‘carrot’. Such an extreme 
variation within the same ‘class’ of recruits (namely: non-professional and low-
ranked) can be explained by several factors: the function they fulfilled in the 
armed group, the social proximity to the local commander and to the mid-ranking 
officers, the period of conflict, the belligerent side. Not surprisingly, those who 
fought in the first line were usually properly rewarded during combat operations, 
however, this never lasted. It also was at a time when the future seemed so 
uncertain that all the money earned was usually spent the same day. As C. put it, 
at that time, you literally did not know if there would be a tomorrow.  
 
• Checkpoints 
On the rebel side, the État-Major developed the practice of paying his troops by 
sending them to the ‘corridor’, which meant posting them temporarily to a local 
checkpoint, usually for two or three days. Given the number of recruits, low-
ranking militiamen were usually sent on duty once every fortnight, unless they 
fulfilled specific duties that required their presence more often. They were paid 
2,000 CFA francs for this by the État-Major (what they called ‘la ration’ or the 
act of ‘être rationné’), and on top of that came extra petty cash collected at the 
checkpoint, which mainly came from bribing civilians (the compulsory taxation 
of economic operators was entirely given over to the État-Major).  
‘I do not have extra-military activities. When I go to the corridor, I go about every week, I 
can earn 2,500-3,000 CFA francs, with the ration on top.’  
‘When I was with the MPIGO or the MJP, I did not receive any money. There was no such 
thing when there was fighting. They gave us 5,000 recently. Twice. When posted to the 
corridor, you can more or less get by. You do not earn a fixed amount, it varies. Sometimes, 
you can go and earn 2,000, sometimes you earn more. I go more often than the others be-
cause I sell the tickets for the État-Major, for the transporters. I can go two or three times a 
week. The transporters pay 1,000 CFA francs for a 24-hour permission. What the others do 
is different. Them, they are “rationed”. Us [they are several per shift], we sell tickets. In the 
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evening, we count the money, we deduct our rations, and the rest we send to the État-Major 
so that it can pay for the food and medical care of the other militia members in town.’  
Twice in December (in 2005 and 2006), around the period of Christmas, the 
rebel État-Major distributed 5,000 CFA francs to all the low-ranked elements as 
end-of-the year incentives. As one respondent cynically put it: ‘5,000 is not a 
payment, it is a favour. It is perhaps only to check the number of people in the 
rebellion’. Probably so, but giving petty cash in December to dependents is also a 
widespread cultural practice that was confirmed by many individual recollections 
of pre-war life. The rebel État-Major was just reviving the tradition, which was 
opportunistically coloured by a military agenda. 
On the counter-insurgent side, militia members also rotated at the checkpoints, 
usually filling a position for a whole week before being relieved by another 
group. Beside the petty cash collected there (the non-autochthonous passers-by 
were particularly targeted), payment was extremely variable, from nothing to 
periodic incentives, or more regular wages. The driver of Maho for instance re-
ceived 50,000 francs every month. Those who had fought or held positions close 
to the front line during the period of combat were often paid in the beginning 
(every two weeks), but for a very short time and it did not last long (‘We re-
ceived pay six times’). Others never got anything. The counter-insurgents who 
were eventually seeing to the security of their own villages and nearby surround-
ings occasionally received bags of rice, but were mostly paid by what they ex-
tracted from passers-by. The interview fragments below shed some light on how 
payment trickled down to the individual: 
‘We were not paid. We were given nothing. Apart from the food. I was paying my rent with 
the small contracts I was doing on the side.’  
‘The chief of section was receiving money from time to time, 300,000. That paid for food 
and soap.’  
‘When there was a ceasefire, the chiefs gave us 10,000 francs to go back to our families.’  
‘We received contributions from the cadres of Doké [cotisations]. They once sent 150,000 
francs, rice and medicines. Otherwise, the FANCI usually provided us with coffee, rice and 
tinned beef. It was sent from their camp. When we were setting a town free, the villagers 
were happy and were preparing food for us.’  
‘I went to the checkpoint everyday during six months. We were not paid. Our salary was the 
money we took from people. We did checkpoints in the villages of Doké, Kouably, Pohouin. 
When the checkpoint was in Doké, I slept at home, but when it was in the other villages, I 
was sleeping on the road. We could make 1,500 francs a day, so about 10,000 a week. When 
we were doing checkpoints in the other villages, there were always villagers with us, so we 
always knew who was from here and who was not. Those who were not from the village 
were obliged to pay 100 francs to pass.’  
  
171
• The practice of stealing 
Despite the internal rule of ‘no stealing’, several respondents on both belligerent 
sides confessed to having sold equipment found in empty houses. Their loot 
ranged from fans, tools, machines, cocoa bags, with respondents’ families often 
receiving a share of the loot. The practice of stealing dead enemies was also quite 
widespread. 
‘If you enter an empty house and if there is food, you take to eat. The equipment, you don’t 
take. The chiefs take it all anyway. But I could keep some stuff. In Zouan Hounien, I sold a 
TV for 30,000 francs. I also sold a pulverizator for 10,000. I sold the equipment to soldiers. 
We were paying ourselves using the towns we set free.’ (D., Blolequin) 
‘My chief told me to break into the houses people had abandoned to steal things. Our com-
mander did not like that, but I was obliged to do it because it was an order from my chief. 
We used to search everywhere in the houses. I had to give everything to my chief. I was not 
allowed to sell the stuff myself. If the chief was in a good mood, he would give me some 
money. If not, I got nothing. Sometimes, I kept small things for myself. I kept a Walkman 
and a tape player.’ (D., Man) 
‘I earned five mattresses in Toulepleu. I sent one to Bedy Gouazon, to my wife. I also gave 
one to my parents. I still have two. The Liberians were often traveling to Guiglo so I could 
find transport to send the equipment. I also gained six bags of cement. I sent four to Bedy 
Gouazon and I sold two in Toulepleu. Also three fans. I gave two to my older brother. He 
lives in Port Bouët. I also got pagnes, “les complets wax”, I gave those to my mother, and I 
also got two radios. One I gave to my sister, one I kept. I also could sell four fridges in 
Toulepleu, 7,500 each. And in Liberia, I got a motorbike, but because I could not have it 
cross over, I sold it for 50,000 Liberian dollars.’ (S., Guiglo). 
‘When we kill rebels, we search them. If they have money, we take it. Sometimes we can get 
100,000 francs from a rebel, sometimes 5,000, it is a matter of luck. When we earn some-
thing, when there is a truck leaving for the village, we send money to the family.’ (M., Blole-
quin) 
 
Ambiguity of the rebel hierarchy:  
Between paternalism, authoritarianism and laissez-faire 
From the points of view of the interviewed recruits, the rebel military hierarchy 
cultivated an ambiguous attitude towards its low-ranked elements. If there was 
some kind of standard pattern in terms of general modus operandi (the État-
Major was ensuring a regular turnover of militiamen at checkpoints, free food 
was provided and in order to maintain some kind of social cohesion, daily and 
weekly military assemblies were held, ‘rassemblement’2), unequal treatment was 
the norm when it came to individual requests, and this strikingly came out of the 
individual interviews. With some recruits, the rebel État-Major was quite gene-
                                              
2  The daily assemblies only concerned the elements of a military camp, and there was one daily assem-
bly per camp. The weekly assemblies were a gathering of all members of all camps in town, once a 
week. 
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rous when asked for help, with others it showed much less empathy, as these two 
accounts illustrate:  
‘The chiefs here, they do not give anything. If you do not have a shoe [she takes off her 
shoe], if you go and plead your case, the chief is not going to give you anything. It is because 
we are so many. If he gives to you today, others go to see him afterwards to ask, and later the 
chief is upset and asks me, “Why did you tell the others that I helped you?”’ (F., female 
recruit, Man) 
‘To get by, I go to the corridor. When I have problems, I go and see the chiefs. They usually 
help. They give money, bags of rice.’ (B., female recruit, Man)  
Without being too greatly mistaken, one could attribute these differences to 
the quality of the social network in question. Unsurprisingly, those closer to a 
high-ranking element were likely to benefit more than those lacking such privi-
leged contacts, and the volume and quality of personal networks varied widely 
according to someone’s geographical position and appointed places of duty. One 
female respondent, for instance, mentioned that she was very well treated in 
Korhogo by the chief she had been following since the beginning, but when she 
moved to Man after the death of her commander, things changed drastically as 
she had no ‘protector’ to rely on. Rebel paternalist behaviour found several 
modes of expression on various occasions: commanders distributing petty cash or 
in-kind contributions to some of their troops; commanders paying for medical 
expenses; when the rebel État-Major promoted all low-ranking recruits to the 
rank of corporal (2005). When support was granted (elements had to plead their 
cases individually), it was usually punctual, limited in time and scope, and geared 
at solving a very specific problem (for instance paying for funerals, medical ex-
penses, transport costs, etc.): 
‘If I have a problem, I go to see the Com’Zone, or his deputy. When I lost my uncle, the 
brother of my father – he was living in Man, he was like a father to me – they helped me 
with the funeral, they did that. So for me, Forces Nouvelles are like my parents. If I have a 
problem, they solve it well. When my mother got sick, I went to see the commander, and 
every time I have pressing problems, he takes care of it.’ (A., female recruit, Man) 
‘The chief, if I have a problem, he can help but he is not obliged. When I have family issues, 
I go and plead my case.’(G., male recruit, Man) 
If someone could ask for petty assistance, he or she could not ask for more. 
Requesting help for beginning a small business, for instance, even when many 
recruits were ostensibly performing an extra military task when not on duty, 
could simply not be done. The first reason was indeed that it would open the door 
to widespread defection (something the État-Major could not back). The second 
(less intuitive) reason was that it would have closed an important channel of day-
to-day support for many low-ranking recruits, namely a source of petty cash and 
free food that was also benefiting their close family. The interviewed low-rank-
ing recruits were in fact continuously playing on that ambiguity: trapped into a 
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movement that could not release them, they nonetheless regularly used their 
position to extract funds from mid-ranking and high-ranking commanders for 
their routine expenses. If they were no longer enlisted, one of their channels of 
support would inevitably dry up. 
‘It is because I work with them that they help me. I am their element. The commander cannot 
help you anymore if you tell him that you are leaving the army to do something else. He is 
not going to want that. So I did not tell him that I was working.’ (A. worked part-time as a 
hair-dresser for a short period while she was still active in the rebellion.) 
‘If I have a problem regarding pommade (skin cream), I go to see a chief. I ask him, even 
little, 200 francs. I don’t always go to see the same person. It depends. When I have 2,000 
francs, I go to the market and buy my things.’ (G., female respondent, Man)  
But reducing the rebel military hierarchy to a means of providing welfare 
would be a mistake since the rebel État-Major regularly took coercive measures 
against his elements when it was considered that they were overstepping the 
rules. Those who were caught stealing or who were harassing civilians too much 
were usually arrested (in the early stages of the insurgency, they were executed). 
Leniency was far from being a given and the rebel hierarchy knew how to rule 
with an iron fist. One respondent reported having experienced serious intimida-
tion when he resumed his pre-war activity shortly after arriving in Man: 
‘One morning I wake up, all my equipment is on the floor. I’m told: “Did you come here to 
do war or work?” I was obliged to let it go. When my workshop was destroyed, I went and 
filed a complaint at several police stations. But I was always told the same thing: “We have 
come here to do the war, we did not come to work. We do not have a solution for you.”’ (E. 
is a technician who was forced to enter the rebellion in Borotou to provide rebel forces with 
technical support. When he was deployed in Man, he set up a small repair workshop in town, 
in parallel with his military activity. E. usually made a point of not wearing a uniform 
(‘treillis’). He also avoided eating at the camp.)  
Timing and form were certainly two important factors when deciding to show 
signs of detachment from the military. It is for instance noteworthy that after 
some time, E. did not have a problem working for someone everybody knew in 
town:  
‘There was a Senegalese here, at the market. He hired me to check his devices. The machines 
came, I checked them. If one was broken, I repaired it, I did the maintenance. They [the 
rebels] knew that. The Senegalese was a well-known man; the rebels even took their 
equipment there for repair, so they could not do anything to me. The Senegalese was paying 
me per day. One VCD at 1,500 CFA francs, the big TV screens at 2,000. He was paying me 
all at once, after I did five or ten repairs. Sometimes we had to wait one week before the next 
stock arrived. When I was finished with all checks and repairs, I was selling the equipment 
with him. He would have told me before: “This, you have to sell it at 17,500 CFA”, so if I 
sold it at 18,000, then 500 were for me. I also did a lot of cell-phone repairs. I could make 
50,000 per month sometimes.’  
Six months later, the same respondent was self-employed, earning much less 
than when he was employed by the Senegalese. His boss had actually moved 
elsewhere (without helping him to start his own workshop as promised) and after 
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some time on his own at the market, where he was paying 5,000 CFA francs rent 
plus 500 CFA francs a week to the Forces Nouvelles for his authorization to sell, 
he moved to another workshop in another neighbourhood, mainly because he 
could not cope on his own with all the expenses: 
‘I’ve known the workshop’s owner for two and a half years. He is a friend. He is a civilian. I 
work well with him. I repair outside the workshop, either directly at the client’s home, or in 
the village. They call me and I repair there. It is better than being at the market. There, there 
were always problems with the electricity, the rent, the licence (patente). It was a lot of 
expenses. Sometimes, my friend goes outside to work and I take care of the workshop in his 
absence. When there is not a lot of work – sometimes, we can go three or four days with 
nothing – we go to villages on market days. We travel regularly. It is difficult these days. 
The big workshops in town are doing well, but there I would be an apprentice and I don’t 
want that. In the big workshops, all the repairs you do are for the boss. You only get prix du 
savon, perhaps 150 francs a day. And when you come back to your house, what can your 
wife do with that??? So to get by, I prefer staying with my friend in the small workshop.   
I have not joined assembly at the camp for a long time. Foremost because I lack the means to 
go there and Grand Gbagpleu where I work is quite far from the military camp, and because 
I have to travel a lot for work. But they told us recently that they were distributing 5,000 
CFA francs for the holiday season. So I’ll go there. But I know that because they have not 
seen me a lot, they will divide. They’ll probably give me 2,500 instead of 5,000. But because 
it is a gift, I cannot complain.’ 
In 2006 and 2007, such practices of laissez-faire were relatively common in 
rebel-held territories (after March 2007, it was probably boosted by the Accord 
Politique de Ouagadougou, which while fostering inter-Ivoirian dialogue, had 
also reiterated its attachment to the disarmament and demobilization of militari-
zed civilians). At the time of doing fieldwork, not attending the daily and/or 
weekly military assemblies was tolerated, as well as the practice of not going to 
the checkpoint when appearing on the roster. On that last point, several respond-
ents openly expressed their shame to be put in a position where it was expected 
that they would extort from civilians. Noteworthily, there was no sanction when 
they stopped going. 
 
Modus operandi on the counter-insurgent side, 
In many respects, the modus operandi of the counter-insurgents resembled that of 
the rebel forces: the question of payment, punctual ‘gifts’ supplied by militia 
leaders, the supply of militia cards to ensure free transport,3 the supply of free 
food during the encampment period (although in advanced bases, this was far 
                                              
3  ‘There had been a call on the radio asking everyone who had gone to war to go and fetch the card. It is 
after the war that I came to the Mayor’s compound. He gave me the FLGO card.’  
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from as systematic as within the rebellion).4  Paternalist behaviour expressed 
itself in a number of ways but appears much more centralized than with the rebel 
forces, respondents usually mentioning ‘the General’ as their direct source of 
support5 :  
‘The General would take care of the family if someone died during combat.’  
‘The General gave me two loads of wood so I could start making charcoal again.’  
‘Maho paid for everything. Our food, our sleep. Before, we used to be 1,100 at his camp. 
Now we are 600. Before the demobilization, I was earning 20,000 every month. The wage 
depended on your rank but also whether or not you had to pay rent. I rented a house for 
10,000, so I was given 20,000 every month. The others could perhaps get 5,000.’ (R. moved 
to Guiglo from Abidjan to defend his region. After the period of combat, he stayed at 
Maho’s camp for a while. Later, he moved out to stay in a rental place with his spouse. In the 
summer of 2006, he received a demobilization incentive of USD 900.) 
‘The chiefs were sometimes giving rice when the family was not good.’  
A typical trajectory that came out of the interview was to alternate a period of 
serving in the bush with a period of encampment (in more or less advanced 
bases), and when the situation calmed down, to retreat to a militia leader’s com-
pound or to go back home. Encampment did not necessarily mean that all militia 
members were sleeping at the camp, and many houses abandoned due to the war 
were converted into militia quarters. Until 2005, encamped recruits had to 
request permission if they wanted to go on leave. It was not a given, and non-
expendable recruits (the ones particularly skilled in combat operations) could 
experience difficulties as the following account illustrates:  
‘I had to lie to go and visit my family. I had to say I was sick. The problem is, when you are 
skilled, it is difficult to let you go.’ (A.)  
A peculiar trait of the pro-government militias has been their close connection 
with the national army and police up until 2004-2005. Several testimonies in fact 
pointed out that in the first two years of the counter-insurgency, the national 
armed forces were regularly coming to fetch militia elements when going on 
patrol (which was every night). Another characteristic of the low-ranking militia 
elements has been that they have developed privileged partnerships with private 
businesses, and that in part this was to their own benefit. We mentioned earlier in 
this chapter the securing of small businesses as an extra-military paid occupation 
(third interview fragment: J. used to work as private vigilante for a small Guiglo 
business in parallel to his activities in the militia. He could earn 15,000 francs 
every month from that activity). But on a larger scale, a whole network of 
                                              
4  I remember a MILOCI recruit complaining about ‘eating bad’. If we place his remark into context, it 
is perhaps not surprising. The MILOCI was created in 2005, thus this was years after the first counter-
insurgent groups had emerged; civilian support in terms of food and cash had probably run dry then.   
5  They refer here to Maho, the FLGO leader described earlier. 
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surveillance developed around the timber export industries, and low-ranking 
militias were sent to escort timber or to guard equipment:  
‘Mr. M. used to sign contracts with us. We were sent ten or fifteen elements to guard a 
portion of road, to block the trucks that come to steal the wood for sending to San Pedro. We 
could get 10,000-15,000 each per mission.’  
‘Quite often, we went to the bush to guard the machines of the timber industry [he names the 
company]. When you go on a mission, you can get up to 60,000. Also, when there was a 
soccer game in town, we can be called to do the security and to prevent disputes.’  
 
The military-civilian nexus 
The relationships between militarized recruits and local populations in western 
Côte d’Ivoire have generally been based on a combination of solidarity and 
coercion, and were all the more complex when they involved family ties. They 
varied over time as the conflict evolved and as the immediate stakes of capture or 
defence were replaced by the necessity for each group to find ways to control 
their zones; they also varied by location, as the insurgents had more stakes than 
the counter-insurgents groups in securing economic self-sufficiency in the zones 
they controlled by extracting resources from economic operators. In the litera-
ture, the military-civilian nexus has foremost been explored from a macro per-
spective and has mainly been framed in terms of the extent of civilian control 
over the military – the main argument being to place ultimate responsibility for 
military matters in the hands of a civilian political leadership rather than in the 
hands of military officers (Houngnikpo, 2010). But there has been a striking lack 
of studies that have taken an approach viewing matters from below. This chapter 
partially attempts to fill that gap by exploring in situ – from the testimonies 
collected – the social relationships between civilians and low-ranked recruits.  
 
Mutual support between recruits and civilians:  
Genuine solidarity or social obligation? 
At the time belligerents still had moving bases (as they were advancing or re-
treating), solidarity expressed itself in a number of ways. On the counter-
insurgent side, much of the financial aid was sent through private channels, at 
several levels, at group or individual initiative. In the rural areas close to the front 
line, female villagers were preparing food for the fighters alongside women who 
had been enlisted in a militia and who had ended up in this particular village as 
they had followed their group. Guéré cadres were raising money in their res-
pective towns to send to the front. Collecting money also developed overseas 
within the Wê diaspora. This was sometimes directly stated in the interviews, ‘les 
cadres se sont cotisés’, or as here: 
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‘During the war, parents were raising funds per canton (sub-district) within the Guéré 
community. The guys were then sending this to us. They paid four times. The first time, they 
sent 100,000 CFA francs and bags of rice. Each village had to raise a contribution and send, 
one after the other. We were sharing among all of us. For instance, if the village of Nounou-
baye paid, we shared with everyone, even with the ones who were not from Nounoubaye. 
Some villages did not send anything. The village of Goya for instance.’  
These expressions of support certainly played an important role in ensuring 
basic logistics and a (relatively) steady source of cash and food in the beginning 
of the counter-insurgency. Yet a question remains: Were these contributions 
genuinely meant (by the contributors) as a contribution to the war effort or were 
they foremost directed at providing some kind of support to the war-affected 
populations residing close to the front line? Even if we lack information to be 
able to make a completely informed analysis, we must question this assumed 
civilian volition on the counter-insurgency side. Although an article dated 7 
January 2003 from Le Grand Soir (Le Grand Soir, 2003) testifies to a real interest 
by the Wê diaspora in providing financial and in-kind support to the affected Wê 
populations (they were planning to raise funds, to collect food and basic supplies 
from French supermarkets, to liaise with the comité de crise du Grand Ouest in 
Abidjan), humanitarian and military goals were probably condemned to end up 
overlapping given the circumstances, thereby providing a very nice example of a 
forced military/humanitarian alliance confined – for a change – to very local 
stakeholders.6  
On the rebel side, contribution to the war effort was more coercive, in the form 
of compulsory taxation, but an interesting trait that came out of the interviews 
was the dilemma rebel recruits experienced when posted in a familiar place (after 
the period of fightings), as they literally appeared trapped between their military 
duties and their social obligations. One respondent expressed it quite well when 
describing the line of acquaintances who regularly came to see him to request 
help in getting family or friends out of prison. It became such a burden for him 
(he even began to be poorly perceived by his superiors) that he asked for a 
transfer elsewhere. Other testimonies point out the dilemma of having to arrest a 
parent:  
‘Because Biankouma is my home and many times people were leaving their village just to 
see me, to tell me: “Ah! We have this brother who has been arrested, you have to go and 
fetch him.” My chiefs were not very keen on me. They were saying: “But you here, you are 
                                              
6  It is noteworthy that at the time of doing fieldwork (2006-2007), there was a tendency to remain quiet 
about such past civilian support. In the local press and through the eyes of the dominant public 
opinion, militiamen were equated with criminals and lumpen youth, and the Ivoirian conflict became 
conceptualized as the work of others. The fact that most militarized youths had in fact been recruited 
locally to protect their region and that their own parents did play a significant role in sustaining the 
movement were no longer brought to the fore. 
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always the one who comes and intervenes.” That is why I decided to leave there. I came to 
Man at the end of 2003.’  
‘When you are in the army, it is not good that you stay home. The thing is, when you are in 
the police, if you are sent on a mission and if you have to catch your parents, you are obliged 
to do it, it is an order. But if you catch your parents, they are not going to understand that 
you do that because it is an order from your chief. They will misinterpret.’  
Persistence of family ties has been a striking feature on both belligerent sides. 
If social links were disrupted by the war, close familial bonds somehow suc-
ceeded in enduring and the flows of food, cash and services were going on both 
sides between the militarized recruit and those who remained civilian. Recruits 
were dispatching whatever they could, whenever they could, depending on the 
occasions of transport. It could be bags of rice, petty cash, pans, plates and 
cooking gear (especially from those working in a military kitchen). Those with 
family nearby continued to be involved in family affairs, notably when there 
were funerals or medical expenses. On the rebel side, rebel commanders also 
used the family unit as some kind of leverage to discipline their troops. Fol-
lowing a reported case of robbery in Logoualé, the Com’Zone of Man issued this 
awkward statement on the local radio:7  
‘Mothers should warn and look after their rebel kids. If their children want to remain rebels, 
they have to stay on the right track and accept the internal rules.’8 (extracts from an INGO 
situational report, Man, 8-19 November 2003) 
Expressions of support and mutual help did not remain confined to the family 
unit and several accounts pointed out the strategies some militarized civilians 
used to protect a simple passer-by: 
‘The way I did my work, God will help me. I can even give the name of someone I saved. It 
was a Baoulé. He was accused of being a suspect at my checkpoint, the boys wanted to kill 
him. I asked them to keep him alive, time for me to check his story. The Baoulé was saying 
that he was coming from Séguéla. I went to see the Mossis who were working at the truck 
station. They eventually confirmed that the Baoulé was not a suspect and that he had a 
chicken farm in Séguéla. There were sometimes buying eggs from him.’   
On the counter-insurgent side, since the bulk of the militia youths had been 
locally recruited and were still close to their place of residence, most continued 
to keep close contacts with their family during their time in the militia. During 
                                              
7  Rebel commanders have often made use of the local radio to disseminate information to the general 
public, notably for appeasing tensions or for communicating new developments (they used the local 
radio in 2004 to announce the deployment of the blue helmets, to provide information on DDR, and to 
inform on the demobilization of children).  
8  The rebellion had formalized strict rules in terms of how their elements should interact with civilians 
and newcomers entering willingly were usually notified about them upon their registration. Stealing 
from civilians and hassling people was for instance strictly forbidden.  In Man, a rule was also set 
among the soldiers that rapists were to be killed immediately. If recruits wanted to go and visit family 
or friends (even for attending funerals), they had to request official permission. There was, however, 
an unavoidable gap between theory and practice, and many free-riding elements and commanders. 
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the encampment period (which lasted until the end of 2004), several respondents 
reported that they were commuting regularly from their military camp to their 
home village when they were not in service, up to several times a month (trans-
port was free upon presentation of their militia card). Several respondents also 
mentioned that they dispatched everything they could to their relatives in their 
village whenever they had the chance (cash, mattresses, cement, radios, air fans, 
pagnes). If we look at the data collected, about half of the interviewed militia 
members were supporting their family while still active in the group. Conversely, 
some respondents mentioned being completely financially dependent on their 
spouse’s work of during their time in the militia. The youths who mentioned 
having no contact at all with their family before returning home were usually the 
ones who had only served for a short period at the height of the conflict and who 
had then returned home directly. Sometimes the family had even been informed 
that he or she had been killed during combat operations.  
 
What degree of civilian leverage in coercive relationships? 
If the relationship between armed forces and local populations also followed a 
logic of coercion, there was a certain degree of civilian leverage. On the in-
surgent side, perhaps coercive measures were more prominent in the beginning; 
after all, more recruits seem to have been forcedly drafted and freedom of move-
ment was severely hampered by routine bribes and compulsory ‘exit’ taxes.9 
They lasted longer in any case, for the mere fact that in the absence of national 
tax income, the rebellion had to find ways to sustain itself.  
As already mentioned in the contextual chapters, rebel forces started levying 
compulsory taxes at the end of 2003. It included the ‘verification tickets’ men-
tioned earlier, proving that transporters were paying their daily contribution to 
the movement, and it also included organized forms of extracting money from 
local businesses. In Man, shops and market stalls were taxed 500 CFA francs a 
week and they were regularly checked. Heitz’s work (2009b) sheds some light on 
these local mechanisms of taxation.10 The large export industries of cocoa, coffee 
and timber were ransomed at every single level of the chain and a system even 
developed to control the supply of fuel. In addition to this formalized taxation, 
bribing was still commonplace. If part of the tax could be considered to be 
redistributed to some extent to the local population in the form of services (after 
all, for nearly a decade, rebel forces served locally as police, gendarmerie, cus-
                                              
9  In Zouan-Hounien and Danané, Human Rights Watch reports similar stories to those from the Péhé 
and Toulepleu areas: ‘Liberian mercenaries were forcing civilians to pay 25,000 CFA or more to leave 
the towns’ (Human Rights Watch, 2003b). 
10  She notably brings to the fore that the municipality of Man had succeeded in negotiating a share of the 
market taxation with the rebel État-Major. 
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toms officials, eaux et forêts, and judiciary in the zones they controlled), exces-
sive taxation weighed heavily on individual households and did little to alleviate 
already strained socio-economic circumstances.  
If there is a tendency to assume that local populations residing in war-affected 
areas are either victim, passive or neutral, what happened in Man shows in fact 
that they are capable of surprising resilience. Even confronted with dire circum-
stances, the local populations of Man have continued to organize themselves and 
to negotiate with the rebel forces with whatever room to manoeuvre they had. 
When a local butcher was killed by a group of rebels in late 2003, all butchers in 
Man went on strike for a full week (extracts from an INGO situational report, 
Man, 8-19 November 2003). The extent of leverage civilians had on the rebellion 
is probably best exemplified when examining individual accounts on accommo-
dation. When I was doing fieldwork, an issue that regularly popped up during 
interviews was the reappearance of landlords (who had fled their homes when the 
war erupted) and the necessity for the militarized recruits who were occupying 
their premises to start paying rent. The rebel État-Major was even in favour of 
this, asking his troops to regularize their housing situation with their respective 
landlords. In 2007, many respondents were still ‘squatting’ for free in houses 
they had requisitioned (many houses having been left empty after the first at-
tacks), and were finding themselves in the awkward position of having to nego-
tiate their stay with a private person:  
‘I live in a house with other soldiers. But we have to leave. We have to pay rent. The house 
was entrusted to us by a neighbour with the owner’s approval. The neighbour lives in the 
same cour and the owner left years ago for Abidjan. But now the owner says he is about to 
come back, so the neighbour asked us to find another place. We said, “No problem. We’ll 
search for another house.”’ (T.) 
On the counter-insurgent side, the ambivalence of the militia/civilian relation-
ship reached its peak in the very beginning, when Liberian mercenaries were still 
active. A report released by Human Rights Watch in 2003 in fact pointed out that 
in locations close to the Liberian border, the civilian population was being 
robbed and held hostage. In Péhé, the town closest to Toulepleu, home to many 
displaced people who had fled the Toulepleu area after rebel attacks on their 
villages, it was reported that the population was forced to pay the Liberians at 
checkpoints to get wood or be allowed to go to their fields. They also had to pay 
to leave towns:11 ‘Those trying to leave Toulepleu in late January 2003 were 
forced to pay the government-backed Liberian forces between 95 and 200,000 
                                              
11  Preventing civilians from fleeing is in line with a war strategy that uses local populations as forced 
labour to bury corpses, find food or carry equipment. The use of civilians as leverage to secure basic 
supplies for the functioning of armed groups does not seem to have been a prominent practice in 
western Côte d’Ivoire. 
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francs CFA’ (Human Rights Watch, 2003b). People were not free to leave: ‘They 
[the Liberians] said people can’t leave because they don’t want the region to be 
empty’ (ibid: 38). Similar stories came up during the interviews I conducted. One 
respondent, for instance, openly said that he joined the Liberian forces because 
he was fed up with being enslaved by them. Because he could not leave, he had 
no other choice than to comply with the occupants’ demands. His enlisting was 
therefore seen by him to be a pragmatic alternative: at least he could set himself 
free by enslaving others. Later, as the conflict started to last long and as the 
composition of armed forces evolved (with the visible retreat of the Liberian 
allies), coercive measures were more diffuse and only applied to a certain fringe 
of the population: during the checkpoint period, Burkinabés, Dioulas, Lobis, 
were particularly prone to extreme extortion. After the checkpoints’ dismantle-
ment in 2005, coercive measures continued underground, on a more individual 
and hidden scale.  
 
Blurred spaces 
An important feature to bring to the fore is that it is in fact quite difficult to draw 
a clear line between the military and civilians: examined from individual per-
spectives, both arenas regularly overlap. Soldiering has become so much a part of 
the residents’ immediate environment, especially in towns where military camps 
are based, that militarized recruits and civilians have been compelled to interact. 
This feature was particularly visible in Man, in rebel-controlled territory. If we 
look at accommodation habits, respondents were usually living in a military 
setting at first (either in a military camp or in a private place requisitioned for 
hosting the rebel elements)12 before transferring to private places with family or 
cour-mates.13 In some cases, respondents were living with their spouse and child-
ren, in others with relatives or civilian acquaintances, sometimes with other sol-
diers. Interestingly, when finally having left their military home, some made a 
point in not speaking about their belonging to an armed group:  
‘In my neighbourhood, many do not know. It is not something to advertise. You can be 
emotional about it. I do not find it important now because it is something from the past. 
When I talk to my friends, we talk about other things.’  
Eating practices clearly show the entanglement of the military with the private 
sphere. Some respondents always ate at the camp (some even had a spouse or 
mother working as cook at one of the military bases), some took home food from 
                                              
12  This was to be expected from people who were not residents of the Man area before the war, but it 
was initially also the case for the recruits posted in their own town. 
13  One reason to leave the military camp as accommodation place was the robberies taking place there.  
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the camp to share with their close family,14 and others were keen on saying that 
they always ate outside camp, showing that they could fend for themselves, out-
side the military structure. Some were claiming to be full-time recruits, doing 
nothing on the side, while others were visibly working outside their military 
duties, earning a living. Most respondents were easily mistaken for civilians 
when they were not on duty and when they were not in uniform. These examples 
challenge the popular idea that conceptualizes the military and the civilian 
spheres as two completely different spaces with few links between them. But in 
Man and elsewhere, armed men had just become part of the town, and navigated 
between their civilian and military lived realities, depending on needs and obli-
gations.15  
The humanitarian-military nexus  
If we already started the reflection in Chapter 5 when examining the extent of 
capture of humanitarian resources by the armed groups operating in the western 
region, it is worth exploring the humanitarian-military nexus from two additional 
angles. A first interesting approach is to examine, at the individual level, the 
perceptions militarized recruits have of humanitarianism, especially the ones who 
are – or were – involved in a project (after all, any direct intervention has the 
potential to impact them directly). The second perspective worth looking at is 
linked to the shift in activities of certain militia warlords in post-conflict settings, 
as some of them converted into development brokers.  
 
From the individual’s perspective 
Several young rebels I interviewed who were participating in a reinsertion project 
run by a German agency pointed out their mixed feelings about the intervention. 
On the one hand, they usually acknowledged that the intervention was providing 
them with a small extra: another place where they could receive free food, an 
opportunity for following short-term training, in sum, some in-kind support. But 
on the other hand, their participation in the project was sometimes interpreted as 
                                              
14  In a context of general impoverishment, the provision of free food proved in fact to be an important 
factor in holding the rebel elements together. 
15  At the meso-level, the blurring of the military/civilian divide is perhaps best exemplified when armed 
groups started to take public prerogatives in the absence of the State. In Man, this was not limited to 
the security sector (police/gendarmerie), and rebel agents were also acting as customs, eaux et forêts, 
and judicial officials in the zones they controlled. Some respondents were penitentiary guards, some 
had passed a test to enter the local police force, some were appointed in the local forests for forestry 
control. What is particularly striking in the Ivoirian case is that all pre-war administrative structures 
continued to persist in the rebel zones. They have not merged, new names were not created, rebel 
agents have just continued the pre-war routine checks, while exacerbating its bribing part. 
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a burden. Some even expressed their fear of being excluded by their rebel 
superiors from services they could normally apply for if they had not been 
participating (that concerned food rations and the financial prospect of the DDR 
safety net). The following accounts are particularly telling: 
‘It is not sure we’ll get the safety net if it comes. At the camp, they say, “No! We are with 
GTZ, we received the kit, we are already demobilized.” But we did not receive anything! 
You cannot do the war for five years and then get a kit of 75,000 francs and then say that you 
are demobilized!’  
If there is a clear gap between what ‘small men’ say in the army and what the 
rebel État-Major does and promotes, such remarks were nonetheless fostering an 
ambiguous climate, in line with what we mentioned earlier: if someone shows 
too visibly clear signs of detachment from the rebel apparatus, he or she runs the 
risk of ending up excluded from potential benefits.  
If the État-Major had no intention to start releasing recruits (talking about 
demobilization was taboo in the rebel-controlled areas at the time the fieldwork 
was being conducted), individuals interpreted their room for manoeuvre very 
differently. For some, participating in a project was clearly subordinate to their 
participation in the rebellion: 
‘Presently, I run the pig farm, here in Man. I am not from here but the chiefs say the war is 
not yet over. So we cannot go home yet. But when DDR comes, we will be able to go 
wherever we want.’  
For others, the connection was more fluid and they had clearly started to cut 
back the frequency of their military tasks:  
‘Thanks to GTZ, I now run a small home business. I no longer go to the corridor. The last 
time was perhaps two or three months ago.’  
On the counter-insurgency side, perceptions of humanitarianism also varied 
depending on the individual, and despite the fact that all respondents had re-
ceived financial compensation in 2006 (unlike their rebel counterparts). I develop 
the use of such incentives in the following chapter; here I just mention a few 
examples of respondents’ satisfaction or disillusionment: 
‘Some say GTZ did not do well. But this is not true. GTZ did what it could with the means it 
had. I will be given my kit tomorrow. I’ll take it home then, and perhaps if I’m lucky I’ll 
even get a diploma. At the garage where I’m enrolled, they’ll probably give me a certificate. 
It would be a great asset for me.’ 
‘They told us that when we will be disarmed, they will give us plenty of things. They told us 
that we would be comfortable, that we would forget all this. We’ve been waiting. True, we 
are disarmed, but for the rest, we’re still waiting.’  
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Extent of entanglement of humanitarianism with the remnants of warfare  
A second interesting approach for exploring the humanitarian-military nexus is to 
examine the extent to which humanitarianism has interacted with the remnants of 
the apparatus of warfare, especially in Guiglo where local warlords converted 
into development brokers. Bierschienk, Chauveau and Olivier de Sardan were the 
first to come up with the concept ‘courtiers locaux du développement’ to refer to 
social actors implanted in a given local arena who play the role of intermediaries 
in order to attract external resources with the aim of ‘developing’ the arena in 
question (by ‘developing’, it is meant fostering any kind of activity that could 
improve the local living conditions). This of course includes liaising with inter-
national INGOs active in the area but not just with these. Public or private parties 
with a genuine interest in developing a certain domain can also be seen as poten-
tial sources to tap into.  
In Guiglo, when it became clear that a political settlement would prevail over 
a military one, militia leaders were keen on (re)endorsing a local politician hat. 
For at least two major leaders, this meant resuming pre-war local political 
functions16, and since they had militarized civilians to ‘reinsert’ (those who were 
previously under their command), their political persona had to also function as a 
development broker. What happened there is in fact a good illustration of local 
leaders’ multiple registers of action, with some assuming many roles within the 
community they belong to, from armed faction representative to respected tradi-
tional chief, via local politician to President of a local NGO. Because individuals 
could pass from one register to another and introduce themselves under different 
guises to outsiders, the action repertoires were inherently blurred and a former 
militia leader had no difficulty taking on a humanitarian persona. In Guiglo, the 
UPRGO militia leader, Octave Yahi, founded the local NGO Nouvelle Famille, 
to be able to tap into the burgeoning hevea export industry nearby, by positioning 
himself as a potential partner. Cultivating hevea was particularly in vogue there 
when fieldwork was being conducted, a popularity amplified by a campaign run 
by the Compagnie Hévéïcole du Cavally (CHC) to incite small farmers to pro-
duce this crop. Information on hevea benefits was disseminated through public 
meetings and partnerships with local stakeholders. Hevea was presented as a very 
lucrative prospect with yields estimated at 100,000 CFA francs per hectare and 
per month when the plants reach maturity (six years after planting). This was 
indeed an attractive revenue for many people, especially since rubber trees pro-
duce nearly all year long and can last up to fifty years. The local NGO Nouvelle 
                                              
16  Before (and during) the war, FLGO leader Maho Gloféhi was the third assistant of the Mayor of 
Guiglo, member of the FPI, and a traditional Wé chief. UPRGO leader Octave Yahi had just been 
named Vice President of the Conseil Général in Guiglo.  
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Famille was further claiming its aim was to reintegrate ‘deviant young men’ into 
society by fostering the promotion of hevea cultivation. It therefore combined a 
humanitarian goal with the promise of boosting the CHC production capacity. 
During his time in Zagné (the former location of the UPRGO base), Yahi had 
developed privileged contacts with the CHC. He knew that only one third of the 
company’s production capacity was being exploited for lack of raw material, and 
that the company was looking for independent farmers it could sub-contract to 
increase its production. A certain number of incentives were therefore proposed 
to peasants to produce or increase their production of rubber:17 this included the 
free supply of hevea plants (young seedlings) and extensive training for setting 
up seedbeds in the region.18 Nouvelle Famille succeeded in positioning itself as a 
more or less unavoidable partner to the CHC, which gave it free access to young 
plants and a hand in the hevea business on the supply side. On paper, the Nou-
velle Famille project was targeting 1,200 youths, of whom many were known to 
be former militia members. To be eligible for entry, participants had to fill in a 
registration form and purchase a Nouvelle Famille membership card (2,000 CFA 
francs), and also had to show a certificate of land property, which had to be 
signed by the village chief where the youth wanted to settle. The plots were 
supposed to be given ‘in recognition of the services rendered during the war’ 
(personal communication with Yahi, June 2007).  
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has challenged the traditional boundaries used in the analysis to 
explore the humanitarian, civilian and militarized spheres. Rather than conveying 
the idea of a clear distinction between the three arenas, it has stressed their 
overlaps, their dynamics, and has clearly dismissed strict conceptual boundaries. 
It has in addition stressed several opportunist manoeuvres of the militarized 
youths, which has reinforced the blurring effect. On both belligerent sides, full-
time involvement in an armed group gradually evolved into a ‘part-time’ one, 
after the peak of the conflict had passed. Extra-military activities took longer to 
develop on the insurgent side since there was a genuine willingness to fight 
against widespread defection, however, they nevertheless ended up emerging – if 
we can date the start of the phenomenon to 2004 for the pro-government militias, 
2006 is a more appropriate guess for the start of extra-military activities on the 
                                              
17  The CHC was planning an extension of small farmers’ plantations of approximately 1,000 hectares 
per annum and an increase in its production targets of 2.17 t/ha for the company plantations and 
1.70t/ha for individual plantations (company website, accessed 28 November 2008). 
18  The use of seedbeds was estimated to decrease the price of seedlings from 180,000 to 35,000 CFA 
francs per hectare. 
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rebel side. On both belligerent sides, relationships between militarized recruits 
and local populations have been based on a combination of solidarity and co-
ercion varying over time, depending on strength of ties and the immediate stakes 
involved. Concerning the group of recruits locally recruited, the persistence of 
family bonds was a striking feature in Guiglo and Man and the flows of food, 
cash and services were going in both directions between the militarized ones and 
their respective families. But relationships with civilians went beyond the close 
family structure and an important feature that this chapter brought to the fore is 
that it is in fact quite difficult to draw a clear line between military life and 
civilian life: eating habits, accommodation practices, continued participation in 
family affairs, obliged militarized and non-militarized civilians to continuously 
interact, with the effect to have less and less distinct roles. 
 
  
9 
 
Return to civilian life  
for militarized populations:  
Two standard humanitarian 
instruments under the lens 
Since borders between military, civilian and humanitarian spheres have become 
increasingly blurred, especially as situations of ‘no war, no peace’ tend to linger, 
the conceptualization of reintegration processes would undoubtedly gain if it 
were no longer presented as a drastic change, ‘post’ military. Reintegration has 
much to do with the way local communities construct memories of violence 
(Pouligny, 2004b: 11) and this process takes a particular turn when recruits stay 
close to their place of residence, as has partly been the case in western Côte 
d’Ivoire. Because it is through a social group that reintegration processes take 
place, militarized civilians who leave the military cannot therefore be conceived 
as isolated from the society they are (re)entering: social networks and immediate 
surroundings play a key role in these social processes. 
If reintegration is driven foremost by internal processes, post-conflict interven-
tions nonetheless also attempt to facilitate the return to civilian life of militarized 
populations, and have engaged in such programming for about a decade. If there 
are proponents and opponents of such types of intervention, reintegration pro-
gramming has become so much part of any environment affected by warfare that 
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it has become an unavoidable actor in any given system, regardless of one’s 
opinion of the relevance of the intervention. This section therefore explores the 
extent to which (re)socialization processes have been externally driven in west-
ern Côte d’Ivoire from the particular points of view of recruits who have received 
external help in the process. What have been the various stakes in favour of 
participation? To what extent have processes driven by planned interventions 
responded to recruits’ individual expectations? Respondents’ accounts when 
describing the resumption of their daily routine and the reactivation of their past 
social relationships are particularly telling when exploring these questions.  
In this chapter, I first clarify the main debates related to reinsertion and rein-
tergration before pointing out the specificities of the Ivoirian case. I then focus 
on two standard reinsertion instruments widely used in post-conflict politics to 
help ‘resocialize’ young people temporarily drawn into armed groups: the supply 
of financial safety nets, and the provision of short-term vocational training. For 
the latter, I draw on observations made when studying a pilot project executed by 
a German agency (GTZ-IS), which targeted low-ranking demobilized militia 
members and rebels still active in the rebellion. The project offered them a short 
education in a specific craft (tailoring, welding, mechanics, agriculture/hus-
bandry, or small business management) and provided them with basic starting 
equipment. Regarding the financial safety nets, given that the recruits I inter-
viewed put the cash allowance they received to several uses, it is worth exploring 
the extent to which such a form of financial compensation has helped them to 
secure social acceptance, especially in light of the fact that they received it 
several months (and sometimes even years) after their practical demobilization.  
The global approach to reinsertion and reintegration 
A conflict resolution pack 
Conflict prevention and peace-building processes are largely based on the idea 
that positive change can be induced by targeted interventions, and it is expected 
that the propensity for recruits to resume fighting can be diminished if sound 
interventions are implemented step by step, according to some kind of checklist. 
Donors and humanitarian practitioners talk in terms of programme objectives, 
outcome indicators, accomplishments, number of beneficiaries, and a twelve-
month reintegration programme for ex-combatants is genuinely considered 
enough to prevent recruits from re-enrolling. This conception largely over-
estimates the impact of planned interventions by ignoring the fact that inter-
ventions are always reshaped by contextual dynamics and that they rarely go as 
planned. By taking place in a social arena, they interact with different stake-
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holders and are constantly being reshaped according to the changing balance of 
power at the local level (Long, 2001).  
DDR programmes are no exception. Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsert-
ion and Reintegration are all planned processes which look very good on paper, 
but which rarely go as planned. They have nonetheless become standard inter-
ventions to secure peace in the aftermath of war and they usually pave the way 
for international initiatives in the domains of development and reconstruction. If 
DDR processes are in general widely accepted by donors, multilateral agencies, 
and parties involved in a conflict – Muggah refers to them as ‘a part of the 
emergent post-conflict orthodoxy’ (Muggah, 2005) – they are not free of short-
comings, and several scholars have in fact called to critically reflect on these 
processes, if only to help them to realize their full potential. I clarify the acro-
nyms below, and then I present the main debates related to reinsertion and re-
integration processes. 
 
Clarifying the terms 
Demobilization is the planned process by which armed forces downsize or com-
pletely disband. It implies the reduction in size of the official army, paramilitary 
forces, and rebel groups.1 In practice, it involves the gathering, disarmament, 
administration, counseling, skills assessment and discharge of former combat-
ants, with a compensation package usually including financial ‘safety nets’ and 
reintegration support (DPKO, 2000; ISS, 2008). Disarmament is the central ob-
jective of demobilization and consists of the collection, control and disposal of 
small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons from anyone 
involved in armed groups. It formally marks the change of status from com-
batants to ex-combatants (DPKO, 2000; Swarbrick, 2007). Perhaps even more 
importantly, it fulfils a strategic symbolic function by signaling the commitment 
of all parties to the peace process. It is often used as a ‘confidence-building’ tool 
and it is genuinely believed that it has the potential to increase stability in very 
tense and uncertain environments (Willibald, 2006). 
In DDR programming, Reintegration is conceptualized as the complex econo-
mic, political, social and psychological process by which former militarized 
people make the transition from military to civilian life (ISS, 2008; Knight & 
Ozerdem, 2004). It is conceived as a long-term process since it is assumed that it 
takes several years for former recruits and for their families to adapt to their new 
situation. It encompasses several dimensions, usually defined as followed: eco-
nomic reintegration is understood as the process through which demobilized 
                                              
1  Depending on the context-specific security sector reform, part of the paramilitary forces and the rebel 
recruits are (or not) integrated into the regular army once it is restructured (Bryden et al., 2005). 
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soldiers achieve financial independence by securing a stable livelihood for them-
selves and their dependents; political reintegration is the process through which 
they engage in community-based structures and in local processes of consultation 
and decision-making; social reintegration is the process through which they (re)-
consider themselves to be part of the community with whom they relate to; and 
psychological reintegration is the process by which they adjust from a military 
lifestyle (generally characterized by a strict hierarchical system of command and 
a high exposure to violence) to civilian life (usually less dangerous and much 
more flexible). Reintegration support can take the form of cash payments, food 
donation, access to credit schemes, counseling, job placement, vocational train-
ing and small equipment. Reinsertion differs from reintegration in the sense that 
it refers to the immediate post-demobilization period. It is generally also accom-
panied by a small package which aims at providing interim support before the 
longer term process of reintegration commences (Willibald, 2006). In practice, 
the two terms are often used interchangeably, which adds to the confusion by 
sending mixed messages to target groups with respect to what assistance to ex-
pect.  
A few scholars have argued that donors are not really serious about funding 
the developmental component of DDR and tend to forget long-term reintegration 
processes very quickly (Pouligny, 2004b). When (some) funding is secured for 
the R component of DDR, it is usually for reinsertion, not reintegration. The 
general focus mainly remains quantitative and focused on the DD phases (gene-
rally perceived as the most urgent to address). Targets are measurable in terms of 
number of guns returned, number of recruits demobilized and number of recruits 
relocated.2 Less tangible pointers, such as the degree of social acceptance and the 
degree of general wellbeing, lag far behind, regardless of their social importance. 
It is worth noting that DDR programmes do not necessarily have to start with 
the DD components. Even if the acronym suggests that the procedural order is 
first Disarmament, then Demobilization and then Reinsertion (and eventually 
Reintegration if funding allows), the sequence of the different phases of DDR 
processes does not need to be in line with the acronym (Pouligny, 2004b: 5; 
Specker, 2008a). Disarmament can also take place during or after demobilization, 
and can even be separate from the demobilization process; for instance, when 
armed civilians turn in their weapons. Combatants may also only want to disarm 
and dismantle their groups once they have gradually resumed civilian life. A 
variety of ‘D’ and ‘R’ combinations has therefore been used in practice, accord-
ing to funding availability and the preferences of individual agencies. While 
                                              
2  Spreading the recruits tends to give the impression that it disperses their military chain of command, 
hence that it prevents them from getting re-enrolled. 
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Pouligny recognizes the inherent advantage of this system – which allows for 
maximum flexibility in operational planning – she also underlines its major in-
convenience: it creates confusion, and by adopting competing and often contra-
dictory definitions of what DDR means, it creates discrepancies between the 
different stakeholders’ expectations and possibilities. Sharing the same view-
point, Specker (2008a: 14) also underlines the fact that activities within the R 
phase itself are not always well sequenced, which results in operational delays. 
There is, for instance, often no clear vision as to how the various activities should 
follow one another: after the short-term vocational training comes to an end, for 
instance, there are frequently no jobs or not sufficient equipment available to ex-
combatants.  
 
Reinsertion and reintegration in debate 
There are several practical debates associated with external processes of rein-
sertion and reintegration. Should cash be given to militarized populations to help 
them make the transition from soldiering to civilian life? Should specific pro-
grammes be created for them, regardless of potential risks of stigmatization? 
Who should be in them, who should be left out? And given the unpredictability 
of securing stable funding in the long run, to what extent is the reinsertion/rein-
tegration distinction still relevant to make in operational programming (Specker, 
2008b)? There are many practical difficulties in following up demilitarized re-
cruits in the long run: African youths, including those who had joined an armed 
group, frequently move between towns, villages and regions, and their hyper-
mobility makes them difficult to trace. Another difficulty is due to the length of 
most reinsertion/reintegration programmes: with any project lasting more than 
six months considered long-term, there is a clear lack of perspective and a 
serious need for longitudinal studies that explore the changing lifestyle of former 
recruits over a long period of time.  
 
• The use of cash in safety nets 
Most DDR processes include cash transfers to militarized civilians in at least one 
of their phases. What lies behind this practice is the assumption that giving 
money to ex-combatants directly can have a positive effect on their lives. While 
this runs against the conventional view of aid that favours in-kind assistance over 
financial help, the relevance of using cash is being reconsidered in development 
circles and has received growing support. A certain line of thinking argues that it 
is in fact quite efficient to give money directly to the ones in need (Hanlon, 2004; 
Willibald, 2006). Still, the use of cash in development response remains confined 
to a few niches, and donors and practitioners are still reluctant to use it on a large 
scale. Interestingly, it has become increasingly widespread in DDR processes, 
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despite the many acknowledged shortcomings. Cash incentives are used in the 
disarmament stage to ‘buy back’ weapons and reduce the number of guns and 
ammunition in circulation. It is also sometimes used in the reinsertion/reinte-
gration stage to facilitate ex-combatants’ return to civilian life (Knight & Ozer-
dem, 2004; Muggah, 2005). I focus below on cash incentives used in the rein-
sertion/reintegration stage.  
There are several pros and cons to using cash at this stage in the DDR process. 
At one extreme, it is believed that financial support can have a positive effect on 
former recruits by facilitating their transition between war and post-war life, 
namely by providing them with the necessary means to meet the immediate 
challenges they face. At the other extreme, another interpretation is that reward-
ing the fighters with financial incentives might have the possible effect of fos-
tering re-enrolment, should the situation deteriorate once again in the same area. 
By drawing on a variety of case studies, Willibald (2006) has identified various 
benefits and risks for using cash in development response. In terms of benefits, 
he mentions: the advantage of adapting very well to the specific needs of the 
individual; the benefit of preserving individual’s dignity and freedom of choice; 
cost efficiency (understood as lower transaction and logistical costs associated 
with programme implementation); beneficial knock-on effects on local markets 
and trade; and a way to sidestep the problem of commodity aid being sold. 
Specifically regarding DDR, he stresses that the provision of cash incentives 
encourages former combatants to return their weapons and to return to their 
communities relatively quickly, thereby diffusing political unrest as former re-
cruits disperse. He also points out that it curbs dependencies on informal support 
structures by alleviating the burden on communities and households (those would 
otherwise be adversely affected by the return of ex-combatants). In terms of 
shortcomings, he mentions the higher risk that the money be used ‘unwisely’ (on 
alcohol, drugs, weapons), especially when the recipient has limited financial 
management skills. He also acknowledges that it creates more exposure to 
robberies and targeted assaults (of both beneficiaries and programme staff), and 
he points out the difficulty of selecting recipients, since extra cash is usually 
needed by most of the war-affected population. With specific regard to DDR, he 
and other scholars (Junne & Verkoren, 2005: 312) recognizes that cash incen-
tives could potentially fuel an illegal arms market by expanding cross-border 
movements, could potentially incite recruits to take up arms again if expectations 
are not met, and could eventually disconnect ex-combatants from the commu-
nities they relate to, should they be given disproportionate financial compen-
sation. I will come back to these pros and cons when discussing empirical find-
ings. 
 
  
193
• Specific programming and entry criteria 
Donors’ representatives in the field and practitioners are increasingly skeptical 
about creating specific programmes for ex-combatants in protracted situations 
(personal communication, June 2007). This observation is shared by several 
scholars who instead advocate broadening the current programmatic frameworks 
(Saferworld, 2008). When situations of ‘no war, no peace’ prevail in areas struck 
by structural poverty, it is in fact quite difficult to target the right individuals and 
to ensure a fair allocation of assistance: everyone seems to be in need. One of the 
main rationales brought forward in support of this argument is that communities 
might become resentful of ex-combatants if they receive (perceived) dispropor-
tionate support from their participation in assistance programmes (i.e. if the 
programme privileges them too much in comparison with the local standards). 
The Liberian and Sierra Leonean experiences have both confirmed that non-
militarized civilians grow frustrated when they do not receive any compensation 
for their suffering, and that such a situation can create tensions. In Sierra Leone, 
ex-combatants who received humanitarian support eventually were perceived as 
a privileged group by their immediate environment, and instead of decreasing 
tensions, these escalated between demobilized recruits and the population in 
several locations. Cash payments and in-kind donations are often locally per-
ceived to be rewards, some sort of financial compensation for the war effort, 
which at the local level conveys the ambiguous message that crime pays; in such 
a perspective, (re)enrolling, should hostilities resume, could be a possible threat, 
driven by lucrative prospects. Several studies have nonetheless indicated that 
community resentment is likely to fade away with time, when the community 
realizes that it indirectly benefits from the return of these youths. The testimony 
of this demobilized recruit is particularly telling: ‘Community members did not 
like the fact that we got money but did not mind taking our cash’ (Tesfamichael 
et al., 2004 cited in (Willibald, 2006). In an impoverished area, any infusion of 
extra cash eventually ends up stimulating the local economy, generating colla-
teral profits for others. 
 Another rationale brought forward with regard to avoiding creating specific 
reintegration programmes for ex-combatants is that it could open the door to 
many abuses. Such interventions de facto inherit from existing patron-client rela-
tionships upon which they have little control, and there is the risk that benefi-
ciaries themselves attempt to bluff the system using influential social networks to 
get on the list of beneficiaries, regardless of their participation in warfare. In 
western Côte d’Ivoire, after all, militia and rebel leaders had much more say than 
humanitarian staff in selecting the recruits to include in the reinsertion projects.  
If scepticism increases in development circles over the relevance of creating 
specific programmes for ex-combatants, the alternative approach, which consists 
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of targeting the war-affected community at large, is not often applied in practice.3 
Specific programmes remain the norm, despite their inherent stigma and acknow-
ledged shortcomings. Who is included? Who is left out? What are the entry 
criteria? Girls and women are curiously invisible in most DDR processes, and 
children and adolescents recruits are usually entitled to special treatment.4 Very 
few donors are also prepared to pay for reinserting war chiefs, since they usually 
receive quite bad press according to international standards. The question arises 
then whether a military unit can be effectively dismantled without dealing at all 
with its hierarchy. As Pouligny pointed out, what in that case guarantees the 
break in the chain of command (Pouligny, 2004b)? An additional difficulty 
emerges when attempting to sort out militarized recruits from civilians. The 
distinction is rarely clear-cut. Some recruits consider themselves mobilized for a 
limited period of time only, in contrast to others who continue to assert their 
belonging to an armed group several years after the end of combat. Some ex-
pressly fall into the category ‘combatant’ while others never fought and always 
held a position in the rear. The way the National DDR Plan is drafted has a direct 
influence on individuals’ eligibility for support: it determines who is entitled to 
benefit and who is not. But even then, determining status is not easy: the Ivoirian 
DDR plan used such a wide definition for ex-combatant that it eventually in-
cluded far too many people to reasonably cope with.  
DDR in Côte d’Ivoire 
Dismantlement of militias: a series of false starts 
If the disarmament of the main belligerent parties never started on a massive 
scale and resembled a political yoyo (see Chapter 4 for more details on the plan-
ned process), the dismantlement of pro-government militias partially occurred, 
although not without difficulties. There were a series of false starts. The begin-
ning of the process was announced several times and actually started three times 
in Guiglo: on 25 May 2005, on 26 July 2006, and on 19 May 2007. The first 
year, there was no eagerness to disarm. FANCI Chief of Staff General Mangou 
organized a ceremony in Guiglo in the presence of the four main militia leaders 
(FLGO, AP-We, UPRGO and MILOCI) to mark the start of the dismantlement 
of militias; local authorities, dignitaries and UN representatives were also repre-
sented (OCHA, 2005). During the event, militia leaders expressed their commit-
                                              
3  When applied (at the time of doing fieldwork), it was usually an extension of a specific programme. 
For instance, while the first reinsertion project of GTZ-IS targeted demobilized militiamen and young 
rebels still active in the rebellion, the follow-up projects enlarged the target and included groups 
labeled ‘at risk’, which included participants who had not necessarily been involved in armed groups. 
4  For more information on the youngest recruits in the Ivoirian conflict, see Chelpi-Den Hamer (2010). 
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ment to restoring peace. They reiterated their willingness to be included in the 
DDR process, and, as a symbol of their commitment, they handed over a sym-
bolic weapon. At the ceremony, the PNDDR representative announced that 
western militias would be taken into account in DDR programming, but he did 
not specify what they would be entitled to in terms of a reinsertion package. Six 
days after the 25 May 2005 ceremony, the dismantlement of militias was no 
longer an option. Forty-one people had been killed in the villages of Guitrozon 
and Petit Duékoué, sixty-one had been wounded, all of Guéré origin, and both 
belligerent sides were accusing the other of having plotted the massacres. 
On 27 July 2006, in line with the Pretoria Agreement and following the re-
sumption of the DDR talks between the regular troops, 150 pro-government mili-
tia members surrendered their weapons in Guiglo in presence of Prime Minister 
Charles Konan Banny and PNDDR and UN representatives (OCHA, 2006). They 
were the first to do so, out of an ever-changing estimated target of 2,000 militia 
members. They received the financial safety net agreed in the national plan, 
which was disbursed as follows. A first instalment was given upon disarmament 
(125,000 CFA francs5) and represented a fourth of their total entitlement.6 The 
rest was supposed to be paid later, in two instalments, respectively one and two 
months after their official demobilization.7 The second payment was made rela-
tively on time, but the third payment was eventually delayed a month for a 
variety of reasons. Between 27 July and 3 August 2006, 981 militia members 
eventually underwent the same demobilization process, and 108 weapons and 
6,975 pieces of ammunition were handed over to the impartial forces, including 
some automatic weapons and a cannon (ONUCI, September 2006). But most of 
the arms were defective, and the ratio of combatant per surrendered weapon/am-
mo was so ridiculous that the DDR division of the United Nations Operation in 
Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) recommended suspending the operation. The dismantle-
ment of militias therefore ground to a halt on 4 August 2006 (OCHA, 2006; UN 
chronology, 2008). 
The third false start in the militia dismantlement was on 19 May 2007, when 
the Ivoirian Presidency initiated a media-conscious operation in Guiglo, during 
which 1,026 weapons were handed over (government estimate) against cones-
quent payment to the main militia leaders (estimated at 280 million CFA francs8). 
The ONUCI revised the number of weapons down (to 500) and pointed out that a 
third were dysfunctional (personal communication, November 2007). Interesting-
                                              
5  125,000 CFA francs are equivalent to EUR 190. 
6  The total amount of the package amounted to 499,500 CFA francs (USD 940 or EUR 760). 
7  Transport expenses were promised to be paid separately (personal communications with demobilized 
recruits, April 2007). 
8  280 million CFA francs are equivalent to EUR 427,000. 
196 
 
ly, this initiative was launched outside the National DDR Plan, and neither the 
National Commission for DDR (CNDDR) or the ONUCI were associated with 
the event. After that day, one of the President’s advisors unilaterally declared the 
end of the militia dismantlement (ICG, 2007). Although a presidential envelope 
was supposed to be dispatched to militia members, the process was so opaque 
that militia leaders were accused of keeping the money for themselves and of 
favoring their relatives, which generated some tension. When I was on fieldwork 
in June 2007, a lot of militia members recruited in Blolequin had in fact left town 
to travel to Abidjan in order to claim a share. 
 
Particularities of the Ivoirian case 
In addition to the general debates associated with disarmament, demobilization, 
reinsertion and reintegration (Should cash be given to combatants? Should 
specific programmes be created for them? How to determine entry criteria?), 
there are a number of particularities to take into account in the Ivoirian case, 
necessary to better comprehend the situation there. Firstly, the Ivoirian PCO uses 
a broad definition of militarized people and does not limit it to those solely in 
possession of a weapon. It clearly states that anyone who has joined an armed 
group and who has acted in support of military operations is considered a ‘com-
batant’, and thus is eligible for entry into the official DDR programme: ‘Leur 
qualité de combattant procède de leur appartenance à un groupe armé’ (PCO, 
2004). A second particularity is the unreliability of the figures (Unowa, 2005). 
For obvious strategic reasons, the number of recruits and equipment has re-
mained unclear on both belligerent sides, and to date, PNDDR and ONUCI 
representatives have not yet received the lists of combatants and weapons, which 
raises several issues in terms of planning. Thirdly, there is the need to acknow-
ledge the brevity of the conflict, in sharp contrast with what happened in the 
neighbouring countries. The Ivoirian conflict did not last long, nor the violence 
related to the war, yet as mentioned in the contextual chapters, it left quite a 
cultural mark, especially in areas close to the front line.  
An interesting peculiarity of the Ivoirian case is that on both sides, most 
recruits had de facto disarmed without undergoing the official DDR process. In 
2007 on the rebel side, most respondents stated that they had not carried arms for 
several years. The bulk of the weapons had been collected by their leaders when 
the military situation stabilized and had been gathered in arsenals, ready for a 
potential redistribution if the situation evolved in such a direction. On the 
counter-insurgent side, right before the dismantlement wave of the 981 militia 
members in the summer of 2006, weapons were collected in advance from 
combatants in towns and villages by militia leaders, and then were surrendered in 
batch to the ONUCI, under CNDDR supervision. Such a modus operandi actu-
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ally raised a certain number of issues, as not all recruits who had given back arms 
appeared on the list for inclusion in the official demobilization programme. Mili-
tia leaders were therefore accused of favouring relatives. Outside Guiglo in parti-
cular, militarized civilians expressed their frustration more than once with respect 
to their lack of reward.  
The fact that most rebel and militia recruits were in fact disarmed several 
years ago revisits a common assumption in literature on DDR, one that states that 
combatants only agree to surrender the physical and economic security their 
weapons provide if they see alternative livelihood prospects in what reinsertion 
programmes offer (Knight & Ozerdem, 2004; Willibald, 2006). If most low-
ranked recruits surrender their weapons to their commanders way before the start 
of the official disarmament, this claim is no longer valid, and some contexts 
similar to our case might confirm the fact that recruits in non-State armed groups 
do not necessarily use the threat of a gun for private economic gain.  
An interesting feature probably not confined to the Ivoirian case is the multi-
plicity of reinsertion initiatives that have run in parallel to the National DDR 
Plan. We mentioned one before, in May 2007, when the Ivoirian Presidency 
initiated militia dismantlement in Guiglo and gave cash payments to militia lead-
ers to dispatch to their troops. The initiative was launched outside the National 
DDR Plan and did not involve the key DDR actors CNDDR and ONUCI. 
Another parallel initiative focusing on the reinsertion of ex-combatants is the 
pilot project undertaken by the German agency GTZ-IS that is described in detail 
below. It initially targeted 500 of the 981 militia members demobilized in 2006 
who were allocated financial compensation, and 500 FAFN elements still active 
in the rebellion who had not yet received any reinsertion support. Another 
initiative that can be documented is the ONUCI USD 4 million reintegration 
programme for ex-combatants and youths at risk, launched in August 2008 with 
wide media coverage, and planning to foster the creation of 1,000 micro-projects 
(the programme was initially designed to last six months and the amount of in-
dividual support ranged between 300 and 420,000 CFA francs) (ONUCI, 2008). 
In November 2008, the UNDP publicly announced its support for the reinsertion 
of 700 ex-combatants in Katiola and Bouaké. Other initiatives included UNDP 
and UNICEF, which secured specific funding to support the reintegration of 
children9 and women associated with armed forces. The international NGOs Save 
the Children and International Rescue Committee were also developing specific 
programmes with respect to children associated with armed forces, and the Nor-
                                              
9  Children associated with armed group or forces were handled separately. They usually went through 
an orientation and transit center (CTO) under the direct supervision of NGOs and the overall manage-
ment of UNICEF. They were not entitled to the safety net package.  
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wegian Refugee Council succeeded in securing funding for offering training and 
economic opportunities to youths at risk in the militia stronghold of Duékoué. 
Although, theoretically, most of these initiatives occurred in partnership with the 
National Programme of Reinsertion and Community Rehabilitation (PNRRC),10 
it has been difficult for this institution to coordinate all this in practice. This 
raised additional issues and added to the confusion by sending mixed messages. 
When the official DDR process starts (if  ever), what will be the approach to 
recruits who have already benefited from an alternative type of support? Would 
they be included in the official programme? And given the fact that each alter-
native programme delivers a different package and keeps its own records, to what 
extent is it possible to assess the impact of such ‘extras’ on participants’ lives? 
Can recruits easily navigate between the different schemes? 
The next two sections focus on how young people temporarily drawn into 
armed groups made use of two standard reinsertion instruments widely used in 
post-conflict politics as ‘resocialization’ tools: financial safety nets, and short-
term vocational training. I first look at how respondents made use of their finan-
cial safety net and the extent to which it helped them to secure social acceptance, 
especially since the cash instalments were given several months after their 
effective demobilization. I then specifically focus on a pilot project undertaken 
by the German agency GTZ-IS, by examining the pros and cons of taking part in 
such an intervention from the particular points of view of youths who partici-
pated in the project. What were the economic and social stakes in favour of parti-
cipation? How have they made use of the reinsertion prospects the programme 
offered? And how have they integrated it (or not) with other opportunities that 
arose at the same time?  
Reinsertion under the lens: how were cash allowances spent? 
Genuine belief that recruits had earned the right to compensation was a recurring 
litany throughout interviews. ‘We lost five years of our time.’ ‘We’ve been de-
layed.’ There was something intrinsic to these statements, namely, the expression 
of a certain conception of fairness and the implicit claim that financial compen-
sation was due, regardless of the outcome of conflict. The majority of recruits, 
rebels and militia members alike, emphasized the fact that despite having been 
called to fight for their country, they had gained little from it, and they had 
mainly lost their time in the movement instead of being able to work elsewhere. 
They therefore were entitled to a proper reward for their services rendered. If 
                                              
10  The PNRCC was founded by the APO in March 2007 and replaced the former structure of 
PNDDR/RC. 
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some threatened to return to violence if not satisfied, the particular fact that most 
recruits had already been disarmed in 2006-2007 make foremost these claims 
rhetorical, without being mistaken too much.  
While most low-ranked recruits saw financial compensation as a back-pay-
ment for their services, military leaders, and especially the high-ranking ones, 
had a different perspective; once the right to compensation was institutionalized 
in the National DDR Plan, they used it as a carrot to retain their troops. The 
prospect of no financial reward would probably have led many recruits to aban-
don the ranks after a certain time, especially among the western militias who 
were in this respect much freer than their rebel counterparts. But the prospect of 
being on the official demobilization list and of potentially receiving DDR money 
had the reverse effect of building recruits’ loyalty. This was especially expressed 
on the rebel side, as no recruit had yet received any form of financial compen-
sation.  
This section examines how the financial incentive distributed in the summer of 
2006 to the 981 militia members was spent. It was dispatched in three instal-
ments: the first one was supplied on July 2006 (125,000 CFA francs), the second 
on 13 September 2006 (125,000 CFA francs), and the third one at the end of 
November of the same year (249,500 CFA francs).11 The analysis is based on a 
careful examination of 100 testimonies.  
 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork (interview fragments from discussions with A., M. and G., spring 2007) 
                                              
11  Initially planned on 29 October 2006, it was delayed a month. 
Box 9.1: Three examples of the use of financial incentives 
 
‘The first instalment I shared with my family and my in-laws. I kept a little, but not much. Most 
of the money was used to pay miscellaneous expenses. The second instalment, I gave 
50,000 to my wife for her small business. I also set up a cabine for my little brother but he 
screwed everything up. I used the last instalment to invest in my own business, a maquis 
and to improve my home.’ 
 
‘I gave money to my family and I paid for my uncle’s medical expenses. I also gave petty 
cash to acquaintances I have in the militia group who are not yet demobilized. I bought a plot 
of land in Guiglo, near the timber industry for 50,000 CFA francs. I am currently building a 
house. I also purchased wood from the timber company, to make charcoal. I opened a CCP 
account at the local post1.’  
 
‘I improved my home. I set up a water tap for 58,000 CFA francs and I purchased an 
electricity counter at 72,000 CFA francs. I helped my brother to start his own hevea field and 
I gave him 125,000 CFA francs. I also gave petty cash to my family.’  
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Juggling between social obligations and personal benefit 
Drawing on interview fragments and informal discussions with demobilized mili-
tia elements, findings show that respondents used their safety net very different-
ly, constantly juggling between social obligations and personal benefit (Chelpi-
Den Hamer, 2009). I come up below with a rough categorization of expenses.  
 
• Reimbursing creditors 
Reimbursing creditors was not an uncommon answer and many respondents said 
that upon reception of the cash, they paid the debts they accumulated during the 
war period. One respondent had accumulated as much as 325,000 CFA francs in 
debt since the beginning of the war. He had not paid his house rent for several 
months, which put him 25,000 CFA francs in debt every month, not to mention 
the unpaid utilities bills (electricity/water). For him it was important to pay his 
creditors first, otherwise he feared they would have gone to the police to file a 
formal complaint when they found out that he had received some cash. Another 
respondent explained that even if he had slept most of the war in military camps, 
he had to keep renting a home in town for his wife. Several militiamen also 
mentioned that they had bought food on credit during the war. They could 
usually eat at the camp but their dependents were not entitled to free food. One 
respondent had contracted a loan to bury his mother. She had remained in the 
mortuary for a month (billed 5,000 CFA francs a day) and he had to borrow for 
the cost of the coffin (50,000 CFA francs) and to pay for the stay of relatives who 
had come to attend the funeral. He used his cash allowance to clear this debt.  
 
• Responding to familial demands 
The relationships respondents have with their family after receiving their cash 
entitlement are quite complex and range from strategies of avoidance to strate-
gies of resignation. How to best manage the burden, seems to be the standard 
strategy. Several respondents’ remarks illustrate the difficulties in avoiding rela-
tives: ‘People know when you get your cash. The following morning, you see all 
your relatives in a row in front of your door and you have to give them some-
thing. You give 5,000 to your aunt, 5,000 to your cousin, 5,000 to your other 
cousin, etc.’ One respondent bypassed the issue by putting all his cash in the 
local bank and returning empty-handed to his village. Even when cornered, he 
was practically incapable of giving cash to anyone.  
A few respondents mentioned having loaned money to a sibling (up to 
100,000 CFA francs). While most loans were not yet repaid at the time of the 
interviews, some had already been bitterly abused. One respondent mentioned he 
had given his complete first instalment to his family, ‘to be left in peace’. He 
used to be employed as a katakata driver before the war, and he wanted to save 
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the rest to buy a katakata. Katakatas are a sort of bush tractors that transport all 
kinds of merchandise. Given the second-hand cost of such vehicle (about 1.5 
million CFA francs), one of his brothers convinced him to entrust him with his 
second and third instalments. The plan was to travel to Abidjan to ask their eldest 
brother to participate in the purchase by paying the remaining million. The 
entrusted brother eventually usurped all the money, claiming that he had been 
robbed on the way. 
Regardless of these cases of abuse, a recurring argument in favour of family 
support is gratefulness. Close to the front line, villages often played an important 
role in supplying food to combatants and complex mechanisms of money col-
lection occurred between armed groups, villagers, and the educated elite in 
Abidjan native to these war-affected areas. One interview fragment summarizes 
it well: ‘You have to be grateful and reward those who fed you during the war.’ 
Several respondents therefore felt obliged to reward their benefactors, and these 
included close relatives who participated in the war effort and who supported 
them during difficult times. Rewards to the spouse and to direct parents (father/-
mother) were rather standard patterns, and I heard several stories of respondents 
setting up a farm for their father, or helping their wife develop her own business. 
 
• Investing 
Several respondents mentioned that it was not until the last instalment that they 
could do something productive with their money. Some invested in wood and 
bought loads from the nearby Thanry timber industry to make into charcoal. 
Others entered the growing sector of hevea cultivation or expanded the plantation 
they already had (this sector was especially in vogue at the time I was doing 
fieldwork). Respondents who were already engaged in cultivating hevea before 
the war usually bought new plants from the CHC (Compagnie Hévéïcole du 
Cavally), an international rubber company located in the area (to give a rough 
cost estimate, there are about 600 plants on one hectare, and one plant costs 
about 250 CFA francs). Those new to the activity purchased land, cleared their 
field and/or joined the myriad of private and humanitarian projects that were then 
offering incentives to cultivate hevea in the Moyen-Cavally region.  
One respondent used his last instalment to purchase one hectare of hevea for 
the rubber industry for 180,000 CFA francs.12 He had used the previous two 
transfers to give petty cash to his relatives (wife, brothers and sister), pay for his 
son’s school boarding expenses (35,000 CFA francs), buy food (three bags of 
                                              
12  Access to land must not be considered a given for the autochthones. Some indeed mentioned that they 
could rely on their father’s forest to start their own plantation, but others said they had to buy a piece 
of land. 
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rice at 36,000 CFA francs) and to purchase agricultural equipment (a pulverizer 
at 48,500 CFA francs). Another respondent used his third transfer to enter a local 
project, the Nouvelles Plantations Hévéïcoles de l’ouest Montagneux de la Côte 
d’Ivoire, to benefit from free seedlings. When we met, he had just started con-
tracting workers to clear two hectares of forest to start a hevea plantation.  
Respondents did not solely invest in agricultural activities. One used his safety 
net to purchase a sewing machine, a Singer-à-tête-noire (75,000 CFA francs). He 
was planning to return to tailoring, an activity he was doing before the war, and 
to run his own workshop. Another waited for the third instalment to restock his 
shop with 200,000 CFA francs worth of new merchandise. Another invested in a 
chicken farm. He bought poultry, food, vaccines, and resumed his pre-war 
activity. Another used most of his safety net to start a maquis. He spent 300,000 
CFA francs to purchase a freezer, several chairs, a few tables, the first stock of 
drinks, and to cover the various costs related to the installation (restoration, rent 
and a security deposit). Other types of investments included partial payment to an 
auto school (in the prospect of getting a driving licence to be able to work as a 
taxi/truck/minivan driver), paying city fees (for setting up a market stall or a 
small business), paying intermediaries to find a job, paying registration fees for 
being authorized to take national civil service exams, and the payment of bribes 
and fees to be allowed to take the 9th and 12th grade exams (in the hope that this 
would open more doors). 
 
• Using unwisely? 
Although I am not at ease with the term, there are a range of uses that could be 
labeled ‘unwise’ or ‘unproductive’ from a Western perspective: improving one’s 
home, buying a plot of land (when not for agricultural purposes), purchasing 
basic furniture, clothes, marrying, rewarding old men who provided mystic pro-
tection during the war (gris-gris), etc. If buying a bed and a mattress perhaps 
raises few eyebrows, purchasing a TV/VCR, building a house or spending im-
portant sums on marriage could be more contentious; yet locally, they send quite 
important signals. Noteworthily, a certain number of respondents took advantage 
of their financial safety net to leave the family home and to settle independently: 
‘Before the war, I used to sleep at my parents. With the net, I detached myself. I 
built a 2-chambres-salon.’13 One respondent used his second instalment to have 
his identity papers drawn up. In a country where the lack of documentation often 
impedes free circulation, this is far from being unproductive. Many respondents 
also mentioned having spent substantial sums on medical expenses right after 
                                              
13  This means a small house with two bedrooms and a living-room. 
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receipt of their cash entitlement, either for themselves or for close relatives. Usu-
ally, such use was a major expense and there was nothing left. But it is difficult 
to label such types of expenses unproductive. Respondents preferred the term 
‘bad timing’ when a serious disease hit them (or their family).  
Perhaps the best statement to illustrate how most respondents felt upon receipt 
of their safety net is the following interview extract: ‘When you are not paid for 
years, you live one day after the other. This cash we got, we could do nothing 
good with it.’14 That partly explains why a lot of respondents spent their money 
quickly and to relatively insignificant personal benefit. Many respondents were 
also not happy with the fact that the safety net came in three instalments. They 
would have preferred to receive everything in one go, as smaller cash amounts 
are easily wasted, in particular by responding to familial demands;15 however, 
such a flexible view runs against the preferred international approach that favours 
payment by instalment (Knight & Ozerdem, 2004). 
 
• Allocating money to war chiefs: racket or reward? 
Allocating part of the financial safety net to war chiefs is a common feature, 
which raises the question of the extent to which it should be interpreted as racket 
or reward. If we look at interview fragments, there is plenty of anecdotal evi-
dence suggesting that extortion was real. One account is particularly enlighten-
ing: ‘It was serious in Duékoué.16 You were obliged to give. If you did not give, 
you could not get out. The first time, my leader took 30,000 out of my instalment 
as recognition payment. The next two times, he did not get anything. As I was 
walking out of the compound with the cash in my pockets, he asked me, but I 
lied to him. I told him that I was still expecting my money and that I just wanted 
to get out for a drink.’ Retaliation rarely follows such avoidance strategies, and 
once the immediate threat had passed, there was usually no follow-up action on 
the part of war chiefs. Other respondents were less entrepreneurial and could not 
avoid being shaken down after having received each instalment.17  
While certain leaders were more magnanimous than others, UPRGO war lords 
seem to have been particularly prone to extorting from recruits. Who really bene-
fited from this money remains vague though, based on the information we have. 
                                              
14  ‘Quand vous êtes resté quelque part sans salaire pendant des années, tu vis au jour le jour. Cet argent, 
on ne pouvait rien faire avec.’ 
15  This is in line with the previous finding: most respondents could not do anything productive with their 
money until the third instalment. 
16  Duékoué is the site where militia recruits were gathered and officially demobilized under PNDDR and 
ONUCI supervision. The money was given in a protected compound, however, as soon as people got 
out, they were prone to abuse. 
17  One respondent could not avoid giving half of his safety net. He was relieved of 70,000 CFA francs 
from his first instalment, 80,000 from the second and 100,000 from the third.  
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The distinction between war leaders and war leaders’ envoys was often blurred 
on the ground and in the respondents’ discourse, and it was not easy to distin-
guish between organized racketeering orchestrated by militia leaders and simple 
robbery by higher-ranked recruits, who were taking advantage of their position to 
abuse their peers. Most accounts showed that rather than giving cash directly to 
their chiefs, recruits were more likely to pay an intermediary, especially if the 
person was known to have a close relationship with their leader. Some even 
signed receipts! In addition, there was a certain group dynamic: as the first demo-
bilized recruits had given money to their chiefs, the later cohorts were likely to 
imitate them.  
If rewarding war chiefs resembled a racket in some cases, that was not the 
only pattern and the informal back payment to warlords varied considerably from 
one individual to another. Several respondents pointed out that they were not 
forced to give money. I also heard accounts of militia leaders gathering recruits 
before the first instalment was made and telling them that they were not obliged 
to make any financial contributions.18 Some recruits did not perceive it as co-
ercion. One respondent rewarded his chief by paying for several rounds of 
drinks. Another said that although his chief had mentioned that he did not want 
anything, he was happy to give him 20,000 out of his last instalment. Allocating 
money to war chiefs is strongly connected to social obligation, and the majority 
of recruits were grateful to have been put on the official demobilization list by 
their militia leaders, making them eligible for financial compensation.  
Another feature to take into account is to whom recruits want to give. Militias 
have also their hierarchy, and while some may feel more inclined to give to the 
general leader, others might prefer rewarding a chief who was closer to them 
during the war and to whom they related more. A few respondents who fought in 
advanced positions were keen on rewarding the chiefs of their section. In their 
view, he had succeeded the most important: he had preserved their lives during 
combat. I remember one female recruit praising her local commander: ‘I really 
say thank you to Colonel T. because he took good care of us. We did not lose 
anyone in our group. He watched our back. When he knew the day was not good, 
he would tell us not to move. That’s the way we worked.’ The social value of 
reward associated with mystic beliefs must therefore not be downplayed when 
examining the relationship between war chiefs and recruits.  
 
                                              
18  Some added to that that those willing to give were nonetheless very welcome. 
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Has the spending of cash allowances facilitated social acceptance? 
Given the well-known controversies associated with using cash transfers in the 
reinsertion phase of ex-combatants, it is worth questioning the extent to which 
the financial safety net has been helpful in securing acceptance by the com-
munity with whom ex-combatants associated, and whether it played a role in 
facilitating their transition to civilian life. Examining these questions is parti-
cularly relevant since most low-ranking militias had returned home 1½ to 2 years 
before being officially demobilized and eventually faced reinsertion issues then.19 
Accounts widely varied per respondent. The ones who chose to remain in Guiglo, 
in the militia leaders’ compounds or nearby, were clearly waiting for the official 
disarmament to start and for the several-times-announced financial safety net. 
Some experienced no problems at all and were warmly welcomed by their fami-
lies: ‘My folks were told I was dead. They were quite happy to see me back.’ 
Others had never severed contacts with their parents during their time in the 
armed group. As the previous chapter clearly illustrated, many recruits in fact did 
not need to be ‘resocialized’ after their military experience; their actual bonds 
with society had never been cut.  
But how smooth was their return to civilian life? Accounts were rather mixed 
and there was no single pattern. While reinsertion problems directly experienced 
after having demobilized oneself were not often spontaneously mentioned (and 
unfortunately not systematically probed in depth during interviews), several 
things came up during the discussions. Shortly after their return, a certain number 
of militia recruits were feared by the people with whom they usually associated, 
especially those known to have fought with Liberian mercenaries. The account of 
this female recruit is particularly highlighting:  
‘In the beginning, I was scaring everyone. Even my cousins were afraid. Even my mother. 
When I was angry, I often noticed that people acted different. They were all scared of me. 
But I said no. What I did [during the war], it is past. But even my friends were scared, and 
they were saying, “She went to war, she’s going to kill you at night”. It did not feel good. So 
I moved on elsewhere for some time. I spent two months in Abidjan. When I came back to 
Guiglo, I started to sell alloco in front of the Becanti.20 People were coming to see me out of 
curiosity, also soldiers. Some were surprised, “Eh, you are here now!” Some did not even 
want to eat alloco, they just came to see me. It took some time, but people eventually saw me 
differently. I had not changed, but their perception did. They saw that I behaved well, and 
that I did not look for arguments21 with anybody. Now everything is okay.’  
Like her, several respondents mentioned having felt the need to work on their 
image shortly after returning to their pre-war lives; they had to emphasize their 
                                              
19  Most of them had returned to their home in 2004-2005 after the end of the encampment period in a 
military setting (in Blolequin, Toulepleu, Zéo, or Zagné, depending on the faction integrated). 
20  The Bécanti is a local maquis. Alloco is a local dish, based on bananas. 
21  ‘Je ne faisais pas palabres avec quelqu’un’. 
206 
 
non-violent attitude. If some respondents could resume their pre-war activities 
relatively quick, others encountered difficulties. Again, there was a multiplicity 
of patterns, which mostly depended on respondents’ individual attitudes, charac-
teristics and social networks. One respondent could not go back to his previous 
work because he had a bad reputation. As he put it: ‘Many things happened 
during the war. I did not know the face of all rebels, so when the chief suspected 
someone and said, “This person is a rebel, he has to be killed”, we obeyed. But 
this man might have family in Guiglo; and now if I approach someone for work, 
these people can tell him that I’m not a good person and that it is better to avoid 
me.’ In contrast, well-known fighters had no problems resuming their pre-war 
jobs. One respondent who had fought in the front line with the Liberians resumed 
upon return his work as building painter, and even if he mentioned getting fewer 
contracts than before, the main cause was the general decrease in local economic 
activity due to the displacement of most of the local middle class, not the fear of 
dealing with him. 
Has financial compensation facilitated social acceptance? For most demobili-
zed militia recruits, the safety net was distributed well after their return to their 
community. Some had even ended their participation in the militia group two or 
three years earlier. This raises a first doubt as to the extent to which cash 
allowances played a role in facilitating social acceptance. In addition, not every 
combatant benefited from them. As already mentioned, the demobilization pro-
gramme of the summer of 2006 was only partial and targeted 981 low-ranked 
militia recruits. Not everyone appeared on the list for inclusion and in a single 
village – even in a single family – some received the package and others did not. 
Selection appeared quite arbitrary in some cases. Perhaps the most interesting 
feature is that those who did not receive financial compensation were mocked by 
their peers. A posteriori, going to war and getting nothing out of it was perceived 
locally as ridiculous and as a waste of time. I observed this several times when I 
went to villages to interview demobilized recruits. There was, however, a certain 
tolerance with respect to this unfairness, and if the few militia recruits I inter-
viewed who did not receive compensation indeed expressed their frustration, they 
seemed to accept their situation.  
Respondents used their safety net very differently, constantly juggling be-
tween social obligations and personal benefit. Out of the five broad categories of 
expenses I identified – 1) reimbursing creditors, 2) responding to familial de-
mands, 3) investing in an own business, 4) allocating money to war chiefs, and 5) 
dealing with social events (such as medical expenses, funerals, home improve-
ments) – three would not have existed if no cash had been given to combatants. 
Creditors would not have rushed to ask for full payback and would have con-
tinued to display the same attitude as towards their other debtors. Relatives 
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would not have lined up in front of respondents’ doors, and war chiefs and 
undemobilized friends would not have had a share.  
For the two other categories (investing and dealing with social events), the 
financial compensation was useful but rather limited in time and scope. When 
discussing investments, a recurring point that came up from the interviews was 
that the safety net should have been given in one go instead of in three in-
stalments. Relevant investments usually involve substantial sums of money and 
small amounts are easily wasted on day-to-day expenses. With respect to social 
events, one important contribution that this extra cash has made is in allowing 
young men to emancipate, by being able to leave the family home and/or by 
becoming a short-term provider for their close family.  
If I go back to the previous list of benefits and risks in using cash in the 
reinsertion stage and apply it to this case, several things are worth highlighting. I 
found no evidence in support of the argument that cash incentives encourage 
former combatants to return their weapons and return quickly to their com-
munity. Most militia recruits in the west were already disarmed and no longer 
living in military camps at the time of their official demobilization in the summer 
of 2006. The majority had in fact returned to their homes in 2004-2005 and 
resumed some sort of activity. The financial safety net therefore had a limited 
impact on the immediate post-return phase, which is when social acceptance was 
the most challenging. I also found little evidence that individuals used the money 
‘unwisely’. After receiving their safety net, they faced a certain number of de-
mands (from creditors, family, and acquaintances made during the war) to which 
they had to respond, and the range of responses greatly varied from one in-
dividual to another. The demobilized recruits I interviewed were not particularly 
privileged in comparison with the communities they related to. Extra cash has 
helped them face a number of events (medical expenses, school feels, costs as-
sociated with marriage and newborn children) and in several cases, has enabled 
them to partially invest in a small business, even if they were more likely to be 
abused by their direct entourage. The use of cash transfers in the reinsertion 
phase has indeed meant a breath of fresh air for ex-combatants, but should not be 
overrated, as their room to manoeuvre was eventually limited by the way they 
individually balanced social obligations with personal benefit.  
The next part examines how respondents made use of a second reinsertion 
instrument widely used in post-conflict politics to help resocialize young people 
who had temporarily joined armed groups: the provision of short-term vocational 
training. I specifically draw on observations made when studying a pilot project 
executed by a German agency (GTZ-IS). I attempt to discover the extent to 
which participating in such an externally driven humanitarian project can help 
militarized youths to secure a decent post-war livelihood.  
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Assessment of a pilot initiative fostering economic reinsertion 
In August 2006, following militia dismantlement in Guiglo, the German agency 
GTZ-IS started an EU-funded project in partnership with the National DDR 
Programme for reinserting combatants on both sides of the front line. The first 
intervention targeted 500 of the 981 militias demobilized in 2006 (those who had 
received the financial safety net), and 500 FAFN recruits still active in the re-
bellion who had not yet been demobilized and had not received any financial 
compensation. They were offered a short education in a specific craft (tailoring, 
welding, carpentry, agriculture/husbandry or in small business management). 
Basic equipment was provided at the end to help the youths begin their activity.  
I explore here the pros and cons of taking part in such intervention from the 
very particular perspectives of young civilians who were militarized for some 
time before receiving short-term reinsertion assistance. What were the entry 
criteria? Were there major differences between rebel and pro-government mili-
tias? From the points of view of these youths, what were the economic and social 
stakes in favour of participation? How did they make use of the reinsertion 
prospects the programme offered, and how did they integrate them with the other 
opportunities they encountered at the same time? The bulk of the data is based on 
200 semi-structured interviews with low-ranked youths who joined government 
militias and rebel groups in Guiglo and Man at the start of the conflict and who 
benefited from assistance at some stage. Additional interviews were done with 
minors and with female recruits, and also with a few people who did not benefit 
from any support. 
 
Project description 
The initial project developed by GTZ-IS was designed to support the official 
DDR process once it would begin. It was supposed to intervene in the official 
disarmament and demobilization stage by providing operational support on site 
(rough renovation of infrastructure, canteen management for demobilized com-
batants, basic logistics for all involved agencies). In the reinsertion stage, it was 
supposed to provide short-term support to 1,000 pro-government militia recruits, 
within the framework of a pilot initiative. On paper, this reinsertion initiative was 
conceived as a short-term project (3 months) and was geared at preparing recruits 
for longer-term social and economic reintegration. It included basic literacy, 
sensitization to civic education, human rights, and peace education (1 month), 
and also a first provisional orientation towards specific reinsertion streams such 
as ones for job training or small businesses (2 months). Importantly, it was pre-
sented as inseparable from long-term reintegration perspectives and its main at-
tempted contribution was to bridge the opportunities the GTZ-IS project offered 
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with the reintegration support mentioned in the Ivoirian DDR Plan22 (Ball & Van 
De Goor, 2006; GTZ, 2007a, 2007b).  
The project was supposed to start on 15 June 2005 and last six months. Due to 
repeated delays in the disarmament and demobilization stages, a first amendment 
extended its duration by eighteen months. The persistent lack of progress led to a 
second amendment which suspended the project in March 2006. In August 2006, 
in light of the partial militia dismantlement in Guiglo, the EU agreed to waive the 
suspension and the GTZ-IS launched the reinsertion component of the project. 
The first intervention targeted 500 of the 981 militias demobilized in 2006 who 
had received the financial safety net, and 500 FAFN recruits still active in the 
rebellion who had not yet been demobilized and had not received any financial 
compensation.23 Given that the Ivoirian DDR Plan had taken a broad definition 
of combatant and did not limit it solely to those in the possession of arms, 
(former) members who had joined an armed group and who had operated behind 
the front line in support of military operations were also eligible for entry.  
The first step of the project consisted of a 4-week process, which included in-
dividual profiling for each participant, basic literacy24 and numeracy (or refresher 
sessions for the ones already literate), and a first professional orientation. The 
second step consisted of an 8-week process orientated towards job placement and 
technical training, with a strong practical component of which the content de-
pended on which reinsertion stream had been chosen by the participant. Basic 
concepts of management and group business were also explained during that 
period. In the initial project, there was no support planned for helping partici-
pants to start up their business or for supplemental training if needed. The as-
sumption was indeed that the short-term opportunities the project offered would 
be a bridge to the long-term reintegration support the Ivoirian DDR Plan would 
provide. But with the official DDR process not taking place, it became quite 
unlikely that this support would ever materialize. GTZ-IS therefore included a 
budget line for purchasing basic starter equipment, made possible by slightly 
amending the EU budget and also by drawing on a complementary source of 
funding. Most participants in the GTZ-IS reinsertion project therefore received 
basic assistance when they began their economic activity.  
                                              
22  As mentioned in Chapter 4, the National DDR Plan foresaw subsequent financial benefits to reinsert 
demobilized combatants. It included a financial safety net for six months, possible education grants, 
vocational training, a subsequent starter kit, and privileged access to micro-credit. It is a real pity that 
it was never applied in practice. 
23  Follow-up interventions took a broader perspective and enlarged the target to non-combatants. 
24  It included several modules to raise awareness of civic education, human rights and peace promotion.  
210 
 
Both reinsertion centres – in Guiglo and in Man – started in October 2006.25 In 
Guiglo, the PNDDR provided a list of 207 demobilized militia members to 
include in the project, 146 were regular participants. In Man, the central rebellion 
administration in Bouaké had first provided a list of FAFN recruits to include in 
the project. When most recruits did not show up when the project started, the 
project staff assumed that much of the list was obsolete and entry criteria were 
therefore locally reviewed in collaboration with the local rebel administration. 
Low-ranking elements of the Forces Nouvelles were informed of the possibility 
of taking part in the GTZ-IS project on a voluntary basis. As talking about 
demobilization was still taboo at the time, in the rebel-controlled areas of 2007, 
the framing of the project goal was stripped of any DDR connotation and the 
label ‘pilot’ was extensively used with the military hierarchy, as a way to legi-
timize an experimental intervention that should not have drastic consequences for 
the zone. It worked. The mere prospect of having to release recruits in the near 
future was not debatable with the Com’Zone five years after the start of the 
conflict, but under the label ‘pilot’ the GTZ-IS project was authorized to be 
implemented in Man. Tables 9.1 and 9.2 present the distribution of recruits by 
reinsertion streams for the two towns of Guiglo and Man. 
Small-scale agriculture/husbandry was the most popular track in both 
locations, while job training was a much more popular stream in Man. Practical 
workshops were set up inside the centres for technical training. In Man, there 
were four of them: tailoring, joinery, welding and auto mechanics; in Guiglo, 
there were two: tailoring and auto mechanics. Recruits who had chosen other 
tracks received practical training outside the centre (those who chose to spe-
cialize in ‘cold’ for instance, the repair of AC units and freezers, or in elec-
tricity): they were either working as apprentice in a local workshop or they en-
rolled in private technical courses, with the project agreeing to pay their tuition 
for a few months. For farm-related projects, GTZ-IS partnered with local farm 
cooperatives and the national agency ANADER (Agence Nationale d’Appui au 
Développement Rural), which provided technical training on site.26 In what fol-
lows, I examine the economic and social stakes in favour of participation. I focus 
in particular on how the project participants made use of the reinsertion prospects 
 
                                              
25  The project also included three other towns in the west: Duékoué, Blolequin and Toulepleu. These 
were, however, smaller-scale satellite units, mainly aimed at reaching demobilized militia recruits 
who had returned to relatively remote communities (Toulepleu is at the Liberian border, about 120 km 
from Guiglo, and half of the road is in very bad condition). 
26  The training was quite flexible, and really depended on the participants’ former experience. For some, 
the training could be extended. Others, more experienced in the skill, could get down to work directly, 
sometimes even without practical training (especially if they were resuming their pre-war activity). 
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Table 9.1 Distribution of project participants by reinsertion streams in Guiglo 
 MEN WOMEN TOTAL 
 N % N % N % 
SMALL-SCALE 
AGRICULTURE/HUSBANDRY 82 60 - - 82      60 
Pig farm 61 45 - - 61 42 
Poultry farm 12 9 1 10 13 9 
Agriculture 9 7 - - 9 6 
JOB TRAINING 21 14 6 60 27 18 
Tailoring 6 4 6 60 12 8 
Mechanics 10 7 - - 10 7 
Electricity 2 1 - - 2 1 
Computer 2 1 - - 2 1 
Joinery 1 1 - - 1 1 
SMALL BUSINESSES 33 24 3 30 36 25 
TOTAL 136 100 10 100 146 100 
Source: GTZ (2007). 
 
 
Table 9.2 Distribution of project participants by reinsertion streams in Man 
 MEN WOMEN TOTAL 
 N % N % N % 
SMALL-SCALE 
AGRICULTURE/HUSBANDRY 196 39 - - 196 39 
Pig farm 123 26 - - 123 25 
Poultry farm 59 12 - - 59 12 
Agriculture 9 2 - - 9 2 
Ox farm 5 1 - - 5 1 
JOB TRAINING 157 33 13 73 170 34 
Tailoring 39 8 3 17 42 8 
Hair dressing - - 10 56 10 2 
Welding 48 10 - - 48 10 
Mechanics (auto) 46 10 - - 46 9 
Mechanics (motorbike) 1 - - - 1 - 
Electricity 6 1 - - 6 1 
Tapestry 4 1 - - 4 1 
Joinery 13 3 - - 13 3 
SMALL BUSINESSES 129 27 5 28 134 27 
TOTAL 482 100 18  500 100 
Source: GTZ (2007). 
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GTZ-IS offered, and how they combined it with the other opportunities that arose 
at the same time.   
 
Reinsertion streams 
If we look at the charts, what is striking is that the majority of respondents en-
gaged in an activity that they had never done before the war. Only 45% of the 
respondents used the opportunity the project provided to continue with their pre-
vious work. Job training was the most popular track (chosen by 40%), followed 
by small businesses (36%) and small-scale agriculture/husbandry (23%). More 
than a third of the respondents said openly that they would not continue the 
activity after the end of the programme.  
If I refine the analysis by town, the picture is different. In Man, the majority of 
interviewed recruits engaged in vocational training (65%), then in small busi-
nesses (21%), followed by agriculture/husbandry (14%). Only a third engaged in 
an activity they were familiar with before the war; the rest restarted from scratch. 
Three fourths of respondents said they wished to continue the activity after the 
end of the program, either by managing it in person or by placing someone they 
knew at the head of the business. In Guiglo, job training was the less attractive 
path27 (15%), and half of respondents engaged in small businesses and in ac-
tivities they were familiar with. Agriculture/husbandry was also popular, with a 
third of respondents choosing this stream. 40% of respondents said openly that 
they would eventually have someone manage their activity for them when the 
programme ended. Figures 9.1 and 9.2 present the data. 
There are several elements to take into account when interpreting these 
figures. To what extent have respondents chosen their reinsertion streams and 
were certain tracks imposed on them? What were the main shortcomings of the 
profiling process? How have respondents made use of the reinsertion prospects 
the project offered and how have they combined it with other activities eventu-
ally engaged in at the same time? I describe the research findings below. 
 
• Misinformation and group bias:  
   What degree of agency exists in the choice of reinsertion streams?  
Information disseminated to (ex)combatants has been far from optimal, especi-
ally in the start of the program, when these youths had to pick a reinsertion 
activity.28 Many respondents were attracted to certain streams by the prospect of  
 
                                              
27  This loss of interest in job training is consistent with the general distribution of recruits by reinsertion 
streams in Guiglo (Table 9.1). 
28  This is in line with other studies (Jennings, 2007). 
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Figure 9.1     Which reinsertion activities have respondents engaged in? 
 
Man                                                                    Guiglo 
agriculture / 
husbandry
small business
job training
        
Source: Fieldwork (2007) 
 
 
Figure 9.2 Were respondents familiar with this activity before the war? 
Man                                                                    Guiglo 
no
yes
 
Source: Fieldwork (2007) 
 
 
receiving subsequent inputs (in particular in small businesses) and were quickly 
disabused by the little they got. Individual kits amounted to 75,000 CFA francs 
(EUR 115), which was considered too little by the majority to attain economic 
sustainability. Several youths also pointed out that when they added up the price 
of the items they had been given, they discovered that the value of the package 
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was below the announced 75,000. This raised serious concerns among them and 
some obvious questions with regard to the transparency of the supply chain. 
If we compare the content of the project reinsertion package with the long-
term reintegration support the Ivoirian DDR Plan was supposed to provide ex-
combatants, we can only regret the difference in scale. As detailed earlier (Chap-
ter 4), the DDR Plan was supposed to provide demobilized combatants with 
several benefits, including a financial safety net for six months, possible educa-
tion grants up to 200,000 CFA francs, long-term vocational training, and privi-
leged access to micro-credit (up to 180,000 CFA francs for an individual loan, 
150,000 for the purchase of equipment, and 100,000 for agricultural projects). 
The GTZ-IS project offered much less and only in-kind contributions. With the 
official DDR process failing to happen, the pilot project failed in providing the 
necessary support for the post-reinsertion phase. The assistance it provided 
remained too limited in volume and scope, and if it indeed did offer some extra 
to participants, it was incapable of fulfilling its primary objective of securing a 
sustainable livelihood for the majority of recruits.29 The project may also have 
added to the general confusion surrounding DDR and reinsertion/reintegration 
packages through its faulty dissemination and the mixed messages it sent. Seve-
ral interviewees in fact pointed out that recruits were confused because they 
thought the GTZ-IS project would provide them with the package proposed in 
the Ivoirian DDR Plan. That partly explains why they had expected more. Failing 
to meet these expectations has only contributed to fueling and sustaining frustra-
tion. 
 
 
Table 9.3 Nature and cost (in CFA) of individual kits in the small business track 
Cellphone (cabine) : - cellphone (20,000) 
- recharge cards (50,000) 
- SIM card (5,000) 
Retailer (boutique): - Prime necessities products (75,000) 
(soap, cigarettes, batteries, tea/coffee, biscuits, matches, rice, 
condiments, Maggi cubes…) 
Specialized retailer: - depending on products (75,000) 
(second-hand clothes (friperie), (pagnes), plastic shoes, 
cosmetics, rice/beans, alcohol, etc.) 
Source: Fieldwork, 2007. 
                                              
29  This is in line with other studies (Bouta, 2005; Dzinesa, 2007; Humphreys & Weinstein, 2004, 2007; 
Peters, 2006, 2007; Thakur, 2008).  
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Another feature that can explain why certain tracks were more popular than 
others is that some activities were initially presented as individual activities, but 
then at a later stage became compulsory group activities, as the initial investment 
costs were too high to settle the youths individually. This was in particular the 
case for respondents engaged in husbandry (in pig and poultry farms) and for 
those engaged in welding and joinery. In Man, for instance, 34 husbandry groups 
of five people were set up (poultry, pigs or oxen). The cost of setting up the 
farms varied between 956,500 and 1,133,500 CFA francs30 and included the con-
struction of the stables, and the purchases of vaccines, food, livestock, and basic 
equipment. Seven groups of four/five people were also formed in welding: they 
collectively received a tool kit worth 758,736 CFA francs and the project dis-
bursed an additional 475,000 CFA francs to cover the cost for building a basic 
workshop.31 All things combined, group support for welding approached EUR 
1,900 while individual welding kits were much more basic (the individual equip-
ment was only worth EUR 130). Sixteen recruits nevertheless chose to settle in-
dividually.  
Given the striking imbalance between individual and collective kits, recruits 
who had entered these streams therefore had little choice: they could either join 
up with vague acquaintances, go into business together, with all the vagaries one 
can easily imagine, and receive a decent kit; or they could settle individually, in 
the same track, but with the disadvantage of receiving little equipment; or they 
could change tracks. Most respondents who eventually decided to switch tracks 
eventually did so at the end of the project period and thus could not benefit from 
the full training associated with their new choice. Several youths who were 
initially enrolled in husbandry or welding/joinery preferred switching to the 
small business track and to settle individually. Clearly, they did not want to be 
forced to go into business in a group, with people they barely knew (the trust 
issue was cited several times by the respondents), and they had not found the 
individual kit attractive enough to remain in their initial track. This push towards 
group activities might have been the cause for the widescale drop-out of militia 
members: in January 2007, project participants had already decreased by one 
third in Guiglo, dropping from 207 to 146.32 Rebel participants were much more 
assiduous. 
Although some groups broke up shortly after setting up business, some have 
continued for quite a while, and I can testify to a few working projects. However, 
                                              
30  This ranges between EUR 1,460 and 1,730 by group. 
31  This is equivalent to EUR 1,160 and EUR 725. 
32  This is in line with other studies. When Pouligny (2004) compared the survival rate of micro-enter-
prises supported within the framework of a reinsertion initiative, Congolese individual projects scored 
65% versus 30% for Mozambican group initiatives.    
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very quickly, operational issues arose. With the farms, it was often difficult to 
secure the necessary land to raise feed for the livestock (maize and cassava). This 
was partially managed in the beginning by donating feed, but when the bags were 
empty, finding enough resources to feed the animals became a serious problem. 
The youths who were not from the area had to negotiate plots with the local 
landowners, which was not always possible. Two respondents I met six months 
after establishing their farm told me that they were about to divide the remaining 
pigs between them, and to continue farming individually. They had had so many 
difficulties in finding a field to plant maize to feed the pigs, that in their view, 
splitting the group and continuing on their own was the only solution. It had the 
advantage of being flexible: ‘If we go back to our own villages, we can ask for a 
plot. People help each other. But here, we are strangers. We have too many diffi-
culties in cultivating land.’  
With the welding/joinery workshops, trust was a main issue among group 
members and vis-à-vis potential clients. A welding group felt the need to relocate 
to Danané, two hours west of Man, because they genuinely believed that given 
their rebel past in Man, they would get fewer customers if they stayed there. In 
contrast, other groups had no problem settling in the town they were in during 
their military engagement. Another issue was more practical. If, after a while, 
individual group members wanted to go elsewhere (to respond to familial obli-
gations for instance), it was difficult to split up the expensive machines and it 
was quite unlikely that when it did happen, the workshop would be able to 
generate enough profit to be able to compensate them properly.33 One option was 
to sell the equipment, but this would jeopardize the whole enterprise; another 
option would be to barely give anything to the ones leaving and to let the other 
group members continue. If reinsertion tracks were never imposed on project 
participants, several incentives acted as push factors in informing their choice, 
such as changing information, the imbalance between individual and collective 
kits, the confusion arising from the multiplicity of initiatives parallel to the 
official DDR Plan, etc. Yet these factors do not fully explain every choice made 
and there is the need for a deeper understanding of recruits’ individual trajecto-
ries to be able to understand this. 
 
The profiling process 
There were several shortcomings in the profiling process used by the humani-
tarian agency. What struck me most was the lack of perspective regarding com-
batants’ pre-war profiles, in particular with respect to their professional trajecto-
                                              
33  Group members were not necessarily from the same area. 
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ries. The general assumption was that most participants had limited skills, almost 
no professional background, and that the project would offer them a unique 
opportunity to develop their individual capacities. This is in line with the ‘loose 
molecule’ hypothesis well anchored in development circles, which states that the 
base of an armed group consists of jobless, uneducated and dissocialized youths 
who are expected to start their lives over from scratch when they disengage from 
military activities. If we look at section 3 of the profiling sheet which refers to 
professional background (Figure 9.3), it is rather thin. It consists of one question 
– ‘Did you have a job or an activity before the war?’ – and eight closed answers: 
‘1. No activity; 2. Civil servant; 3. Employed in the private sector; 4. Self-
employed; 5. Small business; 6. Farmer; 7. Pupil; 8. Student’. There is no men-
tion of any time period, no room for providing details. Yet, we are talking about 
people who are likely to have worked in a range of activities before the war, from 
an early age, in several locations. Chapter 7 illustrated that clearly, and when 
examining the pre-war profiles of militarized youths, it became evident that most 
of them were regularly earning money before the war. Some were doing con-
tractual work and their income varied according to contract opportunities, some 
were working as daily labour, and some had a regular income. The majority was 
employed in the informal economy, and a few had very decent jobs. Another 
interesting finding was that from the day they started working, respondents were 
successively pushed and pulled into activities from one region to another, fol-
lowing opportunities, responding to familial demands, fulfilling certain commit-
ments; they usually had to work in many locations before attaining self-suffi-
ciency. With such backgrounds in mind, oversimplifying recruits’ past in a 
general profiling sheet does not appear to be the ideal approach, and should not 
be used as a base for orientating militarized youths towards specific tracks.34 To 
gain a thorough understanding of recruits’ individual trajectories and to advise 
them well, there is the need to dive into their life stories, in order to give suffi-
cient credit to their personal and professional evolution.  
 
Local notions of ownership, lucrativeness, and seizing other opportunities 
It is an unfortunate fact, but humanitarian practitioners, from field officers to 
headquarters staff, are in general deeply annoyed by the fact that their target 
group does not perform according to plan and divert from project objectives. This  
 
                                              
34  This tendency towards oversimplification has been noted by several scholars in many contexts. In a 
case study on Darfur, Tubiana (2009) points out that despite years of presence in the field, some 
practitioners continue to misinterpret the context, as they oversimplify too much extremely complex 
social processes.  
  
Figure 9.3 Profiling sheet 
 
Source: Fieldwork (2007)
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is usually interpreted as deviant behaviour, it is fought against in practice, and 
because of operational imperatives, there is rarely the time or interest to seek to 
understand what motivate participants to make such a different use of oppor-
tunities provided. This case study is no exception. When a certain number of 
respondents ended their activity or ‘disappeared’ out of sight of the project staff, 
this was considered a failure. The mere conception that these youths had changed 
their mind and had chosen to invest their time in a different activity than the one 
initially picked was perceived quite negatively. This is indeed linked to different 
notions of ownership. Even though the term conveys the common-sense wisdom 
that in order to be successful, an intervention has to be embraced by those who 
have to live with it (Donais, 2007), most interventions remain externally driven, 
and local notions of ownership are rarely taken into account.  
In examining how the youths I interviewed made use of the reinsertion 
prospects the project offered, a main finding was that many of them took the 
opportunity to place someone they trusted in charge of the project activity, while 
they were investing their time in more lucrative matters. Such an arrangement 
had the advantage of providing income-generating activities to close relatives 
and, in some cases, could even provide the youth with an extra income. Another 
finding was that many respondents who were supposed to run cabines (cabines 
are cellphone stalls, where people pay to make phone calls) had actually put 
someone in charge to manage it for them. The main reason for such behaviour 
relates to local notions of lucrativeness, namely the lucrativeness of the GTZ-IS 
project compared to the lucrativeness of any alternative opportunities. Under-
standably, if more interesting opportunities emerged elsewhere, project partici-
pants were likely to be attracted by these. The account of this female respondent 
who opted not to participate in the first wave of the project is particularly in-
formative:  
‘Before the war, I was selling things. I used to go to Ghana to purchase goods, and later I 
was selling them in Côte d’Ivoire: pagnes, shoes, small stuff. I was also tâcheron, that means 
that I was taking contracts with the local timber industry, hiring workers to execute them. I 
used to take afforestation contracts. It is like being head of your own company; you agree on 
a price, you manage your workers, the timber company pays. They pay very well in fact. For 
this year, I already completed the afforestation contracts. We worked in protected areas, in 
the forêts classées. You can be paid about 70-80,000 francs per hectare, and then you pay the 
workers, and then you can perhaps earn 30,000 francs per hectare. With the money, I was 
paying for my other trade, selling things. I also gave to my family. I can say I ran a small 
business. I paid taxes, I have papers which prove it, and when I go to the timber industry to 
negotiate the contract, they can see that I comply with the norms […].’  
‘After the war, I restarted the afforestation contracts in March last year [2006]. I responded 
to a call and they took me, they gave me a contract. And then a project came, for reinte-
grating ex-combatants. My name was even on their list. But I went to see the project staff 
and I said: “No. I am currently busy now. I have already committed to work and I cannot do 
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two activities at the same time. So if there is a second wave in the project, put me in it then, 
but not now. ”’ 
The GTZ-IS project has failed to embed itself in lucrative opportunities of-
fered locally. Given the local violent history of land tenure, it did not want to 
engage in cultivation of perennial crops that would have implied a long-term use 
of land, and it did not really take note of the fact that several project participants 
had chosen to follow this path outside the project framework (and many times at 
the expense of it). Heveaculture was particularly in vogue in Guiglo when the 
fieldwork was being conducted, a popularity amplified by a campaign run by a 
local export rubber industry to incite small farmers to raise this crop, and as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, certain warlords had even converted them-
selves into development brokers to liaise with this burgeoning hevea industry. 
One can only regret that the German project did not take part in such dynamics. 
By failing to link with the main export-oriented industries,1 the project stayed 
confined to limited opportunities and failed to connect with sustainable employ-
ment options. In the follow-up interventions led by GTZ-IS, the focus on labour-
intensive work2 (road repairs for instance) does not appear strategic, as it conti-
nued to only provide the youths with short-term gain. Besides, one can seriously 
question the necessity of liaising with an expensive internationally driven project 
to promote contract work in an area where functioning local chambers of com-
merce exist and where the announcement of upcoming labour-intensive work is 
usually followed by overwhelming applications.3  
The specificities of the youngest recruits 
In early writings, Brett and McCallin wrote something profoundly disturbing 
about the youngest combatants: ‘These children have no skills for life in peace-
time and are accustomed to getting their way through violence’ (Brett & Mc-
Callin, 1996). Child soldiers were portrayed as having no connections in society, 
without skills, incompetent and prone to violence, and it was strongly implied 
that they were trapped in a vicious cycle, and that they would always experience 
difficulties in returning to a non-violent routine because they had been actors in 
and witnesses of too many atrocities during the war. Such a quote is disturbing 
because it assumes a causal relationship between actions executed in warfare and 
processes of demobilization, and it draws the hasty conclusion that former child 
recruits are cursed, and that they are unlikely to reinsert well in society by them-
                                              
1  Thanry in Guiglo (wood/coal); the CHC in Zagné (rubber); several timber companies in Man. 
2  Employment intensive work is locally named HIMO. The acronym refers to works ‘à Haute Intensité 
de Main d’Œuvre’. 
3  This observation has also been made by other scholars (KLEM & DOUMA, 2008). 
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selves. Research on children’s and adolescents’ processes of demobilization has 
in fact largely remained confined to the examination of external interventions 
with the inherent bias of overestimating the impact of projects in children’s re-
insertion phase and of largely ignoring the role of endogenous features. Here, I 
try to rehabilitate some of these endogenous dynamics in the immediate demo-
bilization phase, before reflecting on an intervention that targeted children as-
sociated with the rebel forces in Man, from the points of view of the ones who 
benefited from this intervention.4  
Demobilization accounts varied a lot depending on individuals, and included 
stories of escape, self-demobilization, and cases of commanders directly handing 
over recruits to humanitarian staff (see Chelpi-den Hamer, 2010 for detailed 
demobilization stories). The use of children as soldiers has come to be perceived 
so negatively in recent years that parties to conflicts are in general quite co-
operative about stopping the practice, once the peak of the conflict has passed. In 
many accounts, children’s length of stay in the armed group was linked to the 
length of stay of the group in the area. When there was a move to establish the 
base in another location, rebels often took some children with them while letting 
others go. Triggers to demobilization usually included discussions with care-
givers, the visit of a parent to the camp, a change in command, the death of the 
direct chief, seizing an opportunity to escape (absence of chief, not returning 
from leave), and, sometimes, the emergence of the child’s critical consciousness 
(as one put it: ‘It is not worth staying, I can be killed tomorrow’). In some cases, 
release was negotiated by a family member. When bargaining was not possible or 
when the child had no one to bargain for him, a risky escape and the ability to 
profit from external interventions were the only way out:  
‘I wanted to quit the rebel forces, but I could not. Because once, one man told them he 
wanted to quit, and they killed him in front of me. I was scared. There were other children in 
the camp, but for them, there was no problem in leaving because they often had brothers in 
the rebel forces who could negotiate their departure with the chief. I had no brother in the 
rebel forces, so I was obliged to stay. They never gave me permission when I asked for it to 
visit my parents. If UNICEF had not come with the project, I would still be in the camp.’ 
                                              
4  The project targeting child soldiers was then run by the Ivoirian NGO ODAFEM and was funded by 
UNICEF. The first step of the project entailed a three-month process, which included listening, coun-
seling, individual profiling, medical care, sports, an initial career orientation session, basic numeracy 
and literacy courses (refresher sessions for the already literate). During that period, demobilized 
children had to stay day and night in the transition centre, where they were offered proper care, shared 
accommodation, shower facilities, a functioning canteen, and basic entertainment (games, video). 
There were strict rules inside the centre premises and children had to ask for permission if they 
wanted to leave the centre to go somewhere else, even during daytime. The second step of the project 
consisted of a short-term vocational education programme. Youths were placed on a temporary basis 
at local entrepreneurs’ workshops for a six-month period, at the end of which it was assumed that they 
would have acquired the basic skills to continue the work with a starter kit of basic tools/material. 
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Once the child was demobilized, accounts were rather mixed in terms of 
community acceptance. Some respondents reported having experienced extreme 
rejection by their direct environment, they were either isolated upon return, 
feared or mocked. In contrast, others mentioned having been warmly welcomed 
from the start and could easily blend in. The role of parents, caregivers and, in 
some cases, village chiefs, has been important factors in putting an end to verbal 
abuse and isolation as they were mediating the social reintegration of the child in 
the community. A few respondents mentioned having gone through some kind of 
cleansing ritual shortly after their return home, to purify them of their wrong-
doing. The accounts below are quite illustrative of this diversity of stories: 
‘When my sister and I returned to our village, my mother told me that I was no longer her 
child. She had told me not to join the rebels, and I had not listened to her. She was not 
happy. But then my grandfather forgave me, and she accepted. My grandfather called my 
mother and told her: “What the child did, it is not his fault. It is his sister’s fault because she 
asked him to follow her.” They did not forgive my sister. She left the day after our return. 
She slept, then she left, without telling anyone.’ 
‘When we went back to our parents, they were very happy. Nobody bothered us. They 
thought that we were dead, that we had already been killed. I moved back in with my father 
and mother. I started helping my mother in the fields. My father was sick and had stopped 
working.’ 
‘They were all scared of me. They would not come close to me because they thought I was 
violent, I could kill someone. They were scared. I was mostly alone. I was sad. I had no 
friends. When she saw that, my tutrice gathered the people in the neighborhood to ask them 
forgiveness. She told them that I would not harm them and that they could play with me. 
Now I’m fine. I have no problem anymore.’ 
‘In my village, everyone knows I was a rebel. Here in town, some people know, some people 
don’t. It is not a problem because I was never stationed in Man when I was in the rebel 
forces. I was close to the Liberian border. Here I have no contacts anymore with soldiers. I 
play football, everyday at 5 p.m., after I’m done with work.’ 
A project ran by a local NGO (under UNICEF funding) had quite a mixed 
impact on the lives of the children interviewed. One very important effect is that 
it boosted the number of demobilizations: some children self-demobilized when 
they heard that they had the option to register for a project, others were directly 
referred to humanitarian staff by military commanders, and others were traced 
back to their village when NGOs toured war-affected areas to provide support to 
children associated with armed forces. Another positive impact is that it provided 
short-term relief to children who had entered the reinsertion project. They were 
supplied with free food on a daily basis, they had access to medical care for a few 
months, and some benefited from school supplies for the ones who resumed 
schooling. But in its core aspects, the impact was rather mitigated because it 
often occurred several years after children had demobilized themselves; the 
intervention only played a marginal role in facilitating his or her social rein-
sertion, and while one would have expected that, because of their limited social 
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capital, children would have embraced the opportunities humanitarian interven-
tions offered (by working hard during their training, by showing that they were 
motivated, by being assiduous), longitudinal follow-up of some of the children 
provides a different picture – actually showing quite high dropout rates. Clearly, 
reinsertion assistance has to be redefined in order to bear any fruit. Projects 
targeting children have tended to miss the dynamics of these young people’s 
lives by negatively perceiving those who deviate from the initial activity; and 
like with their older peers, there is to date a limited interest in seeking to under-
stand what motivates them to do so. 
Concluding remarks 
Recourse to humanitarianism is far from being the ideal way to alleviate suf-
fering, yet it is a widely promoted solution and is usually tolerated by parties in 
conflict. If one should not long for it, there is no way to avoid it. The challenge, 
therefore, is to find a satisfactory way to put external interventions into per-
spective, especially as general enthusiasm for humanitarian values is turning into 
general scepticism. Pouligny (2004) genuinely hopes for a change in mentality, a 
‘revolution’, which would redefine the function of humanitarian experts and 
would conceive them as facilitators of local negotiation processes, not practi-
tioners. For this revolution to occur, a serious questioning of the current praxis is 
needed, with a new approach that must show more flexibility, patience and 
modesty in terms of aims. It is highly unlikely that a short-term intervention 
constrained by limited means changes the life of an individual. But if it relates 
well to its immediate context, it may diminish someone’s burden and potentially 
help them to develop. This is the real operational challenge to take up: no longer 
regarding projects in isolation. 
The examples of externally driven interventions given in this chapter are 
striking illustrations of the fact that humanitarianism is far from being at the core 
of the post-war context of western Côte d’Ivoire. In contrast to other social 
dynamics, humanitarianism has not been the central driving force in the local 
environment, and people have not hesitated to opt out when better opportunities 
emerged elsewhere. Perhaps the fact that Côte d’Ivoire has not been as ravaged 
as Liberia or Sierra Leone can be advanced as explanatory factor: the country is 
still rich and when the odds are good, it is still full of lucrative opportunities to 
take up. We are far from a situation where a myriad of humanitarian projects 
would run the risk of drying up important social mechanisms. What we saw 
instead is that humanitarianism has been locally used as something extra: to 
participants, it provided a social opportunity among a wide range of other social 
opportunities; to local dignitaries, it provided a way to expand their brokerage 
portfolio and to bolster their local political influence. It is however worth re-
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flecting on what were the driving determinants of such effects: was it because of 
a question of dosage? (i.e. one could argue for instance that since interventions 
were marginal in western Côte d’Ivoire, such effects were all the more exacer-
bated since people could not rely too much on them). Or was it more due to local 
opportunity structures, which inevitably differ from one context to another? It is 
difficult to clearly answer this questioning because I did not study in depth all the 
factors that were at play, yet it is worth keeping such an interrogation in mind, to 
avoid drawing tautological conclusions. 
  
  
10 
Conclusions 
The main puzzle I wanted to address in this study was to understand the extent to 
which, in western Côte d’Ivoire, externally driven interventions targeting mili-
tarized civilians and aiming at facilitating their demilitarization and return to 
civilian life should be conceived as special processes compared to other social 
processes at play in the local environment. This work clearly shows, for this 
particular context, that such types of post-conflict humanitarianism cannot be 
analyzed in isolation from endogenous factors: on the one hand, it has brought to 
the fore the extreme porosity of borders between the social arenas in which low-
ranking and non-professional militarized youths are evolving in, while still 
involved in an armed group (notably by stressing the navigating strategies of the 
youths between these different spaces); on the other hand, based on that assess-
ment, it calls for a re-conceptualization of reintegration processes – stripped of 
their ‘post’-military ‘specialness’ in contexts where the military and civilian 
spheres are intimately related. If the militarization of civilians cannot be dis-
connected from the wider context, neither can their demilitarization, especially 
for those locally recruited, who have never really severed their ties with their 
families and other pre-war social groups. The effects of external interventions 
targeting ex-combatants cannot therefore be considered unique in environments 
where borders are blurred between the military, the civilian and the humanitarian 
spheres.  
As already mentioned in the theory chapter, the contexts under study and the 
data collected during fieldwork have brought to the fore several phenomena that 
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have so far been undertheorized for situations where post-conflict intervention 
plays a side role in the local system. I develop below five main findings that fill 
certain conceptual gaps or that rehabilitate certain theory trends: the circum-
stantial and emotional forms of engagement; the nature of entanglement of the 
militarized youths with their immediate environment; the effects of humanitari-
anism targeting ex-combatants in such environments (with special focus on the 
extent to which the clients themselves are able to manipulate the intervention); a 
critical reflection on several existing analytical dichotomies that might be easily 
challenged in contexts similar to western Côte d’Ivoire (notably the distinction 
between militia and local vigilante); and the nature of possible remnants of 
mobilization when the peak of the conflict has passed (by assessing the extent to 
which certain armed groups are reactivated to fulfil a function of local guardian 
more in line with traditional forms of urban/rural vigilantism).  
The main empirical and conceptual findings 
Circumstantial and emotional enlistment 
Enlisting in an armed group in western Côte d’Ivoire was more often than not the 
result of highly circumstantial factors and one of the main contributions of this 
study has been to rehabilitate the importance of immediate contexts in explaining 
processes of violent mobilization. In Guiglo and Man, who mobilized and who 
did not was largely due to a combination of geographic, military and emotional 
factors. If theories resting on such elements are usually downplayed in the lite-
rature as compared to theories that rest on assumptions of causality and that 
emphasize the loose molecule hypothesis (those that state that adverse structural 
conditions largely explain engagement in armed groups), this work has stressed 
quite well the place of such a circumstantial form of engagement, emphasizing 
the role of leaders and the elite in promoting certain values within society and the 
importance of ‘framing’. 
What in addition strikingly came out of the various testimonies is that in-
dividual perceptions mattered quite a lot in such processes of local mobilization. 
Several considerations were at play for individuals: how they experienced direct 
danger; how they perceived their degree of vulnerability and that of their close 
family; how their choices were constrained by the room to manoeuvre they had; 
how close they were to militia and/or rebel insiders, etc. These results are in line 
with a certain line of thought, which argues that circumstantial and emotional 
factors are perhaps more decisive in explaining processes of mobilization in cer-
tain contexts than poverty per se, or perceived socio-economic exclusion (Gui-
chaoua, 2007). Recruits in fact displayed very different pre-war trajectories and 
the study tends to depict a picture that shows that it was people who were quite 
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embedded in society who joined an armed group, rather than the alienated ones. 
Empirically, this finding conclusively dismisses the loose molecule hypothesis, 
where the stand is taken that the most likely profile of low-ranking recruits is that 
of jobless, uneducated, and dissocialized youths with few alternative prospects 
other than to resort to violence to make ends meet; such a conclusion is in line 
with other scholarly work (Guichaoua, 2007; Peters, 2004; Richards, 1996). 
 
The entanglement of militarized youths with their immediate environment 
It is often assumed that youngsters who have been involved in armed groups 
must be resocialized after their military experience, as if their bonds with society 
were cut during their engagement; the vast majority of humanitarian programmes 
targeting ex-combatants are based on this postulate. But there is growing evi-
dence that militarized civilians often keep in contact with civilian life during 
their period of engagement in an armed group, especially the ones locally re-
cruited who remain posted in their immediate surroundings (their main charac-
teristic, in fact, is to never have stopped being involved with family, friends and 
pre-war acquaintances). In western Côte d’Ivoire, many recruits I interviewed 
undertook extra-military activities when violent fighting diminished, and there 
were always basic logistics to take care of, which implied continuous interaction 
with non militarised people. If not yet mainstream, this conception of armed 
violence as a prosaic and intermittent occupation calls for a nuanced approach 
when analyzing processes of violent mobilization, one that foremost rests on the 
assumption that borders between the military, the civilian and the humanitarian 
spheres are fluid and blurred, especially once the period(s) of open fighting has 
passed. Rather than conveying the idea of a clear distinction between those three 
arenas, this study has stressed their overlaps, their dynamics, and has clearly dis-
missed strict conceptual boundaries. It also stressed the opportunist manoeuvres 
of the militarized youths, which reinforces such a blurring effect all the more.  
On both belligerent sides, full-time involvement in an armed group gradually 
evolved into a ‘part-time’ one after the period of open fighting was over. Rela-
tionships between militarized recruits and local populations have been based on a 
combination of solidarity and coercion and have varied over time depending on 
strength of ties and immediate stakes involved. Within the group of recruits 
locally recruited, persistence of family ties was a striking feature in both Guiglo 
and Man and the flows of food, cash and services were going both ways between 
the militarized and their respective families. But relationships with civilians were 
not confined to the close family structure. An important feature that the study 
brought to the fore is that it is quite difficult to draw a clear line between mili-
tarized life and the civilian one, since eating habits, accommodation practices, 
and continued participation in the family affairs (in sum, the daily routine) oblige 
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the militarized and the non militarized to continuously interact, with the effect 
that they have less and less distinct characteristics. 
Since borders between military, civilian and humanitarian spheres were so 
much blurred in western Côte d’Ivoire, the conceptualization of reintegration 
processes would undoubtedly gain if it were no longer presented as a drastic 
change, ‘post’-military. Immediate reintegration was mainly driven by internal 
processes there, since reintegration assistance did not occur during the immediate 
post-return phase recruits went through, when social acceptance was at its most 
challenging (social networks and immediate surroundings therefore played a key 
role in local demobilization processes). But even if they were late, post-conflict 
interventions also attempted to facilitate the return to civilian life for militarized 
populations, and engaged in such a programming in 2006 and 2007. Regardless 
of one’s opinion of them, they were part of the environment in western Côte 
d’Ivoire and, as such, unavoidable stakeholders in the local systems. The exam-
ples of externally driven interventions given in this study clearly showed that 
humanitarianism was not at the core of social change there, with people not 
hesitating to opt out when better opportunities emerged elsewhere. Humanitari-
anism has instead been locally used as something extra and, to project partici-
pants, it provided a social opportunity among a wide range of other social oppor-
tunities. 
 
What comes out of a humanitarian apparatus targeting ex-combatants when it 
does not play such a central role in their immediate contexts? 
Considering that planned interventions implemented in post-conflict contexts are 
simply additional social opportunities among a wide array of other social oppor-
tunities does not mean that they do not have effects and that these effects do not 
influence the local systems in some ways. This case study has highlighted at least 
three: 1) the seizing of an opportunity, 2) the placing of close relatives in the 
income-generating activities fostered by the intervention (a variant being to hire 
someone to operate the activity on a regular basis), and 3) the boosting of demo-
bilization and disarmament processes, an effect particularly pronounced with the 
youngest recruits on the insurgent side (certainly linked to the negative internati-
onal press surrounding the child soldiering phenomenon), but also noticeable for 
some older ones, especially on the counterinsurgent side, as exemplified by some 
testimonies heard: 
‘When we came back from Toulepleu after the military encampment period, I kept my wea-
pon in the village. Later, Maho disarmed us in Guiglo. From there, we were put in a truck 
and we were brought to Duékoué for the DDR.’  
What is of particular interest regarding the last two effects is that although 
they both result from unintended consequences of the interventions themselves, 
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they are probably their most tangible outcomes: the second one by bringing to the 
fore the ineluctable involvement of the close family structure in the potential 
benefits derived from the intervention, and the third one by giving a sense of 
closure to those who were once involved in an armed group (and to the war-
affected population). If rarely highlighted by the operators of post-conflict inter-
ventions, these effects clearly show that the navigating strategies of the mili-
tarized youths between different arenas are not confined to their time within their 
respective armed groups. From the perspective of the youths benefiting from re-
integration programmes, placing someone else in a project seems to be a logical 
move when more interesting opportunities emerge elsewhere; such behaviour in 
fact only reproduces a well-embedded cultural pattern of patron/client relation-
ships, coloured with a degree of moral obligation when the close family is in-
volved. It is in no way unusual. In that respect, it resembles the strategies of the 
population at large, which can be quite keen on navigating between informal paid 
work opportunities; this social behaviour is not confined to those who have parti-
cipated in an armed movement.  
This last remark enables us to reflect on the extent to which the clients them-
selves are able to manipulate the intervention and to go beyond the usual patron-
client relationship that depicts warlords as the only skilled manipulators of ex-
ternal assistance. There are many stakes in DDR-related interventions, even 
when the benefits seem at first hand minimal, and those who profit from them 
also play with them if it has the potential to serve their ends. This is why there is 
an urgent need to reconceptualize externally driven demobilization and reintegra-
tion processes, away from a segmented approach1 that overemphasizes the im-
portance of the local elites in shaping the effects of the interventions, and to-
wards a perspective that recognizes the room to manoeuvre of the low-ranking 
recruits and their continued links with their immediate environment. In situations 
where humanitarianism does not play such a central role in the local context, 
interventions do not run the risk of drying up the already existing social mecha-
nisms that regulate social life – quite the contrary. One interesting finding of this 
study has actually been to stress – with caution – that a possible effect of DDR-
related interventions is to reinforce existing moral obligations, not to weaken 
them. This point is probably best exemplified by the behaviour of ‘reinserted’ 
recruits, who we literally see juggling social obligations and personal benefit 
after having received their financial safety nets, and who sometimes place a close 
relative in the activity fostered by the intervention.   
Another contribution of this study has been to bring nuance to the general 
perception of the patronage links inherited from relationships built during war-
                                              
1  ‘D’ and ‘R’ can simply not be seen as distinct processes, they constantly overlap. 
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fare. If the humanitarian interventions that were under the lens eventually drew 
on existing patron-client relationships over which they had little control (since 
militia leaders and the rebel État-Major were the ones selecting the recruits to 
include in the reinsertion projects2), the study has revealed that the extent of 
patronage relations in reintegration processes has in the end not been as sys-
tematic, negative and unfair as intuitively anticipated. If there is no way to avoid 
militia leaders’ relatives appearing on the reinsertion lists, who else is included 
and who is left out appears to be chosen quite arbitrarily in many cases, espe-
cially in areas far from the leaders’ compounds, where these decisions are taken 
without taking into account the usual social networks based on geographic proxi-
mity (from the same family, one can be in the project, another not). It is note-
worthy to recall here that whether or not someone makes the list does not depend 
so much on the function fulfilled in the armed group: the Ivoirian DDR plan – 
like many others – had taken such a wide definition of who was entitled to post-
war benefits that many people could eventually qualify, provided they had been 
associated with an armed group for a certain period of time. To put it bluntly: a 
combatant has as much chance of making the list as a cook or a cleaner, even if it 
is often locally perceived that the one who fought has more ‘rights’ to post-war 
benefits. But since the function eventually does not matter, there is no need to 
manipulate one’s identity to ‘fit’ into a combatant category to receive post-
conflict assistance. Reinserted recruits get the same package, regardless of their 
former wartime occupation. In western Côte d’Ivoire, some militarized youths 
became eligible for reintegration assistance, while others did not, for no parti-
cular reason, and despite having assumed similar duties during the war. For the 
lucky ones, the fact that they made the lists has opened a door for them, and it 
has since been up to them to make the most of it. This observation is in line with 
other scholars’ calls for moving away from the general rejection of war-time 
patronage networks and to consider the potential benefits of this phenomenon 
pragmatically, notably by recognizing its ability to foster a stable economic basis 
for recently demilitarized local youths (Lemasle, 2010: 334).  
 
Calling existing analytical dichotomies into question  
What does it mean to be a ‘reinserted’ or a ‘reintegrated’ rebel or militia, and 
what does thinking in terms of dichotomy bring to the analysis when making the 
distinction between ‘reinserted’ and ‘non-reinserted’ recruits? Is it to be expected 
that there will be no regression into armed groups for the ‘reinserted’ ones? 
Under no circumstances? The recent events in western Côte d’Ivoire seem to 
                                              
2  With the variant in Man that the initial list supplied by the the central rebellion administration in 
Bouaké was eventually adapted locally, in collaboration with the local rebel administration. 
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prove this wrong by rehabilitating once more the argument that enlistment into 
armed groups stems from highly circumstantial factors. When I talked to M. in 
early May 2011 (M. was a demobilized child soldier I interviewed in Man in 
2007 and with whom I continued to have sporadic contact in 2008), once past the 
relief of learning that he was still alive after the wave of particularly violent 
events that rocked the west in the spring of 2011, it became clear that he had 
been lucky to escape reengagement. As he told me, he had to hide. He was 
particularly in danger of being redrafted because the rebel État-Major needed 
recruits skilled with weapons for the southern offensive taking place, and he had 
once been one of them. Sadly, his partner did not make it and was killed by a 
stray bullet during the events. He was about to bury her, hence the reason for his 
call. But beyond this tragic anecdote, M.’s story shows well that having been 
‘reinserted’ once does not mean that someone can claim to no longer have 
anything to do with warfare.  
This study also challenges the notion that ‘reinserted’ recruits are different 
from ‘non-reinserted’ ones by highlighting the fact that interventions targeting 
ex-combatants in the end play a very modest role in improving their lives, to the 
point that several people do not hesitate to opt out when better opportunities 
emerge elsewhere. If most demobilized recruits interviewed saw financial com-
pensation as a back-payment for their services, the safety net was distributed well 
after their return to their community, sometimes two or three years after they had 
ended their engagement in the armed group. It therefore had a limited impact on 
their immediate post-return phase, which is when social acceptance was the most 
challenging. Recruits used their safety net very differently. Out of the five broad 
categories of expenses identified – 1) reimbursing creditors, 2) responding to 
familial demands, 3) investing in own business, 4) allocating money to war 
chiefs, and 5) facing social events (such as medical expenses, funerals, home 
improvements) – three would not have emerged if no cash had been given to 
combatants (reimbursing creditors, responding to familial demands, and allo-
cating money to war chiefs). For investment, the financial compensation was 
indeed useful but should not be overestimated, especially since it was given in 
three instalments in a context where small amounts are easily wasted on day-to-
day expenses. In terms of facing social events, extra cash has helped recruits to 
respond to immediate expenses (medical expenses, school feels, costs associated 
with marriage and newborn), however, they were more likely to be abused by 
their immediate entourage. In sum, the use of cash transfers in the reinsertion 
phase has indeed meant a breath a fresh air to ex-combatants, but should not be 
overrated, as their room of manoeuvre was eventually limited by the way they 
balanced their social obligations with personal benefit.  
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Another dichotomy that could easily be challenged in contexts similar to 
western Côte d’Ivoire is the distinction between a militia member and a local 
vigilante. More than being a terminological challenge, it is a real puzzle in some 
contexts to draw a clear line between who is/was a militia member and who 
is/was a civilian; as Pouligny (2004) rightly noted, the distinction between the 
two can be all the more blurred by the fact that the construction of the mili-
tarized/civilian dichotomy might differ from the viewpoints of individuals and 
groups within the local societies, and from the viewpoints of outsiders. If the 
confusion and overlapping of terms exists to such an extent – Who is a com-
batant? Who is a militia member? Who is a local vigilante? – it actually makes 
little sense to distinguish between the three labels in certain contexts, especially 
on counterinsurgent sides and in areas close to the former front line, where armed 
mobilization is likely to have been initially based on community forms of poli-
cing.3 The literature on vigilantism sheds some light on this dilemma by pointing 
out the multiplicity of forms vigilante groups take over time and space and by 
stressing several paradoxes that surround the concept when traditional forms of 
rural/urban vigilantism are related to a form of mobilization that resembles war-
fare (Baker, 2007; Kirsch & Gratz, 2010; Kyed, 2007; Menkhaus, 2007; Pratten 
& Sen, 2007; Reno, 2007). If vigilantes are often genuinely driven by a set of 
moral values and a desire to promote social order in the societies in which they 
operate, their ‘guarding’ function can be paralleled by acts of extreme violence 
against whomever is perceived as the enemy (Abrahams, 1987). Also (and con-
trary to a widespread perception), vigilantes are no substitute to the State and 
often engage in an evolving relationship with it, alternating periods of confront-
ation with periods of entanglement and mutual support (Buur, 2010; Kirsch & 
Gratz, 2010). It is this last point that applies so well in the Ivoirian case, given 
the extent of entanglement of the counterinsurgent movements with the national 
army in the beginning of the conflict and their severing of links at a later stage; 
as Meagher (2010) convincingly writes, there is a strong urge to look at how the 
State accommodates (or not) counterinsurgent armed groups over time. The mass 
uprising in Guiglo was largely a response to violence ‘from below’, which got 
quickly captured, absorbed and instrumentalized by the Ivoirian State, as the 
national army was failing to provide protection to the western residents at the 
onset of conflict. But while one would have expected that this counterinsurgency 
would gradually slip into a function of local guardian by securing their imme-
diate surroundings (resuming thereby a more traditional form of urban/rural 
vigilantism once the period of combat had passed), western militias in fact did 
little to counter the criminality in their zone. Worse, there have been several 
                                              
3  Which was notably the case in Guiglo. 
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allegations that some militia members contributed to it. Thieves and coupeurs de 
route have remained a structural issue in Guéré territory (with seasonal peaks in 
December and during the cocoa/coffee harvest time, when money circulates most 
widely), and autochthonous and allochthonous communities have continued to 
clash regularly, without appropriate mediation.  
 
When fighting is over, what remains of the warfare apparatus?  
The (quasi) absence of intervention on the counterinsurgency side in local se-
curity matters once the peak of conflict had passed is another odd trait of the 
Ivoirian case. Although there has been anecdotal evidence that some militia 
recruits have genuinely been contributing to the maintenance of the local social 
order (some being employed as local security guards by private companies or as 
escorts), militia leaders have never publicly advertised this role, which, to some 
extent, has maintained a certain vagueness with regards to the participation of 
militarized civilians in local security matters. Another layer had yet been added 
to the existing system, even if the main driver had switched from some sort of 
moral obligation in the very beginning (which boosted massive recruitment for 
self-defence) to more lucrative notions at later stages (the prospect of deriving an 
income from securing local goods); in addition, this phenomenon did not concern 
everyone and the ones who got access to these paid opportunities were usually 
the ones who continued to maintain visible links with prominent militia leaders. 
But if new regimes of local governance have certainly been negotiated at the 
local level with regards to local security matters – informed by immediate cir-
cumstances, but also derived from the local historical trajectory of popular justice 
and social mobilization (Buur, 2010; Kirsch & Gratz, 2010: 18; Mbembe, 2001: 
76-93) – the situation in Guiglo has been quite a far cry from situations else-
where, where local vigilantes were quick to redress the grievances of the poor by 
taking local justice into their own hands (Meagher, 2008; Sen, 2007). On the 
insurgent side, conversely, an interesting development that took place after 2006 
is that low-ranking elements in the rebel forces increasingly started to fulfil the 
role of public security officials (in agreement with the Ivoirian government) to 
make up for the absence of State officials in the rebel-controlled areas4 (this no-
tably concerned the functions of police, forestry control and penitentiary guards). 
But instead of interpreting such a phenomenon as an example of militarized 
youths keen on pursuing an opportunistic career in the rebellion, one has to see it 
as a social claim, with a main rationale less linked to the willingness of pursuing 
                                              
4  A quite ironic development when compared to the situation in 2002, when the first to die in the rebel-
controlled areas were precisely those State security officials. 
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war in the long run than to individuals’ desire for (and ability to achieve) upward 
mobility.  
When assessing the extent to which certain armed groups might be reactivated 
to fulfil a function of local guardian more in line with traditional forms of 
urban/rural vigilantism, what is striking on both belligerent sides is that we are 
quite far from a ‘group’ response and that the phenomenon has remained rela-
tively small-scale and limited to a few individuals. The question is therefore not 
so much framed in terms of why some armed groups continue to protect local 
communities over time while others do not (a collective bias several authors 
endorse), but how individuals are able to make sense of their limited options and 
how they are able to devise ways of coping with the different opportunities faced, 
even those deriving from warfare. The concept of agency is central to this ap-
proach. Social actors circulate between several sets of logic and choose between 
various standards: eventually, several rationalities come to meet.  
 
Conceptual implications 
In light of those conceptual and empirical findings, there are several elements to 
include in any analytical framework developed for conceptualizing the demobili-
zation and reinsertion processes of young people temporarily drawn into armed 
groups. The variety of individual backgrounds must be carefully looked at, in 
terms of personal skills and situations but also in terms of motivations for en-
gagement, in order to better guide the intervention. The second element concerns 
the extent of entanglement of the militarized sphere with the civilian and humani-
tarian domains. A comprehensive framework must address the complexity of the 
links militarized civilians continue (or not) to maintain with their close family 
and pre-war social networks during and after their time in an armed faction. 
Finally, for each given context, there is the need to get an idea of the dosage of 
interventions. Not so much to suggest a causal relationship (after all, whether 
interventions are at the core of side of a given environment, they are part of the 
local opportunity structures and have certain effects), but because in situations 
where humanitarianism does not play such a central role in the local context, 
interventions hardly run the risk to dry up existing social mechanisms, and this 
situation enables the analyst to study quasi-usual endogenous processes in socio-
political-economic spaces recently affected by conflict. The specific character of 
an intervention is an empirical question, which cannot be determined in advance 
and which has to be contextualized at several levels; one of them is to assess the 
extent to which other factors have potentially played a role in an effect presu-
medly boosted by the intervention. 
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The step forward 
Humanitarianism has only been an extra in western Côte d’Ivoire and there is no 
need to overestimate its effects. Because it came late for most of the militarized 
civilians in this study (two or three years after their effective demobilization), 
and because it was never implemented on a large scale, it certainly opens up the 
debate whether an indigenous process of peace building is conceivable in western 
Côte d’Ivoire, given the context we know. There is certainly ample room for 
research in this respect, but we can perhaps guide the early stages of reflection by 
returning to one of the effects mentioned above. It has been empirically shown, 
humanitarian interventions targeting ex-combatants have the collateral effect of 
boosting demobilization and disarmament processes. Ironically, this is not con-
sidered to be their objective (and their goal remains framed and measured in 
terms of socio-economic reinsertion), yet de facto this unintended consequence is 
probably the most valuable contribution these interventions make in terms of 
conflict mitigation. As hinted earlier, it gives a sense of closure to those who 
were once involved in an armed group and to the local population they live 
amongst. It fosters self-demobilization and it creates political and media events 
that invite militarized individuals to return their weapons without being further 
chased. The possibility of indigenous recovery must therefore be analyzed in this 
light: are there alternatives in contexts where the global approach to post-conflict 
interventions has permeated so much the local contexts? 
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Photograph 11: Apprentices, including former militarized recruits, in a tailoring  
                          workshop, Guiglo 
Photograph 12: Informal training in electricity, Man  
(GTZ-IS was paying their tuition for three elements of the Forces Nouvelles) 
  
Appendix 1 
Chronology of violent events in the west (2002-07) 
The aim of this chronology of violent events is to help the reader grasp the general 
ambiance that prevailed in western Côte d’Ivoire throughout the different phases of the 
conflict. It has been compiled drawing on several sources:1 local newspapers (Fraternité 
Matin, 24 Heures, Notre Voie, L’inter, Le Front, Soir Info), national and international 
press agencies (Agence Ivoirienne de Presse, Agence France Presse, BBC, PANA Press, 
Reuters), institutional reports (International Crisis Group, IRINNews, OCHA Bulletins, 
INGO reports), impartial forces intelligence (as documented in the UN and UNOCHA 
security bulletins) and some reflections taken from individual weblogs. Far from deny-
ing the partiality of certain sources and the politicized nature of some documents 
(Ivoirian newspapers are well-known for their political engagement), the goal here was 
to extract the most ‘factual’ information. The documents are therefore treated as valu-
able primary sources that account for a particularly violent period. A few general events 
are recalled which are not specific to the west and have been included for a better com-
prehension of the chain of events. Their dates are underlined in the chronology. 
 
2002    
 
 
19 September Strategic positions are attacked in three major Ivoirian towns.  
At least 400 people are killed in Abidjan, including Minister of 
Interior Boga Doudou and former head of State General Gueï. 
Having failed to take Abidjan, rebelling soldiers retreat to 
Bouaké and announce the creation of an insurgent group, the 
MPCI. BBC and RFI programmes cease within a week on FM 
frequencies, eliminating access to independent media coverage 
of the conflict for most rural residents. 
 
 24 September Rebel forces capture the town of Tiebissou, 50 km north of 
Yamoussoukro. 
 
 26 September Ivoirian authorities declare Bouaké and Korhogo war zones. 
Rebel forces take the town of Korhogo, almost without 
                                              
1  Sources include: (Agence France Presse, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2003a, 2003b, 2005; Agence Ivoiri-
enne De Presse, 2002; Associated Press, 2002; Bbc News, 2002, 2003; Fraternite Matin, 2002a, 
2002b; Human Rights Watch, 2002, 2003b; International Crisis Group, 2003; Irinnews, 2005; L'inter, 
2007b; Le Front, 2005; Le Monde, 2002, 2005; Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2003; Notre Voie, 2002, 
2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2006; Operation Des Nations Unies En Cote D'ivoire, 2007a, 2007b, 2008; Pana 
Press, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2002e, 2002f, 2003a, 2003b, 2003d, 2003e, 2003f, 2003g, 2003i, 
2003j, 2003m, 2003n, 2003p, 2004a, 2004c, 2004d); (Pana Press, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 
2005e, 2005f, 2008; Rassemblement Des Republicains, 2005; Reuters, 2002, 2003; Soir Info, 2002; 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2005, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 
2006d, 2006e, 2006f, 2006g, 2006h, 2006i, 2006j, 2006k, 2006l, 2006m, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2008) 
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resistance. 
Loyalist forces reinforce their troops in Vavoua. 
 
 7 October The French channel TV5 is taken off the air. 
The military front moves west with the rebel forces capturing 
the town of Vavoua, 100 km east of Man. 
The following days, in rural areas nearby, and especially on the 
Duékoué-Kouibli axis (the villages of Blodi, Iruzon, Diahouin, 
Toazeo, and Kouibli), Guéré youths are mobilized by mayors 
and local chiefs to protect their villages. Checkpoints are set up 
in each locality to control entry. Escalating violence against the 
Burkinabés residing in the area, beginning with extortion and 
verbal harassment and ending in physical assaults, including 
murder. By the end of October 2002, most Burkinabés have fled 
the area.  
 
 11-12 October Moving south from Vavoua, rebel forces attack Daloa, a major 
urban hub in the Bété area. Daloa borders the Guéré area, and is 
a key transit point for the cocoa and coffee trade.   
 
 14-15 October Loyalist forces recapture Daloa with Angolan help. 
‘Cleansing’ operation follow (operation de ratissage): arbitrary 
arrests and summary executions of suspected rebels, which 
include many civilians of northern origin and RDR 
sympathizers. 
A blacklist circulates among loyalist troops, with names of 
people suspected of having links with the rebel forces. 
 
 15 October Regarding the Daloa attack, an article in Notre Voie suggests 
strong ethnic and political polarization. On rebel forces: ‘The 
assailants found refuge in the Dioula neighbourhood, the Dioula 
showed them support. Abandoned guns were collected by young 
RDR members, who have encouraged these terrorists’ actions 
since the beginning of the attack in Daloa; rebels are praised as 
they pass by their neighborhood.’ 
 
 17 October  A ceasefire is brokered by the Senegalese Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and accepted by both belligerent sides (MPCI and 
Ivorian Presidency). The agreement provides that both insurgent 
and government troops remain in the areas they are controlling. 
The ceasefire line runs east to west and divides the country in 
half. The towns of Odienné, Korhogo, Séguéla, Vavoua and 
Bouaké are controlled by rebel forces, and French forces are 
asked to supervise the ceasefire until ECOWAS troops take the 
lead.  
 
 23 October In reaction to the very negatively perceived repressive 
operations in Daloa, Jules Yao Yao, spokesperson of the loyalist 
forces, makes a public statement in the local press, 24 Heures. 
He acknowledges that such operations are taking place, but that 
they only target individuals who hosted or helped the assailants.  
Arbitrary arrests and summary executions end immediately 
afterwards. 
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 31 October Lomé peace talks. Both belligerents agree to respect the 
ceasefire and to refrain from having mercenaries and children in 
their ranks.  
 
 3-4 November  
 
Rebel forces attack the local firm Sucrivoire in Borotou-Koro, 
150 km north of Man. They take 42 tons of sugar, cash and 
various equipment. 
 
 27 November Loyalist forces launch an attack on Vavoua, 100 km east of 
Man, and use helicopters to bomb rebel military bases. Due to 
their proximity to downtown Man, there are many civilian 
casualties. 
The same day, government helicopters fly over the nearby 
villages of Pélézi, Dania and Monoko-Zohi, in the rebel-
controlled area. They drop several bombs and shoot at people. 
Non-autochthonous neighbourhoods seem to be affected the 
most.   
 
 27-28 November Armed groups attack the village of Monoko-Zohi, 70 km 
southwest of Vavoua. They deliberately target civilians.  
 
 28 November  Two new rebel groups appear in the west of the country, below 
the ceasefire line set on 17 October (MPIGO and MJP). The new 
forces come at quite an opportune time as the MPCI has signed a 
ceasefire with the government, impeding pursuing further 
military advances. The opening of a new western front by MJP 
and MPIGO forces has the advantage of not violating any treaty. 
A mix of MJP and MPCI forces takes the town of Man, and 
MPIGO claims the attack of Danané. The town of Danané is 
bombed by a government helicopter.  
The same day, rebel forces capture the town of Zouan-Hounien, 
south of Danané, located next to an important gold mining area.  
 
 30 Nov. - 1 Dec. Loyalist forces recapture Man. 
‘Cleansing’ operations follow the next days, similar to what 
occurred in Daloa (disappearances, arbitrary arrests, summary 
executions of suspected rebels, many of whom of northern 
origin and Yacouba background, RDR and UDPCI 
sympathizers2). A blacklist from Abidjan circulates among 
loyalist troops, a list of names is also compiled by local 
authorities and ‘denunciations’ are commonplace. 
 
 2 December MPIGO, quickly moving south along the Liberian border from 
Danané and Zouan-Hounien, takes Toulepleu. 
  
 4 December Loyalists launch a counter-attack on Toulepleu. 
The town is bombed by helicopters but remains a rebel-
controlled area. 
                                              
2  UDPCI used to be led by General Gueï (head of State between December 1999 and October 2000). 
The General was of Yacouba origin.  
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 5 December French soldiers find a mass grave in Monoko-Zohi. 
The information is relayed in both local and international press.  
There is a great deal of controversy who is to blame, but loyalist 
forces seem to have been the perpetrators, according to 
testimonies of people who survived the attack. 
 
 6-7 December Rebel forces move west from the Toulepleu area and take the 
town of Blolequin (MPIGO). 
 
 12 December Loyalist forces take Blolequin back with the help of Liberian 
forces and Guéré militia members. 
 
 18 December Mahapleu, 50 km east of Man and in rebel-controlled area, is 
bombed by a helicopter on market day. The attack is led by 
loyalist forces. Market stalls and the mosque are among the 
targets.  
 
 19 December The town of Man is recaptured by rebel forces. 
Violent retaliation targets civilians who helped loyalist forces 
during the two-week period they had control of the town (for 
instance, by fingering suspected rebels). Those involved in 
neighbourhood vigilantism are particularly at risk of being 
arrested or killed. 
The BCEAO bank in town is ripe for the taking. 
 
 20 December Rebel forces take Bangolo and the villages nearby, including 
those on the Duékoué-Kouibli axis (Blodi, Iruzon, Toazeo, 
Sibabli and Kouibli). 
Massive displacement of the Guéré population to the 
government-controlled area. 
 
 21 December French forces clash with MPIGO rebels in Duékoué. 
 
 23-27 December Mass arrival of civilians in Duékoué (estimated at 24,000).  
They are mostly of Guéré origin and come from villages located 
on the Duékoué-Kouibli axis. 
 
 end of December The Ivoirian government commits to grounding combat 
helicopters.  
 
2003   
 1 January Rebel forces take the village of Zou. 
 
 6 January  Rebel forces attack French forces in Duékoué. They launch the 
attack from Fengolo, their most advanced base south, but do not 
succeed in taking the town.  
Rebel forces eventually move to CIB the following days, in the 
sous-préfecture of Blolequin, and pass through the villages of 
Kahin, Tomepleu and Guezahi. 
 
 10-12 January Loyalist forces retake Toulépleu (and Blolequin?), with the help 
of Liberian forces and Guéré militia members. 
Rebel forces, and especially Liberian fighters, ravage several 
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villages as they retreat north, looting and killing arbitrarily. 
 
 13 January Ceasefire signed between the government and the two rebel 
groups MPIGO and MJP. It remains a deal on paper. 
 
 15-24 January  Linas-Marcoussis peace talks in France: an agreement is reached 
to establish a government of national reconciliation with wide 
executive powers, composed of ministers from the main political 
parties and rebel groups. 
While the talks are being held, fighting continues in the west. 
 
 14 January  Ethnic tensions explode in the area of Bagohouo, Nidrou, 
Yorozon, Blodi, Bahé Sebon, in Guéré territory. Alliances of 
convenience occur between Burkinabés and rebel forces to fight 
the autochthonous youths (the first targets are self-defence 
committee members) and a great deal of violence is used against 
Guérés. Some accounts describe the rebel forces as having been 
incited by the Burkinabés. 
Massive flight of Guérés to Duékoué. 
 
 late January MPCI leader Tuo Fozié orders the expulsion from Man of the 
worst of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters. 
 
 February Reports of alleged attacks on Yacoubas in the area of Bangolo. 
 
 10 February Fighting between Ivoirian government and rebel forces takes 
place in Toulepleu. 
 
 25 February Reports of attacks on Baoulé farmers in the area of Guiglo. 
 
 3 March In Liberia, Liberian government troops retake the town of Toe 
Town, on the south-eastern border, from Liberian insurgents. 
They are allegedly backed by the Ivoirian state. 
 
 7 March Al least 60 civilians are killed in Bangolo by Liberian fighters.  
There is controversy on which side perpetrated the violence, but 
these Liberians seem to have been backed by the government. 
The Dioula quarter in particular was targeted. 
 
 8 March Rebel forces have decided to close their ‘border’ in order to 
prevent infiltration of government forces. 
 
 22-23 March 
 
The village of Dah, 9 km southwest of Bangolo, is attacked at 
night. It is locally interpreted as an act of retaliation after the 
Bangolo killings. There do not seem to be any particular targets. 
Both autochthonous and non-autochthonous residents flee the 
area. 
The Ivoirian armed forces accuse the rebel forces of having 
killed 42 civilians. Three days later, AFP states that there was no 
independent confirmation of the claim, since French forces 
based in Duékoué report having heard the rumour, but not being 
able to confirm the attack.  
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A few weeks later, Human Rights Watch gathers several 
testimonies documenting the event. 
 
 28 March Loyalist forces and Guéré militia members help their Liberian 
ally to attack the town of Zwedru in Liberia.  
 
 1-2 April French positions in Duékoué are attacked. 
 
 3 April Rebel forces attack ECOWA troops, south of Vavoua. 
 
 4 April Rebel forces attack the French near Dibobli, 40 km east of 
Duékoué. 
 
 6 April Loyalist forces launch a major offensive along the Liberian 
border and intense fighting starts for the control of the road 
between Toulepleu and Danané.   
Despite government committing to grounding combat 
helicopters in late December, the town of Zouan-Hounien is 
bombed by an MI-24 on 6 April. Most residents flee the town 
after the aerial attack. 
Loyalist forces recapture the town of Zouan-Hounien, with the 
help of Liberian and Guéré militias, and hold it for a week. 
Some accounts say that the remaining Guérés were evacuated to 
safer places during that period. 
The towns of Zouan-Hounien, Danané and surrounding villages 
are bombed several times in the following days. 
Surrounding villages are set ablaze by Liberian fighters. 
 
 13-14 April For the second time, rebel forces capture the town of Zouan-
Hounien and Bin Houyé. For fear of aerial reprisals, the 
remaining population takes refuge at the Catholic Mission. 
 
 14 April Intense aerial raid on Zouan-Hounien by the loyalist forces. 
Non-military premises are clearly targeted, including the 
Catholic Mission and the health centre it hosts.  
 
 15 April The towns of Danané, Mahapleu and Vavoua are bombed by 
helicopters but remain rebel-controlled areas. The aerial attacks 
are denied by the government. 
 
 17 April Press release by Médecins sans Frontières: ‘On Tuesday, April 
15, in the afternoon, MSF had to treat about fifty wounded 
civilians in the hospital of Man. The wounded - among whom 9 
children, 13 women, and some elderly persons - reported that 
they were victims of helicopter attacks in Danané and 
Mahapleu.’ 
On the same day, while war is still raging in the west, the 
reconciliation government composed of pro-government and 
pro-rebel ministers holds its first full cabinet session in Abidjan. 
The event is hailed by President Gbagbo as ‘a major step in 
restoring peace’.  
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 18 April Rebel forces launch an offensive on the town of Toulepleu. 
The town remains government-controlled area. 
 
 22-23 April Loyalist forces attack rebel positions in the towns of Zouan-
Hounien and Bin Houyé. 
 
 25 April The MPIGO Ivoirian leader Felix Doh is killed after Ivoirian 
rebels clash with their Liberian and Sierra Leonean allies.  
 
  
3 May  
A ceasefire is signed by the belligerent sides, immediately 
preceded by a violent scramble on both sides to gain as much 
territory as possible before it goes into effect. Part of the 
agreement is that each side will expel its Liberian fighters.  
 
 5 May Both loyalist and rebel forces reject the idea of setting up a 
buffer zone to separate their respective territories. 
 
 6 May Despite the ceasefire, loyalist forces attack rebel positions in the 
town of Zouan-Hounien and retake the town. 
 
 4-8 May Reports of ‘Burkinabé rebels’ allegedly killing 223 people of 
Guéré origin (including children) as they were trying to leave 
the Bangolo area for Duékoué. 
 
 8 May French soldiers are attacked by an unidentified armed group near 
Guiglo. Two people in the group are killed. 
Sierra Leonese commander Sam Bockarie, who used to be 
involved in MPIGO leadership, is reported dead. 
 
 10 May The national curfew in place since 19 September is lifted. 
The government of reconciliation announces the end of the war. 
 
 14 May  Loyalist forces re-establish curfew in two western cities.  
 
 15 May 
 
The government denounces the violence against civilians in 
western Côte d’Ivoire and promises to take measures.  
 
 22 May The Préfet of Korhogo is set free by the rebel forces after 8 
months of detention. He is handed over to loyalist forces. 
 
 23 May Impartial forces are deployed in the west to monitor ceasefire.  
The west continues to see extreme violence, despite the ceasefire 
being signed.  
A buffer zone is instituted in the west, the Zone de Confiance 
(60 km by 40 km), which separates government and rebel 
territory with a neutral area, monitored by impartial forces. Only 
later is the Zone de Confiance extended to the breadth of the 
country. 
 
 27 May Ivoirian Prime Minister and other political figures, including 
rebellion supporters, visit the western region in order to send a 
strong political signal. French forces and ECOWA troops 
provide direct support in this security operation. 
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 4 June The President is accused by the rebel forces of fueling the 
Liberian war by supporting the Liberian insurgent movements 
LURD and MODEL and using some of these Liberians to retake 
the towns of Man and Danané.   
 
 5 June Rebel forces officially announce that the West has been 
‘cleansed’ of mercenaries. They no longer have such fighters in 
their ranks. 
 
 22 June Dismantlement of hundreds of checkpoints in Bouaké.  
 
 25 June Impartial forces make a public statement in which they report 
relative stability in the Zone de Confiance and the western 
region.   
 
 4 July  Government and rebel Chiefs of Staff officially announce that 
the war is over. In a ceremony held at the presidential palace, 
former rebels present President Gbagbo with a rifle, to signal 
their intent to disarm.   
 
 11 July The Ivoirian government promises emergency food aid in the 
west. 
 
 21 July Rebel forces hold a meeting with the population in Man and ask 
them to endorse the new peace plan. They also ask for 
forgiveness for the acts of war committed. 
 
 25 September The BCEAO bank in Bouaké is robbed. Heavy shooting 
between rival rebel factions. Checkpoints are reinstalled in town. 
Five days later, rebel Chief of Staff Colonel Bakayoko and his 
right hand Commander Cherif Ousmane, are ambushed. This 
leads to drastic measures in town, and rebels are eventually 
prohibited by their leadership to bear arms in Bouaké. 
 
 15 October Mass displacement of populations of Dioula, Burkinabé and 
Malian origin from the western region to the town of Gagnoa. 
People arrive in successive waves, fleeing the violence in rural 
areas. 
 
 11 November Non-autochthones continue to be hunted down around Gagnoa. 
 
 20 November Heavy fighting between Guéré and Burkinabé in the village of 
Zou, in the Zone de Confiance. 
 
 23 November PANA reports the distress of 7,000 Burkinabés, chased from 
their plantations by young Guérés and living in temporary UN 
encampments nearby Guiglo.  
 
 8 December The displaced Dioula, Burkinabé and Malian people that had 
sought refuge in Gagnoa in October return to their plantations. 
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2004   
 8 January Young Guérés raid the village of Kahin, in the Zone de 
Confiance, mainly populated by Baoulés and Burkinabés.  
Eight people are killed (one of Guéré origin). 
 
 18 February Three Burkinabé farmers are killed in Duékoué, allegedly by 
Guérés. 
   
 4 March Fifteen people are killed, including children, in the village of 
Broudoumé, in the region of Gagnoa, by unidentified armed 
men. 
 
 20-27 April Fighting between autochthones and dozos in the villages of 
Diéouzon and Kouibli. Mass displacement of population to 
Bangolo. 
\ 
 18-19 May A Togolese is found dead in Guiglo, allegedly killed by militia 
members. 
 
 2 June A Dioula taxi driver is found dead in Guiglo, his throat slit.  
 
 7 June French forces attacked by unidentified group in Gotihafla. 
 
 20 September 
 
While it was believed that the BCEAO bank in Man had been 
completely emptied in December 2002, remnants of cash are 
robbed by some of the French soldiers posted in the bank to 
secure the town. 
 
 4 November Loyalist forces launch an aerial raid on Bouaké. 
 
 6 November Loyalist forces attack the French peacekeeping mission. 
The French destroy all Ivoirian aircraft. Anti-French riots erupt 
in both government and rebel-controlled areas. 
In Man, several thousand people demonstrate at the French base, 
asking the French peacekeepers to leave. 
 
2005   
 28 February  Pro-government militias attack Logoualé, in rebel territory. 
The UN mission intervenes to re-establish order and monitor the 
ceasefire. 
 
 8 May The UN representative for Côte d’Ivoire Humanitarian Affairs 
makes a public statement regretting the violence that happened 
in Duékoué in late April, leading to many deaths and displaced 
people. 
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 13 May Firmin Mahé, sometimes presented as militia chief, sometimes 
simply as a bandit (‘coupeur de route’3) is killed in Guchiébli by 
French forces in doubtful circumstances near Bangolo, in ZdC.  
 
 25 May Start of the dismantlement of the pro-government militias in 
Guiglo. 
 
 31 May - 1 June The Guéré villages of Petit-Duékoué and Guitrozon are attacked 
by unidentified men armed with machetes and hunting guns, 
leaving 41 dead and more than 60 wounded, all of Guéré origin. 
Mass displacement of population follows. 
 
 6 June 
 
Reprisals immediately follow. 
Three Dioulas and one Burkinabé are killed by AP-Wê militia 
members in Duékoué. The same day, four Guéré are attacked by 
Dioulas. 
 
 15-17 June On a visit to Wê territory, the Ivoirian President encourages the 
youths to remain mobilized. 
 18 June  Following rising insecurity near Duékoué, the President decides 
to set up a military administration in western Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
2006   
 January In reaction to the contested terms of UN Resolution 1643, a 
wave of violent protest against the UN is led by the Young 
Patriots in Abidjan and by pro-government militias in Duékoué 
and Guiglo. 
 
 17 January Bangladeshi UN peacekeepers open fire on the crowd in Guiglo, 
killing 5 demonstrators. 
Violent reaction of the mob. All UN and INGO offices are 
looted in Guiglo with the exception of the MSF premises. UN 
peacekeepers and INGOs retreat from Guiglo for a few months. 
 
 5-6 February 
 
Unidentified armed men attack the encampment of Peehapa, part 
of the village of Mona, 17 km from Guiglo. 12 people are killed, 
of Guéré and Gnaboua origin. Several Guéré families move to 
Guiglo. 
 
 13 February When Guéré youths from the villages of Mona and Zouan plot 
to attack the camp of the displaced Burkinabé in Guiglo, in 
retaliation for the Peehapa killings, local authorities intervene 
and contain the youths. 
 
 10 April First day of disappearance of a Baoulé farmer, last seen in an 
encampment near Petit Guiglo. 
 
 
                                              
3  The coupeurs de route is a French term used to describe groups of armed individuals who attack vehi-
cles and then rob the passengers of money and goods. It typifies lawlessness in western Côte d’Ivoire. 
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 14-15 April A Baoulé farmer is shot dead in Basinkro, near the village of 
Guézon Tahouaké. It is the third time armed men visit the 
encampment. 
 
 16 April The UN Police reports that some people have lef the village of 
Petit Guiglo after hearing rumours of retaliation by the Baoulé 
community. 
 
 17 and 19 April The UN facilitates reconciliation meetings between the Guéré 
and Baoulé communities. 
 
 April Security incidents in the villages of Gohouo Zagna, Béoué, 
Tahebly Gahé, Bahébly, Diéouzon, Gran Pin, and Douekpé. The 
MSF assists some of the wounded. Displacement of population.  
Alleged perpetrators are dozos and ‘coupeurs de route’ 
(bandits). 
The same month, a Burkinabé is attacked near Bangolo by a 
bandit and Burkinabés attack young Guérés in reprisal. 
Rebel forces and dozos fight people of Lobi origin in the village 
of Zoupleu. UN Police notes several similar cases of violence in 
the southern villages of the Zone de Confiance. 
 
 1 May 
 
Guéré accuse Baoulé and Burkinabé of having set fire to several 
autochthonous plantations in the village of Gohouo Zagna, east 
of Bangolo.  
 
 3 May A Burkinabé is reported missing by the Burkinabe community 
leader of Gohouo Zagna. He is found dead two days later. 
 
 4 May Three Guérés are found dumped in a hole, hands tied behind 
their backs and stabbed to death. Four other Guérés fall into an 
ambush in the same area but manage to escape and alert the 
impartial forces. 
 
 20 May Armed individuals attack a passenger truck in Saada, 20 km of 
Guiglo, north of Zouan, in the Zone de Confiance.  
 
 29 May Armed individuals attack two buses and rob passengers between 
Bangolo and Guehiebly. 
 
 1 June  A Guéré is found dead between Goenle-Tahouaké and Baibly, 
east of Bangolo. 
 
 24 June Two Burkinabé children aged 3 and 6 are found dead in 
Douekpé, east of Bangolo.  
 
 25 June Four women, one child and one man are reported missing in 
Georgeskro (an encampment of Fengolo). 
 
 27-28 June Armed men attack the village of Boho 2, in the sous-préfecture 
of Zéo, east of Bangolo. 
French forces discover 7 dead and 15 wounded in the villages of 
Blédi and Goho 2, next to Douekpé. The attack is locally 
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perceived as a reaction to the murder of the two Burkinabé 
children. 
  
 27 July Western pro-government militias start to disarm. The modus 
operandi is centralized in Duékoué.   
 
 4 August 
 
Because too few weapons are surrendered, the disarmament of 
the western pro-government militias is suspended. 
 
 20 August Two local businessmen, of Guinean and Nigerian origin, are 
reported missing, last seen on their way back from the market of 
Blolequin. 
It triggers an inter-ethnic conflict four days later, between Guéré 
and non-autochthones from the village of CIB (in the Zou sous-
préfecture). 
 
 23 August 
 
A Burkinabé is killed in the village of Binao, on the Duékoué-
Bangolo road. In response, Burkinabé attack Guéré women in 
their fields. Many Guéré flee towards Bangolo. 
 
 
 26 August 
 
Two minivans are attacked on the Duékoué-Bangolo road, 
killing a driver and a little girl. 
 
 
 September  French forces report that since February 2006, inter-ethnic 
conflicts have cost the lives of 25 people and wounded 46 in the 
area east of Bangolo (Baibly/Gohouo axis). Acts of banditry 
have cost the lives of 16 and wounded 11 on the 
Bangolo/Duékoué axis and the Daloa-Vavoua road.  
Near Kouibly, populations living in the rebel-controlled area 
bordering the Zone de Confiance complain about frequent 
attacks.   
 
 12 September Two Guérés are found dead near Blolequin; autochthones 
accuse Burkinabés. In response, armed youths create 
checkpoints between Glopaoudy and Zouan. 
 
 27-28 September 
 
Two young Guérés are found dead in Délobly, between 
Duékoué and Bangolo. Several Burkinabés accuse the 
autochthones of protecting the criminals and as the incident 
degenerates, autochthones flee the village to move to villages 
nearby (e.g. Guéhiebly, 7 km from Délobly).  
 
 28 September  Pro-government militia members demonstrate in Duékoué, 
asking for the DDR operations to resume.  
 
 10 October 
 
Shooting is heard in the village of Banguéhi (Zou), with dozos, 
in charge of the security of the village, fighting armed thieves, 
particularly active when coffee and cocoa is being traded. There 
are allegations that the thieves are of Burkinabé origin. 
 
 early November 
 
The Burkinabé community leader of Toa Zéo calls on the dozo 
brotherhood to protect his community. This decision is contested 
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and leads to an internal clash ending with one dead and several 
wounded in the Burkinabé community. 
  
 19-20 November Tensions rise when the armed dozos move from Toa Zéo to 
Blody. AP-Wê militia members become involved, and fighting 
leads to 6 dead, an allogene encampment being burnt down, and 
the emptying of the nearby villages of Toa Zéo, Blody and 
Irozon. Autochtones seek refuge in Duékoué. 
 
 4 December In Téapleu, between Zouan Hounien and Danané, a traffic 
accident between a bus and a motorcycle dissolves into ethnic 
conflict between Yacoubas and Dioulas. Several houses are 
burnt and many people flee the area.  
 
 9 December Unidentified armed men attack the village of Fengolo, killing 
one person and wounding four. Displacement of population to 
Duekoue.  
  
 24-26 December The village of Toa Zéo is attacked, and shooting is heard in 
certain neighbourhoods of the town of Duékoué, where 
displaced residents of Toa Zéo have temporarily sought shelter.  
Impartial forces indicate that young Guérés have started the 
shooting in an attempt to oust the dozos from Toa Zéo. 
 
2007   
 2 January A minivan is shot at, at the village of Petit Logoualé, near 
Bangolo. Two passengers are killed. 
 
 8 January Several coffee/cocoa plantations located between Duékoué and 
Blodi are burnt down (UN Pakistani peacekeepers had just left 
the village of Blodi). The loss is estimated at 64 hectares.  
In the encampment of Dobobly in the same area, 21 persons 
claim that their fields were set ablaze. One of the perpetrators, of 
Guéré origin, is shot dead during the violent outburst that 
followed, on the Toa Zéo-Irouzon axis.  
 
 14 January Six young Guérés of the village of Baoubly (between Duékoué 
and Bangolo) are declared missing after having gone fishing 
near the Baoulé encampment of Koffikro.  
Impartial forces conduct the investigations. 
 
 18 January Armed individuals set an empty truck on fire on the Duékoué-
Bangolo axis.  
 
 19 January On the same road, armed individuals attack a van and rob 
passengers. 
 
 20 January Discovery of a corpse, the skull is crushed, on the road between 
Mona and Demobly, 12 km from Guiglo. The victim is 
apparently not from the direct area but is alleged to be a 
‘displaced’ person from Zou. 
A minivan is attacked on the road Yabli-Guinglo. One dead, one 
wounded. 
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 22 January 
 
A group of Burkinabé forbids a vehicle carrying Guérés from 
entering the village of Blodi.  
Five armed individuals attack a bus in Diahouin (between 
Duékoué and Bangolo) and rob passengers, killing one. 
 
 23-24 January  Two persons of Baoulé origin are lynched in the village of 
Baoubli, between Bangolo and Logoualé.  
A Burkinabé is stabbed to death near Baoubli. 
 
 25 January 
  
An old man of Guéré origin, about 90 years old, is found dead 
on his plantation located next to the Baoulé encampment of 
Jeunessekro. His feet were bound, and he had been beheaded 
and disembowelled. 
 
 5 February 
 
The UN police is impeded by the population in the arrest of the 
persons suspected to be involved in the disappearance of the 
Guéré fishermen three weeks earlier. 
  
 6 February Journalists from IRIN/Radio were taken hostage by their 
interviewee, militia chief Colombo, of the AP-Wê group. 
 
 25 February Armed individuals attack someone of Guéré origin in 
Glopaoudy, 15 km north of Guiglo. The incident turns into 
ethnic conflict between autochthonous and allochthonous 
communities. 
  
28-30 March 
 
Armed confrontation between two rival groups in Bangolo and 
surrounding villages. 
 
 11 April  Signature of a quadripartite agreement to eliminate the buffer 
zone known as Zone de Confiance by 16 April. 
 
 16 April The Zone de Confiance is officially dismantled. 
Medecins sans Frontières continues to report almost daily 
attacks against civilians in the western part of the Zone de 
Confiance. 
 
 19 May Western pro-government militias begin again to disarm. 
 
 23 May Dozos kill four thieves in the Zou area, who allegedly had 
attacked their village next to Danané. 
 
 26 June UN Police reports cases of rapes on the Duékoué-Toa Zéo road. 
Several women are attacked, allegedly by 8 men, resident of the 
Toguéhi neighbourhood in Duékoué.  
4 Nigerians are robbed by young men, who had convinced them 
to take a side road on their way out from Duékoué in order to 
avoid checkpoint harassment.  
 
 6-7 July A 50-year-old Malian from Guiglo is killed at home during a 
robbery.  
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 23 September Following militia riots in Duékoué and Guiglo, a curfew is set in 
Duékoué.  
 
 25-26 September A farmer from Pinhou (sous-préfecture of Zou) is accused by his 
peers of being a thief and having stolen poultry. He is severely 
beaten and dies.  
Impartial forces arrest four suspected criminals. 
 
 19 October The Prime Minister announces the future introduction of the 
‘Service Civique’, an institutional device which will target the 
Ivoirian youth by minimizing the risk that ex-recruits re-enrol.  
   
 29 October The President officially announces his willingness to ban the 
‘carte de sejour’, imposed on foreign nationals living in Cote 
d’Ivoire since the early 1990s. 
 
2008   
 January UN reports several attacks on cocoa/coffee buyers on the 
Zou/Pinhou axis. 
 
 18-19 January Violent altercation between UN peacekeepers and youths in 
Béoué, between Guiglo and Blolequin.  
 
 28 June The towns of Séguéla and Vavoua are the theatre of heavy 
fighting between rival rebel factions. 
 
 24 November Armed men try to take control of the rebel arsenal of Séguéla. 
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Photograph 13: Small business sponsored by the GTZ-IS project, Guiglo 
 
Photograph 14: Poultry farm sponsored by the GTZ-IS project, Man 
  
Appendix 2 
Checklists of individual interview guidelines1 
Main socio-demographic characteristic 
age, sex, ethnic group, place of birth, social group membership, involved in a relation-
ship or not, ethnic group of spouse, with/without children under custody, age of child-
ren, educational status of children, raised by whom and at what period, parents/guardi-
ans occupations (current or former), parents alive/deceased, parents living together/apart 
during childhood, general information on siblings, strength of ties with the near family, 
involved/not involved in a past family conflict 
 
Mobility 
list of all localities where the respondents have lived since childhood detailing the peri-
ods, the occupation, the reason of having moved there and the extent of financial (in)-
dependence, last place of residence at the moment of recruitment and composition of 
household, place of residence affected/not affected by open fighting at the peak of 
conflict, displaced/not displaced due to war  
 
Educational trajectories 
list of all schools (public and private) where the respondents have studied since child-
hood detailing the localities, the periods, the people taking care of food/accommoda-
tion/school and clothing expenses, reasons for dropping out, for those who had dropped 
at an early age or who had never gone to school, extent of functional literacy and nume-
racy  
 
Professional trajectories 
age of respondent when he/she started working (including unpaid help to parents), list 
of all paid/unpaid economic activities since childhood by locality and period, frequency 
and amount of the money earned (including time in informal apprenticeship), details of 
possible dependents, goals of possible savings 
 
Recruitment  
place and date of recruitment into the first armed group, age when recruited, name of 
first group integrated, detailed circumstances of recruitment, rationales for joining, any 
proof of enlistment, relatives/friends/acquaintances already into the armed group prior 
enlistment, violent death of someone close due to war 
 
 
                                              
1  The checklist for interviewing the youngest recruits was adapted from the adult guidelines.  
254 
 
Militarized life 
list of all fronts and military settings where the respondents went by period and locality 
since recruitment day, accommodation and eating habits and locations, general informa-
tion on earnings during that period including sporadic incentives given by war chiefs 
and products of the loot, description of the various tasks executed while in the armed 
group, extent of involvement in extra-military paid activity, extent of social connection 
with close family during the time in the armed group  
 
Return to civil life 
demobilized or still active2 current place of residence and composition of the household, 
current activity, eating habits, personal and professional project once demobilized, des-
cription of training followed within the reinsertion project, familiar/not familiar with the 
activity, willingness to continue the activity or to do something else, nature of financial 
and in-kind support received, ideal location to run the project, in group/in family/alone, 
general knowledge of DDR benefits  
  
 
                                              
2  Note that nearly all respondents were involved in a reinsertion project at the time of doing fieldwork 
but only about half were demobilized (the pro-government militias). There had not yet been any de-
mobilization of rebel forces. 
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